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vPreface
Agriculture seems to be a difficult sector to manage for most governments.
Developing countries face tough dilemmas in deciding on appropriate price poli-
cies to stimulate food production and maintain stable, preferably low, prices for
poor consumers. Governments in developed countries face similar difficult deci-
sions. They are cal1ed upon to give income guarantees to farmers whose incomes
are unstable and relatively low when compared to those in the nonagricultural
sector. These guarantees often lead to ever-increasing budgetary outlays and
unwanted agricultural surpluses.
High prices make new investments and the application of new technologies
more attractive than world prices warrant, and a process is set in motion where
technological innovation attains a momentum of its own, in turn requiring price
policies that maintain their rates of return.
Surpluses are disposed of with subsidies in domestic markets or in the
international market. Price competition reduces the market share of other
exporters, who may be efficient producers, unless they are willing to engage in
subsidy competition. This lowers export earnings and farm incomes or depletes
the public resources of developing countries that export competing products.
Retaliatory measures have led to frictions and further distortions of world prices.
Every so often the major agricultural exporters - the USA, the EC, Aus-
tralia, or Canada - accuse one another of unfair intervention. Though they have
agreed to discuss agricultural trade liberalization under GATT negotiations, if
anything, the expenditure on farm support has continued to increase in both the
EC and the USA.
Some developing countries do benefit from the subsidized disposal of
surplus cereals on the world market. This, however, might be only a short-term
gain. Low prices are a disincentive to their own producers and lead, in the long
run, to an unsustainable dependence on imports, as appears to be the case in
many parts of Africa. Also, these benefits of cheap cereals may not offset the loss
of markets, such as the sugar market, which is important to a large number of
developing countries.
Against that background and in the light of the fact that many countries
have agreed to discuss agricultural trade liberalization under GATT, it is impor-
tant to assess the consequences of agricultural trade liberalization. It should
increase efficiency at the global level as countries adjust their production more in
line with their comparative advantages. However, in the absence of
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compeIlllating transfers, some countries may lose under liberalization. An assess-
ment of efficiency gains at the global level and gains and losses of countries can
provide some insight into the degree to which their own production and trade
have become distorted and how large the adjustment costs may be. Several
questions are relevant here: what if the developed market economies remove
border protection? But also: what consequences can be expected from the re-
moval of border protection by developing countries only? (This is an issue that
can be usefully analyzed as it belongs to the regular package of adjustment poli-
cies recommended by the World Bank and the IMF.) What would be the impact
of simultaneous liberalization by all market economies? Who would gain and
who would lose?
This book reports on a study that explored these questions using a system
of empirically estimated national a ricultural policy models linked together
roug tra e an ca 1 a transfer A general eqUl I f1um approac 1S owe
or ot the national models and the international linkage. Thus, behavioral
responses of consumers and producers, as well as the responses of government
policies to changes in world market conditions, are accounted for.
We call this system of models the Basic Linked System (BLS). It consists
of 18 national models, two models of regions - namely, the EC and the Council
-for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) - and 14 somewhat sim ler models 0
,gro 0 un nes...... oget er these cover all the nations of the world. We
believe that the BLS is particularly suited - at least, better than any other exist-
ing analytic tool - for the analysis of issues related to agricultural trade liberal-
ization and self-sufficiency.
The present study differs from other available studies on trade liberaliza-
tion in combining all the following features: a general equilibrium approach is
applied to both the national and international levels; most of the parameters are
empirically estimated; a number of agricultural commodities are distinguished;
nations are distinguished; and a rich variety of policy instruments for national
governments is permitted, including tariffs, trade, quotas, taxes, transfers, and
stock operations. The existence of these features can significantly alter policy
conclusions derived from the analysis.
The development of BLS, without the use of which this study could not
have been made, has involved many people in the Food and Agriculture Program
(F AP) at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and
its network of collaborating institutions. As with any large project that takes
many years, it is virtually impossible to give individual credit to all those who
have contributed; yet one must try. The program core of FAP consisted of the
following:
Kirit Parikh (Program Leader 1980-1986)
Ferenc Rabar (Program Leader 1976-1980)
Gunther Fischer
Klaus Frohberg
Michiel Keyzer
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The members of the program core have been responsible for all aspects of
model development and analysis. Conception of the system and development of
the algorithms was done mainly by Michiel Keyzer.
Other program participants who have contributed to development of vari-
ous aspects of the BLS are: Michael Abkin, Csaba Csaki, Tom Christensen, Odd ...
Gulbrandsen, Janos Hrabovszky, Gerhard Kromer, Bozena Lopuch, Dougla~
Maxwell, Donald Mitchell, Jan Morovic, Nanduri Narayana, Martha Neunteufel,
Karl Ortner, Gerald Robertson, Mahendra Shah, Ulrike Sichra, Ralph Seeley,
T.N. Srinivasan, Eric Wailes, David Watt, Chris Wolf, and Laszlo Zeold.
A large number of others were involved in the program, particularly for the
development of detailed national policy analysis models for specific countries.
Though several of these models have been used in a number of countries, not all
of them are currently available as a part of the BLS. Naturally the study has
benefited from the country-specific knowledge and evaluations made by many of
these researchers.
Other researchers have also commented constructively on various aspects
of the system methodology and behavior. Among them are, in alphabetical
order, the following: Reinaldo Adams, Harold Carter, Hartwig de Haen, U.
Farber, Bruce Gardner, Erik Geyskens, John Graham, John Guiset, Werner
Giith, Bruce Huff, Vladimir Iakimets, Raul Jorge, Werner Kiene, F. Desmond
McCarthy, Constantine Meghir, Haruo Onishi, Brian Parmenter, Pierpaolo
Pierani, Leon Podkaminer, Todor Popov, Alberto Portugal, Allan N. Rae, Bruno
Raguet, Sudhaker Rao, E. George Rossmiller, Kozo Sasaki, Stephen Schmidt,
Peter Michael Schmitz, Jorg-Volker Schrader, Taisto Sonnenson, Valter JOse
Stiilp, Stefan Tangermann, Robert Thompson, A~ton Timman, Wouter Tims,
Paul J.J. Veenendaal, Anton Visser, Matthias v6n Oppen, Jean Waelbroeck,
Anton Wagemeyer, and Cheryl Williamson.
In designing our approach to the study of trade liberalization we have
benefited from the suggestions and comments of Bruce Gardner, Bruce Huff,
Michiel Keyzer, T.N. Srinivasan, and Robert Thompson.
We have also benefited from the constructive comments of T. N. Srinivasan
and Wouter Tims, who read the various drafts of this report.
It is my privilege to gratefully acknowledge the many contributions of all
my colleagues at IIASA and the various program participants in the many
collaborating institutions. A great deal of credit goes to them; but the authors of
this report bear all the responsibility.
Finally, the authors want to acknowledge with thanks LiJo Roggenland for
typing and correcting numerous drafts of this report.
Kirit Parikh
Program Leader, F AP
International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis
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CHAPTER 1
Issues in Trade Liberalization
1.1. The Setting
1.1.1. Interventions are common in agriculture
Almost all governments in the world intervene in the determination of agricul-
tural production and prices. As a consequence, international trade in agricul-
tural products is affected. This is not a new phenomenon, as governments have
done so from very early times for various reasons, such as to safeguard adequate
food supplies, to extract resources from farm populations, or to exchange agricul-
tural products for other desired commodities and services. These objectives still
characterize agricultural policies in many developing countries today and, to
some extent, also in the developed industrial countries. While in developing
countries, because of the dominance of agriculture in employment and produc-
tion, the major objective is often extraction of resources from the agricultural
sector for the development of the entire economy, in developed countries rela-
tively few people are still engaged in agricultural production, so supporting the
incomes of these few at levels comparable to the rest of the population is the
major objective of intervention. A multitude of interventions that influence
domestic agriculture in virtually all countries has led to considerable distortions
in international trade in the contemporary world.
Indeed, the patterns of interventions and distortions have become so com-
plex that any attempt to disentangle them faces major problems. Even the
terms to be used in describing the present situation are not unambiguous and
therefore need to be defined with considerable care. A basic characteristic of
world agriculture is the starting point of the analysis: policies affecting agricul-
ture are nationally (and sometimes regionally) made, to serve overwhelmingly
domestic objectives. However, these interventions in the national markets do
have an impact on each country's external balance and can and do lead to
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distortions in international trade. There is no special agency that is charged
with responsibility for international markets, let alone any explicit international
objectives that such an agency would serve were it to exist. International nego-
tiations concerning agricultural trade usually focus on price instability and dis-
tortions in these markets but, ironically, domestic policies, which cause the dis-
tortions, are outside the scope of these negotiations.
A first impression of the magnitude and spread of interventions can be
gleaned from Figure 1.1, which shows the extent to which domestic prices of
agricultural products differ from world market prices. These differences, when
plotted against per capita gross domestic product (GDP) for the major agricul-
tural producing countries of the world, demonstrate that richer countries tend to
protect their agricultural markets more against foreign competition than do
poorer countries. This confirms, to some extent, the differences in national
objectives between developed and developing countries described earlier. It also
suggests that richer countries have greater resources to finance their interven-
tions.
The interventions are not without cost; some can, indeed, be quite expen-
sive. The distribution of the costs and benefits depends on the nature of the
intervention, both between the various affected economic groups and over time.
Experience in many countries demonstrates that interventions that started as a
transfer - in either direction - between producers and consumers become a
major burden on the government budget. If policies are not flexible and timely
adjustments are not made as the underlying situation changes, the adjustments
are postponed until they become unavoidable. At that stage the needed adjust-
ment is drastic and may involve politically difficult, if not impossible, redistribu-
tion of costs. The rigidity of interventions - the lack of flexibility in adjusting
these over time - is a characteristic of almost all interventions in agriculture in
virtually all countries.
1.1.2. A multiplicity of objectives behind interventions
Government interventions in agriculture are usually meant to achieve one or
more of the following objectives:
(1) Food self-sufficiency and the expansion of domestic production of major
agricultural inputs.
(2) Food security for all people in all regions within the country.
(3) Mobilization of resources for development.
(4) Maintenance of agricultural incomes compared to other sectors.
(5) Sustaining environmental balance.
(6) Exploitation of any real or perceived market power.
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Figure 1.1. Degree of nominal protection in agriculture (1978-1980) for (a) net agricul-
tural exporters and (b) net agricultural importers, given by:
(Value of output at domestic prices - Value of output at world prices) X 100
(Value of output at world prices)
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Food self-sufficiency, defined as the capability of a country to meet domes-
tic food demand largely from domestic production, is an almost universal objec-
tive. It is based on the perception that dependence on food imports means expo-
sure to sharply fluctuating world prices and physical availabilities; in cases of
dependence on food aid, there is a further risk of potential external political pres-
sure. Similar considerations may also apply in the case of imported inputs, such
as fertilizers.
Fluctuations in world market prices can cause fluctuations in domestic
prices and/or government budgets unless the country is insulated from world
markets or holds sufficiently large stocks. If variability in the domestic produc-
tion of a country is smaller than the variability in the world market prices,
greater self-sufficiency may lead to greater stability in its domestic prices for a
given allocation of resources through buffer stock operations or trade. Fluctua-
tions in food prices can have undesirable consequences. Not only the poorest
suffer more when food prices rise, but, to the extent that wages are influenced by
food prices, a cost-push inflation may be triggered by food price increases, if
prices and wages are so rigid that they do not fall when food availability
increases later. It is thus conceivable that the social benefits of stabilizing food
prices through food self-sufficiency, where feasible, exceed the costs of forgoing
the benefits of dependence on imports that are cheaper on the average.
The objective of food security pursued by many governments includes, in
addition to food price stabilization, income supplements for the poor in a way
that assures minimum supplies to all people at all times. Achieving food security
involves the use of government revenues to subsidize food distribution. Govern-
ments in rich countries may easily raise the revenues, as the poor are relatively
few and the costs of subsidizing them small in comparison to other public expen-
ditures. Poor countries are obviously not in such a comfortable position. Some
poor countries have used subsidy schemes that do not involve explicit taxation.
Food for distribution to the poor is procured through a compulsory levy on pro-
ducers at below-market prices, which taxes the producers only implicitly.
The desire for food security may lead to interventions to promote food pro-
duction at the expense of exportable cash crops, even in countries that are agri-
culturally self-sufficient in the sense that they could finance the foreign exchange
costs of food imports through earnings from the export of cash crop.
The objective of food security can be at odds with the need to mobilize
resources for development. The scope for levying taxes in developing countries is
limited both because incomes are low and for reasons of limited administrative
capacity. In a direct sense, this puts limits on the extent to which food security
can be achieved. A second, more indirect, conflict arises as taxes on external
trade - on imports as well as exports - are the easily levied taxes, if not the only
feasible ones. Taxes on imported food can provide protection to domestic pro-
ducers and at the same time raise revenues, but they also increase consumer
prices and reduce food intake of the poorer classes unless the government can
provide them with relief through subsidies. The cost of subsidies wilI exceed the
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tariff revenues generated if the poor consume more than imports or if the subsidy
rate exceeds the tariff rate. Taxing agricultural exports will reduce domestic
producer prices if the country cannot significantly influence world market prices.
In practice, many developing countries are concerned only with the food
security of their urban populations, both for political reasons and because the
costs and administrative requirements of extending it to the entire population
are prohibitive. In order to assure adequate supplies, governments often mono-
polize the trade in major food items and export commodities. Even if the entire
trade is not monopolized, the prices paid by government for its purchases for dis-
tribution to urban consumers or for exports are usually kept below the compar-
able world market price. There is thus an implicit transfer of resources from
agriculture to the government, which may actually add to public revenues in the
case of export crops or be passed on by way of lower food prices to consumers.
As countries become more developed, the sources of government revenues
become more diverse. Besides, the private sector may increasingly generate the
resources for economic development. As food becomes a less important part of
most consumer budgets and the agricultural labor force declines, governments
become less concerned with food security or with the extraction of resources from
agriculture. Even though labor productivity in agriculture increases with
development, productivity in nonagricultural occupations rises even faster. If
the rate of migration out of agriculture required to equalize income under such
differential productivity gains is too "high" from some social point of view,
disparity between agricultural and nonagricultural incomes arises. Interventions
gradually turn toward reducing this gap through measures that improve agricul-
tural incomes and living standards. Thus, in a number of rich countries agricul-
tural policies become the opposite of those in the developing countries, aiming at
the maintenance or improvement of agricultural incomes as compared to other
sectors of the economy. Objectives of social and political stability playa role in
the formulation and implementation of these interventions, stemming the tide of
urbanization, and allowing time for older farmers to retire and for the younger to
be trained for other types of employment.
Interventions into agricultural production and trade can also be in response
to environmental concerns and to public health considerations. Sometimes, such
arguments are used to disguise protection in the form of essentially nontariff bar-
riers rather than explicit tariff. Restrictions on alcoholic beverages and tobacco
belong to this category, as do a number of border interventions addressed to
quality controls on imported food items. Environmental considerations give rise
to taxes aimed at avoiding overgrazing in vulnerable areas, to incentive or disin-
centive measures for particular crops, and to associated border measures that
have an impact on international trade. To the extent that such interventions
merely serve to prevent a market failure that would otherwise occur, they may
not be distortions.
Finally, one should also recognize that in some situations intervention may
be the optimal national policy, even from an economic point of view. Exporting
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countries with some power in the world market for certain commodities may
raise their export earnings by suitably restricting exports. Similarly, importers
with market power may improve their terms of trade by restricting imports.
Here, as in many other policies, one should recognize that the short-term gains
from intervention may be lost in the long run. For example, when a monopolis-
tic exporter restricts exports and keeps the world price at a higher level, poten-
tial competitors may expand their production and substitute products may
emerge. Moreover, even in the short run, these are national gains secured at the
expense of the rest of the world.
1.1.3. The questions interventions raise
All of these interventions may be rational, given the social objectives of a
national government; they may even be necessary for economic optimality. Yet
a number of questions must be raised in analyzing their effects. What are the
(net) economic costs or benefits of these interventions? How are the costs and
benefits distributed among the various participants in the economy? Are some
parts of these costs, or benefits, passed on to other countries? Are there
differences in those distributions when comparing the short-term and the long-
term effects of those interventions? From an international point of view, there is
the further question: Are these the best policy instruments to attain the stated
objectives?
The effects of one country's policies on other countries' development are of
considerable concern and interest. While world agriculture and international
food markets are strongly influenced by the behavior of a few major producing
and trading countries, all the remaining countries have no such influence and
must passively accept the consequences of the policies of major actors. Even
though some poor countries have market power in some commodities, by and
large the market power of countries in which hunger and malnutrition are
endemic appears to be limited. This puts before the student of international
food relations, as before the policy-maker, the question whether large countries
or groups of countries acting together exploit their influence on the world market
or not, and to what extent the policies pursued by the strong can hinder or help
in reducing hunger.
In the present study this question, as well as the others referred to earlier,
will be analyzed particularly from the angle of trade liberalization. However,
before addressing these issues concretely, in the next section we discuss the pol-
icy relevance of the study. Then, in Section 1.3, the specific issues addressed, a
broad outline of the approach taken, and the way in which this study differs
from other studies on trade liberalization are indicated. Finally, we present a
brief outline of the organization of this volume.
luuea in Trade Liberalization
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Understanding the impact of trade liberalization on a country's own economy as
well as on the economies of other countries is of considerable policy relevance.
To what extent the protection that countries provide to domestic producers or
consumers deprives other countries of their legitimate market share is often the ~
bone of contention in trade policy negotiations among countries. For example,
the USA repeatedI claims that the subsidies provided to Euro ean ersJ.1.
under t e ommon Agricultural Policy (CAP of the European Community
(EC) lead to much subsidized ex ort of grains by the EC, resultin in a loss of
market to farmers. Similarly, developing countnes often complain that e
subsidized sugar production in the EC not only deprives them of potential
exports to the EC but also depresses world prices. On the other hand, the
import quotas on dairy products and beef imposed by the USA are objected to
by countries exporting those products.
1.2.1. History of trade negotiations
A brief review of the history of negotiations in agricultural trade liberalization
indicates the importance of studying its consequences. Negotiations geared at
dismantling tariff and nontariff barriers impeding free trade have been conducted
under the umbrella of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
since its creation in 1947. Though much progress has been made in lowering
trade barriers among developed market economies for trade of nonagricultural
products, such has not been the case for agricultural commodities. As summar-
ized by the GATT Secretariat itself (1979):
When GATT rules were originally drafted in the 1940s, they were intended
to apply to trade in agricultural and industrial products alike. Things have
worked out differently however. Agriculture has been virtually excluded
from the broad sweep of trade liberalization and insulated from the normal
disciplines of market forces and international competition....
The variety and complexity of the protective measures used in agriculture
made the negotiations of balanced reductions particularly difficult. If the
underlying problems were essentially technical, ways could be found of over-
coming them by the adoption of appropriate negotiating techniques. It is,
however, the fundamental political and social factors governing the protec-
tion of farmers, and the link between production policies and measures at
the frontier, that give rise to the basic problems.
During the 1950s and 19605, nations conducted their agricultural policy in
a basically self-serving way, either by simply bypassing GATT's rules or through
obtaining exceptions and waivers.
By the end of the 1960s, there was, however, a general concern with the
need to discuss agricultural matters under the GATT umbrella. Very minimal
results had been reached during the Kennedy Round (1963-1967). The debate
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went OIl- - and is still alive today - as to whether a distinction should be made in
the upcoming negotiations between agricultural and industrial products or
whether they should be considered as one undertaking. This reflected two funda-
mentally different approaches between, among others, the USA and the EC. In
the words of the GATT Secretariat (GATT, 1979):
The US wanted the negotiations to lead to the liberalization of agricultural
trade and increased access to foreign markets for products of which they
were efficient producers. The EC, on the other hand, sought the stabiliza-
tion of agricultural trade through commodity arrangements, a sufficiently
high income level for its farmers, and the preservation of an effective CAP.
Hence, the USA defended the same treatment for agricultural and indus-
trial products alike, although with added exceptions. The EC emphasized the
unique characteristics that sharply distinguish agriculture from the industrial
sector. Stressing that it had largely eliminated quantitative restrictions, the EC
pointed out that tariffs cannot be considered in isolation from minimum prices,
maximum prices, stockpiling, subsidies, international supply commitments, etc.
As far as developing countries were concerned, commodity agreements were seen
as a good method to ensure their goal - namely, to secure improved and liberal
access to markets and stabilization of agricultural trade at fair and remunerative
prices.
During the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), which was the last round of negotia-
tions held within GATT, agriculture was discussed in the context of nontariff
barriers in general, and more particularly in the context of the codes on subsi-
dies. A few main agricultural products were discussed in specific subgroups -
namely, grain, dairy products and bovine meat. In addition to reaching arrange-
ments on the latter two products, progress was made with regard to liberaliza-
tion of a number of products through the traditional process of a number of
bilateral concessions. A compromise was reached over the issue of subsidies, but
its application to agriculture was left very general. Parties discussed the need to
create a "multilateral agricultural framework" in order to organize in a more sys-
tematic manner future consultations and exchange of information under the aegis
of GATT.
Owing to growing tensions since the end of the 1970s, the need to draw a
new set of international rules to govern agricultural trade seems almost inescapa-
ble. Given the structural issues at stake, conflicts cannot continue to be solved
on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, advocates of trade liberalization argue
that agricultural trade, if it is to become more responsive to world market forces,
must be treated as a whole in a consistent manner. Hence, since 1982, there has
been considerable talk within GATT regarding the most efficient way to
integrate agriculture in the upcoming round of multilateral negotiations
scheduled for 1986-1987, when preparatory discussions will have reached con-
sensus over the general agenda. The prominence given to agricultural trade
issues by the governments of many developed countries promises to bring these
issues to the forefront of GATT negotiations.
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These negotiations have often involved discussions on questions of the
degree of distortion introduced by a variety of tariffs and nontariff measures, and
the securing of "just market shares". The safeguard clauses of GATT rules per-
mit the imposition of import restrictions when they are necessary to enforce
government measures that operate to restrict domestic production. However,
import restrictions in this case should be such that the ratio of imports to
domestic production is maintained at a level that would have prevailed in the
absence of restrictions. Similarly, export subsidy is permitted if it does not
secure more than an equitable share of the market or does not cause a serious
prejudice to the interests of other contracting parties.
1.2.2. Importance of quantitative analysis
Notionally, "just" or "equitable" market shares are conceived of as those shares
that would have prevailed in a situation of free trade. However, to determine
these shares in practice is not easy for a number of reasons. When agricultural
protection of a commodity is removed by a country, the relative prices change
and not only the production, consumption, and trade of the commodity itself,
but those of others as well, may change. If the country is also a major trader,
this will result in changes in world market prices; and as a reaction to these
changes other countries may alter their policies, production, and trade patterns.
As a result of the interplay of all these changes, the world moves to a new pat-
tern of trade and world prices. To determine this new pattern, one needs to look
not only at all the major commodities, but also at all the countries simultane-
ously.
The importance of the adjustments and reactions of other countries in
determining the impact of free trade can be seen in an example of the impact on
farmers' income in the EC. For farmers in the EC, as we have noted, the protec-
tion provided by the CAP is of great importance. However, this does not mean
that, were the EC to dismantle the CAP and eliminate all protection, the farm-
ers' income would fall by 40%, which is the nominal rate of protection. This is
because a number of adjustments would take place in the EC and in the world
market, were the EC to liberalize. The changes in domestic EC prices would
change demand by consumers in the EC as well as change the levels and compo-
sition of production by farmers in the EC. As a consequence, the EC's trade on
the world market would change, leading to changes in world prices since the EC
is a major trader on the world market. The final impact on the incomes of agri-
cultural producers in the EC cannot be easily predicted without accounting for
all these adjustments. For the producers and consumers of other countries with
a relatively large degree of distortion, the impact of agricultural trade liberaliza-
tion would be similarly unpredictable. Also, the impact on EC farm income
would be quite different, were the EC to liberalize alone or were other countries
also to liberalize.
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The EC import levies on cereals provide another example of interdepen-
dence of policies. The levies aim at improving the income of the farmers in the
EC. Because of the large size of the EC the levies depress the world market
prices. This lowering of world market prices and, through them, of the domestic
prices in developing countries makes consumers better off and producers worse
off. Whether it hurts the poor in a country depends on whether by and large the
poor are purchasers or producers of cereals. Similarly, owing to EC levies, agri-
cultural employment may decline everywhere. Again, its incidence on poverty
depends on whether the poor depend on agricultural employment to a greater
extent.
Also, the income distributive effects in the EC of the levies are not une-
quivocally socially beneficial for the various groups, even within the EC. With
inelastic land supply, the levies are capitalized in the land value, providing a for-
tune to those who have a lot of land, which means making the rich even richer.
The small farmers, however, gain little; and the poor consumers, spending a
large proportion of their income on food, suffer real income losses owing to the
high food prices.
Although it is a complex task requiring an elaborate analytical apparatus,
determining the characteristics of a free trade situation is important for bilateral
and multilateral trade negotiations between countries, for monitoring the agree-
ments reached, and for adjudication of some of the disputes that may arise.
For developing countries, understanding the impacts of agricultural trade
liberalization may be particularly important. In most developing countries, agri-
culture constitutes a significant part of the economy and employs much of the
population. Thus, changes in prices of agricultural goods, consequent to trade
liberalization, can significantly affect income distribution and thereby the
incidence of hunger in these countries. Moreover, the macroeconomic effects on
changes in savings, investments, and allocative efficiency can be relatively larger
in developing countries than in developed countries. This is reflected in the
advice often given to developing countries by international lending agencies, such
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to pursue a
more liberalized policy toward agriculture. Many economists as well have
argued that more outward-oriented policies would be beneficial to developing
countries (Balassa, 1981a, b, c; Bhagwati, 1978; Krueger, 1978, 1982, 1983;
Krueger el al., 1981; and Srinivasan, 1986). To what extent should such advice
be followed? A quantitative evaluation of the impact of agricultural trade
liberalization is important for answering this question and for determining strat-
egies for development.
In the absence of nondistortionary compensatory transfers, economic theory
of trade liberalization does not provide, from qualitative reasoning alone, any
general guidance regarding the distribution of gains and losses between countries
and within countries (shown in Appendix AI). These have to be evaluated and
assessed before one can reach a conclusion on the desirability of free trade.
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1.3. Issues Addressed, Outline of the Approach, and Distin-
guishing Features of the Study
1.3.1. Issues addressed
From the discussion in the preceding sections, one can see the importance of
exploring the impacts of agricultural trade liberalization. In assessing these
impacts, consequences for income parity in developed countries and for growth
and hunger in the developing countries should be specially emphasized as impor-
tant policy objectives that lead governments to intervene. In particular, in ~this
study we address the following issues:
(i)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
How would world market prices, trade patterns, and market shares of
different countries for agricultural commodities develop over a i5-year
period if countries were to continue to pursue their present policies?
How would world market prices and market shares change if all countries,
or a subset of them, were to liberalize agricultural trade?
Is a move to free trade in agriculture desirable globally? For all countries?
For some countries? What would happen to production, consumption,
trade, prices, farm incomes, and government incomes in different countries
in the event of elimination of trade and production restrictions? In the
near future and after some years?
Should a country move to free trade even when others do not? What
would be the impact on a country if it were the only one to liberalize? If
only the developed countries were to liberalize? If only the less developed
countries (LDCs) were to liberalize? Should major actors, such as the USA
or the EC, liberalize unilaterally?
Which groups and countries lose in a shift to free trade, l\nd by how much?
Can they be compensated for their losses? What would be the impact on
LDCs, and particularly the poor in them? Does one need to design special
protection measures for them even when the developed world moves toward
free trade?
What domestic policy changes could help the poor countries to better
adjust to agricultural trade liberalization?
1.3.2. Outline of the approach
To answer these questions, as pointed out earlier, one needs sophisticated analyt-
ical methods that can account for the various adjustments and interdependen-
cies when protection levels change. The behavioral responses of producers and
consumers, and the responses of government policies to changes in world market
conditions, which themselves may result from changes in the policies of other
governments, have to be accounted for. Unfortunately, as shown in Appendix
Ai, economic theory does not give unambiguous answers to these questions from
purely qualitative reasoning. One needs a quantitative approach that describes
the world food system in a reasonable way.
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We have explored these questions using a system of empirically estimated
national agricultural policy analysis models, which have these features and which
are linked together through trade and capital transfers. We call this system the
Basic Linked System (BLS). The system consists of 18 national models, two
models of regions - namely, the EC and the Council for Mutual Economic Aid
(CMEA) - and 15 somewhat simpler models of groups of countries. Together
these cover all the nations of the world. We believe that the BLS is particularly
suited, and, at least, better than any other existing analytic tool, for the analysis
of issues related to agricultural trade liberalization and self-sufficiency.
The present study differs from other available studies on trade liberaliza-
tion in having all the following features together: it has a general equilibrium
approach at the national and international level; most of the parameters are
empirically estimated; a number of agricultural commodities are distinguished; it
distinguishes nations and permits a rich variety of policy instruments to national
governments, including tariffs, trade quotas, taxes, transfers and stock opera-
tions. The existence of these features can significantly alter policy conclusions
from analysis.
The BLS differs from many past global models (FAO, 1971; Japanese Min-
istry of Agriculture and Forestry, 1974; Takayama and Hashimoto, 1976; Rojko
and Schwartz, 1976; and Lundborg, 1981) in that it distinguishes nations. The
Model of International Relations in Agriculture (MOIRA) (Linnemann et at.,
1979) distinguishes nations, but has only one aggregate agricultural commodity
and a restricted set of government policies. Other multicountry general equilib-
rium models include those by Gunning et at. (1982), Manne and Preckel (1983),
Miller and Spencer (1977), Whalley (1982), and Whalley (1985). The model of
Deardorff and Stern (1981) is not a fully general equilibrium one.
These models - except for MOIRA, which uses empirically estimated
parameters - use elasticities obtained from literature search, best-guess or alter-
native specifications, and benchmarking procedures from one year data for
describing production and consumption behavior. Moreover, the models by
Gunning et at. and Manne and Preckel have only regions and do not distinguish
nations. Whalley in his two four- "region" and seven- "region" models does dis-
tinguish the EC, the USA, and Japan, but other countries are grouped by region.
Only Deardorff and Stern distinguish 34 different nations, but they treat only
two highly aggregated agricultural goods out of 22 tradable goods.
In the tradition of agricultural economists and commodity modelers, stud-
ies of trade liberalization are usually for a single commodity, and are most often
assessed by relying on partial equilibrium models. The reason for such a partial
equilibrium approach is to be found in the costs and time needed to build these
models. General equilibrium models are costly to build and quite time-
consuming. The partial equilibrium approach itself varies quite often in terms of
spatial and commodity coverage. In terms of spatial extension, the simplest
model is the one that covers only the country under investigation and neglects
the impact on, and feedbacks from, the international market completely. The
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so-called "small country" assumption implied in such an approach is violated in
many cases. To overcome this deficiency a net trade response of the outside
world is added to the country model. While this approach is theoretically sound,
its problem lies in the fact that it is very difficult to obtain reliable empirical
information. Therefore, partial equilibrium models are built to include explicitly
the most important countries from the point of view of trade in the product(s)
under study.
A few studies of the latter kind are mentioned here. Anderson and Tyers
(1984) and Tyers (1985) analyze the the EC grain and meat policies including
uncertainties in supply. Meyers et al. (1985) study the impact of trade liberaliza-
tion for wheat, feed grains, and soybeans; and Tangermann and Krostitz (1982),
liberalization for beef. World trade in vegetable and fruit products is investi-
gated by Sarris (1981). The GOL model covers grain, oilseeds, and livestock
(Liu and Roningen, 1985). The impact of the the EC sugar policies on the world
market and on developing countries is investigated in a study by Koester and
Schmitz (1982). Buckwell et al. (1982) assess the costs of the CAP of the EC by
using a free trade policy as reference scenario. A similar study restricted to 11
commodities is published by Matthews (1985). Valdes and Zietz (1980) analyze
the impact of a 50% reduction in agricultural protection by countries of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), covering 99
raw and processed agricultural products.
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAD) study Agriculture: Toward
2000 (FAD, 1981a) is in a certain way the most comprehensive analysis to date.
Though not a trade policy study, it does bring out some implications for future
trade patterns. It covers 90 developing countries and 98% of the developing
countries' population excluding China. Twenty-six agricultural commodities are
analyzed in this study. The results of various scenarios for the developing coun-
tries are linked with projections for 34 developed countries.
The number of studies following a general equilibrium approach is much
smaller. The MOIRA study deals with two aggregates, one for agriculture and
one for nonagriculture, but includes 104 countries. Harrison (1984) uses a model
for 11 countries and seven commodities, of which one is an aggregate of agricul-
ture, forestry, and fishing, to analyze welfare effects of unilateral and multilateral
trade liberalizations. Lundborg (1981) employs a general equilibrium approach
to assess the impact of agricultural policy in the USA and the EC on income dis-
tribution in developing countries. Trade liberalization in European agriculture is
analyzed by Burniaux and Waelbroeck (1985) with the RUNS agricultural model
described by Burniaux (1984).
1.4. Plan of the Book
The study is organized as folIows:
In Chapter 2 we explore in some detail the magnitude of, and driving forces
behind, agricultural distortions. Estimates of distortions are also summarized.
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In Chapter 3 the analytical framework needed for assessing the impacts of
agricultural trade liberalization is discussed; this is followed by a brief descrip-
tion of the BLS. Alternative scenarios are defined, and a framework for analyz-
ing the scenarios is set up.
In Chapter 4 a perspective on agricultural development until 2000 as it
emerges from the reference scenario of our modeling system is described.
Chapters 5-8 deal with various trade liberalization scenarios in which
different groups of countries liberalize their agricultural trade.
Chapter 5 deals with the impact of agricultural trade liberalization by the
GECD countries.
Chapter 6 gives results of two scenarios of unilateral trade liberalization by
the EC and the USA. The gains from such trade liberalization are compared
with the gains from trade liberalization by all GECD countries.
Chapter 7 analyzes the impact of agricultural trade liberalization by only
the developing countries (excluding China).
Chapter 8 presents the results of agricultural trade liberalization by all
market economies, both developed and developing.
Finally, in Chapter 9 we discuss and summarize our results.
In Appendix Al we give some selected results from economic theory of
trade liberalization, while in Appendix A2 the problems of definition, measure-
ment, and estimation are discussed. Appendix A3 looks at individual countries
in all the various relevant trade liberalization scenarios and highlights their
behavior and policy implications for them. Appendix A4 is a list of countries
and groupings.
1.5. A Guide for the Reader
We provide below some guidance for the reader, as one cannot expect everyone
to have the same level of interest in all issues addressed in this book.
A reader who is primarily interested in the main findings of the study
regarding trade liberalization may follow Chapter 1 by reading parts of Chapter
3 (namely, Sections 3.1, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, and 3.3.5), parts of Chapter 4
(namely, Sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.8, and 4.9), any or all of the chapters on trade
liberalization (namely, Chapters 5, 6, and 7), and Chapter 8.
A reader who is interested in the empirical aspects of agricultural protec-
tion and trade liberalization may want to read, in addition to the above parts,
Chapter 2 as well as Appendix A2.
Professional economists who want to read not only the main findings, but
also to evaluate them, need to read Chapters 1 to 8. Note that Chapters 6 and 7
may be read in any order after the first five chapters have been read.
Those interested in the behavior of specific countries may want to read the
relevant portions of Appendix A3.
Finally, readers not too familiar with international trade theory may want
to read Appendix AI, which summarizes some of the relevant results.
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CHAPTER 2
Agricultural Distortions: Magnitudes
and Driving Forces
What constitutes an agricultural intervention? What constitutes a "distorting"
intervention in some well-defined sense, and how does one determine whether a
particular intervention is "distorting" in this sense or not? Formally, one could
define intervention as any government policy that has an effect on the equilib-
rium levels of prices, outputs, inputs, domestic absorption in various forms, and
foreign trade.
Even when government intervention in foreign trade may be appropriate
from a country's viewpoint - for instance, in the unilateral exercise of market
power by those countries that have such power - even then such exercise of
market power by some reduces global welfare from what could be realized under
free trade with nondistorting transfers. When such transfers are not available,
free trade may not lead to a Pareto-superior global outcome. Thus, such protec-
tionist interventions, which may be appropriate from one country's viewpoint,
are viewed as distortions of the system. Similarly, other taxes, subsidies, quanti-
tative restrictions, etc. that are not imposed to correct some failure of the market
system are also viewed as distortions. Needless to say, there is analytical interest
in an intervention (or the absence of it) if it is distorting (or if there is a market
failure).
There are alternative ways in which an intervention - for instance, in
foreign trade in agriculture - could be measured. In Appendix A2 we describe
forms of intervention, alternative quantitative measures thereof, and how we
estimated the extent of agricultural protection in different countries. Here we
summarize only the estimates of agricultural protection.
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2.1. The General Pattern of Distortion
Toward Free Trade in Agriculture
It is a "tariff equivalent" that is reported in most studies, and which is also
referred to herein. As already mentioned, this reflects quite well the overall pro-
tection level in agriculture in developed countries. [According to the FAO (1975)
study, only two out of 13 developed countries had input subsidies for a few prod-
ucts (mainly for fertilizer) that amounted to a few percent of the output price.]
For developing countries, input and factor subsidies often have a relatively larger
share in the protection, but they might work to offset the negative effect of a
domestic producer price below the world market level (owing to export taxes or
excessive margins between purchase and selling price administered by a state
export monopoly) rather than increase border protection.
For developing countries, there is an additional problem in measuring the
protection level. This stems from a lack of convertibility of the currencies of
many of them. Owing to frequent overvaluation of the official exchange rate and
irregular large devaluations to offset a sometimes galloping domestic inflation,
conversions of world market prices to domestic currency equivalents are difficult
to obtain. Figures on tariff equivalents are therefore particularly error-prone as
regards these countries.
It is with these limitations in mind that one has to examine the protection
levels shown in Table 2.1. These protection levels are estimated by the authors,
and the details are given in Appendix A2. The figures reveal the general pattern
referred to in the preceding chapter - namely, that the highest agricultural pro-
tection ib found in Japan and Western Europe, with levels of 50-175% of the
world market price, whereas developed countries in North America and Oceania,
as well as developing countries in general, show lower protection levels or even
negative ones.
The somewhat lower protection rate for the USA IihOllld be interpreted
with care. The USA follows a number of protective policies whose effects are not
captured in the estimates of tariff equivalence. The US policies on land set-
asides, payment-in-kind (PIK) type programs, loan rate subsidies, etc. provide
protection to US producers without adding to the difference between domestic
price and world market price. Though some of these policies increase farm
incomes, they do not increase output. Nonetheless, they do affect the world
market.
When we consider the development of protection over the period
1961-1980, the individual countries show very different patterns. Japan, topping
the list, shows a steady increase from 150% to 175% protection over the period.
According to a more recent source, this development has continued, but with a
tendency to stabilize in the early 1980s. [Tyers and Anderson (1984) used a
somewhat different set of commodities and weighting pattern to show that the
protection level for Japan increased from 147% in 1975-1979 to 151% in
1980--1982.]
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Tahle £.1. Average agricultural protection (at nominal prices) and exchange rate
changes in various countries, 1961-1980.
Agricultural protection
averages (%) Exchange rate
yearly change (%)
1961-1969 1969-1971 1975-1976 1970-1980
Japan 152 161 175 -4.5
EC 76 65 55
Italy 86 68 85
UK 77 56 69 0.3
Belgium 82 69 56 -5.2
France 60 64 54 -2.7
West Germany 109 86 53 -6.8
Denmark 55 38 37 -2.8
Ireland 28 30 1.5
Netherlands 79 56 23 -5.8
Portugal 61 77 78 5.7
Egypt 9 13 58 4.9
Turkey 43 38 57 20.9
Sweden 84 84 55 -2.0
USA 45 31 48 0
Canada 32 8 33 -1.1
Kenya 11 14 31 0.4
India. 30 0.5
Mexico 42 16 26 6.3
Austria 47 49 16 -6.8
Nigeria 35 74 10 -2.6
Brazil -5 -26 6 27.6
Thailand -25 -3 -1 -0.2
Australia 33 18 -13 -0.3
New Zealand -11 1 -14 1.4
Argentina -11 -16 85.7
Indonesia 15 -19 5.6
Pakistan -26 -29 7.6
Source: FAP estimates based on FAO data, using production valued at world market prices as
weights. Exchange rate changes from IMF Yearbook of International Finance Stati$tiC8 (various
years). They are expressed in relation to the US dollar. Increase means devaluation and de-
crease revaluation.
Some other countries show a pattern similar to that of Japan: for example,
Portugal, with protection increasing from 60% to 80%; Egypt, from 10% to 60%;
and Kenya, from 10% to 30%. Most other countries show an irregular pattern.
Since the EC is a major trader in agricultural commodities and since the
CAP is widely regarded as a strongly protectionist policy, we look in some detail
at the protection levels in the EC and its member countries.
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Table 2.2 shows the development of EC protection levels for the period
1968-1981 according to three different measures. One is based on F AO data on
domestic producer prices and world market prices at the raw material level; a
second refers to a comparison between EC intervention prices and the
corresponding import prices; and a third, to a similar comparison for EC thres-
hold prices. As intervention takes place only when domestic prices fall below the
threshold prices by a certain percentage, the latter prices will give a higher figure
for the protection level than the intervention prices. The realized tariff
equivalent would be expected to lie between the second and the third measure
and, in principle, be most correctly estimated by the first measure. In practice,
however, differences in product coverage and data information might give other
results.
Table JU!. Average agricultural protection levelsa (%) In the Ee, 1968-1969 to
1979-1980.
Price level
1968-1969
1969-1970
1970-1971
1971-1972
1972-1973
1973-1974
1974-1975
1975-1976
1976-1977
1977-1978
1978-1979
1979-1980
1980-1981
Raw materialb
76
64
65
46
40
42
51
58
Intervention
113
128
92
43
47
31
37
59
108
116
Threshold
54
52
39
43
68
125
134
140
114
67
aprotection levels for the F AP are averages of eight of the standard F AP commodity groups
(excluding protein feed). The other protection levels are averages of soft wheat, barley, sugar,
beef, pork, butter and skim milk powder, using 1977-1978 production valued at world market
prices as weights and assuming that 1 kg of milk gives 0.044 kg of butter and 0.09 kg of skim
milk powder.
b Raw material price refers to the price of the unprocessed product, i.e., it is the retail price less
value of trade, transport, and processing.
Source: Raw material: F AP estimates based on F AO data. Commodity protection levels at in-
tervention price: P.M. Schmitz (1980), Wohlfahrtsokonomische Beurteilung preis- und
wahrungspolitischer Interventionen auf EG-Agrarmarkten, EuropaiscM Hochschulschriften, 272,
39 (Frankfurt). Commodity protection levels at threshold price: Eurostatj Yearbook of Agricul-
tural Statistics, various issues, Table F4.
The figures lend themselves to three comments. First, the protection grad-
ually fell from a high level at the end of the 1960s of 70% (raw material prices)
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or 110% (intervention prices) to about 40% in the middle of the 1970s; then, in
the latter half of the 1970s, it increased to levels even higher than the 1960 ones,
and reverted to the levels of the 1960s at the beginning of the 1980s.
The main reason for this movement is that cereals and sugar prices in the
world market increased strongly during the food crisis of the early 1970s and, at
times, were higher than the EC prices. These latter are mainly based on cost
and income considerations within the Community and, therefore, are primarily
dependent on the development of the general domestic price and salary levels.
Thus, the EC relative producer prices have remained more or less constant, and
the fluctuations in protection levels more or less reflect the changes in the world
market prices. It is likely that similar changes in the movements of protection
level occurred in most other developed countries with high protection as the
protection-determining factors are in general the same in these countries.
Second, the protection level based on intervention prices is about 15-20%
lower than the level based on threshold prices. This is consistent with the fact
mentioned above that the intervention prices are those calling for intervention
when the domestic prices fall below them.
Third, protection levels based on raw material prices (Le., retail prices less
value of trade, transport, and processing), which are used for the free trade
analysis in this book, most closely follow those based on intervention prices.
That they are on the low side for the late 1960s may be due to a broader cover-
age of products for raw material prices, which include products with more stable
protection (e.g., tropical and nonfood products).
Returning for a moment to Table 2.1, one notes that protection levels for
countries that are members of the EC deviate considerably from both the EC
average and each other. In addition, these deviations are not symmetric over
time. For example, West Germany shows the highest protection to begin with,
whereas later Italy shows the highest protection. The protection levels in the
Netherlands fall drastically over the period, from about the EC average level to
less than half of this.
That the protection levels for new members of the EC - the UK, Ireland,
and Denmark - may show deviations from the EC average in the period
1961-1980 is not surprising, as these countries became members only in 1973,
and there was a phasing-in period of several years. But how can the differences
between the others be explained, with a variation in 1976 from 85% for Italy to
23% for the Netherlands?
There are two main explanations. One is the difference in production mix:
for example, the Netherlands produces large amounts of pork, which has low
nominal protection. The other reason is the arrangement that dampens the
influence of exchange rate fluctuations on national prices - the so-called Mone-
tary Compensatory Amounts - which has effectively split price harmony in the
EC (although it is not clear, without detailed analysis, in what direction these
amounts affect the protection levels).
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Figure £.1. Nominal tariff rates (%) on agricultural commodities (1978-1980): selected
developed countries. W, wheat; R, rice; C, coarse grain; B, bovine and ovine meat; D,
dairy; 0, other animals; P, protein food; F, other food; N, nonfood agriculture.
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Owing to price variations on the world market and the way these are
transferred to the domestic markets, protection rates vary from year to year.
Commodity-wise estimates of protection rates for different countries for
1978-1980 are given in Tables A2.11 and A2.19 of Appendix A2, which also pro-
vides the details of our estimations of protection rates. These protection rates
are obtained from simulation runs of the national models, in which world market
prices were taken at their observed prices and domestic prices were obtained
from the simulation runs. These are the protection rates that are eliminated in
any free trade scenario. These are plotted in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.
The pattern of protection levels depicted in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 shows large
differences in protection rates across commodities within a country. For exam-
ple, in Japan the protection rates vary from 35% for wheat to 238% for rice.
Similarly in the EC, the protection rates range from a low value of 5% on "other
food" to high values of 70% for dairy products and 84% for wheat. The protec-
tion rates for a commodity differ significantly across countries. Thus, wheat has
a negative protection of 21 % in Argentina and a positive protection of 84% in
the EC, even though both of them export wheat. Similar differences are observ-
able for protection levels in all commodities.
2.2. Driving Forces behind Agricultural Distortions
When distortion, despite its negative effects on the functioning of the economy in
many situations, is so widespread, there must be strong forces behind its per-
sistence. An appreciation of these forces is useful in determining which particu-
lar impacts of agricultural trade liberalization are especially important. The
alternative theories advanced for explaining distortions have been broadly
classified by Magee (1984) as policy theories, terms-of-trade theories, and politi-
cal theories. According to policy theories, governments, in pursuit of the various
objectives of economic policies, may distort agriculture, as was indicated in
Chapter 1. However, here the question remains whether tariffs and other distor-
tions are the best way of achieving these objectives or not (see Bhagwati, 1971,
1982b). If other, less expensive, ways of achieving the same objectives can be
found, removing distortions introduced to realize these objectives should be com-
paratively easy. Yet distortions persist.
The terms-of-trade theories explain tariffs and taxes as devices to increase
the welfare of the country at the cost of other countries. Thus, a country can
introduce a scientific or optimal tariff (see Johnson, 1960) to increase its welfare.
If this is the only objective behind tariffs, countries should be willing to dispense
with their optimal tariffs if appropriate international compensations are given.
Though, for a large country, optimal levels of tariffs may be nonzero, for small
countries free trade is the optimum policy. And yet distortions persist also in
small countries.
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The political theories explain tariffs as an outcome of successful lobbying
by some groups in the economy who try to increase their wealth at the cost of
others in the economy. Here, tariffs (distortions of various kinds) "are an equili-
brating variable in political markets, which balance opposing forces in redistribu-
tional battles (Magee, 1984)". These theories are reviewed by Magee (1984) and
the results summarized by Magee et al. (1983). The theories thus try to explain
why societies pursue particular policy or redistributional objectives. In that
sense the political theories are extensions of the policy theories of tariffs. It
would seem that, in the political marketplace (implicit behind many political
theories of endogenous tariff is an elective form of government), the more
numerous group should have more power and should be able to get more protec-
tion. Yet agriculture, the most numerous and largest sector in most developing
countries, is penalized rather than protected. (Within the context of political
theories, this cannot be explained away by the costs of lobbying and the inability
of poor agriculturists to bear them, for why do not political entrepreneurs
finance such lobbying?) Olson (1965, 1982) has argued that small homogeneous
interest groups can more effectively organize themselves as pressure groups.
Thus, the numerically small groups of agriculturists in developed countries are
able to press successfully for protection. Yet Olson's arguments about the
difficulties of organizing large but homogeneous interest groups are not per-
suasive enough to explain why political entrepreneurs are unable to organize a
large number of fairly homogeneous farmers in developing countries into success-
ful pressure groups to secure more protective government action.
This very brief review of theories explaining tariffs shows that none of them
can fully or exclusively explain the driving forces behind agricultural distortions.
One can, however, look at the pattern of protection and the main beneficiaries
within a country of such distortions to see what may be the more important
objectives.
2.2.1. Income parity - a major objective of protectionism in developed
countries
Among agricultural economists, it is widely held that the income objective is one
of the main reasons for agricultural protectionism in developed countries. Other
objectives, such as food security, particularly in view of cut-off risks in war situa-
tions, price stabilization, employment safeguard, and environmental considera-
tions, will be of secondary importance. This is not to say that these other objec-
tives could not, in certain situations, be of overriding significance.
The introduction of agricultural protection in Europe during the Great
Depression was certainly strongly motivated by price stabilization and employ-
ment objectives. The experience of World War II solidified the food security
argument, particularly in neutral states. The latter argument has, by now, lost a
lot of its strength as a result of the greater economic integration and prosperity
in Western Europe.
24 Toward Free Trade in Agriculture
H one accepts (a) that the income objective is the primary goal of protec-
tionism in developed countries at present, and (b) that it is caused by problems
of agriculture's adjustment in a rapidly developing society, then insight as to the
economic consequences for income parity, suitable nondistorting compensating
mechanisms to protect income parity, and a wide acceptance of the benefits to
the economy as a whole are required before agricultural trade liberalization
becomes acceptable in such countries.
The low-cost producers among developed countries demonstrate that it is
possible for agriculture to be competitive. Despite facing prices lower than the
equivalent free trade world market prices, agriculture manages to provide an
income that is the same as or larger than that from nonagriculture in, for exam-
ple, New Zealand and Australia (see Table 4.19). This might partly be due to
favorable climatic and soil conditions, low density of population, and the fact
that they have been only recently settled by the present dominant groups so that
problems of adjustments have not yet become important. For countries of the
Old World, increasing farm sizes cannot be accomplished without out-migration
from agriculture. It is often argued that, even when out-migration is possible, an
obstacle to reducing protectionism stems from the capitalization of high prices
in the values of fixed resources, particularly land. If protection were removed,
farmers with no or little debt would suffer a fortune loss and those with high
debt would face bankruptcy. They would certainly oppose liberalization. Once
the losses had been absorbed, however, the new set of lower output and land
prices would allow profitability for efficiently run farms. Moreover, since free
trade is an optimal policy for a small economy, the gains would be enough to
compensate the farmers who lost.
As for a number of studies of various countries, a recently published
analysis indicates that Swedish agriculture has reached a stage where such a
strategy for liberalization may be followed (Bolin et al., 1984). In this country,
agriculture has demonstrated a higher productivity growth than other sectors,
which has brought it to a stage of international competitiveness when the inputs
are assessed at opportunity cost. (A contributory factor to making the Swedish
agriculture competitive might be the series of devaluations the country has
undertaken in recent years.) By compensating farmers for the fortune loss and
overburden of debt, protection could be removed without negative effects on the
production capacity. The gains in terms of consumer welfare, current fiscal
expenditures, and increased efficiency of agriculture would, over some years,
cover the compensation cost.
2.2.2. Policy objectives for taxing agriculture in LDCs
Most LDCs penalize agriculture rather than protect it. The reasons and compul-
sions for doing so may be many.
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At the early stage of development, agriculture accounts for a large share of
the employment and income in the economy. For the low-income economies in
1980, agriculture provided 70% of total employment and generated 37% of the
gross domestic product (CDP) in the economy. For individual countries, the
share of CDP varied from 21% to 75% (World Bank, 1983a). If surpluses have
to be generated for investment, they have to come mainly from agriculture.
Taxing agricultural income directly in developing countries with generally
many small farmers is administratively very difficult. Thus, governments tend to
tax agriculture through indirect taxes, which can be collected with greater ease
at either at large-scale processing facilities or at the border.
The comparative ease of collection of trade taxes and tariffs is important
for developing economies with poor administrative infrastructure. This is
reflected in the proportion of government revenues obtained from trade taxes.
For low-income countries, taxes on international trade and transactions provided
30-50% of government revelllle ill L981 (World Bank, 1983b). The reliance on
these taxes decreases with increasing per capita income [11. When the impact of
a move toward free trade is ('xalllined, the importance of tariffs and taxes on
international trade and trallsactions for the central government budget should be
kept in mind.
Other policy objectives for taxing agriculture include some degree of
monopoly enjoyed by some developing countries in specific export commodities
(tea, coffee, cocoa, jute, etc.). The removal of an optimal tariff under trade
liberalization would be reflected in loss of external terms of trade.
Protection of poor, and many times not-so-poor but well-organized, urban
consumers also motivates governments to keep food prices lower than the world
market prices. This indirectly punishes (taxes) agricultural producers. Thus, the
impact on the consumption level of the poor and urban consumers should also be
looked at in evaluating the desirability of trade liberalization or the need for
other compensating policies.
2.2.3. Assessing the impact of agricultural trade liberalization: Some
indicators of interest
The discussion above indicates that, for assessing the desirability of agricultural
trade liberalization, the impacts on income parity in developed countries and on
government budget and consumption levels of the poor and urban consumers in
developing countries may be of particular importance.
Indicators that reflect other policy concerns include the conventional indi-
cators of economic well-being - namely, CDP per capita, indicators of consumer
welfare such as equivalent income or cost of consumption comparison, and self-
sufficiency ratios. Finally, indicators that reflect social well-being ~ but which
sadly are not always reflected in the policies of countries - are the impact on the
poor, their calorie intake, the number of persons who suffer from hunger, and life
expectancy at birth.
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[11 This is seen in a regression fitted to cross-country data for 1981 given below,
where figures in parentheses are t-statistics:
85.9
(12.5)
8.682 In (GNP/capita)
(-9.2)
iF = 0.47 degrees of freedom = 93
where Titt is taxes on international trade and transaction as a percentage of cen-
tral government revenue in 1981, and GNP/capita is the gross national product
(GNP) per capita in US dollars for 1981.
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CHAPTER 3
The Analytical Approach
It is useful to describe at the outset the analytical tool or model and the scheme
of analysis used to obtain the economic and social consequences of removing pro-
tection. We begin by examining the essential as well as desirable properties of
any tool for analyzing the issues addressed. Then, in Section 3.2, we justify our
approach and briefly describe our analytical tool, the Basic Linked System
(BLS), in a nontechnical fashion. The scheme of analysis followed (including a
description of the notion of trade liberalization in this study, the alternative
scenarios, the approach used to explain the results of scenarios, and the welfare
indicators used to evaluate the results) is described in Section 3.3.
The reader who is primarily interested in the results can, without loss, skip
Section 3.2.
3.1. The Analytical Framework Needed for Assessing Impacts
of Trade Liberalization - and Our Approach
For a satisfactory analysis of the impacts of agricultural trade liberalization, one
needs a framework that accounts for a number of important interrelationships
and feedbacks. There are three groups of actors within each country: namely,
producers who supply commodities and demand inputs including primary factors;
consumers who demand commodities and supply primary factors; and govern-
ment, which sets taxes, subsidies, and quotas, and otherwise intervenes in the
market. Each group is constrained - producers by technology, consumers and
government by their budgets - and economists usually assume that the agents
are rational and that each maximizes its objective. It is also customary in
microeconomics to assume that profits are maximized by producers, utility by
consumers, and social welfare by governments. Alternatively, governments can
be described by behavior rules that mayor may not correspond to any explicit
maximization of an objective function. When agricultural trade is liberalized,
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relative prices and the relative scarcity of resources such as land, labor, and capi-
tal change. One should model:
(1) The response of:
(a) Producers to the prices of inputs and outputs they face.
(b) Consumers to the prices of factors and consumer goods that they face.
(2) The determination of consumer income as a function of factor prices and
factor supplies.
(3) Finally, the market clearance condition.
These responses of producers, consumers, and government interact in the deter-
mination of the new equilibrium.
The need to account for the effects of price changes on farmers' incomes,
and consequently on their consumption as well, is particularly important for
countries where agricultural incomes form a large part of national incomes, as is
the case for most developing countries.
Since the difference between domestic supply and demand is, by definition,
the volume of international trade, it is usually, though not always, much smaller
than domestic supply or demand. Changes in demand due to changes in income,
assuming domestic supply is fixed, get fully reflected in trade volume. Thus,
even small income effects can lead to large changes in traded quantities.
It is well known that the impact of changes in domestic prices on net
exports can be of either sign. The analytical implication of this is that the
equilibrium interactions between prices, supply, income, demand, and trade all
have to be considered. And these interactions cannot be correctly assessed if
there are unaccounted supply sources or demand sinks that mask some feed-
backs. In other words, a closed general equilibrium framework incorporating all
supply sources and demand sinks is needed.
Trade policies are but a part of a government's economic policies. For
analyzing the consequences of substantial shifts in trade policies, such as those
implied by trade liberalization in most countries, one needs to account for the
changes in the government's other policies. The macroeconomic effects of policy
changes can have a significant impact on trade patterns as well as on income dis-
tributions.
For example, if tariffs are a major source of government revenues, trade
liberalization not compensated by external aid or transfers will lead to higher
taxes or lower government revenues, public consumption, and/or public invest-
ment. Even when the lost tariff revenue is regained through changes in other
taxes, the incidence of these taxes may fall on groups other than those that bore
the burden of the tariff.
Even small changes in policy, such as changing over from tariff to an
equivalent quota, may affect income distributions. Unless the government auc-
tions the quota, which governments seldom do, the tariff revenue, which accrued
to the government earlier, now accrues as a rent to the party to whom the quota
is allotted.
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An analysis of trade liberalization based on consideration of nominal rates
of protection, or even effective rates of protection, can be misleading if it is a
partial one. Thus, a general equilibrium framework is needed that incorporates
the relevant government policy instruments and the behavioral responses of vari-
ous economic agents, producers, and consumers to changes in such policies.
But it is not enough just to account for the behavioral responses of
economic agents within the country to changes in government policies: considera-
tion of the trade responses of other countries is also necessary. Particularly for
major traders, the reactions of other nations to changes in the country's own pol-
icies can be very significant for analysis of trade policies. Even countries that at
present follow policies of self-sufficiency, and hence are not active in world trade,
may become so once the trade environment changes.
One could argue that, if the net export functions from the rest of the world
are known for a country, one can do policy analysis using only the national
model inclusive of these net export functions. For a number of policies, such
stand-alone analysis based on a national model may be adequate. However, net
export functions are not easily available. Moreover, shifts in such functions con-
sequent on the responses of other governments to major policy changes by one
government would be difficult to account for in an analysis with a single-country
model. Thus, what we need is a system of general-equilibrium-type national pol-
icy models linked together through trade and transfers.
The interactions of the policies of different countries are such that a simul-
taneous abolition of tariffs by two trading partners can raise, lower, or leave
unchanged the world market prices. This possibility is illustrated using the trad-
itional geometric tool of international trade theory in Appendix AI. What this
shows is that the outcome of trade liberalization on terms of trade cannot be
predicted independently of the description of the behavior of all groups of
economic agents and, thus, of the system as a whole.
The BLS national agricultural policy analysis models of the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Food and Agriculture Program
(FAP), is such a descriptive system. We believe that it is particularly suited to
analyze issues related to agricultural trade liberalization and self-sufficiency.
3.2. The BLS for National Models
3.2.1. The general approach
The system of linked national models is called the Basic Linked System (the
BLS). The national models in the system cover more than 80% of the world's
food attributes, such as land, population, demand, production, trade, and so on.
The remaining countries of the world are covered by 14 simplified models
comprising groups of countries. Countries that are likely to have similar rela-
tions with the world market are grouped together, such as poor calorie importers
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of Afriea, poor calorie self-sufficient African countries, Middle Eastern oil export-
ers, etc. Currently, in the basic linked system there are three types of models, as
shown in Table 3.1.
Table 9.1. Models in the BLS.
Models with
common
structure
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Brazil
Canada
Egypt
Indonesia
Japan
Kenya
Mexico
Nigeria
New Zealand
Pakistan
Thailand
Turkey
EC
Models with
country-specific
structure
CMEA
China
India
USA
Regional group models
African oil exporters
African medium-income calorie exporters
African medium-income calorie importers
African low-income calorie exporters
African low-income calorie importers
Latin American high-income calorie exporters
Latin American high-income calorie importers
Latin American medium~low income
Southeast Asia high-medium calorie exporters
Southeast Asia high-medium calorie importers
Asia low income
Southwest Asia oil exporters/high income
Southwest Asia medium-low income
Rest of the world
The first set contains the common structure models, developed at IIASA.
Though they have a common structure they are individually estimated, with the
parameters separately estimated for each country from country-specific data.
The second set contains some detailed models that were built outside FAP at
IIASA and have not necessarily followed the common structure. These models
also relied on country-specific data and embody much more country-specific pol-
icy structures. The third set of models consists of the country groups.
Though the national models may have greater commodity detail, the inter-
national exchange among the national models occurs at the level of the 10 com-
modities shown in Table 3.2. Each of the national models, as well as the interna-
tional system linking them, has a general equilibrium framework. The major
features of the approach are that it is quantitative, the parameters are empiri-
cally estimated, it includes behavior responses, and it is a comprehensive general
equilibrium framework in the sense that it includes the whole economy and the
whole world without any unaccounted supply sources or demand sinks. More-
over, it distinguishes nations and various economic agents within nations.
In the system national governments are important actors with a wide range
of permitted policies. Taxes and transfers, tariffs, quotas, and rationing, partial
or total, are all permitted. Though one talks about the determination of
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Table 9.!!. Commodities and units used in international trade.
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Commodity aggregate
Wheat
Rice, milled
Coarse grains
Bovine and ovine meat
Dairy products
Other animal products
Protein feed
Other food
Nonfood agriculture
Nonagriculture
Main components
Pork, poultry, eggs, fish
Oilcakes, fish/meat meal
Oils, fats, sugar, vegetables,
fruits, coffee, cocoa, tea
Clothing fiber,
industrial crops
All nonagricultural outputs
Type of measurement
Total weight
Total weight
Total weight
Carcass weight
Milk equivalent
Protein equivalent
Protein equivalent
Unit values of exports
(expressed in US$),
averaged over the
period 1969-1970
Averaged over the
period 1969-1970
1970 domestic prices
(expressed in US$)
equilibrium prices, it is not necessary in this system or in the approach followed
that governments select only price as their equilibrating instrument. Govern-
ments may decide to fix prices and let other things adjust; the models determine
relative prices. Also, there is no demand for money or foreign exchange and the
models are independent of exchange rates. The solution of the system gives not
only a global agricultural balance sheet of commodity flows, but also traces how
these come about under the influence of which policies. Not only does the sys-
tem provide international trade flows, but also it identifies the domestic supply
and demand forces that determine exports and imports. Thus, the system con-
stitutes a tool to assess the impact on each country's domestic food situation due
to a country's own government policies, as well as to policies of other govern-
ments.
The internal consistency of a solution of the system is ensured in a number
of ways, which is important but not normally realized in other analytical
approaches. Not only is there consistency among physical flows of commodities,
but also that of the financial accounts of economic agents is ensured:
(1) Quantities produced, demanded, and traded balance at national and global
levels.
(2) For consumers and nations, expenditures and incomes balance.
(3) Income earned is consistent with income generated by production and
trade.
(4) Prices for producers, consumers, and government taxes are consistent.
(5) Government expenditures balance inflows.
(6) Balance of trade is realized at national and global levels.
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These -£onsistencies and the global coverage ensure that secondary effects and
adjustments, which may be quite important, are accounted for.
Again, we emphasize what the BLS is and what it is not. It is a powerful
analytical engine to explore and to understand the impact of alternative policies.
It is not, and one cannot emphasize this enough, a forecasting tool. If forecasting
had been the main objective, a different model would have been built with more
emphasis on statistical fits and less on economic structure.
3.2.2. A typical national policy model of the F AP
The building blocks of the F AP model system are the national policy models.
Each national model has to reflect the specific problems and characteristics of
that particular nation. Although the national models do not differ in their struc-
ture, they are country-specific in their contents, particularly in their descriptions
of government policies. The model system of the F AP enables such diverse
models to be linked, but requires that all the national models meet a few condi-
tions. They have to have a common sector-classification at the international
trade level (nine agricultural and one nonagricultural) and some fairly reasonable
additional technical requirements. For example, net exports have to be continu-
ous functions of relative world prices and independent of their absolute level.
Even though the national models differ from each other, the broad structure is
common to most models. In some, food supply and demand are distinguished by
various income groups. The information flow in a typical model is shown in Fig-
ure 9.1.
Past prices and government policies affect production decisions. The
domestic production in each of the sectors of the economy accrues to each of the
sectoral groups. The income this amounts to is determined by the price that
these products command. For example, if farmers have grown two million tons
of wheat and one million tons of rice, they would have an income of twice the
price of a million tons of wheat plus the price of a million tons of rice, minus the
cost of producing wheat and rice. These initial entitlements of the different
products for the various groups may be redistributed by government policies.
Given these entitlements and world prices, groups trade among themselves
under the influence of government policies, which include national market poli-
cies (price, buffer stock, trade), public finance policies (balance of payments,
public demand, direct tax), and international market and finance policies (agree-
ments on price, buffer stock, trade, financing). The resulting exchange equilib-
rium determines the domestic prices, net exports, tax rates, and consumption
patterns of different income groups whose demand behavior is characterized by a
linear expenditure system. In the process of exchange all the markets are cleared
within the (national) balance of trade constraint and the income and resource
constraints faced by the various actors. Each model distinguishes three types of
economic agents: producers, consumers, and governments. Though all the
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Figure 9.1. Information flow in a typical national model.
national models follow the broad schematic outline described above, the method-
ological approaches in modeling behavior of these agents do differ from model to
model.
Some of the methods most commonly used are:
(1) Producer behavior. Four alternative approaches are used in various models
for modeling the supply response of agricultural products:
(a) Econometric estimation of acreage response and yield functions.
These include relative profitabilities, critical inputs, and factors such
as explanatory variables. This is the approach followed in the models
of India, the USA, and one version of the Canadian model.
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(b) A nonlinear programming model to allocate land, factors, and inputs
for different crops based on estimated production functions is used in
the models constructed by FAP at IIASA.
(c) A linear programming approach, which integrates economic and insti-
tutional aspects with agronomic potentialities and constraints, is used
in models of Thailand and in one earlier version of the model for Ban-
gladesh.
(d) A hierarchy of linear programs is used in models of the centrally
planned economies (Hungary and Poland) to describe and coordinate
the behavior of planned sectors and various agricultural subsectors.
Nonagricultural production in most models IS determined by a
Cobb-Douglas production function.
(2) Income generation. In some models of the developing countries different
classes are identified based on the distribution of assets, such as land,
draught animals, equipment, etc., and the product is distributed across
these classes a,':; income entitlements accruing to labor, land, capital, etc.
The common structure models do not distinguish different classes of con-
sumers.
(3) Consumer behavior. The demand behavior in the BLS is described using
estimated equations, one for each commodity, which express human con-
sumption as a function of income and price. Each year, the expected con-
sumption levels are approximated by a linear expenditure system. For
those developing countries for which different expenditure classes are dis-
tinguished (notably India), a separate demand system is estimated for each
class from time series of household expenditures.
(4) Government policy behavior. Government policy in each national model
can be described by a hierarchical set of adjustment rules for policy targets,
such as domestic price targets, trade quotas, stock targets and bounds, tax
rate bounds, etc. However, to minimize the problem of exploding numbers
of variants in the BLS, price transmission functions are used to character-
ize government policy. These functions relate current to past world market
relative prices and self-sufficiency to the domestic relative target price.
3.2.3. Capital accumulation, labor movement, and trade deficit
Savings are a function of GDP and trade deficit. They are equated to invest-
ment, which is allocated between agriculture and nonagriculture, depending on
the relative marginal value product of the capital in, and the size of, the two sec-
tors. Similarly, labor is also allocated between the two sectors based on its rela-
tive marginal value product and income parity.
In allocating labor and capital to the two sectors, some friction and rigidi-
ties are assumed so that marginal value products are not equalized in the two
sectors. The factor allocations are, however, such that the marginal value prod-
ucts in the two sectors tend to come nearer to each other over time.
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Targets for net trade deficit (including grants and concessional and market
borrowings, and the net of all service and repayment obligations) are set for each
national or country group model. These net trade deficits or net capital flows
each year must add up to zero at the global level.
In modeling net trade deficit targets, emphasis has been placed on the
development aspect. A country with higher growth rate, larger exports as a per-
centage of GDP, and a smaller debt service burden can commercially borrow
more in a sustainable way. Thus, low-income countries are assumed to enhance
their ability to invest by obtaining aid and borrowing as much as is commercially
sustainable in terms of their openness and growth performance. With growing
income, their propensity to seek foreign savings would decrease to zero upon
entering a developed stage. This behavior has been formalized in a net trade
deficit target, based on past performance and a cross-country analysis of trade
balances. As debt has become a serious issue for many developing countries, the
debt service burden has been taken into account in setting trade deficit targets.
The source of capital is high-income countries. The repartition among
them depends on their past performances and an imposed movement toward
higher surplus. The resulting trade surplus targets are proportionally adjusted
so that the sum exactly corresponds to the cumulated trade deficit targets. As
payments are balanced, the capital flows are equal to the trade balances with
opposite sign. They vary from year to year and scenario to scenario.
3.2.4. The international linkage
A first round of exports from all the countries is calculated for an assumed set of
world prices, and international market clearance is checked for each commodity.
World prices are then revised using a nondifferentiable optimi:7.ing algorithm and
transmitted to the national models. Next, these generate new domestic equilibria
and adjust net exports for all countries. This process is repeated until the world
markets are cleared in all commodities. At each stage of the iteration the domes-
tic markets are in equilibrium. The procedure is shown schematically in Figure
3.2. It may be noted that any international agency - such as a buffer stock
agency - can be represented as a country, and the effectiveness of its policies can
be evaluated within a framework in which country policies react to the policies of
the agency.
This process yields international prices as influenced by government poli-
cies. The outcome of this process is examined by governments that may change
their policies for the next period. As agents in the model do not formulate
expectations about government policies, issues of time consistency and the like
do not arise in our models.
Since these steps are taken on a year-by-year basis, a recursive dynamic
simulation results. Simulations over 15-year periods are used to project the
consequences of various policies, not only for individual countries, but also for
the entire system.
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3.2.5. Data sources, parameter estimation, and validation
The basic data sources comprise the various publications of the F AO, the World
Bank, and the International Labor Organization (ILO). In particular, the supply
utilization accounts (SUA) of the F AO have been extensively used. For some
countries, these data were examined by specialists from the countries and were
replaced by more "reliable" domestically published data. The models of the
USA and India, which do not follow the standard structure, were estimated using
published national data.
To a large extent, the parameters were empirically estimated. The parame-
ter estimations were carried out using mostly the time series of 1961-1976, but in
some cases data covering longer periods were also used. The general equilibrium
structure was not imposed, and all the parameters were not estimated simultane-
ously. However, parameters of a number of modules, such as the allocation
model, were estimated simultaneously.
In validating and tuning the models, emphasis was placed on the fact that
the BLS is a medium-term policy analysis model and not a short-term forecast-
ing one. It does not incorporate short-term variations, such as those due to
weather, nor any speculative behavior resulting from such variations. For policy
analysis we want the BLS to track the central tendencies correctly.
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The model system was "validated" in three phases. In the first phase, indi-
vidual national models were tested in a stand-alone mode (Le., unlinked to other
models) with given world prices over the historical period 1970-1978. For each
of some 70 endogenous state variables generated by each model, simulated values
were regressed against the observed values. Ideally, the slopes of these regres-
sions should be 1.0. The frequency distributions of the slopes were examined to
judge the model. These distribut.ions were considered satisfactory. In the
second phase, the country models were run up to the year 2000, again in a
stand-alone mode with given world prices. In the last phase of the validation
process, a series of "linked runs" with full interaction between the individual
national models within the global exchange system was carried out.
The objective in the second and third phases was to test whether the
models behave reasonably. Since this is a very subjective notion, specifications
and parameters were changed in individual models only in the case of extreme
results.
Finally, it should also be noted that the fact that the BLS is an empirically
estimated system lends a strength of objectivity to the system; but, by the same
token, the data base is somewhat old (1961-1976, partly extended to 1980 for
crucial variables). However, since the problems of structural change and agricul-
tural adjustment are of a long-term nature, the observed functional relationships
are likely to remain valid for a long time. Moreover, the system has been tested
to reproduce reasonably the central tendencies observed over the period
1970-1980. This makes the model system suitable for policy analysis.
3.2.6. Exogenous and endogenous variables in the BLS
A number of important variables remain exogenous, though for a large and com-
plex model system such as this the exogenous variables form only a small part of
the total. The more important of these are summarized below:
(1) Population and its growth is taken from the latest UN and ILO sources
(median projections), but for some individual countries, e.g., India, these
have been adjusted by the latest national information and projections.
Similarly, the participation rate in the total labor force is defined exog-
enously, but the allocation of the labor force between agriculture and the
rest of the economy is endogenous.
(2) Land available for cultivation is exogenous, and the data are taken predom-
inantly from F AO sources and from specific national estimates. This also
includes the development of land over time.
(3) Rates of total investment as a share of the GDP are estimated from the his-
torical period and, after a period of adjustment in the early 1980s, they are
kept constant. Some exceptions occur, e.g., India, where the investment
rate changes exogenously over time.
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(4) A number of important exogenous assumptions are made for the Rest of
the World, Le., the residual countries that are modeled only in groups for
inclusion in the system. These include growth rates for both agricultural
and nonagricultural production, based on past performance. The outputs,
however, do respond to changes in world prices.
3.2.7. Comparative advantage of BLS
Compared with other global policy models, the BLS is characterized by:
(1) It is a general equilibrium system empirically estimated (and not bench-
marked on one year's data). As a general equilibrium model, it distin-
guishes a number of commodities, but it distinguishes more agricultural
commodities than other general equilibrium models.
(2) Governments are important actors in the system, and a whole range of
government policies is included.
(3) Government policy reactions are endogenous and can be modified in
response to changes in world market prices. Thus, a change in policies of a
government affects, through the world market prices, policies of other
governments and, in turn, is affected by them. This is important as excess
demand functions facing a country may change when policies change.
(4) It is a policy analysis tool that can explore simultaneous changes ill a
number of policies by different governments.
Of course, compared with commodity models, its strength lies in the fact
that the reactions to policies by other commodity markets are also accounted
for. However, it should be said again that the BLS is not meant to be a tool for
short-term forecasting and hence it does not include any of the usual short-term
phenomena.
3.3. The Scheme of Analysis
Evaluation of the impact of agricultural trade liberalization will be carried out
by comparing the results of a number of policy scenarios generated using the
BLS. To do this, it is necessary that the notion and scope of agricultural trade
liberalization are defined clearly, a set of policy scenarios is identified, and an
approach to interpretation of the scenario results is described. The high degree
of interdependence in the BLS (interdependence among commodities and among
countries as well as the general equilibrium consistency of physical and financial
balances) makes interpretation of the results somewhat complex. Moreover,
indicators relevant for welfare analysis need to be identified.
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In the alternative scenarios of agricultural trade liberalization, different countries
or groups of countries liberalize. These scenarios are designated by F-EC, F-
USA, F-OECD, etc., where F refers to freer trade and the country/countries
liberalizing are indicated in the designation. The results are compared with a
reference scenario, which is designated by RO. Table 9.9 gives the list of
scenarios.
Table 9.9. List of scenarios.
Designation
RO
Agricultural trade liberalization by:
F-OECD
F-LDC
F-EC
F-USA
F-ALLME
Description
Reference scenario
All OECD countries, excluding Turkey
All developing countries, excluding China
Only the EC
Only the USA
All market economies
In all the trade liberalization scenarios discussed, it is assumed that China
and the CMEA do not participate in trade liberalization, though they do
moderately modify their trade patterns in response to changing world prices.
All the scenarios are run from 1980 to 2000. Trade liberalization is gradu-
ally introduced over a five-year period, 1982-1986, so that 1986 is the first year
of fully liberalized agricultural trade. In these scenarios, agricultural trade is
liberalized without introducing any compensating lump-sum transfers either
within countries or among countries.
3.3.2. The purpose and role of a reference run
For any policy analysis, a baseline scenario is required as a reference for evaluat-
ing the effect of policy changes. However, such a scenario depends itself, at least
implicitly, on aRsumptions about how a certain set of policies affect economic
performance. One may define a baseline scenario as a "no change in policies" or
"business a..'i uRual" one, but it is not necessary that it be so. In this context, any
predicted and continuing trends in such policies may also be incorporated in the
reference scenario.
The primary role of the reference run is to serve as a "neutral" point of
departure, so to speak, from which policy scenarios take off as variants, with the
impacts of a policy being seen in the deviation of that policy run from the refer-
ence run. Neutrality will be achieved if the reference run by its very specification
does not accentuate the impact of some policies while muting that of others. If
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the reference scenario is at one of these extremes, reactions to some policy
changes may be muted and others accentuated. Of course, if fortuitously the
scenario of continuing past trend also happens to be such a neutral scenario, it
will be an obvious choice for a reference scenario owing to its aesthetic appeal.
It is important to be clear about the role of the reference run, the
desiderata that it should possess, the pitfalls it should avoid, and above all its
appropriate interpretation.
While neutrality is an important desideratum, short of doing sensitivity
analysis with a number of alternative reference scenarios, obviously one cannot
easily test whether neutrality has been achieved - some judgment is unavoidable.
Should one go beyond this and require that the reference run produce results for
the far future that do not conflict too much with "expert judgments"? We have
not done this for several reasons: very often the so-called "expert judgments" are
more in the nature of informed guesses than the results of analytical work.
Many an expert would be hard put to provide a description of the analytical
framework (if any) and the assumptions about the behavior of exogenous vari-
ables (particularly macroeconomic variables) as well as about policies that impli-
citly influence his judgment in his own area of expertise. It is extremely unlikely
that "expert judgments" relating to different commodities and sectors are based
on a mutually consistent and common set of macroeconomic assumptions, let
alone on a consistent analytical framework. This is not to say that all judgments
not based on formal models ought to be neglected. Indeed, informal and intui-
tive analyses of some experts may often be more flexible in synthesizing informa-
tion than formal models. However, we considered it to be unwise to exaggerate
the importance of expert judgments about the future in designing our reference
run. Barring obviously absurd and incredible results, no attempt was made to
tinker with the model to produce a reference run which reproduces, so to speak,
a median, or whatever, of the distribution of expert judgments or forecasts.
Having thoroughly reviewed the components of the model (and here, expert judg-
ments were very helpful) and having accommodated a reasonable assessment of
likely changes in policies relative to the past, we did not consider a reversal of
past patterns of trade in projections with the model as necessarily indicating a
need for revisions in the model.
The labeling of the reference run as an IIASA-F AP forecast should be
resisted very firmly. This is because the model is not designed as a forecasting
tool but only as a powerful analytical engine to explore and understand the
impact of alternative policy packages in a logically consistent and complete,
though aggregative, model of individual economies and the global trading sys-
tem. Put another way, the expectation is that policy impacts calculated by the
model system and expressed in some suitable relative or unit-free form are more
robust than their absolute magnitudes. One way to test this is to carry out pol-
icy analysis with reference runs using alternative assumptions. This was indeed
done and the qualitative results did not depend significantly on the assumptions
of the reference run.
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3.3.3. The notion of agricultural trade liberalization
The analysis of trade liberalization in this study is restricted to removal of dis-
tortions between trade prices and domestic prices at the level of the raw materi-
als of the agricultural commodities. The scenarios do not remove all distortion-
creating measures from all markets and production activities. Thus, they move
toward free trade and not to total trade liberalization, so that one should charac-
terize them as freer trade scenarios. The reason for restricting the analysis to
removal of only border protection measures is the difficulty of obtaining accurate
information on all trade-distorting measures.
For some countries, additional changes are introduced. In the case of the
USA model, land set-aside programs are also removed in the scenarios in which
the USA liberalizes trade. The wedges which exist between the consumer and
producer prices for wheat, coarse grain, and bovine and ovine meat in Japan and
for wheat in Nigeria are also set to zero when these countries liberalize; and in
Canada the quotas imposed on dairy production in the reference run are
removed when it liberalizes. The monetary compensatory amounts (MCAs) that
are given to member countries of the EC under its CAP are still implicitly
included in the producer prices as the EC is treated as one aggregated country.
The kind of distortion resulting from this is very difficult to assess. Since, how-
ever, the MCAs are small in comparison to the EC's protection against third
countries, one might argue that their impact is not very drastic. This is espe-
cially so if one works with the hypothesis that the MCAs only distort the (abso-
lute) price levels between the EC member countries but not the relative prices of
agriculture, which are the same in all member countries of the EC.
Thus, in our analysis of trade liberalization where these calculated tariff
equivalents are removed, only the supports given at the border are abolished.
The supports given to domestic production orIand consumption are not affected
by the removal of tariff equivalents. This holds for all types of domestic assis-
tance (e.g., input subsidies, storage subsidies, production quotas, consumer sub-
sidies, transportation subsidies, marketing licensing, export credit, insurance).
Trade liberalization is partial in our analysis in yet another sense. Agricul-
tural trade liberalization is achieved in the scenarios by removing protection
from agricultural commodities as reflected in the estimated protection factors
(see Appendix A2). As reliable information on the protection factor on nonagri-
culture is not available, it is not removed from the nonagriculture sector. As a
consequence, trade liberalization here is partial. Relative distortions among agri-
cultural commodities are removed, but the relative distortion between the agri-
culture and nonagriculture sectors is not fully removed and could even be
reversed in some cases.
The protection factors as indicated by available crude estimates for the
nonagriculture sector are much smaller than those for agricultural commodities
in the developed market economies. Thus, nonremoval of distortion from the
nonagriculture sector should have a small impact on the results when only these
countries liberalize.
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For the developing countries, the nonagricultural protection factors may be
expected to be somewhat larger, but many of these countries playa compara-
tively modest role on the world market. Thus, here also, the effects on the
results for the world market should be small. Of course, for individual countries
the results can be significantly affected by total liberalization. In fact, model
scenarios in which crudely estimated nonagricultural protection factors were also
removed confirmed these expectations. The main results at the global level and
the character of the scenarios did not change significantly. A significant impact
on the size of efficiency gains and losses for some developing countries was seen,
but that, too, was not dramatic; nor did it alter the qualitative picture. This
could have been expected for yet another reason. Since nonagriculture is treated
as a single aggregate sector, the gains from removing distortions within its sub-
sectors cannot be captured in the BLS. However, the impact on the size of
efficiency gains and losses does suggest the need for having better estimates of
nonagricultural protection factors.
In treating all nontariff barriers as tariff equivalents, the benefits or costs of
the protection measure do not accrue to the correct agent: e.g., an import quota
increases the domestic price, and the rent from this quota goes to the importer,
whereas the government gets the receipts from a tariff. However, for countries
where explicit trade quotas are used, such as a quota on the import of bovine
and ovine meat, removal of the quota does not lead to such a distortion in the
distribution of costs and benefits of protection.
If agriculture as a whole is protected relative to nonagriculture, then this
suggests that agricultural output will decrease with liberalization of trade. The
reallocation of resources brought about by liberalization can be used to improve
welfare as well.
On the other hand, if world market prices are affected by the trade liberal-
ization of a country (while others do not change their protection levels), whether
or not a move toward liberalization is welfare-improving for that country depends
on whether such a move takes the country toward or away from levels of trade
restriction which are optimal for it.
The relationship between world and domestic prices under a trade liberal-
ization regime and the corresponding relationship under continuation of the dis-
tortionary reference policy regime are shown in Figure 3.3. For a given world
market price of a commodity, the domestic price under trade liberalization
depends upon whether the country is a net exporter or importer of the commo-
dity. Thus, the domestic price can increase suddenly when a country becomes a
net importer from being a net exporter. This knife-edge dependence of domestic
price on the net trade status can be computationally troublesome. A smoothing
relationship is introduced where the transition between the import and export
prices is related to the self-sufficiency ratio defined as the ratio of domestic pro-
duction to consumption. This is shown in Figure A2.1, Appendix A2. Such
smoothing can be justified on the grounds that only net exports or net imports
are considered in the system and that, owing to the composition differences in
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Figure 9.9. World and domestic raw material prices for an imported or an exported com-
modity: (a) under reference run policy and (b) under trade liberalization.
aggregate commodities and quality differences in relatively homogeneous com-
modities, some trade takes place even when a country is self-sufficient in a
commodity.
The self-sufficiency ratio at which the relative domestic price equals the
relative trade prices for an imported commodity (point a in Figure A2.1) is set at
0.90 for dairy products and other foods, and at 0.95 for all other commodities.
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For exports, the corresponding self-sufficiency ratio (point b in Figure A2.l) is
set at 1.05 for bovine and ovine meats, other animal products, and nonfood agri-
culture, and at 1.10 for all other commodities. In other words, only when the
self-sufficiency ratio is equal to or lower than the values mentioned above is the
relative domestic price equal to the relative trade price. Otherwise, the relative
domestic price is interpolated. A similar procedure is used for the case of export.
The results of each scenario are most often expressed as a percentage
change relative to the corresponding outcomes of the reference scenario. Some-
times they are expressed relative to other scenarios appropriate for such a com-
parison. Since a number of time lags are built into the various models of the
BLS, several years of adjustment may be required to fully capture the impact of
trade liberalization. The analyses of the scenarios, therefore, concentrate on a
comparison of the trade liberalization results with those of the reference scenario
around year 2000. Some comparisons are also made for the year 1990.
3.3.4. Comparing scenarios of a general equilibrium system: Simul-
taneity in a dynamic multisectoral world
In all general equilibrium systems, in principle, almost everything depends on
everything else, and the interpretations of policy effects become very complex.
Nonetheless, to understand the nature of the system and the results, and in a
sense even to believe in the validity of the results, one would like explanations
that are largely consistent with the intuition of an economist. Especially when
the results are counter-intuitive, a persuasive explanation, still in the language of
economists' conventional reasoning, is needed. Since much of economists' rea-
soning is based on partial equilibrium (in a ceteris paribus framework) compara-
tive static analysis, it is in the language of such analysis that our explanation of
the results will be offered. It should also be appreciated that, in spite of the
feedbacks and simultaneity in the determination of all variables, not all feed-
backs are equally important. Thus, partial equilibrium reasoning can sometimes
be adequate to explain the results. Though it is hoped that such reasoning
explains most of the results, it should, nevertheless, be emphasized that the
explanations offered are only partial and that they are offered for expositional
convenience.
The major feedbacks and interconnections in the system are such that
world prices affect domestic prices, which affect domestic production and con-
sumption, and therefore net exports of a country, affecting in turn the world
prices themselves. Similarly, consumption demand affects domestic prices, which
affect domestic production and resulting domestic income, and therefore demand
itself. Moreover, these interactions are mostly simultaneous and cannot be
described as lagged or sequential processes. This makes partial equilibrium
explanations somewhat tentative.
Yet another feature of the system that makes it harder to explain its
behavior is that the number of sectors is more than two. In a two-sector
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framework, there is only one relative commodity price, and shifts in resource
allocation are easily predictable. For example, when the producer price of one
sector increases relative to that of the other, one can expect an increase in its
output. However, in a three-sector world, it could either increase or decrease.
Similarly, changes in demand for various commodities, when relative prices
change simultaneously, cannot be predicted either, as the income effects may
dominate the price effects.
Since net export is the difference between production and consumption, the
ambiguity carries over to trade. Thus, net exports of the in-between commodity
may increase or decrease.
2000 PPF
reference scenario
I
2000 PPF
pol icy scenar io
Agriculture
oL----------"---------L----......L------.
8'
Figure 9.,1. Comparison of two scenarios: price alone is inadequate when the production
possibility frontier (PPF) changes.
The dynamic adjustments over time that are involved in the two scenarios
make the outcomes even less predictable from the point of view of a qualitative
and partial analysis. The production possibility frontier for an economy shifts
outward as the economy expands through capital accumulation, increase in labor
force, and technical progress. The way in which the production possibility curve
shifts depends on the development path as determined by policies, prices, invest-
ments, and allocations. In different scenarios the curve shifts differently. Thus,
in Figure 9.4, we see how the production possibility frontier (PPF) shifts from
the base year 1980 in two alternative scenarios. The changes in production
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points pT and pR cannot be explained merely by looking at the differences in
relative prices for the year 2000. As shown in the figure, the relative prices are
the same at points pT and pR but the production levels are different. To
explain this, prices, investments, and allocations over the period 1980-2000 have
to be compared. To the extent that the changes in these variables over the
entire period lead to effects that one would expect from looking at the price
differences between the scenarios in the year 2000, such an explanation may
appear plausible. Yet, one cannot rule out a counter-intuitive supply response to
relative price shifts, particularly when one looks at the structure of production
among different commodities within the agriculture sector.
In our models, as agriculture becomes more or less attractive, it draws
more or less of labor and capital into it. These factors are then allocated to the
production of different agricultural commodities. With different production pos-
sibility frontiers for agricultural production in two scenarios, it is possible (see
Figure 9.5) that in the policy scenario the production point is on the segment ST
on the production possibility frontier tt' whereas it was at point R in the refer-
ence scenario. In this case, the output of both the agricultural goods may
r
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products
Figure 9.5. Changes in the structure of production over time in alternative scenarios
(PPF, production possibility frontier).
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increase compared to the reference run production at R, even when the price of
one of the goods falls relative to that of the other between the scenarios. A move
to free trade accentuates the welfare loss due to other distortions. This is shown
formally in Appendix AI.
In spite of these complexities arising from simultaneity of a dynamic mul-
tisectoral general equilibrium system, the basic functioning of the national
models and the system is not too complex to understand.
3.3.5. Welfare comparisons
In comparing alternative situations as represented by the outcomes in two
scenarios, one has to recognize the variety of viewpoints from which the situa-
tions may be evaluated by different actors in the system. Moreover, a society
has multiple objectives. A single-valued social welfare function in which the
different objectives are integrated is not usually available. For this reason, a
number of alternative indicators are generated so that the results may be
evaluated from different perspectives.
The indicators used can be broadly grouped under three headings as those
relating to:
(1) Economic development.
(2) Consumer welfare.
(3) Social welfare.
Indicators 0/ Economic Development
Gross domestic product. GDP, with all its well-known limitations, is the most
commonly used and widely known indicator of economic development. However,
before comparing the GDPs of two scenarios, one should note that such a com-
parison suffers from all the well-known index number problems. The outcome of
the comparison can be affected by the prices used. Figure 9.6 shows how,
depending on the prices used, the outcome changes.
In aggregating the GDPs of different countries, base-year (1970) world
market prices are also used. Aggregation using 1970 domestic prices and
exchange rates, in the reference run situation where countries have different pro-
tection levels on the same commodity, could lead to substantially different
weights being given to similar production activities in different countries.
The following GDP indicators are calculated:
(1)
(2)
(3)
GDP at constant domestic prices using the divisia price index (an index
with changing weights) with 1970 as the base year.
Per capita GDP in US dollars based on 1970 domestic prices and exchange
rate.
GDP at 1970 world prices in US dollars.
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Figure 9.6. The problem of prices in comparing GDPs. R 1 has a higher value than R 2
when valued at rj R 1 has a lower value than R 2 when valued at P".
Production value comparison. Because of the index number problem with GDP
indicators, to evaluate the impact on producers, GDPs in the two scenarios are
calculated with both the sets of prices, and pair-wise comparisons are made. If
GDP in a trade liberalization scenario calculated at the prices of the scenario
exceeds the GDP corresponding to the production levels of the reference scenario
but valued at the prices of the trade liberalization scenario, one can conclude
that liberalization increases GDP and producer incomes. Similarly, if both the
GDPs (that of trade liberalization and that of the reference scenario) are
evaluated at the prices of the reference scenario, and one also finds that the
liberalization scenario GDP has a higher value, one can say that producer
incomes have definitely improved since, no matter which set of the two price sets
is used, the value of GDP is higher. These calculations are analogous to those
used for comparing consumer welfare (see below).
Agricultural self-sufficiency and self-consumption ratios. Many governments
seem to strive to attain agricultural self-sufficiency. Some governments may
even want to restrict dependence on imports for individual commodities and not
just at the aggregate sectoral level. Two indicators are calculated to reflect these
concerns:
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(1) Agricultural self-sufficiency ratio is defined as the value of domestic agricul-
tural production over the value of domestic agricultural demand, valued at
current world market prices. This ratio will be greater than 1 if the coun-
try has a positive net balance of agricultural trade.
(2) The self-consumption ratio is defined as the ratio of the value of domestic
agricultural demand met from domestic production to the value of domestic
agricultural demand, valued at current world market prices. It differs from
the self-sufficiency ratio in that in calculating the self-consumption ratio the
value of agricultural exports is not included; therefore the ratio cannot
exceed unity.
Indicators of Consumer Welfare
Since comparisons of GDP under alternative situations suffer from index number
problems as well as the fact that GDP is not strictly a welfare measure, other
indicators at the national level are also generated which better reflect different
aspects of welfare.
For assessing consumer welfare, the two measures used are equivalent
income and comparison of costs of consumption bundles in the two scenarios at
the two sets of consumer prices.
To evaluate elements of social welfare not captured by the measures of con-
sumer welfare described above, the number of persons in hunger and life expec-
tancy at birth are calculated as described later based on cross-country regres-
sions.
Equivalent income. Equivalent income corresponding to a consumption bundle is
defined as the income required under a reference set of prices to obtain the same
utility as is provided by the given consumption bundle. The notion of equivalent
income is illustrated in Figure 3.7.
The equivalent income corresponding to alternative consumption bundles
may be compared. The bundle that corresponds to a higher equivalent income
provides a higher level of utility and thus indicates improvement in consumer
welfare. If the consumer demand systems have an underlying utility function,
e.g., a Cobb--Douglas utility function is implied by a linear expenditure system,
equivalent income can be calculated. It may be noted that this notion is similar
to the Hicksian equivalent variation measure.
"Revealed preference": consumption cost comparisons. Not all the national
models of the BLS have demand systems with explicitly defined utility functions
behind them. It is therefore not possible to calculate the equivalent income
measure for all the national models. Because of this difficulty, a "revealed
preference" comparison is also made between the costs of the consumption bun-
dles purchased in the two situations or scenarios. If at the prices prevailing in a
policy scenario - say, a trade liberalization scenario - the cost of the actual
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Figure 9.7. The notion of equivalent income.
consumption basket is greater than the cost of the consumption basket of the
reference run, one can say that consumers are better off in the policy scenario.
This is because they could have purchased the reference run consumption basket,
had they wanted to. This is shown in Figure 9.8.
A similar comparison is also made at the reference run prices. The two
comparisons should be consistent, otherwise an inconsistency in the demand sys-
tem is indicated. Let Pt, Pr and Ct, Cr be prices and consumption in the policy
scenario and reference scenario respectively. Then the following possibilities
arise:
(1) If PtCt > PtCr and PrCt > PrCr, then Ct is preferred to Cr'
(2) If PtCt < PtCr and PrCt > PrCr, then the outcome is indeterminate and
nothing can be said about preference between Cr and Ct.
(3) If PtCt > PtCr and PrCt < PrCr, then the demand system is inconsistent.
(4) If PtCt < PtCr and PrCt < PrCr, then Cr is preferred to Ct·
This is summarized in Table 9.4.
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Figure 9.8. Consumption cost comparison for consumer welfare.
Table 9.4. Consumption cost comparison.
PrCt > PrCr
PrCt < PrCr
Ct preferred to Cr
inconsistent
indeterminate
Cr preferred to Ct
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Indicators for Social Welfare
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The indicators for producer and consumer well-being at the aggregate level may
not capture important social concerns regarding the prevalence of hunger, ill
health, and malnutrition among the population and income distribution among
socioeconomic groups.
Calorie and protein intakes per capita. Though average calorie and protein
intakes do not by themselves give a precise indication of the nutritional status of
the population, changes in them across scenarios do suggest the direction of
change in the population.
Life expectancy at birth. Cross-country regression analysis was used (see Hra-
bovszky et al., 1985) to identify relationships between life expectancy at birth
and variables generated in the simulations. Data [1.] from 108 developed and
developing countries were used. The variables used are defined as follows: LEB,
life expectancy at birth expressed in years; GNPC, gross national product per
capita in 1981 US dollars; CALAR, calorie availability as a percentage of require-
ment, estimated using FAO food balance sheet information for availability and
FAO and World Health Organization (WHO) nutritional standards minimum
average requirements; NAPTOT, nonagricultural population as a percentage of
total population, serving as an indicator for level of urbanization.
Regionally disaggregated analysis confirmed that the data do not belong to
different populations and that the pooling of regional data is permissible.
The final equation chosen was selected on the basis of its explanatory
power, agreement with hypothesized relations, and the statistical significance of
the individual regression coefficients. The estimated equation is:
LEB -35.632 +
(-2.16)**
R 2 = 0.871
1.760lnGNPC +
(2.37)**
DF = 104
15.3231nCALAR + 0.217NAPTOT
(3.87)*** (6.39)***
The numbers in parentheses show t-statistics, with levels of significance denoted
by asterisks as follows: **,5%; ***, 1%.
Population suffering from hunger. In order to evaluate the impact on hunger in
different countries and in the world, it would be useful to generate an indicator.
Except for the model of India, the models do not endogenize income distribution.
Moreover, comparable estimates of persons in hunger are not available for most
countries for more than a year or two. Thus, there are not adequate indepen-
dent observations to postulate and estimate a relationship between the number
of hungry persons based on the variables generated in the model. Nonetheless,
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to evaluate the impact of policies on social welfare, an indicator on hunger is
needed.
Country-wise estimates of the number of hungry persons have been given
by the F AO Fourth World Food Survey (FAO, 1977). The FAO estimates were
obtained by stipulating that calorie consumption distribution in a country is
skewed and can be represented by a beta distribution. The parameters of these
distributions are estimated for each country based on certain assumptions,
country-specific data, and some cross-country comparisons. The same pro-
cedure, in principle, can be embodied in the model to generate estimated
numbers of hungry persons. Since the estimated parameters of the beta distribu-
tions are not reported in the FAO study and since the procedure uses judgment
in some cases, it is difficult to use it in a simulation model.
Instead, what is done is to fit a cross-country regression to F AO estimates
to recover the F AO methodology in a reduced form that can be easily used in
simulation. Using the data ror the years 1969-1971 for 58 countries for which
the F AO provides estimates of the percentage of population in hunger, the fol-
lowing regression was estimated:
HUNGRY = {~.01338(138.6 - CALAR)2 for CALAR :S: 138.6
for CALAR > 138.6
R2 = 0.87
where HUNGRY is the percentage of the population with calorie intake levels of
less than 1.2 times the basal metabolic rate.
The functional form chosen implies that the percentage of population in
hunger becomes zero when CALAR reaches 138.6. It may be noted that this
value was estimated. The high value of R2 should be no surprise as the left-hand
side variable was generated in the first place by using the right-hand side vari-
able.
Both these equations, for LEB and for HUNGRY, were used to generate
indicators for life expectancy at birth and persons in hunger for the various
scenarios. In doing so, the error term for each country in the estimated regres-
sions was retained as reflecting country-specific features, such as income distri-
bution and genetic and climatic characteristics, which may affect the indicators.
Income parity between agriculture and nonagriculture. Maintaining income par-
ity between agriculture and nonagriculture is often the major social objective
behind protection of agriculture; changes in income parity due to agricultural
trade liberalization are therefore of particular interest. The parity indicator used
calculates the ratio of GDP in agriculture per unit of labor to GDP in nonagri-
culture per unit of labor in nonagriculture. GDPs for this are calculated at
current domestic prices.
For the model of India, the parity indicator refers to the ratio of per capita
GDP in rural areas to per capita GDP in urban areas.
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3.4. Summary and Concluding Comments
In this chapter the analytical approach needed to study the impact of agricul-
tural trade liberalization is described. It is also argued that the BLS, briefly
described in this chapter, is suited for such analyses. The complexity of the sys-
tem is unavoidable if one is satisfactorily to account for the essential interdepen-
dences among commodities and countries.
The notion of agricultural trade liberalization is defined, and a scheme of
analysis is outlined. An approach to interpret the results is described that helps
in understanding the nature of the interdependences in the system, which should
make the results of the system credible.
A number of indicators for welfare are described, which will be used to
characterize the impact of agricultural trade liberalization. Policy evaluation
can be based on these indicators, which together embody a variety of criteria.
Naturally, only for a few countries is the impact of agricultural trade liberaliza-
tion likely to be positive for all the indicators.
Though compensatory lump-sum transfers are not introduced in the
scenarios, the notion of such transfers may be used to evaluate whether a coun-
try can, in principle, be better off under all the indicators when such transfers
are used. Such an approach can provide clearer policy guidance for more coun-
tries.
Note
[1] The information for life expectancy at birth, per capita GNP, and ratio of calorie
availability to requirements came from the World Development Report for 1981 of
the World Bank (1981, Annex tables). The information on level of urbanization
came from the 1981 FAO Production Yearbook (FAO, 1981b), and that on the
percentage of the population suffering from malnutrition came from the Fourth
World Food Survey (FAO, 1977).
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CHAPTER 4
A Perspective on Agriculture until 2000:
The Reference Scenario
4.1. Specification of the Reference Scenario
The reference scenario described in this chapter is basically a "business as usual"
scenario. Past policy regimes, as embodied in the price transmission regressions,
are continued in this scenario.
Apart from government policies, the other main exogenously prescribed
variables in the system are population growth rates and some additional vari-
ables (to be discussed below) for the models of the CMEA, China, and country
groups.
Population growth rates for all countries are prescribed exogenously based
on the UN medium forecast (ILO, 1977). Labor participation rates are also
taken from the ILO projections. This means that the time path of total labor
force in a country is exogenously prescribed and does not change from scenario
to scenario. It should, however, be noted that the allocation of total labor
between agriculture and nonagriculture is still endogenous and responds to rela-
tive prices and incomes. For the model of India, which distinguishes rural and
urban populations, both these are exogenously specified.
The overall growth of the world economy is an important attribute of a
scenario. Agriculture is highly dependent for its performance on the develop-
ment of the overall economy. This dependence is particularly high over the
longer term, when not only demand plays its role, but also movements of produc-
tion factors between agriculture and other sectors as well as technological
developments have a profound impact on agricultural production.
Growth rates in most of the national models of the BLS are endogenously
determined based on a savings function that depends only on GDP. However,
for the simpler models of country groups, which together represent nearly 20% of
the economy of the world, the central supply tendencies, for both agriculture
56 Toward Free Trade in Agriculture
and nonagriculture, are based on the middle scenario (scenario B) specifications
of the F AO study Agriculture: Toward flOOD (FAO, 1981a). The supplies, how-
ever, do adjust to the development of world prices; the demands also respond to
world prices.
The models of the CMEA and China (which, in any case, do not liberalize
agricultural trade in any of the scenarios) reflect the practice of the centrally
planned economies of setting human consumption targets. Thus, these targets
and some stipulated self-sufficiency ratios are analogous to the prescription of
policies in other models. These may be considered as exogenous specifications.
However, they are not varied across scenarios.
The reference scenario is a ro 'ection rather tha a A forecast is a
scenario an its outcome that are considered most likely to occur. A projection,
on the other hand, is based on a number of assumptions, and in principle one
can choose to project on any suitable set of assumptions, not necessarily the
most probable from the point of view of their joint occurrence, even if one can
specify such a joint probability distribution. Thus, one dO(ls not say what is the
likelihood of the actual occurrence of the scenario. In this sense, the reference
run is a projection into the future up to 2000 of the model syst.em. This is not to
suggest that the assumptions on which it is based are implausible. indeed, the
reference run is based on a model:
(1) Whose individual components were thoroughly validated.
(2) That was calibrated so as to be consistent with historical data.
(3) That incorporated policies as understood and translated by the authors
into a form easily introduced in the model (i.e., in the form of price
transmission regressions, with suitable modifications for anticipated policy
changes).
(4) That was adequately tested to ensure that a priori unlikely and bizarre
results did not emerge.
For reasons of exposition, growth rates of the economies, price develop-
ments, and changes in production structures and trade patterns are discussed in
turn. The reader should, however, keep in mind that these developments are the
outcome of simultaneous processes and decisions. Only for clarity are these vari-
ables discussed one after the other.
4.2. Growth Performance over 1980-2000 in the Reference
Scenario
The reference scenario, which is designated by RO, provides a comparable view
of overall economic growth in the world in relation to recent historical experi-
ence. The growth rates of some important aggregates are shown in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1. Growth ratesa of population, GDP, agricultural value added and agricultural
trade balances, 1960-2000b: reference scenario.
Developing
countries
World DECD CMEA (excl.China)
Population (% P A)
1960-1970 1.9 1.1 1.1 2.6
1970-1980 1.9 0.9 0.8 2.5
1980-1990 1.8 0.8 0.8 2.5
1990-2000 1.7 0.7 0.7 2.3
GDP (% PAl
1960-1970 5.7 5.1 6.7 5.7
1970-1980 4.0 3.2 5.4 5.8
1980-1990 4.1 3.5 4.8 5.4
1990-2000 3.7 3.0 4.0 5.5
GDP per capita (% PAl
1960-1970 3.5 4.0 5.6 3.1
1970-1980 2.1 2.4 4.5 3.4
1980-1990 2.3 2.7 3.9 2.9
1990-2000 2.0 2.2 3.2 3.1
Agricultural value added (% P A)
1960-1970 1.9 1.6 1.6 2.6
1970-1980 1.8 1.2 0.8 2.6
1980-1990 2.2 1.2 2.4 3.0
1990-2000 2.3 0.9 2.8 2.9
Agricultural balance (% of
value added in agriculture)
1980 0 6.3 -2.2 4.7
2000 0 9.9 -1.8 1.3
aGrowth rates are based on values at constant prices.
b1980-1990 figures and 1990-2000 figures are from the model scenario; the figures for the 19608
and 1970s are from the Yearbook of National Account.! StatiltiC! -19S0, 19S1, 19se (UN).
Figure 4.1 shows shares of different regions in global population and GDP. The
development of per capita GDP is shown in Figure 4.2. The growth rates
referred to in this section are all for variables valued at constant 1970 prices.
The global GDP growth rates over the 1980s and 1990s fall in the reference
scenario from the 5.7% per year realized over the 1960s, to become comparable
to the level realized over the 1970s.
The baseline growth rate for the developing countries is about the same as
that projected by a number of international organizations in recent years. For
the OECD countries, the rate presented here is toward the lower end of most
other projections.
Compared with the historical performance in the 19708, the BLS growth
rates are somewhat lower than the realized ones for developing countries as a
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Population 2000
48% 18% 9% 9% 16%
I
49% 15% 7% 10% 18%
OME
World ! CMEAtotal 4.3 billion :::::::::::::: 6.2 billion:~:~:~:t~:~:~ MidGOP 1980 Low-Mid GOP 2000Low19% 7% 3% 8% 63% 21% 8% 4% 9% 57%
World
total 5.1 X 1012 US$ 1970 11.0 X 1012 US$ 1970
Figure {1. Population and GDP by country groups in the reference scenario, 1980 and
2000. DME, developed market economies; Mid, middle-income developing countries;
Low-Mid, low-middle-income developing countries; Low, low-income developing coun-
tries.
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developing countries; the rest as in Figure .r1.
group and for the CMEA countries, but are very close to the realized one for the
OECD countries.
The world agricultural value added accelerates over the 1980-2000 period
above the growth rates of the 1960s and 1970s (see Table 4.1). The acceleration
is mainly due to an increase in the CMEA growth rate of agriculture from -0.9%
per year over the 1970s to 2.4% per year over the 1980s and 2.8% over the 1990s,
but the increase in the growth rates of developing countries also contributes to
it. The fall in the agricultural GDP growth rates of OECD countries may be
expected as the result of two factors: slower population growth and a tendency
toward food intake saturation with growing income. The growth rate of agricul-
tural output in OECD countries could have thus been maintained only by
increasing exports. And, in fact, the agricultural supply surplus of OECD coun-
tries increases by almost 50% from 6.3% of GDP agriculture in 1980 to 9.9% of
GDP agriculture in 2000. Larger agricultural exports by the OECD would have
depressed world market prices and hence lowered the incentives to maintain
growth rates comparable to the high growth rates in agriculture observed in the
1970s. Moreover, in this scenario the EC pursues a "moderate" agricultural
price policy and therefore labor migrates out of agriculture at a rather high rate
and the capital stock in agriculture also grows slowly. The USA also shows a
strong decline in agricultural growth for similar reasons.
Developing countries as a group accelerate their agricultural growth rate
from 2.6% to 3% per year. This higher production growth is, however, not
sufficient to meet demand, owing both to continued population growth of about
2.5% per year and sustained growth of income per capita of about 3% per year.
Thus, one notes for developing countries, excluding China, a strong increase in
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their net imports of cereals, from 37 million tonnes in 1980 to 120 million tonnes
in 2000 (a tonne is a metric ton). It should be noted that this expansion con-
cerns effective imports, realizable within the balance-of-payments framework
prescribed by the assumed trade deficit targets (developing country trade deficit
being around 3% of their GDP). Since the trade deficits also include implicit aid
through food aid, these imports include, in principle, concessional imports as
well.
While their imports of cereals increase, the developing countries are unable
to increase adequately their exports of tropical foods and fibers because of slow
demand growth in the main export markets - namely, the developed countries.
These developments result in a reduction of the agricultural trade balance of the
developing countries, from a 4.7% net surplus in 1980 to a 1.3% surplus in 2000
expressed as a percentage of agricultural GDP.
4.3. World Market Price Trends in the Reference Scenario
The historical data as well as the resulting prices from the reference run are
shown in Figures 4.3-4.5. The prices are given relative to the prices of nonagri-
culture. In the plots, the prices up to 1980 are actual prices, whereas the prices
from 1981 onward are obtained from simulation.
The growth rates of world market prices over various periods are shown in
Table 4.2, the last line of which shows the terms of trade for agriculture as a
whole, which are a weighted average of commodity prices, weighted by the
volumes produced.
As already mentioned, the terms of trade for agriculture relative to
nonagriculture increase by 0.4% per annum over the period 1980-2000, consider-
ably less than that observed from our data, which is 0.6%.
The development of prices over time is an outcome of the interplay between
the changes in the demand and supply schedules. Figure 4.6 shows how price
trends over time may be mainly the outcome of supply and demand shifts, and
less the result of the shape of these curves. With increases in population and
income, demands increase (at least for commodities that are not inferior): i.e.,
more of a commodity will be demanded at a given price. Demand for commodi-
ties with higher income elasticities will increase relatively more than demand for
other commodities. Demand schedules may also shift as a result of habits and
changes in tastes. Some important determinants of demand shifts in the system
are summarized in Table 4.3. These determinants of demand shifts are them-
selves functions of prices, especially income. It can be seen in Table 4.9 that the
upper ends of the income elasticity ranges are higher for the developing countries
than for the developed market economies, and that the ranges for animal prod-
ucts are much larger than those for cereals and other foods. Thus, demands for
animal products would increase more than those for crops.
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Iligher demands over time, however, do not necessarily imply increasing
prices, as supplies also shift. Technical progress, land development, and capital
accumulation result. in larger supplies at a given price. Larger supplies may also
result from a fall in input, prices for a commodity, such as feed prices in animal
production or fertilizer prices in crop production, increasing the profitability of
that commodity. And, of course, it is possible that increases in input and factor
prices may increase the cost of supplying a given quantity. This underlines the
importance of relative prices and the need to look at a number of commodities
together.
Table 4.4 shows, for selected countries, rates of technical progress that shift
supply. The rates of technical progress cannot be calculated for other national
models because of their specifications. (As a simple example, if in an estimated
supply function time is used as a proxy for other variables, such as capital accu-
mulation or fertilizer intensification, then the coefficient of time does not
represent technical progress.) The rates shown in Table 4.4 include purely exog-
enous technical progress, which depends only on time, and also embodied
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technical progress, which is a function of total capital and total labor employed
in agriculture; both of these in turn are induced by the relative price and
profitability of agriculture relative to nonagriculture.
Comparisons of data in Tables ..1.9 and 4.4 provide strong indications of
why prices develop in the way they do in the reference scenario.
The most striking long-term trend of the world market prices (prices in all
the scenarios presented herein, unless otherwise specified, are normalized prices
and are thus real prices containing no inflation) in the period 1980-2000 is,
according to the reference scenario, a price rise of the products of ruminants
(meat and milk) amounting to about 2% per year in real terms (see Table 4.2).
Two reasons can be given to explain this price rise. From the demand point of
view, income elasticities for meat are high in the developing countries, where
incomes grow at high rates, and are much larger than those for cereals in all
groups of countries. On the supply side, in the important producing countries,
the rates of technical progress for bovine and ovine meat and dairy products are
much smaller than those for cereals.
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Table ~.2. Changes in world market prices for agricultural products relative to nonagri-
cultural prices over the period 1980-2000 according to the reference scenario (percent).
Commodity
Wheat
Rice
Coarse grains
Bovine and ovine meat
Dairy
Other animal products
Protein feed
Other food
Total agriculturea
Nonfood agriculture
1980-1990
2
-4
1
28
23
5
2
1
5
20
Total price change
1990-2000
-10
5
-11
20
11
1
-4
4
3
4
1980-2000
-8
1
-10
53
37
6
-2
5
9
25
Annual
price change
1980-2000
-0.4
0.1
-0.5
2.2
1.6
0.3
-0.1
0.2
0.4
1.1
aAggregated using global production levels as weights.
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For example, the EC, which produces 15% of bovine and ovine meats and
accounted for more than 20% of global dairy production in 1980, has rates of
technical progress of 0.36 and 0.29, respectively, for these products. Moreover,
production costs may be expected to go up relatively strongly in some land-
scarce countries owing to an increase in feeding cost because the opportunity
cost of land for roughage production moves up. Expansion of cropland
encroaches upon the grassland that provides cheap fodder for the ruminants.
The ensuing shift to more expensive feeds in the ruminant diet may cause an
increase in the production cost. The price policy of the EC further contributes
to the rather strong increase in the world market price of bovine and ovine meat.
The EC policy of maintaining the relative domestic price using a variable levy
results in a drop in its tariff equivalent on bovine and ovine meat from 61% in
1980 to 20% in 2000. As a consequence, production of this commodity hardly
increases, and the growth of demand leads to a substantially higher import by
the EC. Twenty-five percent of the additional world trade in bovine and ovine
meat is imported by the EC [11.
The other country with a large increase in imports is Brazil, taking in 42%
of the additional trade. Brazil has a negative protection on meat, which becomes
larger, and hence its domestic price does not go up as much as the world market
price, and production is outpaced by demand. Among the big exporters, only
Argentina and Canada respond to the increases in world market price with sub-
stantially higher exports. The USA pursues a policy of trade restriction and
maintains its self-sufficiency ratio in bovine and ovine meats.
While prices for bovine and ovine meats and dairy products rise
significantly, prices of other animal products (pork, poultry, eggs, and fish) rise
by a very small amount: only about 0.3% per year. For other animal products
the rates of technical progress in the major producing countries are higher than
even those for cereals and thus, in spite of high income elasticity of demand, the
price increases only a little. Moreover, other animal products benefit from the
relative decline in prices of the main feed items. In addition, developing coun-
tries are able to realize their potential for considerable productivity gains for this
aggregate as such gains require less investment than those for ruminants. Hence
the increase in production of other animal products is large enough to meet the
increased demand with only a small increase in price.
Another interestin ong-term trend is the e
prices of w eat and coarse ~rams, commodities that are of mainly tewp@rate---
zone origin. The fall is of the order of a half percentage point per year and is
concentrated in the 1990s. The rate of technical progress in cereals in major pro-
ducing countries exceeds the rate of increased demand due to population and
income growth, and cereal prices can be expected to fall. The rice price does not
fall, as technical progress in rice is smaller than that in wheat and coarse grains
and is negative in Japan, which is a significant producer. (The negative
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Figure 4- 6. Demand and supply shifts dominate price trends: (a) price increases over
time; (b) price decreases over time even with a very price-inelastic supply schedule.
technical progress in Japan is due to outmigration of labor from agriculture and
is conceivable if the relatively more skilled move out of agriculture.) Protein
feeds, on the other hand, show virtually no change in their price (a small reduc-
tion) in spite of the higher prices of animal products. The higher animal product
prices do not get translated into a larger demand for protein feeds, the demand
for which increases only modestly by 2% per annum. This is because cheaper
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feedgrains compete with protein feeds in pork and poultry production, while in
ruminant production protein feeds are relatively expensive substitutes for
roughage.
Nonfood products (Le., fibers, hides and skins, tobacco, and others) show a
clear upward price trend, particularly in the 1980s. The main reason is the quite
strong expansion of demand from the centrally planned economies and the
developing countries in the reference scenario, which materializes as a result of
high overall economic growth in these countries. Prices of rice, other animal
products, and other foods do not change significantly.
In summary, one could say that substitution possibilities in demand and
supply are large enough in the world food system and that supplies are able to
meet effective demand (Le., demand backed up by purchasing power) at reason-
able costs.
4.4. Shifts in Demand and Production Structures
As incomes change, the demand for some commodities changes more than that
for others. Since in the reference scenario incomes and populations increase at
different rates in different countries, one would expect changes in demand as well
as in production and trade patterns.
The changing global pattern of demand can be seen in Table 4.5. The
growth rates of demand for different agricultural commodities differ significantly
from each other. Demand for other animal products grows at 2.3% per year,
whereas the demands for bovine and ovine meats and dairy products grow at
1.6% per year as the latter are restrained by the increases in the prices of bovine
and ovine meats and dairy products. The share of various country groups in
global demand also changes significantly between 1980 and 2000. As can be
derived from Table 4.5, the share of developing countries (including China) in
global demand increases significantly for all commodities. Increase in demand in
a country does not necessarily imply an increase in production, as trade could be
adjusted to meet the higher demand. Nonetheless, many governments desire cer-
tain levels of self-sufficiency and consequently their policies tend to stimulate
domestic production and/or restrain domestic demands when self-sufficiency
tends to decline. Thus, much of the increase in demand for meat in developing
countries is satisfied by local production. Only imports of dairy products expand
substantially (doubling over the 2Q-year period: see Table 4.10). The dairy
imports mainly increase in Nigeria and Pakistan, and to some extent in Brazil,
Egypt, and India. Nigeria has a high income growth, and its dairy demand
increase is the highest of all countries. Pakistan's dairy output falls because of a
relative drop in the producer price of dairy products. However, developing coun-
tries generally seem to have a comparative disadvantage in producing feedgrain.
Hence, almost all (90%) of the large increase in grains needed for feeding is
imported. Developing countries excluding China increase feed consumption of
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Table 4.6. Agricultural production growth 1980-2000, and levels and distribution
among major country groups in 2000: reference scenario.
Commodity World NA+OCEa DMEb CMEA China DEVC
Volumes year !!OOO
Wheat (106 t)
Rice (106 t)
Coarse grains (106 t)
Bovine and ovine (106 t)
Dairy (106 t)
Other animal products (106 t PEd)
Protein feed (106 t PEd)
Other food (106)e
Nonfood agriculture (106)e
Growth rates, j9BO-!!OOO (% PA)
Wheat
Rice
Coarse grains
Bovine and ovine
Dairy
Other animal products
Protein feed
Other food
Nonfood agriculture
Value share of total
agriculture !!OOO (%)
Wheat
Rice
Coarse grains
Bovine and ovine
Dairy
Other animal products
Protein feed
Other food
Nonfood agriculture
619
362
1101
86
642
27
62
347
41
1.9
2.1
1.8
1.5
1.6
2.3
1.9
2.1
2.3
4.8
6.9
6.6
9.1
8.2
15.6
2.0
41.6
5.3
156
9
410
20
105
3
29
20
5
2.8
3.4
2.4
0.9
1.5
1.1
1.7
1.4
1.3
9.1
1.2
18.6
16.3
10.2
14.6
7.1
17.8
5.0
85
15
154
16
171
8
4
38
3
1.1
0.7
1.4
1.0
0.9
2.1
1.6
0.9
0.7
4.3
1.8
6.1
11.5
14.4
29.1
0.8
29.8
2.3
150
2
196
13
172
2
4
37
10
0.8
2.1
0.6
0.9
0.9
-0.3
1.3
0.4
3.0
8.8
0.3
8.9
10.4
16.6
10.7
0.9
33.4
10.1
47
90
98
5
13
6
8
54
7
1.1
0.6
1.5
1.4
3.8
2.9
1.8
1.7
3.2
2.5
11.9
4.1
3.7
1.2
23.9
1.7
44.7
6.3
175
244
237
31
179
7
18
195
15
3.3
2.9
2.1
2.8
3.1
3.9
2.8
3.1
2.3
3.1
10.7
3.3
7.6
5.3
10.0
1.3
54.1
4.5
aNA+OCE, North America and Oceania. bDME, Developed market economies (here excluding
NA+OCE). cDEV, Developing countries excluding China. dpE, protein equivalent. eUS$ 1970.
coarse grains alone by more than 60 million tonnes between 1980 and 2000, and
their imports by 60 million tonnes.
The global structure of agricultural production changes to meet the chang-
ing structure of demand. The growth rates of production of various commodities
differ from each other globally as well as for various country groups. Table 4.6
shows the structure of production in year 2000 for various country groups and
also indicates the commodity-wise growth rates over 1980-2000. Since produc-
tion growth rates for a commodity vary across country groups, the shares of
different country groups change over the years in the production of different
commodities. Though the production patterns change, the country groups
70 Toward Free Trade in Agriculture
contin\le to remain dominant in particular commodities in which they were dom-
inant. Thus, North America and Oceania remain as major producers of wheat,
coarse grains, and protein feeds. Other developed countries continue to produce
more than a quarter of the world's dairy production, and developing countries
continue to remain as major producers of other food and nonfood agricultural
products.
The production of wheat grows at an annual rate exceeding 3% and pro-
duction of protein feeds at nearly 2.8% over 1980-2000 in the developing coun-
tries (excluding China), reflecting the potentials of "green revolution" that still
remain to be exploited in these countries. Even then the developing countries
increase their imports of wheat and coarse grains.
How the importance of specific commodities within a country group
changes over time can be seen in Figure 4.7, which shows the value shares of
total agriculture in 1980, 1990, and 2000.
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Figure 4.7. Value share of commodities in total agricultural production, globally and in
various country groups, in 1980, 1990, and 2000: reference scenario.
The value shares of domestic agricultural production in world agricultural
production, given in Table 4.7, show that the shares of most large countries or
country groups, China, the CMEA, the EC and the USA, decline; those of
Argentina, Brazil, and Japan more or less remain constant; and all other LDC
producers improve their shares.
The general picture of agricultural production development that is
described in our reference scenario shows no dramatic shifts in global specializa-
tion. However, the major producers increase their production at smaller rates
than the rate at which global production rises, and the smaller countries do so at
rates that are higher than the global rate.
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Table 4.7. Value shares of domestic agricultural production in world agricultural pro-
duction: reference scenario.a
Value share (%)
Group 1980 fOOO
North America and Oceania
USA 12.0 11.1
Canada 0.9 0.9
Australia 1.0 1.0
New Zealand 0.3 0.3
Other developed countries
Austria 0.2 0.1
EC 6.7 4.8
Japan 2.4 2.4
Others 4.9 4.5
Centrally planned economies
CMEA 15.3 11.9
China 16.3 15.6
Developing market economies
Argentina 1.6 1.5
Brazil 3.7 3.6
Mexico 1.1 1.5
Egypt 0.8 0.9
Kenya 0.3 0.4
Nigeria 1.9 2.4
India 8.3 10.0
Indonesia 2.0 2.3
Pakistan 0.7 1.0
Thailand 0.9 1.1
Turkey 1.4 1.5
Others 17.3 21.2
World 100.0 100.0
a Agricultural output valued at world prices. This is not GDP agriculture as value of feed is
counted twice if used in the same country.
4.5. Changing Patterns of Trade
The past trends of changing trade patterns continue in the reference run. The
importance of agricultural trade increases and the level of interdependence in the
world increases in the sense that not only does the volume of traded commodities
increase, but also the proportions of total global production of cereals and animal
products that are traded increase in the reference scenario.
The pattern of global net exports reflected in Table 4.8 shows that a major
expansion of agricultural trade takes place in cereals and animal products, the
commodities exported by the developed countries of North America and Oceania.
The major exports of developing countries - namely, protein feed, other food,
and nonfood agriculture - also expand, but at a slower rate.
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Table ,1.8. Global net exports, 1980, 1990, and 2000: reference scenario.
Volumes % change over 1980
Unit of
Commodity account 1980 1990 !!OOO 1990 2000
Wheat 106 t 78.1 113.0 139.9 44.7 79.1
Rice 106 t 8.2 12.9 16.1 56.7 94.9
Coarse grains 106 t 82.9 113.4 172.1 36.8 107.6
Bovine and ovine 106 t 3.5 4.1 6.0 16.7 71.9
Dairy 106 t 16.8 21.1 29.0 25.6 72.7
Other animal products 106 t 0.9 1.1 1.4 25.6 59.3
Protein feed 106 t 16.7 20.6 23.7 23.4 42.1
Other food 109 US$ 1970 15.4 20.8 24.4 35.0 58.9
Nonfood agriculture 109 US$ 1970 5.3 6.1 7.0 15.3 31.0
The lower growths in trade of other food and nonfood agriculture may also
be a result of the fact that these are aggregates involving a number of commodi-
ties each and that, for each national or country group model, only net exports
(i.e., exports minus imports) are generated. Thus, the growth rates of the
volume of net trade in these aggregates as generated in a scenario of models may
underestimate gross volumes if the subaggregates are partly exported and partly
imported. Though one may argue that, if the trade patterns of commodities
within an aggregate were to remain the same, the growth rates should not be
different, it is an unlikely assumption, and in the model scenarios the growth
rates of traded volumes of these two sectors are likely to be underestimated.
The pattern of trade is affected by the trade deficits - for the economy as a
whole - for the various countries. As was indicated in Chapter 3, the trade
deficits are determined every year endogenously in a globally consistent way
based on a notion of a sustainable level of deficit depending on the country's
growth rate, export earnings of the previous year, and debt service. The result-
ing pattern of trade deficits are shown in Table 4.9.
The projected total net trade deficits show that the developed market
economies increase their trade surplus, the CMEA and China are projected to
maintain balanced trade, and most of the developing market economies increase
their deficits or reduce their surpluses. The exceptions are Brazil, whose trade
deficit of nearly US$ 2 billion (1970$) in 1980 turns into a similar surplus by the
year 2000, and Mexico, Egypt, and Turkey, whose trade deficits decline mod-
estly.
The country-wise pattern of agricultural trade is shown in Table 4.10. Here
one sees significant changes in traded quantities, and also the changing impor-
tance of commodities in a country's trade. Reversals of trade direction for some
commodities are noticeable. Though a number of countries reverse the direction
of trade in commodities in which they were marginal traders, some major rever-
sals are also seen. The major changes are as follows:
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Table .1-9. Net trade deficits in the reference scenario (in 106 US$ 1970).a
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Countries
USA
Canada
Australia
New Zealand
Austria
EC
Japan
Argentina
Brazil
Mexico
Egypt
Kenya
Nigeria
India
Indonesia
Pakistan
Thailand
Turkey
aA minus sign implies a surplus.
1980
265
116
11
289
322
385
-2342
-809
1968 26
781
1191
143
-349
1917
-170
1182
355
1227
1990
-5476
-673
-195
88
16
-4484
-3122
-289
-489
389
777
270
-118
2966
-64
2055
478
742
2000
-6559
-912
-209
-2
-57
-6222
-5331
-127
-2001
437
1046
378
-124
5106
-40
2839
677
875
(1) Wheat exporters and importers continue to remain so, with the exception
of New Zealand, which becomes an importer by 2000 (in fact by 1990) from
being a very small exporter in 1980.
(2) India turns from a small importer of rice in 1980 to a significant exporter
by 2000, whereas Brazil turns from a small exporter in 1980 to a modest
importer in 2000.
(3) Mexico turns into an importer of coarse grain from being a small exporter
of it in 1980.
(4) Brazil, from being a small exporter of bovine and ovine meats in 1980,
becomes a major importer by 2000.
(5) In dairy products, the USA becomes a major exporter by 2000, whereas in
1980 it was a modest importer. The US policy in this scenario of maintain-
ing a constant level of protection for dairy products leads to this outcome.
The EC continues to maintain its exports at more or less the same level,
but its share in the global trade declines.
(6) Though the major exporters continue more or less to retain their shares of
the market for particular commodities, some countries do change their
shares significantly in some markets.
Table 4.11 shows the terms-of-trade indices for the countries for 1980 and
2000. The terms-of-trade index is calculated as a ratio of unit value of exports to
unit value of imports relative to the same ratio prevailing in 1970. The fall in
world market prices of wheat and coarse grains; the increase in the prices of
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bovine and ovine meat, dairy products, and nonfood agricultural products; and
changes in the traded quantities of these commodities mostly determine the
changes in terms of trade. Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Pakistan either
increase imports or decrease exports of those products that increase in price and
thus suffer a loss of terms of trade. India. on the other hand, increases its
imports of bovine and ovine meats and dairy products as well as its exports of
wheat. The loss in terms of trade is partly compensated by its increased exports
of nonfood agricultural products. Even then its terms of trade fall by around 8%
from 1980 to 2000. Though the USA expands its export of dairy products sub-
;tantially, the los~ due to fall in pnces of wheat and coarse grains, its major
exports, results in a terms-of-trade loss of around 8%. The EC's loss in terms of
trade is mainly due to its reduced exports of dairy products, while the CMEA's
loss is mainly due to its increased imports of nonfood agriculture.
The countries that lose on their terms of trade, except for the USA and
Canada, are also the countries whose balances of agricultural trade (also given in
Table 4.11) decline. Most countries maintain their status as either having a
surplus in agricultural trade or a deficit. The two exceptions are Brazil and
Indonesia. Brazil's agricultural trade surplus changes jnto a modest deficit by
the year 2060, whereas Indonesia's sm us becomes a sizable deficit. The
US s agricultural trade surplus, in spite of its loss in terms of trade, continues
to grow, and so does the EC's deficit. India's agricultural trade surplus declines,
but it still remains a surplus country by the year 2000.
Agricultural self-sufficiency ratios, defined as the ratio of the value of agri-
cultural production to the value of demand for agricultural products, are also
shown in Table 4.11. These indicate that, among the net agricultural importers
in 1980 shown in the table, the EC and Nigeria significantly and the CMEA and
Egypt marginally increase their dependence on imports for agricultural products.
The fall in the EC's agricultural self-sufficiency ratio is partly the outcome of the
EC's CAP, which tries to maintain domestic relative prices through variable
levies that insulate its farmers from the world market. As a result, when the
world price of a commodity changes, the EC does not fully alter its trade. Some
of the agricultural surplus countries do reduce their surplus from 1980 to 2000,
but they remain as surplus countries, except for Indonesia, whose self-sufficiency
ratio goes down to 0.9 from 1.02. Countries with substantial agricultural sur-
pluses increase their surpluses, except for Brazil.
This overview of the development of trade patterns in the reference
scenario thus shows the increasing importance of trade and interdependence, and
the continuing of global specialization in most cases.
(Note: It should be recalled that net trade in the model system is the result
of the interaction of estimated demand and supply modules which capture the
persisting trends of the estimation period 1961-1976. Therefore, the trade
figures for 1980 presented in Table 4.10 obtained from the reference scenario do
not in all cases reflect magnitude and/or sign of historical data.)
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Table ~.11. Agricultural terms of trade, agricultural trade balance, and agricultural
self-sufficiency: reference scenario.
Terms 0/ trade Trade balance Sel/-suffi-
(1970 = 1.0) (109 US$ 1970) ciency ratioa
Group 1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000
North America and Oceania
USA 0.98 0.90 9.6 15.8 1.25 1.35
Canada 1.00 0.98 1.2 2.8 1.33 1.67
Australia 1.05 1.10 1.6 2.8 1.66 1.90
New Zealand 1.04 1.44 0.8 1.1 2.20 2.04
Other developed countries
Austria 0.97 0.98 -0.1 -0.3 0.91 0.96
EC 0.93 0.87 -4.0 -6.9 0.89 0.85
Japan 0.96 0.96 -3.4 -4.0 0.75 0.80
Centrally planned economies
CMEA 0.98 0.88 -2.7 -3.7 0.96 0.95
China 1.09 1.23 0.9 0.5 1.02 1.01
Developing market economies
Argentina 1.01 1.18 1.1 2.4 1.30 1.49
Brazil 1.05 0.90 1.5 -0.3 1.17 1.02
Mexico 1.10 1.18 0.3 0.6 1.08 1.07
Egypt 1.12 1.15 -0.1 -0.2 0.97 0.96
Kenya 1.15 1.28 0.2 0.4 1.23 1.28
Nigeria 0.95 0.88 -0.6 -2.9 0.91 0.82
India 1.11 1.02 0.8 0.1 1.03 1.00
Indonesia 1.06 0.88 0.1 1.1 1.02 0.90
Pakistan 1.00 0.92 -0.2 -0.2 0.94 0.97
Thailand 1.11 1.16 1.0 1.4 1.37 1.28
Turkey 1.14 1.28 0.4 1.1 1.08 1.12
a{Value of agricultural production}/{Value of domestic demand for agricultural products).
4.6. Tariff in the Reference Scenario
Implicit in the price transmission equations that characterize government
behavior in our models are the tariff factors, which relate the domestic prices to
the border prices. These factors thus reflect the extent to which governments
protect or tax domestic producers and consumers. Their evolution over time can
be taken to reflect the evolution of protective policies over time and hence is an
important attribute with which to characterize the nature of the reference
scenario.
The tariff equivalents, summarized for 1980 and 2000 in Table ~.12, show
that, in general, for most commodities and countries, these factors remain more
or less stable. Thus, the reference scenario implies more or less a continuation of
the historical levels of protection. However, as discussed in Section 4.3, the tariff
equivalents for bovine and ovine meat and dairy products are somewhat
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Table 4.1f!. Relative nominal tariff equivalentsa of agricultural products in percent of
the world market price usintb consumer prices (three-year averages for 1980-1982,
1998--2000): reference scenario.
Bovine Other Pro- Nonfood
Coarse & ovine animal tein Other agricul-
Country Year Wheat Rice grams meat Dairy products feed food ture
Argentina 1980 -21 7 -20 -27 -17 -22 -0 -32 -5
2000 -20 11 -11 -28 -18 -16 2 -28 -10
Australia 1980 15 27 29 -5 -7 40 15 14 -4
2000 23 25 39 -10 -7 27 19 22 -4
Austria 1980 42 -5 85 74 34 11 20 10 46
2000 38 -6 83 22 -12 4 22 9 81
Brazil 1980 13 2 -16 -13 22 -36 -11 -18 -19
2000 33 -20 -27 -19 -11 -35 -10 -24 -19
Canada 1980 13 -7 14 25 53 -1 -18 -12 15
2000 19 -8 21 6 23 -11 -18 -12 -7
Egypt 1980 30 -6 21 72 14 83 1 -23 -29
2000 33 -23 19 41 11 83 -4 -23 -39
Indonesia 1980 -2 -12 -17 3 10 15 -4 -16 -36
2000 -0 -12 3 -1 5 -2 -19 -25 -45
Japan 1980 35 253 42 52 106 43 134 44 98
2000 31 254 39 56 69 27 127 37 74
Mexico 1980 -7 12 7 12 -3 22 -11 17 -33
2000 -4 27 -7 -8 -14 17 -11 18 -28
Nigeria 1980 44 76 15 42 51 106 -18 -12 -16
2000 47 131 37 82 145 115 -26 -11 12
Pakistan 1980 23 68 50 37 28 31 -2 -17 -17
2000 16 44 82 1 31 22 4 -18 -30
Turkey 1980 31 44 20 61 249 63 55 6 -5
2000 30 40 34 11 172 29 40 0 -1
EC 1980 84 65 42 61 70 26 35 5 26
2000 112 61 37 12 34 24 36 12 28
Kenya 1980 10 0 0 -25 25 5 -5 -10 -10
2000 10 0 0 -25 25 5 -5 -10 -10
New Zealand 1980 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0
2000 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0
Thailand 1980 0 -20 -10 -25 30 -10 -10 -5 -25
2000 0 -20 -10 -25 30 -10 -10 -5 -25
India 1980 68 2 9 9 48 3 1 -28 --9
2000 54 -7 13 30 43 31 -30 -25 -13
USA 1980 0 0 0 25 80 -5 0 5 25
2000 0 0 0 25 80 -5 0 5 25
a..rhese are calculated as the difference between border prices and domestic consumer raw ma-
terial prices, depend on the direction of trade as explained in Appendix A2 and are calculated
with absolute prices (not prices relative to the nonagricultural price).
b-{) means a small negative number, +0 a small positive one.
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exceptional. They decline significantly in some countries and increase in Nigeria.
The decline of tariff equivalents for bovine and ovine meats and, to a smaller
extent, for dairy products, when the world market prices of these products rise,
implies that policies in countries protecting these commodities are directed
toward maintaining desired levels of domestic price for them and not certain lev-
els of protection. This may be a reasonable policy.
As pointed out previously, maintenance and improvement of income parity
is the objective of various groups pressing for protective policies. Thus, parity is
a relevant indicator to see how well protective p:>licies have worked in the
scenario. The development of income parity between agriculture and nonagricul-
ture is seen in Table 4.19. Here income parity is defined as a ratio of CDP agri-
culture per unit of agricultural labor to CDP nonagriculture per unit of nonagri-
cultural labor. Also given in the table are the growth rates of income parity
ratios, and the price and protection rate of agriculture relative to nonagriculture.
The income parity ratios as calculated may not represent the true income
ratios in the economy, particularly for the developing countries. This is because
in many countries the data on labor employed in agriculture may include many
part-time workers who work outside of agriculture. Their earnings from the
nonagricultural sector are not included with their agricultural income except in
the model of India. Moreover, income from processing agricultural products is
counted as a part of nonagricultural income in the models, and this, to the
extent that such processing is done by many agricultural producers themselves,
also understates agricultural incomes. Also, the way parity is arrived at here
assumes that the factors land and capital are owned by those people who work in
those sectors in which these factors are employed. This discrepancy in the calcu-
lation of parity ratios does not affect the outcome of the models as, except for
India, income classes are not distinguished in the models. Though the level of
the income parity ratios as calculated may not be too reliable, the parity ratios
are calculated in a consistent manner so that their changes over time should be
much more realistic.
The average labor productivity ratios in the developed countries seem to
grow more slowly over the period 1980-2000, compared to their growth rates
over the period 1961-1980. To some extent this reflects the fact that over the
period 1961-1980 significant out-migration of labor from agriculture took place.
From the lower agricultural population of 1980 compared to that of 1960, this
rate of out-migration is likely to be much smaller over 1980-2000.
In general, the income parity ratios for the year 2000 seem to follow the
trend of the ratios for 1961 and 1980. The changes in the parity ratios result
from changes in relative prices consequent to changes in world market prices and
relative protection rates, and average labor productivities. Changes in relative
protection rates depend on the price transmission equation, which represents
government policy in the model. Changes in average labor productivities are the
outcome of labor migration from agriculture to nonagriculture, as well as techni-
cal progress and capital accumulation (which change labor/capital ratios).
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Table 4-19. Income parity ratios and rates of change of parity, relative price in agricul-
ture, and labor productivity, 1980-2000: reference scenario.
Income parity ratioa
% change per annum
1980-2000
Group 1980 2000 Parity PAl PNc
Labor pro-
d .. duchvlty
North America & Oceania:
USA
Canada
Australia
New Zealand
Other developed countries:
Austria
EC
Japan
Centrally planned economies:
CMEA
China
Developing market economies:
Argentina
Brazil
Mexico
Egypt
Kenya
Nigeria
Indiae
Indonesia
Pakistan
Thailand
Turkey
0.50
1.25
1.48
0.42
0.47
0.26
0.67
0.16
0.10
0.25
0.08
0.53
0.54
0.27
0.43
0.08
0.18
1.00
0.73
1.12
1.71
0.41
0.61
0.28
0.81
0.14
0.12
0.32
0.10
0.58
0.54
0.38
0.46
0.07
0.29
1.15
0.80
1.73
3.35
0.40
0.71
0.30
1.15
0.13
0.19
0.27
0.14
0.59
0.56
0.31
0.55
0.04
0.31
0.7
0.4
2.2
3.4
-0.1
0.7
0.4
1.8
-0.2
2.1
-0.8
2.0
0.1
0.2
-1.0
0.9
-2.2
0.4
0.7
0.1
1.1
2.2
-0.2
0.2
0.1
1.1
0.7
0.4
0.8
0.9
1.3
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.4
-D.3
0.3
1.1
1.2
0.1
0.5
0.3
3.0
1.8
0.7
-0.9
1.7
-1.5
1.1
-1.2
2.3
-1.3
0.6
-2.6
0.7
a( Agricultural GDP/ Agricultural labor)/(Nonagricultural GDP/Nonagricultural labor) at
current prices. bBased on FAP data base. cp A/P N (Price of agriculture)/(Price of nonagricul-
ture). dDefined as the ratio of GDP per unit of labor at constant prices in agriculture to that in
nonagriculture. eparity figure for India refers to rural/urban rather than agricultural/
nonagricultural per capita incomes.
Though the various determinants of income parity ratios move differently,
government policies reflected in the price transmission equations adjust domestic
prices and the protection rates in ways that result in income parity ratios that
are in general consistent with past trends.
What is worth noting is that, in a number of countries, income parity ratios
improve over time in favor of agriculture, and yet, even by 2000, agricultural
incomes are less than nonagricultural incomes in all but four countries shown in
the Table 4.19.
In addition to the changes in tariff rates and parity ratios, changes in vari-
ous agricultural price indices also characterize the nature of the price
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Table .P4. Price indices (1970 = 1.00): reference scenario.
Country- Indexb of
specific domestic
world producer price Crop Food
price of of agriculture price price
agriculturea PA/PN indexc indexc
Countries 1980 f!OOO 1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000
USA 1.02 1.14 1.00 1.15 1.96 6.06
Canada 1.01 1.10 1.17 1.20 1.07 1.01 1.07 1.19
Australia 1.05 1.27 0.84 1.04 0.91 0.91 0.93 1.13
New Zealand 1.05 1.40 0.98 1.53 1.34 1.34 1.24 1.44
Austria 1.05 1.19 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.89 1.04 1.12
EC 1.05 1.20 1.08 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.08 1.18
Japan 1.08 1.15 1.07 1.09 1.01 1.05 1.08 1.21
CMEA 1.06 1.17 1.00 1.00
China 1.09 1.14 1.00 1.00
Argentina 1.04 1.25 1.04 1.31 1.05 1.04 0.99 1.24
Brazil 1.10 1.21 1.30 1.50 1.16 1.19 1.16 1.36
Mexico 1.07 1.17 1.22 1.32 1.16 1.27 1.13 1.23
Egypt 1.09 1.19 1.28 1.51 1.19 1.20 1.17 1.29
Kenya 1.08 1.22 1.06 1.27 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.16
Nigeria 1.12 1.18 1.31 1.70 1.18 1.34 1.23 1.51
India 1.07 1.13 0.96 1.05
Indonesia 1.10 1.15 1.01 1.09 1.02 1.08 1.02 1.15
Pakistan 1.06 1.22 1.30 1.37 1.07 0.98 1.22 1.29
Thailand 1.09 1.15 1.07 1.16 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Turkey 1.09 1.18 1.12 1.06 1.04 1.06 1.14 1.25
World 1.07 1.16
aLaspeyres index of country-specific world prices weighted by domestic production. bThese are
divisia indices (which have changing weights), except for India, for which the indices are
Laspeyres indices. cAlI prices are related to that of nonagriculture. The price index of crops ex-
cludes animal products. The price index of food includes all foods including animal products.
transmission policy functions and the reference scenario. The country-wise price
indices given in Table 4.14 show that the raw material producer price of agricul-
ture relative to the price of nonagriculture, PAlPN, in different countries rises in
general less than on the world market. This is what can be expected, as most
countries try to insulate domestic prices from world prices to some extent or
other. New Zealand, Argentina, and Nigeria show increases larger than the 13%
increase in the world market relative price of agriculture, as these countries
either increase their protection rates (Nigeria) or share of production (Argentina
and New Zealand) of commodities that increase their prices (bovine and ovine
meats, dairy products, and nonfood agriculture) over the 1980-2000 period. The
only two countries showing a fall in the relative price of agriculture are Austria
and Turkey. These two countries show substantial reduction in the protection
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rates of commodities that gain most in prices - namely, bovine and ovine meats
and dairy products. In spite of this fall, the income parity ratio for Austria
decreases only slightly (from 0041 in 1980 to 0040 in 2000), while the ratio for
Turkey increases slightly (from 0.29 in 1980 to 0.31 in 2000).
The price indices of crops given in Table 4.Lt are for producer raw material
prices relative to nonagriculture. Most of them show very little change or small
declines. Once again, this is what can be expected as world prices of crops also
decline over this period. The price indices for food in Table 4.14 are consumer
raw material prices and show that, in the reference scenario, food prices increase
for consumers, reflecting the increased share of animal products in consumption.
In conclusion, the development of tariff factors, income parity ratios, and
price indices in the reference scenario implies policy behavior in different coun-
tries that seems consistent with past trends and behavior.
4.7. Agriculture in the National Economies
Table 4.15 shows the share of agricultural GDP in total GDP as well as the allo-
cation of factors and inputs to agriculture. It can be seen that the growth rates
of GDP are higher for the developing countries, though the CMEA shows a
growth rate of 404% and Japan shows one above 5%. The share of agricultural
GDP declines in all countries. Comparing the shares of labor and capital used in
agriculture with the share of agricultural value added, one can see the factor
intensity in agriculture relative to the economy. When the share of labor in agri-
culture is higher and that of capital in agriculture is lower than the share of agri-
culture in total GDP, then one can conclude that the labor/capital ratio is higher
in agriculture than in the economy as a whole. Thus, in 1980, the agricultural
labor /capital ratio is higher in all the countries, except Australia and New Zea-
land, than the average ratio for the economy. Comparing the growth rates in the
shares one sees that, for the developed market economies, the labor share
declines faster than the capital share, which implies that the differences in the
labor/ capital ratios between agriculture and the economy reduce over time,
whereas in most developing countries they increase.
The gross cultivated area increases over the period 1980-2000 in all coun-
tries except the EC and Japan, as would be expected for these two highly
developed and densely populated regions.
Use of fertilizer grows at a faster rate in countries that begin with a rela-
tively low intensity of fertilizer use. Among these are Australia and Canada,
which have a relatively low level of fertilizer use in 1980 compared to other
developed countries. In all countries the growth rates of fertilizer use are much
larger than the growth rates of area expansion, showing increases in intensities of
fertilizer applications.
Thus, the broad picture painted by the reference scenario of the develop-
ment in agriculture is one of agricultural development accompanied by
intensification of capital per unit of labor and of fertilizer per hectare.
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4.8. Welfare and Hunger in the Reference Scenario
83
Some of the macroeconomic indicators of development and welfare in the various
countries and country groups are shown in Table 4.16. Not all the indicators are
available or calculated for all the national models.
Comparison of per capita GDP valued at domestic 1970 prices and con-
verted into US dollars for different countries shows that the absolute difference
between the developed and the developing countries widens over the period
1980-2000. Thus, for example, the difference in the per capita GDPs in 1970 US
dollars between the USA and India in 1980 is around US $5600 (:= 5731 - 104),
which increases in 2000 to around US $7800 (8017 - 181) even though the ratio
of per capita GDPs declines over this period from 55 (5731/104) to 44
(8017/181).
• The USA continues to remain the country with the highest (among the-1,L
countries shown) per capita GDP, but Canada and Japan narrow the gaps to ,f
become close second and third. Japan overtakes the EC by far.
The equivalent incomes shown in Table 4.16 are calculated using 1970
domestic consumer prices as reference prices. Equivalent income constitutes a
better measure than per capita GDP for comparing welfare of consumers in
alternative situations. The growth rate of equivalent income differs from the
growth rate of the per capita GDP for the same country. For the developed
market economies, the growth rates of per capita GDP and equivalent incomes
are more or less the same. This can be expected as, in high-income countries,
consumption expenditure on food is a relatively small part of the total consump-
tion expenditure, food demand has relatively low price elasticity, and nonagricul-
ture is just one aggregated commodity in the model, so that changes in the com-
position of the consumption bundle due to changes in prices are not too
significant. The income effect of changing prices may be significant, but it is also
captured by the per capita GDP valued at 1970 prices.
For the developing countries, the growth rates of equivalent incomes are
significantly different from the growth rates of per capita GDP. Moreover, for
some countries the former is higher; and for the others, the latter. This under-
lines the difficulties of using constant price per capita GDP for comparing alter-
native situations.
Per capita calorie intake, shown in Table 4.16, is an important indicator of
welfare for developing countries. It shows an improvement over the period
1980-2000 in all developing countries, and the minimum national average in the
reference scenario in the year 2000 is that for Indonesia.
Estimates of life expectancy at birth and number of people in hunger are
derived using the results of the reference scenario and cross-country regressions
as explained in Chapter 3. The relativel well-off countries of entina Mex-
ico, and Turkey show insigm cant chan es in the number of ersons in hunger,
an ere IS slgm can Improvement in all other developing countries, with t e
exception of Kenya. Kenya has a relatively high growth rate of population and,
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though the improvements in per capita GDP and calorie intake result in a lower
proportion of the population in hunger, the number of persons in hunger
increases over the 1980-2000 period.
Table 4.17. Global incidence of hunger: reference scenario.
Population (106)
World
Developing countriesa
Hunger in developing countriesa
Percent of p'opulation
Persons (106)
aExciuding China.
1980
4340
2190
23
510
1990
5190
2800
17
470
!WOO
6160 I
3540
11
400
Even though globally the number of hungry persons declines, it still consti-
tutes a sizable number. The estimates of hungry at the global level are given in
Table 4.17. While the incidence of hunger declines from 23% of population in
1980 to 11% of population of developing countries, excluding China, by 2000
there are still 400 million people in hunger, compared to 510 million shown in the
scenario for 1980.
4.9. Concluding Observation
In conclusion, the reference scenario paints a perspective of development up to
2000 that can be characterized as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
The economic growth rate is somewhat more optimistic than the historical
trend over the 1960s and the 1970s.
Although effective demand for food grows substantially owing to higher
incomes and larger populations, the world food system meets this demand
with very modest increase in overall agricultural prices, but with a decline
in basic staples prices.
The policies providing more or less stable protection levels are continued in
the scenario. The importance of agricultural trade increases, reflecting the
growing interdependence of the world.
Considerable improvement in various indicators of welfare is shown. In
particular, the proportion of the population of poor countries that is in
hunger decreases significantly.~ven then, howeve.!J-the absolute number of
hungry people declines only marginally, and a large number of eo Ie
remain hungry even y e end 0 e cen ur
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Finally, to appreciate the internal consistency of the scenarios generated by
the BLS, the projection of the reference scenario may be compared with other
projections made with less formal methods.
This projection for the year 2000 in the reference scenario can be compared
with the projections made in the FAD's Agriculture: Toward 2000 study (F AD,
1981a). The only two comparable commodity groups in AT 2000 and in our
scenario are cereals and milk. The trend projections of AT 2000 (see Table
4.18) indicate a cereal surplus of 213 million tonnes for the developed countries
but only a 165-million tonne deficit for the developing countries. These do not
balance at the global level. Nor does milk trade balance. The FAD study notes,
however, that these projected "imbalances would not materialize; spontaneous or
policy induced adjustments will bring balance." However, the study indicates
neither what this new balance would be, nor what would be the needed policies
and price adjustments.
Table 4.18. AT 2000: Implied commodity balances of trend projections to 2000.a
Product
Cereals
Sugar
Citrus
Vegetable oils
Meat
Milk
Developed countries
(106 t)
+213
-13.5
-0.8
-2.8
+12.3
+17.5
All developing countries
(106 t)
-165
+20.7
+10.0
+6.0
-3.0
-25.0
a+, net exports; -, net imports. Source: FAO (1981a), Table 2.3.
Compared to that study, the reference projection described here provides a
global balance and also respects the balance-of-trade constraints for individual
nations. Thus, a consistent projection is made and the associated policy mea-
sures and regimes are identified. Thus, the RD scenario shows that the
developed countries would export nearly 165 million tonnes of cereals and 26 mil-
lion tonnes of dairy products (milk equivalent) compared to 213 million tonnes
and 17.5 million tonnes, respectively, in the F AD trend projections. It should be
noted that the numbers from our RO scenario are rather close to the import lev-
els projected by the FAD for the developing countries.
Note
[1] Actually, in the early 1980s the EO was a net exporter of bovine and ovine meat.
The reader should not overweigh this deviation of model results from actual
figures, since the reference run is not meant to be a forecast. Neither do the results
of the policy analysis depend too strongly on the assumptions of the reference run.
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CHAPTER 5
Reducing Trade Distortions
in DECD Countries
6.1. Introduction
Among the DECD countries, agricultural protection is an important issue of
trade negotiations. In fact, the DECD Council of Ministers has given the secre-
tariat a mandate to study the impact of agricultural trade liberalization by
DECD countries. Thus, a scenario to explore the impact of agricultural liberali-
zation by DECD countries is of specific policy interest.
The countries of the DECD together are sufficiently large actors in world
trade that, when they liberalize trade simultaneously, world prices will change,
though the direction of change cannot be easily predicted. Dne cannot predict a
priori whether, in the resulting equilibrium, a country within the DECD will gain
or lose in welfare from trade liberalization. In describing the results of this
scenario on trade liberalization, the following questions are addressed:
(1) How do the world market prices change?
(2) What is the impact on agricultural production and trade in the world and
in the individual countries? How do market shares change?
(3) What is the welfare gain, if any, for the various DECD countries?
(4) How are farmer incomes and parity affected?
(5) What is the impact on other countries, particularly the developing coun-
tries, of trade liberalization by DECD countries?
6.2. Higher World Market Prices under Trade Liberalization
by the OEeD
With trade liberalization by the DECD countries [Australia, Austria, Canada,
EC, Japan, New Zealand, and the USA, for which explicit models exist in the
BLS (Turkey is excluded from liberalization as one of the less-developed DECD
countries); the other DECD countries are included in a country group model
88 Toward Free Trade in Agriculture
and also liberalizej, the world market prices of agricultural products relative to
nonagriculture would be higher by 9% by the year 2000 compared to the refer-
ence run (see Table 5.1). This modest average increase, however, is misleading
because its modest level is strongly influenced by the very small increase in the
price of the commodity group with a high weight and facing relatively low pro-
tection in the OECD countries - namely, "other food", dominated by fruits,
vegetables, and tropical products.
Table 5.1. Percentage changes in world market prices and global net exports in 2000
under OECD trade liberalization relative to the reference scenario.
Commodity
Wheat
Rice
Coarse grains
Bovine and ovine products
Dairy products
Other animal products
Protein feed
Other food
Nonfood agricultv;e
Total agriculture
Nonagriculture
Relative prices
18
21
11
17
31
-0
13
5
-2
9
o
Net exportsa
-2
37
-5
35
13
17
5
10
5
17
aChanges in quantities, except for net exports of total agriculture for which change in the ag-
gregate export index weighted by 1970 world prices is reported. bprice weighted by produc-
tion.
In fact, for the commodities of primary importance to the producers in
OECD countries, such as cereals, protein feed, and animal products, the
increases in world market price compared to the reference scenario are of the
order of 10-20% and, for dairy products, more than 30%.
The movement of the index of relative prices (with 1980 as base) compared
to the reference run is shown in Figures 8.1-8.9. These figures show that the
transition to trade liberalization more or less stabilizes world market prices by
the early 1990s.
The long-term development of prices in a scenario, as discussed in Chapter
4, is the outcome of the interplay of demand shifts due to population and income
growths and supply shifts due to technical progress and factor allocations. Since
the differences in income growth between the OECD trade liberalization and the
reference scenario are relatively small (and population growths are the same),
even at the country levels the demand shifts should be similar in the two runs.
Explanations for the differences in the prices between the runs have thus to be
sought mainly from the way supply shifts develop in response to changes in
prices between the two runs.
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6.3. Changes in Growth Patterns of National Economies
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The macroeconomic indicators given for different countries in Table 5.2 show
how agricultural trade liberalization by OECD countries affects patterns of
development.
As noted in the previous section, the relative price of agriculture on the
world market increases by 9% in the year 2000, when commodity price changes
are weighted by volumes of global trade. When commodity prices are weighted
by production levels in a country, one obtains country-specific world prices of
agriculture, which are more relevant for looking at the changes in domestic
prices.
Since agricultural GDP is a small part of the economies of OECD coun-
tries, the increase in the relative price of agriculture resulting from trade liberali-
zation has a relatively small impact on savings and real investment. The
changes in total investment, and consequently in total capital, are also very
small. Thus, GDP changes in OECD countries are 0.3% or less, except for New
Zealand, whose GDP in 2000 increases by 1.6% over the reference run value.
Agriculture is more important for New Zealand than for other OECD countries
and the increases in the world prices are in commodities of particular interest to
New Zealand. Table 5.3 shows how changes in the relative price of agriculture
affect investment and GDP in the OECD countries.
The small gains in the GDPs of the EC and Japan, in spite of lower capital
stock, are the results of efficiency gains due to better allocation of resources. The
small drop in Canada's GDP in spite of a larger capital stock is a consequence of
an index number problem, as will be seen later in this chapter.
Thus, the main effect of agricultural trade liberalization is through changes
in allocation of factors between agriculture and nonagriculture as driven by
changes in the relative price of agriculture.
Table 5.4 shows the changes in factor availabilities and GDP in agriculture
and nonagriculture. Relative prices of agriculture are also repeated in this table
for convenience. The elasticities of value added with respect to relative price and
factor availabilities shown in Table A3.1, give a fair indication in most cases of
the changes in value added in agriculture and nonagriculture.
When looking at the individual country behavior at an aggregate level, one
would, in general, expect countries with high protection to reduce production
and countries with low protection to expand production of agricultural goods in
a free trade scenario. The picture is quite clear for developed market economies:
the EC and Japan reduce agricultural output in response to lower prices, and the
economies in North America and Oceania expand output. The USA has, how-
ever, a neutral position in a number of commodities with very small changes in
production (see Table 5.8). The fall in prices of 9-35% for the EC and Japan
causes a reduction in agricultural value added (in constant prices) of the order of
5% owing to the moving out of both labor and capital from agriculture. In
Canada and Oceania, prices increase by around 15%, these increases being
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Table 5.9. Percentage changes in relative price of agriculture, investment and GOP in
GECD 'countries in 2000 under GECD trade liberalization relative to the reference
scenario.
Country pf/pffa PA/PN RIEb RF- TCd GDP70
High protection
Japan 6 -35 0.01 -0.4 -0.6 0.3
EC 12 -9 -0.01 -0 -0.1 0.2
Austria 13 7 0.01 0.3 0.3 --0
Low protection
USA 12 -2 0.1
Australia 13 14 0.05 1.2 0.9 0.3
Canada 12 15 0.00 0.4 0.1 -0.1
New Zealand 16 16 5.6 4.5 1.6
aWorld prices weighted by country's production. bRIE, real investment elasticity with respect
to PAlPN, calculated around reference run values as described in Chapter 3 and given in Table
9.4. cRI, real investment. dTC, total capital.
associated with a similarly large expansion in output, backed up by higher
investments and more labor input (see Table 5.4).
As developing countries do not change their protection policies in the
OECD free trade scenario, the higher world market prices influence their domes-
tic markets as determined by the price transmission mechanisms and the produc-
tion structure. Hence, there is a great variation in the resulting domestic price
increase, from a few percentage points in most cases to around 10% in some
~ases, such as tor ArgentlOa and Kenya.
5.4. Changes in Production and Trade in the World under
DECD Trade Liberalization
Associated with the higher world market prices under trade liberalization is an
expansion of world agricultural production and trade.
5.4.1. Production increases only modestly at the global level
Though production increases in all agricultural commodities except nonfood agri-
culture, the changes are rather modest (see Table 5.5). The largest increase, in
bovine and ovine meats, is only 3.3% in the year 2000. These small changes in
production, in spite of sizable changes in world prices, reflect the fact that
demands for human consumption, particularly in the OECD countries, where the
major price changes take place, are not very price elastic. The income changes
between the reference scenario and the OECD trade liberalization scenario are
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Table 5.4. Percentage changes in sectoral G DPs and factor use in 2000 under GECD
trade liberalization relative to the reference scenario.
Countries PA/PN
a GDPA70b GDPNA70c Lagd Cage TA f T~
Pootively protected
developed countriu:
Japan -35 -5 0.4 -5 -22 -6.0 -0.6
EC -9 -7 0.4 -12 -5 -2.2 --{l.1
USA -2 2 0.1 2.5
Negatively protected
developed countriu:
New Zealand 16 14 -0 3 30 4.5
Canada 15 17 -0.5 20 21 2.4 0.1
Australia 14 3 0.1 4 14 -0 0.9
Austria 7 1 -0.1 2 2 -0 0.3
Developing countrie5:
Argentina 12 14 -1.4 15 20 1.4 1.5
Kenya 11 5 0.6 12 3.8
Brazil 8 1 -0.3 10 4.4 0.1
Thailand 8 3 -0.3 7 1.0
Egypt 5 2 -1.6 2 6 3.2 0.1
Turkey 1 6 -1.2 3 7 1.3 0.5
Pakistan 1 3 -1.2 2 3 0.6 0.5
Indonesia 2 0 -0 0 2 -0 0.5
India 3 0 0.1 0 0
Nigeria 0 7 0.1 5 8 4.6 2.2
Mexico -1 4 -2.4 6 3 -0 -1.0
aRelative prices of agriculture. b Agricultural value added (at 1970 prices). CNonagricultural
value added (at 1970 prices). d Agricultural labor input. eAgricultural capital stock. fTotal
acreage. gTotal capital.
small: demand shifts in a comparable way in the two scenarios. Thus changes in
demands between the two scenarios are small, and so are the corresponding
increases in production at the global level.
The production changes in the DECD countries, however, are substantial,
particularly for the highly protected countries (see Table 5.6). The DECD coun-
tries with low levels of protection and the developing countries increase their
productions to fill the gap created by the reduction in production by the highly
protected DECD countries. In terms of agricultural GDP, the DECD countries
with low protection gain more than twice as much as the developing countries
do. The changes in production levels entail changes in agricultural GDPs, which
impiYchanges in"Tarm incomes as well
- ThUS, what this scenario shows is that protection provided to farmers in
DECD countries depresses agricultural production and agricultural incomes in
developing countries and DECD countries with low levels of protection. The
support provided to farmers in the highly protected DECD countries is at the
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Table 5...5. Percentage changes in global trade, production, and human consumption
under OECD trade liberalization relative to the reference scenario in 1990 and 2000.
Production Trade Consumption
Commodity
Wheat
Rice
Coarse grains
Bovine and ovine
Dairy
Other animal products
Protein feed
Other food
Nonfood agriculture
Nonagriculture
1990
1.1
1.2
0.7
0.9
0.8
0.4
2.5
0.3
0.2
0.0
!1OOO
0.5
1.2
1.7
3.3
1.9
0.8
2.0
0.2
-1.5
-0.0
1990
-3.0
42.8
-6.5
33.0
19.9
6.2
5.1
4.2
5.0
15.4
!WOO
-1.5
37.4
-4.5
34.9
12.5
16.8
5.0
10.1
5.1
17.0
1990
-0.6
-0.1
-0.4
1.0
0.9
0.3
-0.1
0.4
0.6
0.2
!1OOO
-0.8
0.0
-0.4
3.5
1.0
0.7
-0.2
0.3
1.4
0.4
cost of farmers in other OECD countries as well as those in the developing coun-
tries. Of course, as will be seen later, the consumers in food-importing develop-
ing countries are better off as a result of this protection.
5.4.2. Trade increases substantially
The modest increases at the global level in production, however, are associated
with much larger increases in trade levels. This is as one would expect, since
liberalization should increase specialization by countries exploiting their com-
parative advantage, leading to larger trade. As the major OECD countries
remove protection, leading in general to lower domestic prices, domestic demand
increases and domestic supplies fan, with imports increasing to fill the gap.---or--
course, the higher world market prices for agnculturaT products reduce Imports
by developing country importers as their demand falls and domestic production
increases to the extent that world market prices are transmitted to consumers
and producers in such developing countries. The sum total of the outcome is the
ex 'on of world roductio e foTmost c~modities as is seen in
Table 5.5 an agure 5.1. Trade expands in all commodities except wheat and
coarse grains. The most striking percentage increase in trade occurs in rice.
Global rice ex or ise b 37% in 2000, mainly, as was pointed out in the revi-
->lus sec lon, as a result of increase imports y ae.an. mce in this model
different varieties of rice are not distinguished, an implicit assumption is made
that either other countries will supply the type of rice Japanese like to eat
(Japonica) or that the Japanese consumers will develop tastes for other types of
rice. The world trade in animal products also increases by 12-35% in 2000.
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Figure 5.1. Percentage changes in (a) global production and (b) global trade under
OECD trade liberalization relative to the reference scenario: W, wheat; R, rice; C,
coarse grain; B, bovine and ovine meat; 0, dairy; 0, other animals; P, protein food; F,
other food; NA, nonagriculture.
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5.4.3. Increased demands push up bovine and ovine meat trade; the
USA produces more even when the producer price falls
The removal of protection from bovine and ovine meats by Japan, the USA, the
EC, and other developed countries significantly lowers domestic retail prices for
the consumers in these countries, who then demand more meat (see Table 5.7).
This leads to higher imports by these countries, higher prices on the world
market, and larger production by other countries. In the USA, in spite of the
lower producer price, the production of bovine and ovine meat does go up com-
pared to the reference scenario even though the US import quota on bovine and
ovine meat is removed. This is the outcome of the fact that the producer price of
dairy products fal1s even more and the comparative profitability of bovine and
ovine meat increases even when its price fal1s. Since, in the USA, the dairy price
fal1s by 27.5% and the bovine and ovine meat price fal1s only by 10.8% (see Table
5.8), a 2.7% increase in production of bovine and ovine meat occurs while dairy
production fal1s.
5.4.4. Wheat and coarse grain trade decline as domestic feed use
increases
Since wheat and coarse grain prices increase under GECD trade liberalization,
the developing countries produce more and import less of these grains. More-
over, since bovine and ovine meat and dairy prices increase much more than the
prices of wheat and coarse grain, they also increase their production of bovine
and ovine meat and dairy products and reduce their imports.
The impact on the production and trade structures in the GECD countries
of changes in relative prices differs from country to country depending on their
former protection levels. Yet the general pattern is that (see Tables 5.2, 5.7, and
5.8) the USA increases its specialization in producing and exporting more grains
whereas the other major low-protected grain producers, Australia and Canada,
reduce theirs. Moreover, Australia and Canada also increase their production of
bovine and ovine meat and dairy products using more of their grains domesti-
cal1y for feeding. The high-protected EC and Japan reduce their total grain pro-
duction, as wel1 as their bovine and ovine meat and dairy production, importing
more (exporting less) of the latter. The USA also increases its imports of bovine
and ovine meat and reduces its exports of dairy products. Thus, the shift into
meat production of major grain exporters, like Australia and Canada, and the
reduction of both grain and meat production in the EC, reduces the net trade of
wheat and coarse grains under GECD trade liberalization.
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5.4.5. Shifts in trade pattern
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The most significant shift in the world trade pattern is that the highly protected
OECD countries under trade liberalization reduce a ri ex orts and
increase elf a ncu tura imports see Table 5.9 .
One would expect that the OECD countries with low protection would
export a large part of the additional production stimulated by the higher prices
under trade liberalization. However, this is the case only for wheat and protein
feed. For bovine and ovine meat, as well as dairy products, exports even fall.
The reason is that for these products the USA has a high protection (although
its general protection level is low). When trade is liberalized, the lower beef and
milk prices stimulate consumption in this country by more than 10%. Because of
the large volumes involved, this more than offsets the fall in demand in other
low-protected OECD countries.
The developing countries are thus able to export more of their traditional
agricultural products - rice and other food - at higher prices. The LDCs also
reduce their imports of wheat, coarse grain, and dairy products, and turn rice
imports into exports; as a result, their agricultural trade surpluses in 2000 are
nearly trebled compared to the reference scenario.
The increased volume of agricultural trade also results in increased trade of
nonagriculture. In particular the developing countries as a group are able to
expand significantly (by 21%) their imports of nonagriculture under OECD trade
liberalization.
5.4.6. Trade patterns at country levels change significantly
The changes in trade patterns look even more dramatic when one looks at indivi-
dual country shares in the trade of various commodities. Figures 5.2-5.10 show
these. Table 5.10 depicts the trade patterns in 1980 and 2000, while percentage
changes in 2000 relative to the reference scenario for different countries are given
in Table 5.11.
When compared with percentage changes in global trade, the data in Table
5.11 show which countries improve their market share as a result of trade
liberalization by the OECD. From the point of view of balance of payments of a
country, absolute levels of trade rather than market shares are important.
Nonetheless, in international negotiations for trade liberalization, countries do
emphasize market shares, and this may be worth a brief discussion here.
The USA increases its exports of crops - wheat, rice, coarse grains, protein
feeds, other foods, and nonfood agriculture - as well as of other meats. In wheat
and coarse grains, it improves its share in the world market and becomes even
more dominant. Its imports of bovine meats increase and it reverses its trade
direction for dairy products and nonfood agriculture compared to the reference
scenario.
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Figure 5.!!. National shares in the global net exports of wheat under OECD trade
liberalization.
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In general. the EC reduces its exports and increases its imports of a~rjclll-
tural-COmmodities. The exce tions are protein feeds an which
I s Imports are reduced as it reduces pro uction of animal products. The EC~
loses market shares in all its exports. """'""
Japan imports all agricultural commodities except other meats, of which it
is a small exporter in the reference run for the year 2000. With OECD trade
liberalization, it increases all its imports and also its lone agricultural export,
other meats.
ada reduces its exports of wheat and coarse grains and becomes a
major exporter of dairy pro uc s, provi 109 near y 0 0 g obal exports.
--:BOth Australia and New Zealand improve their market shares in dairy
products.
Even when the developing countries maintain the nature of their policy
regimes as reflected in the price transmission equations, trade liberalization by
OECD countries affects their trading patterns. Notable among these are expan-
sion of wheat exports by India and Pakistan, and expansion of bovine and ovine
meat exports by Argentina.
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5.5. What Causes Changes in World Market Prices of Agri-
cultural Commodities?
The movements of factors of production between agriculture and nonagriculture
are mainly determined by the price of agriculture relative to nonagriculture.
Given the availability of factors for agricultural production, the commodity pat-
tern of production is determined by the relative profitabilities of different com-
modities, which in turn are determined by relative producer prices.
Changes in producer prices in different countries between the runs depend
on the extent of protection that was provided to the producers in the reference
run and on the changes in the world market prices. Together with the long-term
supply responses to producer price changes, the changes in protection rates
become important determinants of supply, quantity demanded, net trade, and
consequently world market prices.
In these variables, one can look for explanations for the relatively high price
increases for dairy products, bovine and ovine meats, and cereals.
5.5.1 Why does the dairy price rise?
The major producers and exporters of dairy products are the developed coun-
tries. Though India is a major producer, it is not an exporter. Table 5.12 shows
that the EC, the USA, and New Zealand provide '80\£ly 88% of the exports of
dairy products in the year eference scenario. When trade is liberal-
ize, e aIry producers receive a price that is lower by 27.5% compared to
the reference scenario price, and consequently US milk production is reduced by
12%. A 28% fall in the consumer retail price of dairy products leads to a 10%
increase in demand, and the USA turns into a major dair im orte
dairy exporter. The change of -177% in exports shown in Table 5.12 means
that under OECD trade liberalization the USA imports 77% of what it exports in
the reference scenario.
In the EC, under OECD trade liberalizatio.n, the (relative) producer prices
for dairy products and bovine and ovine meat increase whereas all other agricul-
tural prices go down. Yet production of dairy products and of bovine and ovine
meat goes down in the EC by 6% and 8%, respectively, and dairy exports go
down by 60%. This happens because the withdrawal of protection makes EC
agriculture less profitable, and both labor and capital are withdrawn from agri-
culture. Thus, though dairy production attracts larger shares of capital and
labor than in the reference run, these larger shares are from smaller total avail-
abilities for the agricultural sector as a whole. This can be seen in Table 5.19.
Canada's reaction to dairy productioD under trade liberalizationyrovides
yet another example of the importance of looking at the development of the
entireagriculture sector. Though the producer price for dairy products remains
virtually unchanged, production increases by 108% (i.e., more than doubles)
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Table 5.19. Factor availability and allocation for dairy production in the EC in 2000.
Indicator
GOP agriculture (106 1970 ECUs)a
PA/PN
Agricultural capital (106 1970 ECUs)a
Total labor in agriculture (106)
Total acreage (106 ha)
Capital in livestock production/AGCApb
Labor in livestock production/TLAc
Capital in livestock production (106 1970 ECUs)
Labor in livestock production (106)
aECU, European currency unit.
b AGCAP, total agricultural capital.
cTLA, total agricultural labor.
Reference
scenario (RO)
45011
1.12
254380
5.7
32.6
0.83
0.77
210556
4.4
% change in
F-OECD over RO
-7.15
-8.75
-5.38
-11.65
-2.19
1.96
4.40
-3.26
-8.00
Table 5.14. Fact.or availability and allocation for dairy production in Canada in 2000.
Indicator
GOP agriculture (106 1970 Can$)
PA/PN
Agricultural capital (106 1970 Can$)
Total labor in agriculture (106 )
Total acreage (106 ha)
Capital in livestock production/AGCApa
Labor in livestock production/TLAb
Capital in livestock production (106 1970 Can$)
Labor in livestock production (106 )
aAGCAP, tota.I agricultural capital.
bTLA, t,otal agricultural labor.
Reference
scenario (RO)
5633
1.20
19938
4.72
27.4
0.74
0.79
14717
3.72
% change in
F-OECD over RO
16.59
15.55
21.24
19.84
2.37
11.30
8.70
35.03
30.62
because of the removal of the production quota. Almost the entire additional
output js exported and, from being a marginal importer of dairy products,
Canada becomes a major exporter in the GECD trade liberalization scenario. -
" ""'~plVA Agricultural trade liberalization increases agricultural prices in Canada by
vr' 16%; this makes agriculture relatively more profitable, and it draws in more
,J~ resources of capital and labor. As seen in Table 5.14, in 2000, acreage is 2.5%
~ bigger, agricultural capital 21% higher, and the agricultural labor force 20%
larger than in the reference scenario. Agricultural GOP at constant prices is
17% larger. The price changes, however, differ from commod ity to commodity,
and the relative profitabilities of commodities change (see Table 5.15) leading to
changes in factor allocations (see Table 5.16). Livestock operations get 30%
more labor and 35% more capital, and large expansion in output takes place.
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Table 5.15. Canada: Net revenue per hectare and per animal unit in the year 2000 under
OECD trade liberalization compared to the reference scenario.
Commodity
Wheat
Coarse grains
Protein feed
Other food
Nonfood crops
Fruits
Other animal products
Bovine and ovine
Milk animals
RO: absolute valuesa
0.09
0.09
0.12
0.43
2.86
0.48
2.95
98.02
529.47
F-OECD: % change over RO
11.9
2.5
34.2
21.5
9.6
23.0
19.0
12.5
-0.2
a103 x national currency per hectare for wheat, coarse grains, protein feed, other food, and
nonfood crops; national currency per 1970 US$ for fruits; 103 x national currency per tonne of
protein equivalent for other animal products; national currency per head for bovine and ovine
and for milk animals.
Table 5.16. Canada: Percentage changes in factor allocation by groups of commodities
in 2000 under OECD trade liberalization relative to the reference scenario.
Commodity group Capital use Labor use Fertilizer use
Grainta -55 -59 15
Other 12 -2 34
Livestockc 35 30
Total 21 20 15
aWheat + coarse grain.
bprotein feed + other food + nonfood crops + fruits.
cBovine and ovine + dairy + other animal products.
5.5.2. Factors behind wheat price change
The reasons for the observed responses of world market prices of other products
are somewhat obvious. Among the DECD countries, wheat is substantially pro-
tected mainly by the EC and Japan, their tariff equivalents in 2000 being more
than 110% for the EC and more than 30% for Japan. In the year 2000 in the
reference scenario, EC production is 10% of the total global output of wheat and
its exports constitute 12.5% of the global exports. Japan is a negligible producer
of wheat, but its imports of wheat amount to nearly 7% of global exports.
Removal of protection reduces EC wheat production by 28% and its wheat
exports fall by 98%, virtually eliminating them. Japan's imports of wheat
change only marginally as in the end consumer prices fall only by 11% at the raw
material level and 3% at the retail level. Wheat production increases mainly in
the USA and Australia to fill the gap left by the EC but, of course, since these
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countries very moderately protect wheat, the additional output has to be stimu-
lated through a higher price for wheat.
5.5.3. Rice price rise - mainly due to Japan
The price increase for rice is primarily due to Japan's removal of its very high
(more than 250%) protection. Japan's rice production in the year 2000 in the
reference scenario is 11 million tonnes (or 3%) out of a world production of 366
million tonnes. However, the world rice market is very thin, global exports in
2000 in the reference scenario being only 16 million tonnes. Under trade liberali-
zation, Japan's production falls by nearly 40%, and its imports increase from less
than a million tonnes in the reference run to nearly 10 million tonnes and consti-
tute more than 42% of the global exports, which themselves increase by 37%
because of the increase in Japan's imports. The removal of protection lowers the
consumer price by 45%, increasing human consumption by 5%. The main
increase in demand, however, comes from much larger use of rice for feeding pur-
poses as the only agricultural commodity for which production in Japan goes up
is other animal products (see Table 5.11).
5.5.4. Price of coarse grains: The Ee's interesting response
The protection levels in DECD countries for coarse grains in the reference
scenario are very similar to those for wheat. Yet the responses of countries to
trade liberalization for coarse grains differ from those for wheat. Whereas only
25% of the global output of wheat is used for feeding, more than 60% of coarse
grains output is so used. Thus, on the one hand, coarse grains provide greater
opportunity for substitution by other feeds and, on the other, the development of
the livestock sectors affects it much more than wheat. Table 5.18 shows the
changes in coarse grains production, trade, feed use, and prices in selected
DECD countries and other country groups in 2000. The behavior of Australia,
Japan, other developed countries, and developing countries shows, as expected,
that production increases (decreases) in these countries when producer price
rises (falls). Also, Canada's output of coarse grains decreases in spite of a small
price increase because wheat receives a stronger price increase. Conversely, pro-
duction of coarse grains in the EC increases by 8% under liberalization whereas
the producer price for coarse grains falls by 22% because the price of wheat, the
major competing crop, falls even more (see Table 5.19). This is also caused by
the different responses of the yields of these two commodities to a price change.
The revenue of wheat falls relative to that of coarse grains much more than does
the price of wheat relative to the price of coarse grains.
Similarly, the CMEA countries increase their imports even when world
market prices of coarse grains increase. In fact, the CMEA increases most of its
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agricultural imports as it is able to export more of nonagriculture (see Table
5.20), because the developing countries are able to import more of nonagriculture
under OECD trade liberalization as a result of their being able to export more
agricultural products at higher prices.
5.5.5. Importance of multicommodity multicountry interdependence
It is worth noting that the EC's increase in production of coarse grains under
OECD trade liberalization would have been difficult to predict by looking at
relative protection on different commodities in the EC. Coarse grains have the
highest self-sufficiency protection rate except for rice, which is a very minor crop
for the EC. Self-sufficiency protection rates, shown in Table A2.9 are calculated
with respect to world market prices. The protection rates shown in Table 4.19,
on the other hand, are with respect to border prices [CIF (cost, insurance, and
freight) for imported, and FOB (free on board) for exported commodities]
adjusted for domestic transport charges. In the reference scenario wheat was
exported and coarse grains were imported, and thus the protection rate with
respect to FOB export price of wheat and CIF import price for coarse grains was
higher for wheat than for coarse grains. Under trade liberalization whether the
EC would continue to export wheat or not could not be predicted in advance.
Were the EC to become an importer of wheat, the domestic producer price for
wheat might fall less than that for coarse grains.
Nor could the increase in production of coarse grains have been predicted
by looking at protection of coarse grains provided by different OECD countries
(the EC and Japan have similar, and the highest, self-sufficiency protection
rates). The outcome also depends strongly on the changes in the relative world
market prices, Le., on the protection rates on different commodities applied in
different countries and what substitutions in supply and demand take place in
different countries among these commodities under trade liberalization.
Another example of such interdependence is provided by Austria, whose
agricultural producers get higher prices. A country having medium levels of pro- ~
tection like Austria may expand production under trade liberalization, because ~ lJ..IT
other, and agriculturally more important, countries had higher levels of protec-
tion, the removal of which changes world market prices in a favorable way for
the country's producers.
Similar explanations may be provided for price changes of other commodi-
ties. One should, however, recognize that, though these explanations try to iden-
tify the major influencing factors, it is the interactions of the behaviors of all the
actors in the system that determine the behavior of the system.
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5.5.6. Nominal and OEeD-policy-adjusted levels of protection
The considerable price increases on the world market under OECD trade
liberalization have an interesting implication as regards the "real" levels of pro-
tection in some of these countries. As indicated in Chapter 2, "real" protection
levels may be defined with respect to world prices as they would be in the case of
global free trade. The impact on world market prices of the removal of distor-
tions by a subset of countries is defined here as adjusted levels of protection.
Thus, when protection levels are calculated with the domestic prices and border
prices of the reference scenario, these are nominal protection levels. However,
when reference scenario domestic prices and OECD trade liberalization border
prices are used to calculate protection level, one obtains OECD trade liberaliza-
tion adjusted ("OECD-policy-adjusted", for short) protection levels. Measured
thus, the OECD-adjusted protection levels are much lower than the nominal lev-
els as observed at reference scenario world market prices. This also means that
the adjustment of domestic prices in the protected countries that is required in a
move toward trade liberalization is less far-reaching than might be feared from
looking at the nominal levels only.
TabLe 5.!l1. Nominal and OECD-adjusted protection rates for the EC.
Commodity
Wheat
Coarse grains
Bovine and ovine meat
Dairy products
Other animal products
Other food
Nonfood agriculture
NominaL
1980 (%)
84
42
61
70
26
5
26
NominaL
!l000 (%)
112
37
12
34
24
12
28
DECD-poLicy-adjusted
!l000 (%)
26
22
2
-2
13
9
23
An important example is the EC (see Table 5.21). As world market prices
for the cereal-livestock complex would increase by 11-30% or more, the OECD-
adjusted protection levels would be correspondingly lower. Compared to nomi-
nal protection rates of 12-112%, OECD-adjusted protection rates would range
from -2% to 26%. There would also be a shift in the profitability ratios between
animal products, as measured by the animal/feed price ratio, to the disadvan-
tage of the products from ruminants. In introducing trade liberalization, wheat,
coarse grain, bovine and ovine meat, and dairy production may seem to be the
branches with the greatest adjustment problems in the EC. However, as is
shown in Table 5.18, coarse grain production in fact increases, thus providing an
example of the theoretically well-known results that nominal or even effective
rates of protection do not provide an indication of the direction in which
resources should be reallocated.
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5.6. Welfare Gains and Distributions from OECD Trade
Liberalization
Trade liberalization by OECD countries may be expected to improve incomes
and welfare in the OECD countries, though one cannot rule out the possibility
that some of them may actually be worse off. The non-OECD countries that do
not themselves liberalize their trade are affected mainly through changes in their
terms of trade, which can become significant as the relative world market prices
show substantial changes in the OECD trade liberalization scenario.
In comparing the welfare of a country in alternative situations as
represented by the two scenarios, the problems of finding a satisfactory measure
or a consistent indicator are almost insurmountable. We have therefore used a
whole range of indicators of welfare. Whether a country gains or loses cannot
always be determined unambiguously.
5.6.1. Small impact on global Gnp; assessment affected by prices
OECD trade liberalization increases global GDP calculated at 1970 world prices
by 0.22% in the year 2000 (see Table 5.22). Though 0.22% is a small amount, it
is not negligible. In absolute terms the 0.22% increase amounts to Nlarly IIS$24
billion (1970). V;lued at 1980 US dollars, this ~ould amount to US$50 billion, *"
whereas official development assistance-gi¥en by OECD countries in 1980 was
around US$27 billion. The gain for the OECD countries in GDP valued at 1970 J.~t1 ,-
world prices is 0.57% in 2000, which is nearly IIS$31 bjJJjpu (1970). At these
prices, the loss for developing countries is only 0.02% of GDP in 2000. ~
The small effect on the global GDP at constant prices can also be an out- -~
come of the fact that agriculture in the OECD countries is a small part of the
economy. The efficiency gains to be realized by removing agricultural trade dis-
tortions may be expected to be small. Though in the trade liberalization
scenario all border distortions were removed, the one aggregate nonagriculture
sector does not capture the gains that could be realized by reallocating factors
among the different subsectors of nonagriculture.
5.6.2. Less consumption and more hunger in developing countries
Another indicator of glohal welfare that is generated in the scenarios is per cap-
ita calorie intake. The calorie intake calculations do not suffer from the index
number problem to the same extent as the GDP measure does. As described in
Chapter 3, based on per capita calorie intake and using a cross-country regres-
sion, an estimate of the number of people who are in hunger in each country is
also made. These indicators, important mainly for the developing countries, are
shown in Table 5.29.
I
I
I
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Table 5.!H!. Impact of OECD trade liberalization on GDPs. a
CDP
World
Reference scenario
% change in F-OECD
OECD
Reference scenario
% change in F-OECD
CMEA
Reference scenario
% change in F-OECD
Developing countries
Reference scenario
% change in F-OECD
1990
7558
0.17
4034
0.30
1218
-0.09
1492
0.12
11000
10841
0.22
5433
0:57
1777
-0.40
2503
-0.02
aCDP calculated using 1970 world prices (109 USS 1970).
Table 5.£9. Per capita calorie intake and hunger in developing countries under OECD
trade liberalization.
1990 2000
Reference %change Reference %change
Indicator scenarIo for F-OECD scenarto for F-OECD
Calorie intake (kcaV,day) 2510 -0.13 2640 -0.3
Persons hnngry (10 ) 470 3.3 400 3.6
The average per ca ita calorie intake in the develo in countries decreases
under agricultura t CD countries and conse uent t e
inci ence of hunger increases. Thus, for the developing countries as a group,
such trade liberalization is noCattractive unless additional efforts are undertaken
to minimize the negative impact on the poor in developing countries.
The extent of the adverse impact on developing countries is not
insignificant, but compensation schemes could be devised to ensure that they are
f JlOt worse off under agricultural trade liberalization by the GECD. Nonetheles~the results do show that the trade policies of the developed countries affect thedeveloping countries; thus, in the trade negotiations of the former, a mutual
agreement among all nations is desirable.
5.6.3. Varied impact at national level
Though at the global level the impacts of trade liberalization by GECD countries
are small, at the level of individual countries they could be significant. However,
even at national levels, the largest change in per capita GDP (at 1970 domestic
prices) is 2% (gains in New Zealand and Kenya and loss in Mexico).
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Table 5.1!4. Comparison of production evaluated at different prices (percentage change
under OECD trade liberalization relative to the reference scenario).a
1985 1990 1995 1!000
Countries A B A B A B A B
USA 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9
Canada 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Australia 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.2
New Zealand 0.9 0.6 2.0 1.5 2.6 2.0 2.6 2.2
Austria 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 +0 +0 -0.1
EC 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Japan 0.1 +0 0.3 +0 0.4 +0 0.4 +0
CMEA -0 -0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4
China 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Argentina 0.9/ 0.8 1.4 1.2 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.6
Brazil -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Mexico 0.1 0.1 -0.7 -0.7 -1.5 -1.5 -1.8 -1.8
Egypt 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 -0.5 -0.5 -0.9 -0.9
Kenya 0.3 +0 1.1 0.8 1.8 1.5 2.2 1.9
Nigeria 0.5 0.5 1.6
,
1.6 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.2
India 0.1 0.1 0.1 I 0.1 +0 +0 0.1 0.1
Indonesia -0.3 -0.3 -0.9 / -0.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4
Pakistan 0.9 0.9 2.2 2.2 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4
Thailand -0 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2
Turkey 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.1 +0 -0.2 -0.2
aA = (scenario supply at scenario prices)j(reference supply at scenario prices); B = (scenario
supply at reference prices)j(reference supply at reference prices).
Country-wise information on a number of indicators of welfare is given in
Tables 5.!!, 5.!!4, and 5.!!5. In Table 5.!!6, the impacts on various measures are
qualitatively summarized. Not all the indicators are available for all the models.
Even in terms of equivalent income, or cost of consumption comparisons, the
gains or losses in the year 2000 are rather small. The largest change in
equivalent income is a 2.6% loss for Indonesia in 1990 and a 2.1% gain for Argen-
tina in 2000. The highest gain in cost of consumption comparison is for New
Zealand. (The equivalent income measure is not available for New Zealand.)
5.6.4. All DECD countries, except Canada, show clear gain
Among the OECD countries, the EC and Japan gain in production value com-
parisons, GDP, equivalent incomes, as well as consumption cost comparisons,
showing that these countries benefit from OECD trade liberalization.
New Zealand and the USA show gain in both production value and con-
sumption cost comparisons. One could thus conclude that these countries also
gain from trade liberalization by OECD countries.
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Table 5.25. Consumption cost comparison (GECD trade liberalization compared to
reference scenario). a
1985 1990 1995 2000
Countries A B A B A B A B
USA 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4
Canada 0.3 0.3 +0 +0 -0.1 -0 -0.1 -0.1
Australia 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
New Zealand 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.3
Austria 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1
EC 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
Japan 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.0
CMEA 0 0 +0 +0 0.1 0.1 +0 +0
China -0 -0 +0 +0 +0 +0 -0 -0
Argentina 0.8 1.0 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.2
Brazil -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Mexico +0 +0 -0.9 -0.9 -1.5 -1.5 -1.8 -1.8
Egypt -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 -0.7 -1.1 -1.1
Kenya +0 0.1 1.1 1.0 1.9 1.9 2.5 2.5
Nigeria -0.3 -0.3 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.0
India -0.4 -0.4 -0.9 -0.8 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1
Indonesia -0.7 -0.7 -2.0 -2.0 -1.2 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1
Pakistan 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8
Thailand 0.5 0.5 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2
Turkey 0.2 0.2 -0 -0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
aA = (scenario consumption at scenario prices) ((reference consumption at scenario prices); B =
(scenario consumption at reference prices)((reference consumption at reference prices).
Austria shows either gain or insignificant change in all available indicators.
Thus, it also benefits from OECD trade liberalization. -
Australia and Canada are the only OECD countries (except Turkey, which
does not liberalize in this scenario) that show losses on equivalent incomes. The
comparisons of costs of consumption bundles, however, show gains for Australia
but losses for Canada for 1995 and 2000. Both these countries show gains in
production value comparisons. Even though the losses are very small, Canada's
loss is surprising and needs an explanation, which is given later.
The conflicting indicators for equivalent income and consumption cost com-
parison for Australia imply an inconsistency between the demand systems for
Australia approximated for the year 2000 in the reference scenario and in the
OECD trade liberalization scenario. Note that equivalent incomes are calculated
at 1970 prices for each scenario. If the 1970 prices are very different from the
scenario prices, then these calculations may involve the utility indifference curves
implied by the demand system parameters, at a distance from the actual con-
sumption point. Since the demand system is approximated by a linear expendi-
ture system every year around an expected consumption point, such a
discrepancy between equivalent income calculation with a base-year price and
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Table 5.f!6. Gains and losses on welfare and macroeconomic indicators for 2000 under
OECD trade liberalization relative to the reference scenario.a
EquilJ. Consump- People Life
Countries GDP70 Parity income tion cost hungry expect.
USA G L G NS
Canada L G L L L
Australia NS G L G NS
New Zealand G G G NS
Austria NS G G G NS
EC G L G G G
Japan G L G G G
CMEA L ID
China ID
Argentina G G G G L L
Brazil L G L L L L
Mexico L L L L L L
Egypt L G L L L
Kenya G G G G G
Nigeria G L G G G L
India G G L L L L
Indonesia L G L L NS
Pakistan G G G G L L
Thailand G G G L NS
Turkey L G L L L L
aG, country gains; L, country loses; ID, indeterminate; NS, not significant; -, not calculated.
For a description of the indicators, see Section 3.3.5.
consumption cost comparison is possible (though fortunately this happens only
for Australia). Because of this, consumption cost comparisons may be con-
sidered more reliable, and hence Australia may be considered, on balance, to be
a gainer from agricultural trade liberalization by OECD countries.
5.6.5. Some clear losers and gainers among developing countries
Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, and Turke show losses in terms of all indicators and so
must be treated as c ear osers under OECD trade liberalization. Similarly,
..Indonesia is a loser as it either loses or shows insignificant changes in all indica-
tors.
~ should also be considered a loser on balance, as it loses on all indica-
tors except GDP. The very smaIl gains in GDP and production value comparis-
ons may be considered to be negligible as all the consumer and social welfare
indicators show losses.
By contrast, Kenya shows a clear gain on all indicators.
-.. ...
124 Toward Free Track in Agriculture
Nigeria may be considered a gainer as it gains on all except the life expec-
tancy measure.
Argentina may be considered a qualified gainer as on the consumer welfare
indicators, namely equivalent income and consumption costs comparison, it
shows gains. Its losses on the social welfare indicators, number of hungry people
and life expectancy, affect a small number of people as Argentina is a relatively
well-off country where the projected level of hunger in the reference scenario is
very small and life expectancy relatively high. In principle, Argentina should be
able to compensate the poor who become worse off from the large income gains
at the aggregate level.
Pakistan and Thailand gain on some indicators and lose on others, and
thus they are not unequivocal gainers or losers.
5.6.6. Why do countries gain or lose?
The welfare gains of DECD countries are easy to understand. These countries
remove distortions, and thus domestic resources are allocated more efficiently.
These gains in production efficiency could have been lost by change~ in terms of
trade consequent on trade liberalization by the DECD countries. This does not
seem to have happened for most countries. In fact, terms of trade improve for
all DECD countries except the EC and Japan, for both of which consumption
cost comparisons are still favorable.
Dn top of the efficiency gains, consumers also gain when consumer prices
fall. As can be seen in Table 5.27, the relative price of agriculture, as well as the
food price index, falls more than terms of trade in the EC and Japan. As a
consequence, consumers gain in welfare, and this is reflected in their equivalent
Incomes.
Thus the DECD countries with high protection, the EC and Japan, show
under trade liberalization gains in production efficiency that are not fully
negated by loss in terms of trade, and improvement in consumer welfare as con-
sumer prices for food also fall.
~ustria, which has a moderately high protection, does not gain significl!Iltly
in production, but has a very lar~e ~ain jn terms of trage. The food price index
~ains almost unchanged, and thus consumers benefit, as reflected in consum..£-
tion cost compcyjSOJl,S.--..,
- The USA has relatively low nominal protection rates, but policies such as
land set-aside provide a much greater degree of protection, and the USA behaves
in a way somewhat similar to that of highly protected countries. It shows
significant gains in production value (Table 5.2~), only a 1.7% change in its
terms of trade, and a 2% fall in the relative price of agriculture. US consumers
thus gain.
The DECD countries with low protection rates, Australia, Canada and
New Zealand, not only show production efficiency gains but also show gains in
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Table 5.27. Changes in terms of trade for GECD countries in 2000 due to GECD trade
liberalization.
Terms of tradea % change oller RO
Country
Reference run (RO) % change
lIalue oller RO
Food price
index
Australia
Austria
Canada
Japan
New Zealand
USA
EC
1.1
0.98
0.98
0.96
1.44
0.90
0.87
10.8
6.3
9.5
-7.6
15.8
11.4
-3.6
14.5
7.5
15.5
-35.3
15.8
-2.0
-8.8
12.1
0.6
6.5
-19.3
9.1
-3.2
-3.7
a(Unit value index of exports)/(Unit value index of imports) with trade weights from the refer-
ence scenario.
terms of trade. However, the production value increases are associated with
increases in domestic prices. Though all three countries show an increase of
around 15% in the relative price of agriculture, the production value gains com-
pared to the reference run differ across these countries depending on the struc-
ture of protection in the reference scenario. New Zealand protected only one
commodity, namely, other animal products (by 20%), whose price in 2000 does
not change under liberalization on the world market. Thus, domestic producer
prices of all other products change by almost the same amount as the world
prices. As a result, New Zealand shows the largest increase in value of its pro-
duction, and consumers are better off in spite of higher prices.
Australia and Canada, with similar aggregate agricultural protection levels,
show quite a different pattern of protection across commodities. For example,
Canada has positive protection for dairy products while Australia has negative
protection. When dairy prices increase under trade liberalization, Australian
producers gain a substantial price increase, whereas producer prices for dairy
products in Canada remain the same. Thus, the percentage increase in the value
of production is higher for Australia than for Canada (column A for 2000, Table
5.24). The consumers in Australia gain, whereas the consumers in Canada gain
in early years, but lose in later years, when costs of consumption baskets are
compared across the two scenarios.
The impact on developing countries is through the changes in the world
market prices. Under OECD trade liberalization, agricultural prices rise, and it
is easy to see why food-importing developing countries could lose - in terms of
consumer welfare, as reflected in consumption cost comparisons and equivalent
incomes, and also in social welfare, as reflected in calorie intake and population
in hunger. Even if the domestic producer prices were completely insulated from
world price rise, less food would be imported and less would be available for con-
sumption. To the extent that domestic prices are allowed to increase, consumers
126 Toward Free Trade in Agriculture
will be even worse off, though the increase in domestic production will counter
the price increases. And, if the increased producer prices stimulate enough
domestic investment and agricultural production, they may even lead to
improvement in consumer welfare over the years.
For agricultural surplus developing countries, the higher agricultural prices
on the world market mean higher incomes from exports. If the domestic prices
are completely insulated, even then the country will gain. If higher prices stimu-
late higher exports and increased production, clearly the producers will gain, but
the higher prices may lower somewhat the gain for consumers.
These arguments are of a static nature. The dynamic effects of these
changes can, particularly in the presence of domestic distortions and rigidities,
reverse some of the effects.
The impact of OECD trade liberalization on most of the developing coun-
tries can be explained by the following arguments.
The aggregate of relative price of agriculture and the food price index
increase in all developing countries (see Table 5.28), except Mexico where they
drop slightly. The agricultural surplus countries, Argentina, Kenya, and Thai-
land, all show gains in value of production and consumption cost comparisons
(see Table 5.26).
The countries with low agricultural self-sufficiency as well as low self-
consumption ratios are Egypt, Nigeria, and Indonesia. Of these, Egypt and
Indonesia show, as expected, loss of consumer welfare. However, Nigeria surpris-
ingly shows improvement in production as well as consumption (see Table 5.26).
This is because higher agricultural prices draw more investment and land into
agriculture in Nigeria, the domestic production of agriculture increases, and the
volume of agricultural output is 6% higher. The index of price of agriculture rela-
tive to nonagriculture in Nigeria rises more in the early years after OECD trade
liberalization, and in 1990 it is 5% above the reference scenario value. The
resulting additional investment in agriculture moderates the price rise, and by
2000 the price index is only 0.3% above the reference scenario value. Thus, the
dynamic effect of higher investment in Nigeria results in gains of most welfare
indicators under OECD trade liberalization. Pakistan, which also has a low agri-
cultural self-consumption ratio comparable to that of Indonesia but a higher
agricultural self-sufficiency ratio of 0.97, behaves as Nigeria. Agricultural produc-
tion is stimulated, and the agricultural volume index is higher by 4% in 2000.
Thus, the production value and consumption cost comparisons show gains for
Pakistan. However, the calorie intake falls. Thus, though Pakistan in general
gains, its poor are worse off, with an increase in the number of hungry persons.
India, which is nearly self-sufficient, shows expected behavior in that pro-
duction increases, but the higher prices adversely affect consumer and social wel-
fare.
Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey, all with agricultural self-sufficiency ratios
exceeding 1.0, show in 2000 loss in the production value comparison (see Table
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Table 5.28. Changes in terms of trade, producer prices, and food prices in developing
countries for 2000 under OECD trade liberalization relative to the reference scenario
(RO).
Absolute values in RO %change in F-OECD over RO
Agricultural Terms Food
trade surplus
SCRb
of d pnce
Country (109 US$ 1970) SSRa trade PA/PN index
Argentina 2.4 1.49 1.00 11.3 12.1 7.7
Brazil -0.3 1.02 0.90 -7.1 7.8 5.8
Mexico 0.6 1.07 0.93 -2.6 -0.7 -0.4
Egypt -0.2 0.96 0.86 -8.1 5.4 3.0
Kenya .4 1.28 0.92 2.4 10.6 10.4
Nigeria -2.9 0.82 0.82 -8.7 0.3 0.9
India 0.1 1.00 0.98 13.9 3.0 NAc
Indonesia -1.1 0.90 0.90 -8.6 2.3 1.4
Pakistan -0.2 0.97 0.91 12.0 0.6 0.6
Thailand 1.4 1.28 0.99 5.8 7.7 2.9
Turkey 1.1 1.12 0.97 5.1 1.4 1.3
aSSR, self-sufficiency ratio for product i is defined as SSR j == productionj/demand j and for the
aggregate is defined as the demand-value-weighted sum for agricultural products.
bSCR, aggregate self-consumption ratio is defined as weighted sum of Min(l.O, SSRj).
cNA, not available.
d(Unit value index of exports)/(Unit value index of imports) with trade weights from the refer-
ence scenario.
5.24). The explanation lies in the fact that labor movement out of agriculture is
slowed down in these countries, and the marginal product of labor is much
higher in nonagriculture than in agriculture. These differences in marginal prod-
uct, which get narrowed over time, are historically observed ones and reflect
various rigidities in the labor flows between sectors. Since this behavior pro-
duces much more striking results when these countries themselves liberalize, it is
treated in greater detail in Chapter 8.
In Argentina as well as Brazil (and to a lesser extent Mexico), Table 5.2
shows substantial percentage increases in hunger. However, in these countries
the level of hunger in the reference scenario is rather low. Thus small changes in
the number of hungry persons translate into large percentage changes.
In summary, this look at why some countries gain and some lose has often
shown the impacts of trade liberalization that could have been expected. How-
ever, it has also shown surprising effects, which can be explained. The dynamic
effect, as well as rigidity, are shown to produce these results.
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5.7. Impact on Farm Incomes and Parity
Toward Free TrfMk in Agriculture
Since maintenance of farm income in relation to nonfarm income is an important
motivation for protecting agriculture in the developed countries, impacts on farm
incomes and parity are of considerable importance in determining the acceptabil-
ity of liberalization. If agricultural trade liberalization by OECD countries
lowers farmers' incomes, then the farmers will oppose it, unless they are suitably
compensated in other acceptable and nondistorting ways.
Since, in the developing countries, agricultural prices rise and income par-
ity increases in all countries (except Mexico and Nigeria, where it increases ini-
tially but falls in 2000), there is no need to look at them.
Table 5.29 shows changes due to agricultural trade liberalization in income
parity, agricultural labor, and agricultural volume indices for the OECD coun-
tries explicitly identified in the BLS.
Income parity actually improves in favor of the agricultural producers for
Australia, Austria, Canada, and New Zealand. These are the countries that have
a very small average degree of protection in the reference scenario, and the gains
in income parity for the farmers due to higher world prices are understandable.
What is somewhat surprising, however is t a for the USA Austria the
EC, and Japan, remova 0 el much hi her r te' lev
2arative y very small declines in income parities. The explanation, of course, liesJ(' Tn three thmgs: mcreases in world market prices, adjustment of production
structure, and movement of labor out of agriculture. The last factor is impor-
tant to keep in mind, as a large movement out of agriculture may be politically
as unacceptable as a fall in income parity.
Austrian farmers have a small initial drop in relative income, but in the
ong run the farmers gain in relative income. The labor outflows are also very
small.
US farmers gain initially but over time show a decline (2% in 2000) in rela-
tive income. However, since the USA shows an increase in GDP (see Table
5.26), and an increase in agricultural volume index of 2%, US farmers' incomes
remain unaffected by trade liberalization. Information on labor outflow from
agriculture is not available for the USA. However, one can assume it to be virtu-
ally unaffected by the liberalization as the relative price changes so little.
These small changes in parity for Austria and the USA have to be inter-
preted with some care. Even when farm incomes on the average increase a little,
farmers who specialize in a particular commodity that becomes less profitable,
and who are unable to shift to the production of a more profitable commodity,
may indeed substantially lose income. Of course, to that extent, other farmers,
who can adopt, will gain more income.
The countries where income parity ratios decline substantial\y for agricul-
tural producers are Japan and the EC. Even then the declines are much less
than the degree of protection removed. One of the reasons for the smal\ loss in
income parity is migration of labor out of agriculture. Though in the F-OECD
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Table 5.29. Percentage changes in income parity, agricultural labor, volume index, and
relative price under DECD trade liberalization relative to the reference scenario and de-
gree of protection (in percent) in DECD countries in the reference scenario.
OEeD country 1985 1990 1995 2000
Australia
Parity 14 23 17 12
Agricultural labor +0 1 3 4
Agricultural volume indexa -0 2 3 2
PA/PN b 15 23 17 15
Degree of protection -6 -6 -6 -4
Austria
Parity -3 2 3 7
Agricultural labor -1 -2 -1 2
Agricultural volume indexa -1 -1 -1 2
PA/PN -4 1 2 8
Degree of protectionb 22 19 14 13
Canada
Parity 7 12 10 12
Agricultural labor 1 6 13 20
Agricultural volume indexa 1 5 9 13
PA/PN b 6 11 12 16
Degree of protection -5 -7 -10 -11
Japan
Parity -25 -37 -37 -35
Agricultural labor -1 -4 -5 -5
Agricultural volume indexa 1 1 1 1
PA/PN b -25 -36 -37 -35
Degree of protection 102 95 88 82
New Zealand
Parity 32 37 33 29
Agricultural labor +0 1 2 3
Agricultural volume indexa 3 8 11 13
PA/PN b 26 25 19 16
Degree of protection 2 2 1 1
USA
ParityC 3 3 0 -2
Agricultural labor NAd NAd NAd NAd
Agricultural volume indexa +0 2 1 2
PA/PN b 3 3 -1 -2
Degree of protection 12 12 13 14
EC
Parity -10 -8 -8 -4
Agricultural labor -0 -6 -7 -12
Agricultural volume indexa -1 -4 -6 -8
PA/PN -9 -10 -11 -9
Degree of protectionb 30 28 24 23
aAgricultural volume index is calculated using 1970 world prices. bDegrees of protection for
the reference run are calculated using producer prices. cparity for the USA is calculated as-
suming labor in agriculture does not change between scenarios. dNA, not available.
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scenario more labor is used in the nonagriculture sector, increased migration of
labor out of agriculture may be troublesome politically.
In conclusion, under DECD trade liberalization, farm incomes increase in
most countries. Significant reductions in farm incomes in the EC and Japan
occur, but these losses are still much less than what might be expected from
their present levels of protection. To ensure income parities in the EC and
Japan, lump-sum transfers needed are less than 0.5% of GNP for the EC and less
than 1% of GNP for Japan. These levels of expenditure are smaller than the
budgetary outlays on farm support measures in the EC and Japan.
5.8. Previous Studies of Agricultural Trade Liberalization by
OECD Countries
Although protectionism in DECD agriculture has been of interest to economists
for a long time, hardly any quantitative studies have been made. A number of
studies have explored the consequences of the CAP of the EC, including the
impact of liberalizing the CAP. However, the impact of simultaneous liberaliza-
tion by the DECD countries has not been explored before except in two studies,
one by Valdes and Zietz (1980) and the other by Anderson and Tyers (1984).
Valdes and Zietz follow a partial equilibrium approach. Demand and sup-
ply elasticities are specified from a literature search, and the same value of elasti-
city per commodity is specified for demand as well as supply in all countries.
Moreover, only 50% of agricultural protection is removed by all DECD net
importers of a commodity. Presumably, if an DECD country protects a
commodity so much that it has become a net exporter of that commodity, pro-
tection from that commodity is not reduced. Though protection is removed from
a number of agricultural commodities, the interaction between commodities is
only partially accounted for in the Valdes and Zietz study. Thus, neither the
methodology nor the notion of liberalization is comparable with those of the
present study.
Though the Anderson and Tyers study has a multicountry multicommodity
framework, it also uses a partial equilibrium approach. Dne of their scenarios
considers trade liberalization by all developed market economies for grains and
meat products. It is thus more comparable to the present scenario than is the
Valdes and Zietz study.
Changes in world prices of some commodities due to reduction in protec-
tion by DECD countries in the two studies are compared with the current
scenario in Table 5.90.
The price changes in the Valdes and Zietz study are quite different from
those in the other two studies, as could be expected. Anderson and Tyers show
price changes that are comparable to, and somewhat larger than, the price
changes in the present scenario. This is in spite of the fact that the tariff rate
estimates may be different in the two studies. As shown later in Chapter 6, the
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Table 5.90. Percentage increases in world prices due to reduction in agricultural protec-
tion by DECO countries in various studies.
F-OECd Valdis and Zietzb A nderson and TyersC
Commodity (2000) (1975-1977) (1990)
Wheat 18 5 20
Rice 21 0 16
Coarse grains 11 2d 14
Beef and veal } 1~ 7 24Mutton and lamb 4
Pigmeat } 9 } I gPoultry -4 3Fish
Sugar } 5h 8.Vegetable oils 51
aAII border protection from all agricultural commodities is removed over 1982-1986 and the
results for 2000 compared. b50% of protection from a commodity of which the OECD country
was a net importer is removed. 1975-1977 comparative static analysis. cProtection is removed
by developed market economies from grains and meats in 1981 and an annual simulation car-
ried out till 1990. ~Corn. eBovine and ovine meat. father animal products. gPigs and poul-
try. hOther foods. IGroundnut oil.
estimates for the EC, which are the only estimates Anderson and Tyers report,
differ from those in the present study.
5.9. Summary of Results and Policy Implications
The results of the scenario on agricultural trade liberalization by OECD coun-
tries presented and analyzed in this chapter point to certain methodological and
policy conclusions.
5.9.1. Summary of substantive findings
The major substantive results can be summarized as follows:
(1) Since OECD countries on the whole protect their agriculture, when they
liberalize agricultural trade, the world market price of agriculture rises rela-
tive to that of nonagriculture by about 10%. The largest increases in rela-
tive prices are for bovine and ovine meats and dairy products.
(2) Changes in global agricultural output are small for all commodities.
Demand for agricultural products in the OECD countries, though not very
price-elastic, increases somewhat due to modest welfare gains in these coun-
tries and reduction of food retail prices, especially in OECD countries with
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(3)
(4)
*(5)
*(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
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high protection, the EC and Japan. Global output adjusts to satisfy global
demand.
However, agricultural production patterns in different countries change
significantly as a result of changes in the relative prices of commodities,
and trade in agricultural, as well as in nonagricultural, products expands
significantly.
Though index number problems cloud estimation of efficiency gains,
efficiency gains at the global level due to better allocation of resources are
small but not insignificant. The global GDP measured at 1970 world
market prices increases by around 0.20%. This may seem a small gain but
in absolute terms it amounts to US$30-50 billion at 1980 prices per year.
Moreover, as a percentage of the agricultural GDP in the GECD countries,
which is the part of the economy from which trade distortions are removed,
the gains amount to 20-25%.
The efficiency gains accrue to the countries that liberalize agricultural
trade, namely, the GECD countries. The CMEA countries show lower
GDPs, owing to terms-of-trade loss, while the developing countries as a
group show no significant gain.
Indicators of consumer welfare (equivalent income and consumption cost
comparison) as well as those of social welfare (persons in hunger, life expec-
tancy at birth, and income parity) show gains for a number of countries,
losses for some, and a mixed picture for others.
In ~eneral, the countries of the GECD show gains on the available mea-
sures, except for income parity in the EC and Japan, where it declines.
Even then, the EC and Japan show clear improvement on all other indica-
tors of economic development and consumer welfare. Thus, agricultural
trade liberalization by GECD countries can be considered to be beneficial
to those countries.
Though the agricultural producers in the EC and Japan lose income rela-
tive to nonagricultural income, the losses in income are much less than
might have been inferred from the degree of protection that was removed,
because of the increases in world prices, production adjustments by these
countries to suit the new set of relative prices, and migration of labor out of
agriculture.
The values of the lump-sum transfers needed to compensate fully the loss
in agricultural incomes in the EC and Japan are significantly smaller than
the efficiency gains to these economies. At less than 0.5% of GDP for the
EC and 1.0% of GDP for Japan, the costs of the transfers are less than the
budgetary outlays on farm support measures in the EC and Japan.
The developing countries in general are worse off, though some developing
countries do gain. The higher world market prices of cereals and ruminant
products hurt many food-importing developing countries, and the level of
hunger increases in them. Even some exporting countries that gain in
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terms of economic development show a marginally adverse impact on the
level of hunger due to higher food prices.
(ll) The lump-sum transfers needp(l to compensate developing countries and
groups within these countries who lose are smaller than the global efficiency
gains, which mainly accrue to the DECD countries.
5.9.2. Policy conclusions
The policy implications of these results are clear:
(1) Provided that compensating lump-sum transfers can be arran e
ers in the EC and Japan and for t e ~roups jn deye10piRg (;QuRtries who
lose, DECD countries should liberalize their agricultural trade. Compensa-
tion to farmers in the EC and Japan may be politically necessary and
socially justifiable. Compensation to developing countries may be justified
on the ground that the present production patterns in many developing
countries may have been affected by the present protective policies of
DECD countries. Perhaps, concern for the poor in the developing countries
should be reason enough for such compensation.
(2) The fLdverse impacts on the developing countries of trade policy changes by
the . est that the interests of develo in c ntries
shoul be represented in trade policy negotiations among the developed
countries.
5.9.3. Methodological findings
From an analytical and methodological point of view, these scenario results pro-
vide interesting insights that include some policy implications. The major
methodological findings are as follows:
(1) It is important to account for the interdependence among commodities and
countries. These interdependencies produce apparently counterintuitive
responses, which are described in economic textbooks as curiosities of possi-
ble responses. Among these are the following:
(a) Supply of a commodity increases even when its price goes down.
(b) Supply response depends not only on the relative protection across
commodities within a country but also on protection rates for that
commodity in different countries.
(c) Terms of trade improve but still a country loses.
(d) Short-term gains get reversed in the long term.
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(2) Nominal protection rates, or even effective protection rates, can be mislead-
ing indicators of the real protection provided by a country. The changes in
the world market prices consequent on removal of protection by a large
country, or a number of small countries together, cannot be easily
predicted; neither can the new relative prices or the new production
responses be predicted without an analytical framework, such as the BLS,
that accounts for the various interdependencies.
(3) Trade shares of countries change when agricultural trade is liberalized.
Thus, the assumptions of constant trade share matrices that are often
made in economic analysis may be a misleading simplification.
5.9.4. Policy implications
These methodological findings have some policy implications:
(1) Trade policy negotiations, such as GATT negotiations, should be carried
out not for one commodity at a time but for a whole range of commodities
simultaneously.
(2) It is possible that negotiating positions of countries in trade negotiations
that do not account for the unpredictability and interdependence
highlighted above are not in the best interest of the countries themselves.
A model such as the BLS can contribute significantly in such negotiations.
(3) Determination of "fair market shares" referred to in GATT procedures
requires the use of a system such as the BLS.
The results and policy implications of this scenario raise some questions. If
trade liberalization by OECD countries improves their welfare, should not
OECD countries such as the EC or the USA liberalize unilaterally? Should the
developing countries also liberalize by themselves? Or should they liberalize
along with the OECD countries? These questions are taken up in the chapters
that follow.
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CHAPTER 6
Unilateral Trade Liberalization
by the EC or the USA
6.1. Unilateral Trade Liberalization by the EC
6.1.1. Why trade liberalization by only the EC?
The CAP of the EC is often regarded as a policy that distorts global agricultural
trade significantly. Since, as seen in Chapter 5, the GECD countries gain from
agricultural trade liberalization, it is of interest to see what would be the impacts
of a unilateral trade liberalization by the EC, globally and on its domestic situa-
tion. However, to appreciate the impact of the removal of the currently pursued
CAP by the EC, one first needs to know the objectives of the CAP. These are
(Commission of the EC, 1958):
(1) To increase agricultural productivity by developing technical progress and
by ensuring the national development of agricultural production and the
optimal utilization of the factors of production, particularly labor.
(2) To ensure thereby a fair standard of living for the agricultural population,
particularly by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in
agriculture.
(3) To stabilize markets.
(4) To guarantee regular supplies.
(5) To ensure reasonable prices in supplies to consumers.
In pursuance of these objectives the C,AP has become more and more
inward-looking and protectionist, attracting criticism from both inside and out-
side the EC. [A detailed discussion of the CAP can be found, e.g., in Engels et
al. (1984), Buckwell et al. (1982), and the literature quoted therein.] In addition,
an evaluation of the CAP must also consider Article 112 of the Rome Treaty,
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which asks for international harmony in trade relations of the EC with the other
countries.
Judged only from the EC's point of view, it is argued that the misallocation
of resources due to distorted prices leads to welfare losses. Moreover, the CAP
leads to income transfers that are not always intended: e.g., countries that are
net importers of agricultural goods transfer financial assets to those countries
that are net exporters of these goods (Ritson and Tangermann, 1979), and such
transfers between countries are not intended by the CAP. In addition, though
the CAP tries to ensure a minimum income to the agricultural sector as a whole,
within the sector there is no provision for a guaranteed minimum income to indi-
vidual farmers. Nor is income distribution within the agricultural sector con-
sidered as an important variable to be influenced. In fact, only some kind of
"representative" income of farmers is used as a yardstick (von Witzke, 1979).
In more recent years, another problem has surfaced: the EC has difficulties in
raising the necessary money to pay for the increasing cost of the CAP.
Third world countries criticize the EC, especially for the impact that the
CAP has on the world market and because it restricts entrance into the EC
market. The rather rigid price policy of the EC under the CAP, which stabilizes
domestic prices mainly through a system of variable levies, leads to a situation
where the world market has to absorb to a large extent the annual changes
within the EC in supply and demand balances in many agricultural products. In
other words, the variations in quantities produced domestically are more or less
exported by the EC on the world market as domestic prices are maintained, and
demand for agricultural products adjusts but little in the EC. The impact of
these policies on world market price stability varies from commodity to com-
modity. Empirical work indicates, however, that there are more destabilizing
effects than stabilizing ones (see Schmitz, 1985, and the literature quoted
therein). In order to sell the surplus quantities resulting from its high-price pol-
icy on the world market, the EC has to pay rather high export subsidies. This
often makes it very difficult or even impossible for efficient exporting countries to
compete with EC exporters.
Several attempts have been made to quantify the economic costs of the
currently pursued CAP. One of the first to identify the cost of the CAP were
Koester and Tangermann (1976), who calculated the costs for the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) only. Their result indicates that about 0.3% of the
national income is the cost of the CAP for the FRG (Koester and Tangermann,
1976, p. 198). More recent estimates are not confined to the FRG. Buckwell et
al. (1982) estimate the welfare gains from a "free market" policy at 11 051 million
European Units of Account for 1980, which is approximately equal to 0.5% of
GDP in that year (Buckwell et al., 1982, p. 90, Table 6.2). In a recent study, de
Veer (1985) estimates the benefits from liberalized trade of the EC to be 0.38%
of the GDP (de Veer, 1985, p. 11, Table 2.5). Engels et al. (1984) assess the cost
of the CAP to the consumer alone to be on the order of 36 billion ECU for 1982
by assuming an average protection for agriculture of 25% and using the value of
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production of this year, which was 144.8 billion ECU (Engels et al., 1984, p. 17).
This figure, amounting to 1.3% of GDP for this year, is only a rough estimate
since costs (or benefits) to the producer and taxpayer were not accounted for. A
recently published study by Matthews (1985) goes one step further than those
mentioned so far: it analyzes the impact of EC trade liberalization in an interna-
tional framework. The advantage of this approach is that changes in the world
market prices are taken into account when the gains and losses from a liberalized
EC trade are calculated. Matthews does not provide numbers on the costs of the
CAP, but analyzes the impact on other countries and arrives at the conclusion
that both other developed countries and the less developed countries would lose
from the elimination of EC agricultural protection (Matthews, 1985, p. 141).
These estimates are made using different methodologies, all of which are
based on a partial equilibrium approach. The general equilibrium adjustments
within the EC as well as in other countries consequent on a liberalized CAP can
be significant. A study by Burniaux and Waelbroeck (1985) follows the general
equilibrium approach. These authors compare the results of free agricultural
trade in Europe with two reference scenarios: one in which relative agricultural
prices on the world market decline annually by 2.5% (low-price scenario) and one
where they increase annually by 0.6% (high-price scenario). According to their
results, real income (defined as GNP adjusted for the terms of trade) in the EC
(the results of the region Europe are taken as being representative for the
member countries of the EC) increases after abolition of the CAP by 2.7% in the
low-price scenario and by 1.0% in the high-price scenario (Burniaux and Wael-
broeck, 1985, Tables 7.3 and 7.6). The impact of this altered policy on LDCs is
shown to be positive in the sense that real income increases and food demand is
higher in these countries.
In this section, we describe the consequences of a liberalized CAP both for
the EC and for other countries, generating a scenario using the BLS. The
specification of agricultural trade liberalization in this scenario, called F-EC, is
the same as that discussed in Chapter 5, except that in the present scenario only
the EC liberalizes its agricultural trade, while all other countries continue to pur-
sue their policy regimes of the reference scenario.
6.1.2. Trade liberalization by only the EC increases world market
prices
A removal of the EC's protectionist policies leads to a price increase on the
world market of about 5% (Table 6.1). This effect is more pronounced in the ini-
tial years of the new policies than in the later ones when the other countries have
had time to adjust to the new situation. All relative agricultural prices increase,
but the strongest rise occurs for dairy products (about 15%), the commodity that
the EC protects most. It is therefore not surprising that bovine and ovine meat
indicates the next-strongest price increase, because in many countries of the EC
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Table 6.1. Percentage changes in pricesa and volumes traded on the world market, and
in global production, in 1990 and 2000, due to a unilateral trade liberalization by the EC
compared to the reference scenario.
World market
Global tradeb
Production
prices flolume
Commodity 1990 !WOO 1990 £000 1990 £000
Wheat 6.8 8.7 -3.4 -2.2 0.9 0.6
Rice 5.9 1.5 1.2 -1.8 0.1 0.1
Coarse grains 7.4 3.7 -6.6 -5.0 0.5 0.6
Bovine and ovine 11.1 6.9 12.5 14.4 -0.1 0.7
Dairy 18.9 14.9 -9.7 1.9 -0.8 -0.5
Other animal products 4.8 5.2 -1.1 5.2 -0.4 -0.6
Protein feed 2.9 0.3 0.4 -0.6 0.5 0.2
Other food 3.2 2.4 1.6 6.7 -0.1 +0
Nonfood agriculture 6.6 2.0 2.8 3.1 0.3 0.1
Nonagriculture 10.0 10.1 -0 -0
Total agriculture 6.2 4.5 -0 0
:~:~t~~en~ ~~::~~~gricultural price.
the dual-purpose cow is prevalent: Le., the production of milk and beef is
interwoven so that assistance to dairy production also means assistance to beef
production. Among the prices that increase more than the average in 2000 is
that of wheat. This is again not surprising, since its protection level is relatively
high (see Table -/.12) and the EC has a rather high share of the total volume
traded in this product. The world market prices of all other commodities
increase, but less than the average.
6.1.3. Volume of global trade is only slightly affected and global pro-
duction changes are marginal in EC trade liberalization
Trade in grains contracts as a result of the EC's reduction of exports of wheat
and import of coarse grains. Dairy products are traded substantially less in the
initial period, but later the trade volume is slightly higher than in the reference
run. This is a result of the rather sharp drop in the EC's dairy exports, which is
not taken up by other countries. Initially, many importing countries increase
their dairy production, reducing global trade, but over the long run dairy trade
increases. As can be seen from Table 6.1, production contracts as well, but by a
very small amount.
The largest percentage increase in trade volume is shown by bovine and
ovine meat. Again, this is a direct impact of the EC, which imports considerably
more of this commodity because of lower production and higher demand.
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Production at the global level changes only marginally. Since demand is
rather price inelastic and income does not change noticeably in the developing
countries, where income elasticity of food is high, total consumption does not
change. Therefore, production cannot increase. The non-EC countries need the
price increase on the world market as an incentive to increase their production to
compensate for the reduction in the EC. Even for those commodities that are
largely used as feed (coarse grains and protein feed), no substantial change in
global demand can be observed. The quantities used as feed change by less than
1% (coarse grains up and protein feed down). This also indicates that the shift
in production of animals does not lead to a drastic change in the feeding ratios.
The global response in the volumes traded and produced does not reflect
the substantial changes that occur at the country level. Table 6.2 indicates how
the trade pattern of a selected set of countries changes by 2000 as a result of
trade liberalization by the EC. The EC's share in wheat trade drops almost to
zero because of a substantial reduction in its wheat production and a simultane-
ous increase in demand. EC exports of wheat drop by 16.5 million tonnes. This
is absorbed as follows: Australia, Canada, and the USA increase their exports,
respectively, by 2.3, 4.8, and 3.5 million tonnes, which amounts to 64% of the
reduction in the EC's volume. An additional 17% is taken up by a large number
of other countries, each of which indicates only a small increase. The world
trade in wheat is cut back by about 18% of the EC's reduction. There are also
adjustments of small magnitude among the importers of wheat covering many
countries.
Regarding coarse grains, the situation is substantially different. The reduc-
tion in imports of coarse grains by the EC is matched almost completely by a
global lowering of exports. Many countries alter their import of coarse grains.
The strongest change occurs in Japan, which reduces its import by more than a
million tonnes, and in the country groups that increase their imports by slightly
more than Japan's reduction. The countries forced to cut back their exports
substantially are Argentina (2.1 million tonnes), Canada (1.2), and the USA
(5.6). Together with Australia, these nations face the largest adjustments in the
volume of grains (wheat and coarse grains) traded. All of them increase their
trade share both in wheat and in coarse grains.
A different situation occurs for bovine and ovine meat. The EC increases
its imports by 152%, of which 55% represents additional export quantities sold
mainly by Argentina and 45% consists of reductions in imports elsewhere, not-
ably by the USA. The case is similar in dairy products where the EC becomes
an importer of 3 million tonnes instead of exporting 8.7 million tonnes. Twenty
percent of this additional import is matched by additional exports, and 80% by
reductions of imports, mostly by developing countries. India cuts its imports
most. The increased volume globally traded and the quantities given up by the
EC are sold mainly by the USA (76%). New Zealand and Argentina also
increase their exports by small amounts. Canada continues to remain absent
from the world market because it is assumed not to change its dairy policy of
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Table 6.2. Changes in trade structure (percentages and volumes) worldwide and in
selected countries in 2000 due to unilateral liberalization of agricultural trade in the EC,
relative to the reference scenario.
World- Austra- Argen-
Commodity wide EC lia tina Japan Canada USA
Wheata
% in trade -2 -94 15 -1 -3 19 5
Volume: export -3.04 -16.48 2.32 -0.05 4.83 3.47
Volume: import -0.30
Ricea
% in trade -2 163 +0 32 -32 -0 +0
Volume: export -0.29 +0 +0.01 +0
Volume: import 0.32 -0.25 -0
Coarse grainsa
% in trade -5 -43 2 -17 -3 -8 -4
Volume: export -8.59 0.25 -2.14 -1.23 -5.64
Volume: import -8.38 -1.27
Bovine and ovine meata
% in trade 14 152 17 32 -10 37 -23
Volume: export 0.86 0.8 0.49 0.13
Volume: impo6t 1.57 -0.03 -0.30
Dairy products
% in trade 2 c +0 240 -44 77
Volume: export 0.55 -8.70 +0 0.46 7.02
Volume: import 2.97 -0.18 -0
Other animal productsd f% in trade 5 c 19 56 -5 8
Volume: export 0.07 -0.08 +0 +0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.07
Volume: i~ort 0.13
Protein feed
% in trade -1 -6 -1 -4 -2 22 -2
Volume: export -0.14 -0 -0.01 -0.28
Volume: igtport -0.39 -0.08 0.07
Other food
% in trade 7 30 23 42 -4 -18 3
Volume: export 1.64 0.15 0.24 0.09
Volume: import 2.18 -0.07 -0.07
Nonfood agriculturee f% in trade 3 13 4 15 -1 11
Volume: export 0.22 0.03 0.07 0.02 +0
Volume: import 0.28 -0.01
Nonagriculturee
% in trade 10 41 19 28 +0 32 21
Volume: export 6.03 5.76 0.01
Volume: import 0.51 0.77 0.62 1.62
aVolume in 106 t. bVolume in 106 t of milk equivalent. cln the ca.se where a country switches
its trade position, changes in percent are not given. dVolume in 106 t of protein equivalent.
eVolume in 109 USS 1970. fNo percentage change is given when the volume traded in the refer-
ence scenario does not exceed 2% of domestic disappearance.
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maintaining a 100% self-sufficiency level. Otherwise, it could be expected to take
up some of the exports, as it does in the OECD trade liberalization scenario.
Trade in other animal products is also strongly affected by the EC. From
being a net exporter in the reference run with a share of 6% of the world market,
the EC becomes an importer and holds a share of about 2% under EC trade
liberalization. Again, the USA replaces most (88%) of the EC's exports, with
Argentina, Canada, and other developing countries also contributing to the
increased global exports. The necessary cut in imports occurs only in the LDCs.
With regard to protein feed, the USA loses an important market and cuts
back its exports when the EC liberalizes trade. Some of the world market share
lost by the USA is taken up by Brazil. As expected, the EC's increase in imports
of other food opens up the market for LDCs. They make up for two-thirds of the
additional import by the EC, 18% comes from reduced imports by other coun-
tries (mainly Nigeria), and the remainder comes from adjustments in other
developed countries.
Table 6.9. Percentage changes in agricultural trade deficita at current prices in 2000
under EC trade liberalization relative to the reference scenario.
Country Change Country Change Country Change
EC 69 D China -38 Mexico 348
CMEA 15 D New Zealand 178
Argentina 278 Egypt -69D Nigeria -5 D
Australia 178 India 118 Pakistan -33 D
Austria -50 D Indonesia OD Thailand 58
Brazil -64 D Japan -1 D Turkey 218
Canada 238 Kenya 88 U8A 128
aD, deficit in reference scenario; S, surplus in reference scenario.
In summary, one can say that the EC influences the international trade
structure quite substantially, as evidenced by the changes in trade that occurs as
a result of its trade liberalization. Since all countries except China, the CMEA,
and the EC improve their agricultural trade balances - the surplus countries
increase their positive balance and the net importers of agricultural goods
decrease their deficit - nonagricultural products are increasingly imported (see
Table 6.3). To pay for its larger deficit in agricultural trade, the EC has to
export approximately 40% more of nonagriculture. These additional exports,
plus some more from the CMEA, are shared as increased imports by almost all
countries. Brazil and Nigeria are an exception in this respect because they
reduce their trade deficit in agriculture strongly so that they also have to cut
back their exports of nonagriculture in order to match the overall trade balance,
which shows only marginal changes for all countries between the EC trade
liberalization and reference scenarios. However, in general, most LDCs increase
their imports of nonagriculture.
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6.1.4. EC's welfare improves in spite of a worsening of its terms of
trade
As might already be expected, the terms of trade change unfavorably for the EC
(see Table 6.-/). The nearly 70% increase in the agricultural trade deficit of the
EC is caused not only because the EC imports more of agricultural commodities
but also by higher agricultural world market prices. Yet, the EC gains in wel-
fare, as several indicators show. Equivalent income increases and so does life
expectancy. Also, the nutritional status goes up. These improvements are due
to a decline of the food price index and to a simultaneous increase in income.
The gains in equivalent income for the EC (the costs of the CAP) are
approximately 0.4% in 2000. This number is quite similar to what was found in
the other studies mentioned above. The work by Burniaux and Waelbroeck
(1985) shows a considerably higher number than this 0.4% for the low-price
scenario but not for the high-price scenario that is more comparable with the
reference run, considering the changes of the relative agricultural prices on the
world market.
The income increase for the economy as a whole comes in spite of a con-
stant total labor force, a marginally reduced capital stock, and a reduction in
acreage used. Hence, the income gain is due to a reallocation of resources to
more productive uses. This shows how much the domestic market has misallo-
cated its resources owing to price distortions, which were quite substantial, as
can be seen from the fact that agricultural prices drop by more than 10% when
they align with those of the world market. The crop price index falls even more
than the one for all agricultural products. The worsening of the domestic terms
of trade for agriculture leads to a redirection of investment and accelerated
migration of labor out of agriculture, resulting in a 15% smaller agricultural
labor force by 2000. The agricultural capital stock declines by about 7%. Fertil-
izer application is reduced by 23% while cultivated acreage goes down marginally
by 2%.
The overall impact is a strong reduction of value added in agriculture of
around 9%. The implicit price elasticity for GDP agriculture (at 1970 prices) is
0.74.
6.1.5. Farm sector is adversely affected: Income parity declines and
out-migration increases
Income parity (ratio of current-price GDP in agriculture per worker to GDP in
nonagriculture per worker) falls by 13.6% in 1990 and 5.7% in 2000 (see Table
6.-/). The lower reduction in parity in 2000 than in 1990 can be mainly explained
by a continued and fast out-migration of labor from agriculture in the 1990s.
The reduction in agricultural GDP at current prices, which comprises both a loss
in agricultural volume and a fall in agricultural prices, exceeds 20% in both 1990
and 2000.
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146 Toward Free Trade in Agriculture
T-hough the loss in farm income may seem high in percentage terms, it is in
fact smaller than the level of protection removed. In order to protect the income
of farmers, not only does income have to be maintained, but those who move out
of agriculture have to be absorbed productively in the nonagricultural sector.
Since the per capita GDP increases, those who migrate out are indeed absorbed
in the nonagricultural sector, which yields them a higher income on average.
Those remaining in agriculture may be compensated for their loss in income par-
ity through nondistorting means such as lump-sum transfers.
Though the out-migrants are absorbed in the nonagricultural sector in the
model scenario, one should not underestimate the hardship caused by the migra-
tion of the agricultural labor force to other sectors of the economy. The 15%
fewer people working in agriculture by 2000 amount to 0.8 million. This
increases the average annual rate of out-migration by 35% above the reference
scenario (from 2.3% in the reference run to 3.1% in the present scenario).
Though this many jobs may be available in nonagriculture, the particular farm-
ers being driven out may not have the ability to acquire the skills needed for
these jobs. Thus, in reality they may suffer hardships not indicated in the
scenario and may require special measures to support their standard of living.
Although enforcing this scenario would be very difficult, its results might
shed some light on the extent to which the CAP of the EC fulfills its objectives.
This is examined below in turn for the various objectives.
Objective (1). To increase agricultural productivity by developing technical
progress and by ensuring the national development of agricul-
tural production and the optimal utilization of the factors of pro-
duction, particularly labor.
The CAP does not lead to optimal utilization of factors of production, par-
ticularly labor. This is clear from the fact that GDP increases, as does the
shadow price of labor in agriculture, when the CAP is liberalized. The extent to
which the CAP induces technical progress cannot be determined from the
scenario, as induced technical progress is not so modeled.
Development of agriculture as measured by a volume index of agricultural
production is indeed stimulated by the CAP. However, the loss in volume of
production with removal of the CAP is about 10% by the year 2000.
Objective (2). To ensure thereby a fair standard of living for the agricultural
population, particularly by increasing the individual earnings of
persons engaged in agriculture.
Though the agricultural sector as a whole loses income when the CAP is
liberalized, it is not obvious that the CAP increases the individual earnings of
persons with small holdings engaged in agriculture. Since, when the CAP is
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liberalized, the shadow prices of labor and capital go up by 5% but that of land
falls by 50%, it is quite likely that the loss of income suffered by the small farm-
ers will be very small, if indeed they do suffer a loss.
Objective (3). To stabilize markets.
Though market stability has not been analyzed, as was pointed out earlier,
the literature indicates that the CAP can have both stabilizing and destabilizing
effects.
Objective (.1). To guarantee regular supplies.
The agricultural self-sufficiency ratio falls by nearly 11% in 2000 when the
CAP is removed. The EC's ability to command such additional agricultural
imports is indeed very large. Thus, regular supplies could be guaranteed for EC
consumers by relying on the world market rather than on domestic production.
Thus, though the CAP can be said to ensure regular supplies through domestic
production, the CAP is not needed to ensure regular supplies.
Objective (5). To ensure reasonable prices in supplies to consumers.
In this, clearly, the CAP has failed, as removal of it will result in lower
prices for consumers.
In summary, the results of the scenario indicate that agricultural trade
liberalization by the EC would not be contradictory with the objectives of the
CAP.
6.1.6. Changes in structures of production and demand in the EC
The price decline for EC farmers occurs across all commodities, but with
different intensities (see Table 6.5). Most severely affected are the crops; the
price drop is considerably less for livestock products. The differences in farm
price reductions in different commodities are due not only to the varying levels of
protection removed but also to the fact that on the world market the prices of
different commodities change differently. Thus, the prices of bovine and ovine
meat and, especially, dairy products increase on the world market more than the
prices of other commodities and, consequently, the EC producer prices fall least
for these two products. The decline in domestic grain prices gives livestock
products another advantage through lower feed costs. By 2000, the ratio of aver-
age feed costs to average gross revenue of all animals falls by 12%. Since feed
concentrates become relatively cheaper, the yield level of dairy cattle rises by
3%. In addition, beef cattle are slaughtered at a slightly higher weight. All
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these facts lead to a drastic shift in the revenues per animal compared to net
revenue per hectare of the various crops (see Table 6.6). The decline of net reve-
nues of crops exceeds that of the corresponding prices because of a drop in yield
levels caused by lower fertilizer application rates.
Table 6.6. The EC: Net revenue per hectare and per animal unit In 2000 under EC
trade liberalization compared to the reference scenario.
Commodity
Wheat
Rice
Coarse grains
Protein feed
Other food
Nonfood crops
Fruits
Other animal products
Bovine and ovine
Milk animals
RO: absolute valuesa
0.22
0.46
0.22
1.76
1.82
2.69
0.58
3.42
190.28
500.27
F-EC: % change over RO
-57.6
-60.7
-40.3
-19.7
-14.7
-25.9
-15.0
4.3
-6.3
-3.2
a103 x national currency per hectare for wheat, coarse grains, protein feed, other food, and
nonfood crops; national currency per 1970 US$ for fruits; 103 X national currency per tonne of
protein equivalent for other animal products; national currency per head for bovine and ovine
and for milk animals.
Based on the changes in net revenue, one might expect that animal produc-
tion is increased while crop production decreases. As Tables 6.5 and 6.6 reveal,
this is not the case. The net revenue figures in these tables do not account for
the shadow prices of agricultural factors: labor, capital, and land. In determin-
ing the changes in production structure, the changes in the shadow prices of
these factors are also important. Production of all three livestock products goes
down, and among the crops only coarse grains are produced in larger quantities.
The latter phenomenon can be explained by the high cross-price elasticity
between wheat and coarse grains, as was done in the previous chapter. Livestock
production is cut back because its relatively high capital and labor intensities
make it more difficult to compete for the scarcer resources, labor and capital.
The shadow prices of both labor and capital increase by about 5%. That the
competitiveness of crops is not reduced as much as indicated by the drop in net
revenues is also due to the sharp fall in shadow price of land (50% in 2000).
Retail prices for coarse grains, protein feed, nonfood agriculture, and
nonagriculture fall as much as their counterparts at the producer level. All other
retail prices fall less. The pattern of demand, however, does not shift drastically.
These changes are caused also by the altered feed uses which, in general, go
down, except for wheat. Wheat is substituted for coarse grains because it gets
relatively cheaper.
150 Toward Free Trade in Agriculture
The EC becomes, in general, more dependent on the world market for agri-
cultural products. This is especially evident for livestock products, and less so
for the grain sector. Agricultural self-sufficiency goes down by approximately
11% (see Table 6.4).
6.1.7. Impact on other countries
Welfare Loss for Most Developing Countries in Spite of Terms-of-trade Gains
The effect of trade liberalization by the EC on other countries may be broadly
summarized as follows (see Table 6.7). The developing countries lose from such
a policy whereas the developed countries gain in terms of the welfare indicators
of equivalent income, number of people hungry, and life expectancy. However, a
few exceptions exist to this more general observation. Among the developing
countries, Argentina, Nigeria, and Pakistan gain on equivalent income but lose
on the other two indicators while Kenya gains with respect to people hungry, life
expectancy, and the consumption cost comparison. Among the developed coun-
tries, Austria and Japan lose with respect to equivalent income and do not indi-
cate any change with respect to life expectancy.
If one looks for an explanation of why the LDCs are in general worse off
under EC trade liberalization, then one must first note that in all of them the
agricultural price rise observed for the world market is transmitted to the domes-
tic market, but with various intensities (see Table 6.4). As a result, value added
by agriculture increases. However, the response of total GDP to an agricultural
price increase is mixed. In only two LDCs (Kenya and Nigeria) is this response
positive, in most it is insignificant, and in some even negative. Among the latter
are Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, and Turkey. In those countries the increase in agri-
cultural GDP is more than offset by a decrease in nonagricultural GDP. The
reason is that agriculture's increased competitiveness attracts more resources,
which are drawn from nonagriculture although their marginal productivity is
higher in nonagriculture. This behavior reflects the reverse of what happened in
the past when resources were retained in agriculture in spite of a higher return in
nonagriculture.
The higher agricultural prices lead also to an increase in food prices.
Together with the lack of additional income, this leads to a lowering of food con-
sumption. Therefore life expectancy goes down, and the number of hungry peo-
ple rises.
From a trade point of view, it is interesting to see that the terms of trade
improve under EC trade liberalization for almost all LDCs (see Table 6.4). Bra-
zil, Egypt, Indonesia, and Nigeria are exceptions to this rule. All four of them
have a very low self-sufficiency ratio for wheat (the ratio for Indonesia and
Nigeria is zero). As already mentioned, the wheat price increases the most of all
crop prices on at the world market, and only dairy products have a stronger rise.
I
I
I
Ii
Unilateral Trade Liberalization by the EC or the USA 151
Tr;,ble 6.7. Gains and losses on some welfare and macroeconomic indicators In 2000
under EC trade liberalization relative to the reference scenario. a
Equiv. Consump- People Life
Countries GDP70 Parity mcome tion cost hungry expect.
USA NS G ID NS
Canada NS G G G NS
Australia G G G G NS
New Zealand G G G NS
Austria NS G L L NS
EC G L G G G
Japan L G L L NS
CMEA L L
China NS ID
Argentina G G G G L L
Brazil L G L L L L
Mexico L G L L L L
Egypt L G L L L
Kenya G G G G G
Nigeria G G G G L L
India NS G L L L NS
Indonesia NS G L L NS
Pakistan G G G G L L
Thailand NS G G L NS
Turkey L G NS L L L
aG , country gains; L, country loses; ID, indeterminate; NS, not significant; -, not calculated.
For a description of the indicators, see Section 3.3.5.
The USA Improves its Market Shares
A large share of the changes in the EC's trade pattern is taken up by the USA.
This underlines the importance of the USA as an exporter of agricultural prod-
ucts, but also the competition between the EC and the USA for shares of the
world market. It is especially interesting that the USA expands its wheat export
while it cuts that of coarse grains. This can be explained by the improvement of
the wheat price relative to that of coarse grains as observed on the world market
(see Table 6.1). Accordingly, US wheat production is increased while US coarse
grain production remains unchanged. Since animal production is increased, and
thereby feed consumption of grains, the new export pattern results. However,
the USA cannot prevent the world market prices of the two grains from diverg-
ing rather strongly under EC trade liberalization and reaching a gap reflecting
the more distant past. The export subsidies for wheat that the EC grants its
exporters depress the wheat price on the world market in the reference scenario.
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A similar observation can be made for dairy products. The relative price
increase for dairy products on the world market under EC trade liberalization is
a result of the drop of the export restitutions. The changed volumes of dairy
products traded by the EC cannot be compensated by other countries, although
all countries except India react with an increase in dairy production, especially
the USA. But, as mentioned earlier, the assumption that Canada does not
change its policy of supply management to remain just self-sufficient may also
contribute to the rise of the world market price. If Canada were to mobilize its
production potential for dairy products, the price increase might be much
smaller.
6.1.8. Comparison with other studies
As mentioned already above, the costs of the CAP calculated in this scenario are
found to be quite similar with numbers from other studies, except perhaps the
study by Burniaux and Waelbroeck (1985). Table 6.8 provides an additional
comparison. The changes in agricultural world market prices due to trade
liberalization by the EC are shown for those studies that endogenize the interna-
tional terms-of-trade effects in their analysis.
As usual, the comparison is made difficult owing to differences in the
approach followed, in commodity aggregation, in the number of countries
included, in the transmission of world market price changes on the domestic
market, and in the level of protection assumed for the EC. Anderson and Tyers
(1984) and Matthews (1985) use a static partial equilibrium approach while Bur-
niaux and Waelbroeck (1985) employ a dynamic general equilibrium type of
model. Anderson and Tyers consider five agricultural commodities and disaggre-
gate the world into 24 countries; Matthews analyzes the trade impact for 11 agri-
cultural commodities and 191 countries; and Burniaux and Waelbroeck distin-
guish 13 agricultural and five nonagricultural aggregates and break the world up
into nine regions of which one is Western Europe (neither Anderson and Tyers
nor Matthews covers the agricultural sector).
Burniaux and Waelbroeck indicate the largest price increases on the world
market when the EC liberalizes agricultural trade. This might be an outcome of
the assumption made with regard to the development of the world market prices
in their reference scenario (which fall 2.5% annually in the low-price scenario)
and of the EC prices. To maintain income parity between rural and urban labor,
EC agricultural prices increase in their reference scenario relative to those pre-
vailing on the world market, moving the protection level up as well. This, in
turn, leads to a substantial contraction of the agricultural sector in the EC when
tariff equivalents are removed (rural GNP declines by 12.4%). To compensate
for the EC's output reduction, other countries need a substantial price incentive
at the domestic level. With a price transmission elasticity below unity, the world
market prices must increase even more than prices at the national levels. [In
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Table 6.8. The impact of EC trade liberalization on world market prices: A comparison
of FAP results with other studies.a
Commodity
Wheat
Rice
Coarse grainR
Barley
Maize
All grains
Ruminant meat
Beef
Mutton
Dairy products
Butter
Skim powder
Other animal products
Nonruminant meat
Pork
Poultry
Protein feed
Oilcake
Other fpod
Sugar
Vegetable oaf
Fruit and vegetable/
Average protection
in reference scenario
FA~
8.7 (112)
1.5 (61)
3.7 (37)
6.9 (12)
14.9 (34)
5.2 (24)
0.3 (36)
2.4 (12)
Anderson
and TyersC Matthewi
13 (110) 0.7 (16)
5 (47) 0.1 (36)
16 (83)
2.9 (27)
0.5 (34)
17 (94)
3.9 (35)
5.0 (72)
10.5 (70)
7.5 (43)
1 (40)
4.0 (30)
3.2 (30)
-7.9
6.0
5.0
NAh NAh
Burniaux
and Waelbroecke
13.4
17.3
16.3
16.3
77
a-rhe numbers are percentage changes in world market prices due to agricultural trade liberal-
ization by the EC. The bottom row gives the weighted average protection rate in the reference
run (in %). The figures in parentheses are the protection rates (in %).
bFigures are for the year 2000 (see Table 6.1).
cAnderson and Tyers (1984), Table 2.
dMatthews (1985), Table 7.1.
eBurniaux and Waelbroeck (1985), p 131. The comparison is made with a base run in which
the relative agricultural world market prices fall annually by 2.5%. Results are given for 1995.
The authors do not provide commodity-specific protection rates.
fMatthews assumes a production cut of 3.5 million tonnes for sugar, a consumption reduction of
7.0 million tonnes for oilcakes, and an increase in the world market price of vegetable oils of 5%.
gWeights are based on the values of production in 2000.
h NA, not available.
their paper, Burniaux and Waelbroeck (1985) state that the price changes at the
world market are not fully passed through to the domestic level.]
The results of Anderson and Tyers and of Matthews are not directly com-
parable with those obtained by either the F AP or Burniaux and Waelbroeck
because of the difference in the approach. All four studies show, however, some
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striking differences in the protection rates underlying their results. But these
also can'llot strictly be compared. Those of the F AP and of Burniaux and Wael-
broeck are the outcome of assumptions about future price policies, while Ander-
son and Tyers use protection rates prevailing in 1980, and Matthews (1985, p.
113) took averages over the years 1978-1982. Their impact on EC prices under
EC trade liberalization and, hence, on output can explain to some extent the
different effects on world market prices.
One important difference in the results between the study by Burniaux
and Waelbroeck and the present one is the impact of the CAP on LDCs (not
shown in Table 6.8). The former indicates gains for LDCs while the F AP results
imply losses when the EC liberalizes agricultural trade. Since both these studies
use a general equilibrium approach and arrive at somewhat opposing conclu-
sions, the Burniaux and Waelbroeck study is discussed in some detail here. The
summary statement about the impact of an EC trade liberalization on LDCs is
based on real income and food demand in the analysis by Burniaux and Wael-
broeck, and on equivalent income, calorie intake, and number of hungry in the
present study. Although these indicators are not fully comparable, their
differences cannot explain the difference in the result. [Food demand changes
were also aggregated using 1970 retail prices in the present study. All countries
but India showed the same direction of movement in food demand as in calories
intake.] Burniaux and Waelbroeck argue that the EC's trade liberalization raises
world agricultural prices relative to the world's manufactured goods prices; this
improves the terms of trade for developing countries and makes investment
goods cheaper, so that their economies expand. More gross value added and
improved terms of trade lead to larger real income (GNP adjusted for terms of
trade), and finally to more effective food demand. The gain in food consumption
is not equally distributed over the entire population. In all regions except the
oil-exporting countries, the urban population suffers from the high food prices
and consumes fewer food products. The rural population, however, increases
food consumption to such an extent that, on the average, food intake improves
for the entire population. Only in Southeast Asia and the Mediterranean LDCs
does the food intake decline. The latter countries also face a drop in real income.
In the national models of the BLS also, a higher relative price of agriculture
stimulates investments and growth. However, in some of the countries showing
higher growth, the number of hungry persons increases. Thus, in the model of
India, which distinguishes five rural and five urban income classes, in spite of
higher GDP, improvement in terms of trade, and la"rger household consumption
of agriculture on the average, calorie intake on the average goes down and the
poorest classes in both rural and urban areas are worse off. Moreover, the terms
of trade for a number of developing countries decline as a result of liberalization
of the CAP.
Whether the growth effect offsets the price effect depends on the parame-
ters of the models. This emphasizes the need to estimate empirically parameters
in such models, as has been done for most parameters in the BLS. The
I
I
I
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parameters of the demand systems (an extended linear expenditure system) in
the study by Burniaux and Waelbroeck lead to a somewhat puzzling outcome.
For example, for the regions Latin America and Southeast Asia, rural GNP goes
up by 0.9% and 0.3% and food intake per capita by 2.2% and 4.0%, respectively.
At the same time, urban GNP goes up in the former region by 2.6% and by 1.0%
in the latter, resulting in a decline of per capita food intake of 0.1 % and 1.7%,
respectively. Assuming that the food price changes are equal in both the rural
and the urban sectors, this implies that the marginal propensity to consume food
with respect to real income is positive for the rural population (as one would
expect) but negative for the urban population (as one would not expect in
developing countries).
The case of India and the fact that the terms-of-trade effect varies from
country to country underline the importance of looking at national rather than
regional levels and of accounting in some way for income distribution effects in
assessing the results, as has been attempted in the present analysis through cal-
culation of changes in the number of hungry persons.
The BLS result that higher food prices adversely affect the poor in many
developing countries is consistent with what some scholars of developing country
food policy argue (see Mellor, 1982).
6.2. Unilateral Trade Liberalization by the USA
The protection level of the USA is considerably lower than that of the EC. The
tariff equivalents calculated for the USA in the reference run are also constant
over time (see Table 4.12). The products for which the USA imposes protection-
ist measures are mainly ruminant products, and here especially dairy products.
(In recent years, the USA used protectionist measures for wheat, coarse grains,
rice, and cotton, which are even higher than those used for dairy products.)
Import quotas are used in both cases, amounting to a tariff equivalent in 2000 of
80% for dairy products and 28.5% for bovine and ovine meat. In addition to
ruminant products, the aggregate nonfood agriculture is protected with a tariff
equivalent of 28% and other food with a tariff equivalent of 5%. Other animal
products, of which the USA is an exporter in the reference run, are charged an
export tax of 5%.
A unilateral trade liberalization by the USA - the scenario called F-USA -
results in an average increase of world market prices of approximately 5% (see
Table 6.9). Although this figure is similar to the one obtained when the EC uni-
laterally liberalizes its agricultural trade, the price changes of the individual
commodities are substantially different. Grain prices in the year 2000 hardly
differ from the values obtained in the reference run. The prices of ruminant
products increase substantially (more than 14% for bovine and ovine meat and
approximately 40% for dairy products), while other animal products and nonfood
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Table 6.9. Percentage changes in pricesa and volumes traded on the world market, and
in global production, in 1990 and 2000, due to unilateral trade liberalization by the
USA, relative to the reference scenario.
World market Production
prices Global tradeb volume
Commodity 1990 11000 1990 11000 1990 11000
Wheat -0.4 1.6 0.7 2.3 -0.1 0.6
Rice -1.0 0.2 0.1 -1.3 0.1 -0
Coarse grains -1.5 0.8 5.0 0.7 0.1 1.0
Bovine and ovine meat 18.8 14.3 31.3 25.2 0.6 2.7
Dairy products 28.8 39.0 9.9 -2.1 0.4 1.3
Other animal products -3.3 -2.2 1.6 0.4 0.1 -0.4
Protein feed 0.9 0.3 -1.1 -0.7 -0.5 0.3
Other food 0.3 1.1 -0.4 2.4 -0 -0.1
Nonfood agriculture -1.9 -5.8 0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -1.9
Total agriculture 3.2 4.6 0.1 0.2
Nonagriculture -0.5 0.6 0 -0
:~::t~~en~~~~~:~~~griculturalprice.
agriculture become somewhat cheaper. The remaining products - protein feed
and other food - hardly change their world market prices.
By and large, the changes in world market prices follow the protection lev-
els that the USA imposes in the reference run. The removal of a positive (nega-
tive) protection measure decreases (increases) the domestic price and hence
stimulates (reduces) domestic demand while simultaneously cutting (increasing)
production. As a result, the world market prices increase (decrease) but with
differences in magnitude depending on the response of the other countries to a
world market price change. The only exception to this rule is nonfood agricul-
ture. In spite of a change in the US trade position from an exporter to an
importer, other countries respond to the changed structure of all world market
prices, and the world market price of nonfood agriculture goes down.
The price changes translate into only small production adjustments. Glob-
al production of all agricultural products except bovine and ovine meat is hardly
changed. In other words, the global output responds only marginally to price
changes. This, of course, is also influenced by the elasticity of the transmission
of world market price variations to domestic prices.
Bovine and ovine meat is the only product that generates significant
changes in global trade. All other commodities are traded globally at approxi-
mately the same volume. The 25% increase in the volume of bovine and ovine
meat traded globally is caused mainly by the USA, which imports 163% more
than in the reference run (see Table 6.10). This increased import comes partly
(70%) from additional export and partly (30%) from decreased imports of other
countries, mainly developing ones. Argentina provides half of the additional
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export (0.8 million tonnes), which makes the developing countries as a group a
net exporter of bovine and ovine meat in 2000 under this scenario. The
increased world market price leads to a 4% higher production and a 1% lower
consumption in this group.
Dairy products also indicate a substantial change in trade pattern. The
USA become an importer of this commodity. The export share of the USA is
taken up, first of all, by the EC and by New Zealand, the latter exporting an
additional 1.3 million tonnes of dairy products, but also by a number of LDCs,
especially India, which switches from an importing to an exporting position.
Canada continues to remain absent from the world market because of its policy
of staying self-sufficient.
The reason for the rather strong increase of the world market price for
dairy products is the price policy of most countries. Changes in the world dairy
price are transmitted to the domestic price in many countries only to a small
degree. Small changes in the volume traded lead under these conditions to
rather strong price variations on the world market. This price transmission elas-
ticity is, according to the specifications used, much higher in the USA than in
the EC. (These elasticities, implicit in the model, can be calculated from the
results of the two scenarios discussed in this chapter. The results of the current
scenario yield an elasticity of 0.07 for the EC, and the results of the EC trade
liberalization indicate an elasticity of 0.98 for the USA. In each case results for
the year 2000 were used.) The world dairy price therefore increases more when
the USA liberalizes than when the EC removes its protection. In the latter case,
the USA responds with an additional export of 7 million tonnes of milk
equivalents, while in the current scenario the EC responds with only 2.5 million
tonnes although the increase of the world dairy price is almost three times
higher. Changes in feed cost do not explain this difference in production
response. Feed costs change only marginally for the EC farmer under US trade
liberalization, whereas they increase for the US farmer under EC liberalization.
All other commodities show much smaller changes in their trade pattern.
The USA increases its exports and its world market shares of wheat and coarse
grains because of the reduction in feed use. The additional exports are mainly
imported by developing countries.
As could be expected, the adjustments that take place in both the EC and
the USA are larger when each liberalizes trade than when the other country does
so. Among the countries listed in Table 6.10 (and also in Table 6.2), Argentina
adjusts more when the USA liberalizes, and Australia and Canada more when
the EC removes protection. The impact on Japan, on the other hand, is difficult
to predict. Considering, in addition, the changes in the agricultural trade bal-
ance, Japan adjusts in both scenarios in a somewhat similar way (see Tables 6.9
and 6.11).
According to Table 6.11 trade liberalization by the USA also leads to an
improvement of the agricultural trade balance for almost all developing coun-
tries. Only Egypt increases its trade deficit significantly. All others either
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Table 6.10. Changes in trade structure (percentages and volumes) worldwide and in
selected countries in 2000 due to unilateral liberalization of agricultural trade by the
USA, relative to the reference scenario.
World- A ustra- Argen-
Commodity wide EC lia tina Japan Canada USA
Wheata
% in trade 2 7 +0 -11 -3 -1 3
Volume: export 3.16 1.29 0.06 -0.72 -0.18 1.84
Volume: import -0.31
Rice
% in trade -1 -1 +0 40 -31 +0 1
Volume: export -0.21 +0.0 0.02 0.04
Volume: import -0 -0.24 +0
Coarse grainsa
% in trade 1 13 -0 -22 -6 1 3
Volume: export 1.11 -0.02 -2.8 0.20 3.61
Volume: import 2.61 -2.37
Bovine and ovine meata
% in trade 25 -16 27 52 -10 43 163
Volume: export 1.51 0.13 0.80 0.15
Volume: import -0.17 -0.04 2.19
Dairy produetsb f% in trade -2 28 1 414 -99
Volume: export -0.61 2.5 0.1 0.8 -9.07c
Volume: import -0.39 5.45
Other animal produetsd f% in trade +0 -17 4 70 -20 1
Volume: export 0.01 -0.01 +0 0.02 -0.08 +0 0.11
Volume: i~ort
Protein feed
% in trade -1 -1 6 -0 -8 -0 -2
Volume: export -0.18 0.01 -0 -0.32
Volume: iJIlPort -0.05 -0.30 -0
Other food
% in trade 2 -1 11 53 -5 -9 -7
Volume: export 0.58 0.07 0.31 -0.21
Volume: import -0.09 -0.09 -0.03
Nonfood agriculturee
% in trade -0 1 4 17 +0 4 -
Volume: export -0.03 0.03 0.08 +0 f
Volume: import 0.03 +0 +0
Nonagriculturee
% in trade 1 -4 10 40 +0 9 -35
Volume: export 0.37 -0.54 0.03
Volume: import 0.28 1.10 0.18 -2.79
aYolume in 106 t. bYolume in 106 t of milk equivalent. cln the case where a country switches
its trade position, changes in percent are not given. dYolume in 106 t of protein equivalent.
eYolume in 109 US$ 1970. fNo percentage change is given when the volume traded in the refer-
ence scenario does not exceed 2% of domestic disappearance.
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Table 6.11. Percentage changes in agricultural trade deficita at current prices in 2000
under U8 trade liberalization relative to the reference scenario.
Country Change Country Change Country Change
U8A -198 China 28 Kenya 38
CMEA 250 Mexico 138
Argentina 388 EC -70 New Zealand 338
Australia 98 Egypt 250 Nigeria -1 D
Austria -81 D India 778 Pakistan -1 D
Brazil -250 Indonesia 1 0 Thailand 28
Canada 78 Japan -DO Turkey 148
aD, deficit in reference scenario; S, surplus in reference scenario.
decrease their deficit or increase their surplus in agricultural trade. Among the
industrialized countries, it is to be noticed that Austria decreases its deficit in
agricultural trade by 80%. In this respect, Austria is in a much better situation
under liberalization by the USA than under EC trade liberalization, because of
higher export earnings from trade in ruminant products. The EC reduces its
deficit marginally while the USA has a lower surplus.
The adjustments in production and in demand that take place in the USA
are indicated in Table 6.12. The producer prices of bovine and ovine meat, dairy
products, and nonfood agriculture fall relative to the other agricultural commodi-
ties. A noticeable reduction in output is observed for milk and nonfood agricul-
ture while all other commodities are produced in nearly the same amounts. On
the demand side, dairy products are consumed at a higher level. The strongest
increase, however, occurs in demand for bovine and ovine meat, while demand
for nonfood agriculture goes down in spite of the decline of its retail price. The
reason for this decline is that demand for fibres, the dominating commodities in
this aggregate, follows supply; and supply drops because of the decline of the
producer price.
Table 6.19 shows the adjustments in production and demand for the EC.
Here, it can be seen that the large price increases of ruminant products on the
world market are hardly transmitted into the EC market. The producer prices
for bovine and ovine meat and for dairy products increase in the year 2000 by
only 2.0% and 2.7%, respectively, while the corresponding world market prices
go up by 14.3% and 39.0%. A high price-transmission elasticity in the EC exists
for nonfood agriculture. The price decrease on the world market is almost com-
pletely transmitted onto the domestic market. By and large, producer prices and
retail prices do not change very strongly in the EC when the USA liberalizes
trade. Therefore, the adjustments on both production and demand are of small
magnitude. The trade structure, of course, changes more because production
and demand adjust in opposite directions.
GDP goes up in the USA under this scenario (Table 6.14), while the US
agricultural GDP declines. Compared to the decline of agricultural prices, the
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Table 6.15. Gains and losses on some welfare and macroeconomic indicators in 2000
under US trade liberalization relative to the reference scenario.a
Equiv. Consump- People Life
Countries GDP70 Parity income tion cost hungry expect.
USA NS L G NS
Canada NS G L L NS
Australia NS G L G NS
New Zealand G G G NS
Austria NS NS G G NS
EC NS G NS ID NS
Japan NS G L L NS
CMEA L G
China NS ID
Argentina G G G G L L
Brazil L G L L L NS
Mexico L L L L L L
Egypt L NS L L L
Kenya G G G G G
Nigeria G L G G L L
India NS G NS G NS NS
Indonesia NS G L L NS
Pakistan G NS G G L L
Thailand NS L G NS NS
Turkey L G NS ID NS L
aG, country gains; L, country loses; ID, indeterminate; NS, not significant; -, not calculated.
For a description of the indicators, see Section 3.3.5.
contraction of agricultural value added is relatively small, indicating a low sup-
ply elasticity. In terms of the welfare indicators available, the USA and Austria
gain from trade liberalization (see Table 6.15). The other developed market
economies indicate no changes in equivalent income (New Zealand, EC) or a loss
(Australia, Canada, and Japan). Among the LDCs, gains are rare. Most LDCs
either lose or indicate no change in their welfare indicators.
6.3. A Brief Comparison of Both Unilateral Trade Liberaliza-
tion Scenarios (F-EC and F-USA) with Overall OECD
Trade Liberalization (F-OECD)
As might be expected from the previous discussion, the impact of a unilateral
trade liberalization either by the EC or by the USA has a smaller impact on
international prices and international trade than an all-GECD-countries trade
liberalization. World market prices average 4% lower, and volumes traded are
also generally lower (see Table 6.16). The F-EC scenario shows two commodities
with higher prices than the F-GECD scenario: other animal products and
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nonfood agriculture. All other products are priced lower on the world market,
some of them by more than 10% (rice, milk, and protein feed). The rice price in
the F-EC scenario is lower because of Japan's continued protection of rice and,
therefore, small import needs. The dairy price increases much less owing to a
strong production response of the USA and in spite of the protection decline in
the EC. Protein feed is imported much less by Japan and therefore its price on
the world market is 11% lower.
Table 6.16. Percentage changes in world market prices, global trade volumes, and glob-
al production in 2000 between a unilateral liberalization of agricultural trade by the EC
(F-EC) and by all OECD countries (F-OECD) and between a unilateral liberalization
by the USA (F-USA) and by all OECD countries (F-OECD).
World prices Trade volumes Production
Commodity
Wheat
Rice
Coarse grains
Bovine & ovine meat
Dairy products
Other animal products
Protein feed
Other food
Nonfood agriculture
Total agriculture
F-EC
to
F-OECD
-8.1
-16.1
-6.6
-8.7
-12.1
5.3
-ILl
-2.3
3.8
-4.4a
F-USA
to
F-OECD
-14.2
-17.2
-9.2
-2.3
6.4
-2.1
-ILl
-3.6
-4.2
-4.4
F-EC
to
F-OECD
--0.7
-28.5
-0.5
-15.2
-9.4
-9.9
-5.3
-3.1
-1.9
F-USA
to
F-OECD
3.8
-28.2
5.4
-7.2
-13.0
-14.0
-5.5
-7.0
-5.2
F-EC
to
F-OECD
0.1
-Ll
-1.0
-2.5
-2.4
-1.4
-1.8
-0.2
-1.3
-0.8
F-USA
to
F-OECD
0.1
-1.2
-0.7
-0.6
-0.6
-1.2
-2.2
-0.3
-0.4
-0.6b
alndex of world prices relative to nonagriculture weighted with global production volumes of
1970. blndex of agricultural production weighted with 1970 world prices.
The volumes traded internationally are all reduced by the year 2000, espe-
cially those of rice, bovine and ovine meat, dairy products, and other animal
products. Global production is lower for all commodities except wheat. The
volume index of agricultural production indicates a 0.8% lower output, a level
which is comparable with the reference run.
A comparison of the unilateral trade liberalization by the USA with the one
by all OECD countries shows generally a pattern of differences similar to that
between F-EC and F-OECD. A few exceptions exist, however. Production of
wheat is higher in F-USA by 2000, and all global export quantities except those
of wheat and coarse grains are smaller. The quantity of rice traded indicates the
largest difference because of Japan's protection (as under F-EC). Prices of
cereals are much lower in F-USA than in F-OECD. The lower rice price is a
result of Japan's protection, while the reduced prices of wheat and coarse grains
are caused by the USA, since it exports more. Dairy products have a higher
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price than in F-OECD. In spite of this price increase on the world market, pro-
duction is lower. The reason for this is, as explained above, that the increase of
the world market prices is only marginally transmitted onto the domestic market
in some key countries, e.g., the EC. And Canada maintains its policy of supply
management, so that output of dairy products is lower.
Table 6.17. Gains and losses on some welfare and macroeconomic indicators in 2000 in
F-EC compared to F-OECD.a
Equiv. Consump- People Life
Countries GDP70 Parity tncome tion cost hungry expect.
USA L G L NS
Canada G L G G G
Australia G L G L L
New Zealand L L L NS
Austria NS L L L NS
EC NS L G G NS
Japan L G L L L
CMEA G L
China NS ID
Argentina L L L L G G
Brazil G L G G G NS
Mexico G G G G G G
Egypt G L G G NS
Kenya L L L L L
Nigeria L G L L L G
India NS L NS L G G
Indonesia G L G G NS
Pakistan L L L L NS G
Thailand L L L L NS
Turkey G L G G NS G
aG, country gains; L, country loses; ID, indeterminate; NS, not significant; -, not calculated.
For a description of the indicators, see Section 3.3.5.
Table 6.17 shows the comparison of income and some other indicators in
the F-EC scenario with those of F-0ECD. The EC itself is not better or worse
off if it unilaterally liberalizes trade or does so jointly with all OECD countries.
The other OECD members also do not gain in this scenario compared to F-
OECD. The only exception is Canada, which indicates gains in equivalent
income and consumer costs.
Among the developing countries Brazil, Mexico, and Egypt indicate a clear
improvement in F-EC over F-OECD. (All three are worse off when one com-
pares F-EC with the reference run.) The other developing countries are, in gen-
eral, slightly better off, although some losses are clearly indicated. They improve
most with regard to life expectancy.
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Table 6.18. Gains and losses in some welfare and macroeconomic indicators in 2000 in
F-USA compared to F-OECD.a
Equiv. Consump- People Life
Countries GDP70 Parity mcome tion cost hungry expect.
USA L L L G
Canada G L NS lD G
Australia NS L L L L
New Zealand L L L NS
Austria NS L L L NS
EC L G L L L
Japan L G L L L
CMEA G G
China NS lD
Argentina L L L L G G
Brazil G L G G G G
Mexico G G G G G G
Egypt G L G G G
Kenya L L L L L
Nigeria L G L L L G
India L L G G G G
Indonesia G L G G NS
Pakistan L L L L G G
Thailand L L L G NS
Turkey G L G G G G
aG, country gains; L, country loses; 10, indeterminate; NS, not significant; -, not calculated.
For a description of the indicators, see Section 3.3.5.
The comparison of a unilateral trade liberalization by the USA alone with
F-OECD indicates that it is in the interest of the USA to persuade all other
OECD countries to join in trade liberalization (see Table 6.18). Most developing
countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Turkey, benefit in
F-USA relative to F-OECD, while Kenya loses and the remaining countries show
some mixed results.
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CHAPTER 7
Trade Liberalization
by Developing Countries
7.1. Relevance of the Scenario
The case for liberalization and removal of protection is in some senses stronger,
and in others weaker, for the developing countries. The increased efficiency of
allocation to which liberalization leads should be especially important for a poor
country. The directly unproductive rent-seeking activities that are encouraged
by distortionary protective policies waste real resources, including entrepreneur-
ial talents, which are particularly scarce in developing countries.
The value of increased competition in domestic markets, which improves
the quality and efficiency of production, can be substantial for poor countries.
Though outward orientation makes a country more vulnerable to external
shocks, Srinivasan (1986) has argued, on the basis of the post-oil-shock experi-
ence of developing countries (Balassa, 1981a, 1983a,b), that outward orientation
seems to increase a country's capacity to absorb and adjust to these shocks as
well.
On the other hand, many of the arguments for protection are also of
greater relevance for the developing countries. These include protection of infant
industry to permit learning by doing; optimal or scientific tariffs on exports since
many developing countries exporting primary commodities hold market power as
major exporters facing often inelastic demands; noneconomic objectives such as
special emphasis on the nutritional status of the poor; industrialization; attain-
ment of self-sufficiency, not only for political reasons but also for providing
income to the poor who depend on agriculture (Baldwin, 1952; Caves and Jones,
1973; Johnson, 1953-1954, 1960, 1968).
Notwithstanding the argument for protection, however, many developing
countries, facing balance-of-payments problems, are advised by the IMF and the
World Bank to liberalize. Whereas the IMF and the World Bank advocate
liberalization by all countries, they have relatively little clout with the developed
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countries to make them liberalize trade. Thus, even though some of the gains
from trade liberalization mentioned above cannot be captured using the BLS, it
is of considerable policy relevance to examine the impact of trade liberalization
by the developing countries alone. Developing countries are often given supple-
mental aid in the form of additional loans, sometimes at concessional terms, by
the IMF and the World Bank to help them adjust to liberalization. The results
of a scenario of trade liberalization by developing countries can provide indica-
tions as to the wisdom of liberalization or the adequacy of such aid.
Thus, in this chapter, the outcome of trade liberalization by developing
countries alone is described. The results are analyzed primarily in terms of gains
and losses for the different countries, with a particular emphasis on welfare in
developing countries.
7.2. The Specification of the Scenario
Once again it should be emphasized that only those protection (positive or nega-
tive) measures are removed that are captured in the calculated tariff equivalents.
Thus, only border distortions are removed. As was discussed in Chapter 3, these
include tariff equivalents (positive or negative)' quotas, and subsidies for domes-
tic transport of exports. Other distortioJ's, introduced through subsidy or taxes
on factor and input prices, production quotas, consumer subsidies of many kinds,
etc., are not removed. Whereas one may argue that such nonborder distortions
are not significant for agricultural commodities in developed market economies
(except for the land set-aside program in the USA, which is also removed in the
various trade liberalization scenarios in which the USA liberalizes), one cannot
say this for developing economies. Yet systematic data on such distortions are
not easily available, and in this scenario these distortions are not removed. One
may add here that these distortions are not explicitly modeled in the national
models of the BLS, but are only implicitly accounted for in the estimated param-
eters of the system. Thus, it would have been difficult to remove such distor-
tions, even if data were available on them.
This scenario is designated by F-LDC. Though all developing countries
liberalize trade, China does not do so. Also, as in other scenarios, liberalization
is carried out over five years from 1981 through 1985 so that 1986 is the first
year when trade is fully liberalized.
7.3. Impact on the World Market
Agricultural trade liberalization by the developing countries triggers in this
scenario the changes in the world market prices. However, these changes in turn
also determine the way the different national economies react and develop over
time.
Trade Liberalization by Developing Countrie8 171
7.3.1. A slight drop in world market price, but larger declines for
developing country exports
As can be seen in Table 7.1, the aggregate price of agriculture relative to
nonagriculture falls by 1-2% compared to the reference run. The changes in
world prices consequent on agricultural trade liberalization by the developing
countries can be understood mainly by the levels of distortions removed and the
consequent changes in production and trade in the developing countries shown in
Table 7.2.
Table 7.1. Percentage changes in world market prices and global net exports under LDC
trade liberalization relative to the reference scenario.
Relative prices Net exports
Commodity 1990 f!OOO 1990 flOOD
Wheat 2 5 5 3
Rice 3 1 -5 -12
Coarse grains 3 4 2 0
Bovine and ovine products 3 -3 22 27
Dairy products 11 12 18 24
Other animal products 1 I -4 -4
Protein feed 2 1 -1 -1
Other food -5 -6 -1 -2
Nonfood agriculture -15 -14 0 0
Total agriculture -1 -2
Nonagriculture 0 0 -1 -3
The only significant price drops are in nonfood agriculture and other food.
This is as might be expected since developing countries are the major exporters
of these commodities and many of them tax their exports. Removal of these
negative protection measures (see Table 4.12) leads to lower prices. On the
other hand, though the price of other food drops by 6%, developing country
exports increase by 14%. A more than 20% increase in the protein feed exports of
developing countries results from a world market price increase of only 1%. The
only commodity to show significant price increase is dairy products. Developing
countries are major importers of dairy products, and many of them protect
domestic producers. Removal of these protections increases imports and pushes
up the world price of dairy products.
Though in percentage terms, trade of bovine and ovine meat increases over
the reference scenario level even more than trade of dairy products, its price
actually falls. The developing countries as a group were nearly self-sufficient in
the reference scenario. Though removal of protections stimulates demand in
many developing countries, Argentina, the largest exporter in the world, because
of its large supply response, more than doubles its exports of bovine and ovine
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meat in the year 2000 compared to the reference scenario. This lowers the world
price of bovine and ovine meat in this scenario.
The small increases in world market prices of wheat result from reduced
production (3%) and increased imports (15%) by the developing countries as a
group. Within the group, the major wheat exporters of the reference scenario,
Argentina, India, and Pakistan, all reduce their exports and the major importers,
Brazil, Egypt, and Nigeria, increase their imports.
Similar behavior in the coarse grains production and trade leads to the
small increase in coarse grains price.
7.3.2. Volume of agricultural trade increases: Larger imports of
cereals by developing countries
The developing countries increase their cereal imports in 2000 by more than 20
million tonnes (about 15%) from 146 million tonnes in the reference run, and
their dairy product imports by 7 million tonnes (30%) from 24 million tonnes in
the reference run. They reduce their imports of meats and increase their exports
of protein feed (30%), other food (14%), and nonfood agriculture (6%). Thus,
developing countries increase the volume of their agricultural trade.
7.3.3. Terms-of-trade loss and fall in agricultural balance of trade
The four agricultural commodities that the developing countries as a group
export are protein feed, other food, nonfood agriculture, and bovine and ovine
meat, in the last one of which the group turns from a net importer (in the refer-
ence scenario) into a net exporter under trade liberalization. Except for protein
feed, which gains 1% in price, the world market prices in these products drop.
Also, these products together account for two-thirds of the total value of agricul-
tural production of developing countries. In spite of a drop of 14-15% in the rela-
tive price of nonfood agriculture, developing countries increase their net exports
by 6%. This implies that developing countries export 6% more of nonfood agri-
culture but suffer an export earning loss of about 8-9%. Though developing
countries export more of nonfood agriculture and earn less from it, on the whole
their export earnings increase, as other food is their major export item.
However, the prices of commodities that developing countries import -
cereals, dairy products, and other animal products - all increase, and developing
countries also increase their imports of cereals and dairy products. Thus, as one
would expect, the developing countries suffer a terms-of-trade loss when they
liberalize agricultural trade. This, however, does not necessarily imply that the
developing countries suffer a welfare loss. It could also imply that their earlier
production and trade patterns were not to their best comparative advantage.
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Table 7.9. Impact on LDCs' agricultural balance of trade in 2000 under LDC trade li-
beralization relative to the reference scenario.
Agricultural balance of trade
of developing countries:
at 1970 relative prices
at current relative prices
Reference scenario, RO
(109 US$)
3.2
5.9
F-LDC:
% change over RO
18
-16
Yet, this loss in terms of trade is reflected in the agricultural balance of
trade of the developing countries as a group. As shown in Table 7.9, their
surplus on the agricultural balance of trade at current prices falls by 16%. The
agricultural balance of trade calculated at constant 1970 relative prices shows
that the volume of developing countries' net exports increased by 18%, but they
earned 16% less for them.
7.4. Price Changes and Growth Patterns at National Levels
The changes in domestic prices for the developing countries depend upon the size
of the protection removed. Thus, though the aggregate price of agriculture rela-
tive to nonagriculture drops marginally at the world market level, at national
levels it increases in many developing countries (see Table 7.4). Thus, the agri-
cultural price increases substantially in Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, and Thai-
land, and modestly in Kenya. These countries have negative protection on agri-
culture in the reference scenario. On the other hand, countries with relatively
high positive protection in the reference scenario - Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey
- show a decline in the relative price of agriculture. Mexico, Egypt, and India
show small changes in prices.
The changes in real investments resulting from these price changes are
somewhat larger for the developing countries than they were for the developed
countries (compare Tables 5.9 and 7.4) as, in general, agriculture constitutes a
larger share of the economies of developing countries. In general, changes in
investment and total capital follow the changes in domestic prices. The one
exception is Brazil where, in spite of an 18% increase in the relative price of agri-
culture, investment and total capital stock increase negligibly. As discussed
later, this is the outcome of the fact that, when agricultural prices increase, labor
movement out of agriculture slows down; and for Brazil this can lower its GDP,
which in turn can lower real investment.
The changes in real GDP for the year 2000 shown in Table 7.4 do not fol-
low changes in total capital stocks, as the changed allocation of factors between
the two sectors, when trade distortions are removed, can be more efficient. In
fact, total capital stocks decline for Pakistan and Turkey, both of which show
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Table 7.4. Impact of LDC agricultural trade liberalization on prices, investment, capital
stock, and GDP in various LDCs in 2000.
F-LDC: % change over RO
Country-
specific Domestic
world relative CDP
Current pricesb of price of Real Total at
agricultural RO: agriculture agriculture invest- capital 1970
policy A NPLa Pt'!P/f PA!PN ment stock prices
Protecting:
Turkey 26 -4 -13 +Oc -1 2
Pakistan 12 -1 -10 1 _Od 3
Nigeria 11 -5 -9 -4 -3 -2
Egypt 9 -4 1 1 1 2
Mexico 5 -2 -5 -2 -1 -2
India 4 -2 -2 _Od NAe _Od
Taxing:
Argentina -23 -2 31 6 3 +Oc
Brazil -21 -4 18 +Oc +Oc -1
Indonesia -15 -3 13 4 3 1
Thailand -12 -3 14 2 2 +Oc
Kenya -7 -3 7 4 2 1
aANPL, aggregate nominal protection level (%) in 2000.
b World prices weighted by domestic consumption volumes.
c+0 implies small positive change of less than 0.5%.
d_Oimplies small negative change of less than 0.5%.
eN A, not available in the model in a comparable way.
relatively large percentage increases in GDP. Similarly, Egypt shows a percen-
tage increase in GDP that is larger than the increase in its total capital.
On the other hand, Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Thailand, and Kenya
show percentage increases in GDPs that are lower than the increases in their
capital stocks. These countries are agricultural exporters with a positive degree
of agricultural protection in the reference scenario. Trade liberalization leads to
loss in terms of trade for Thailand and Kenya, and to relatively more capital-
intensive production in these countries.
Nigeria and Mexico show the highest reduction of 2% in GDP in the year
2000. In both these countries agricultural prices fall, and capital moves out of
agriculture into nonagriculture where the capital output ratio is higher than in
agriculture. The lower capital stocks resulting from lower real investments in
these countries are not compensated by improvement in allocative efficiency.
Table 7.5 shows changes in factor availabilities and GDPs in agriculture
and nonagriculture for the year 2000. The changes in the sectoral GDPs in gen-
eral follow the pattern that could have been predicted from the variable elastic-
ity mini-models described in Chapter 3 and the supply elasticities given there.
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Table 7.5. Impact on sectoral factor allocation and GDP (at 1970 prices) in 2000 due to
LDC agricultural trade liberalization: percentage changes relative to the reference
scenano.
Agricultural sector Nonagricultural sectorCurrent
agricultural
policy
Protecting:
Turkey
Pakistan
Nigeria
Egypt
Mexico
India
Taxing:
Argentina
Brazil
Indonesia
Thailand
Kenya
CDP
-14
-9
-7
-4
-3
-1
29
6
4
4
4
Capital
-20
-10
-10
-2
-6
NAa
43
24
13
11
7
Labor
-11
-11
-5
-5
5
NAa
Acreage
-1
-2
-12
-7
-1
_Oc
CDP
4
7
-1
3
-1
-oc
Capital
1
4
-2
1
-0
NAa
-2
-1
o
-1
2
Labor
5
9
3
5
-2
NAa
aNA, not available in the model in a comparable way.
b +0 implies small positive change of less than 0.5%.
c_O implies small negative change of less than 0.5%.
Thus, countries that had negative protection on agriculture show agricultural
price increases under liberalization. All of them draw more capital into agricul-
ture and increase their agricultural GDP at 1970 prices. The implicit "supply
elasticities with respect to price" range among these countries from 0.3 for Thai-
land to 0.95 for Argentina for the year 2000. These are not partial supply
elasticities in the conventional sense, but elasticities between two different situa-
tions where not just the price but also many other things have changed.
In general, the changes in agricultural GDP in the year 2000 follow changes
in relative price of agriculture. Egypt, which shows a fall in agricultural GDP
while its price increases, appears to be an exception. However, the relative price
of agriculture is lower in most of the years prior to 2000 for Egypt.
In Table 7.6 are summarized percentage changes over reference run values
of some important macroeconomic variables and welfare indicators for the years
1990 and 2000 for the various countries.
1.5. Changes in Production and Trade Patterns
Behind the aggregate price changes lie the changes in prices of various commodi-
ties. These changes alter the relative price patterns, profitability, and produc-
tion structures. As an illustration, Table 7.7 shows the production and trade
pattern changes in Argentina for the year 2000. Argentina is interesting to look
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at as it plays a dominant role in this scenario in determining the changes in the
world market.
Large changes in the structure of producer prices, production, and trade
pattern take place in Argentina. Wheat output falls by 7% even when the pro-
ducer price for wheat increases by 32%, which is the second-largest increase in
producer price of any commodity, the largest increase being 36% in bovine and
ovine meat.
The allocation of factors to the production of the different commodities
shown in Table 7.8 indicates why the production pattern changes as it does. The
increased profitability of agriculture in this scenario draws more capital and
labor into agriculture relative to the additional land that is brought under use in
agriculture. The opportunity cost of land, its shadow price, would thus increase
relative to those of capital and labor. The net revenues shown in Table 7.8 do
not include factor costs, so, when the changed opportunity costs of the factors
are taken into account, relative profitability shifts away from cereals - wheat and
coarse grains ~ and toward animal products. In particular, one-fifth of the land
is shifted from these cereals, which together account for three-quarters of land in
the reference scenario, to roughage production. This kind of shift of land use has
in fact been observed in the past in Argentina when cereal/livestock price ratios
have changed. An interesting finding in Table 7.8 is that the rice area increases
even when the percentage fall in net revenue among all commodities is highest
for it. Once again, this can happen since, when factor costs are subtracted, rice
becomes a relatively more profitable crop compared to wheat and coarse grains.
The changes in production structures in different countries get reflected in
changes in trade patterns. Since the developing countries move to agricultural
trade liberalization in this scenario, changes in their trade patterns are quite
significant (see Table 7.9). Many countries change trade volumes severalfold in a
number of commodities, and for some commodities also change the direction of
trade. Turkey, the country with the highest protection level among the develop-
ing countries in the reference run, reverses direction of trade in rice, bovine and
ovine meat, dairy products, other meats, and protein feed. These changes are
better seen in Table 7.10, which gives changes in agricultural trade volumes.
The impact on the trade of developed countries is not very large, as they do
not change their protection policies in this scenario. As was noted earlier in
Table 7.2, developing countries in 2000 increase their imports of wheat by 11
million tonnes, of coarse grains by 10 million tonnes, and of dairy products by 7
million tonnes. This leads the EC and Canada to increase their wheat exports
and the USA to increase its exports of coarse grains and dairy products.
One can summarize the production and trade changes in the developing
countries when they liberalize agricultural trade as follows:
(1) The world market prices of their agricultural exports go down, those of
their imports go up, and the aggregate price falls so marginally that one
can say it is nearly unaffected.
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Table 7.8. Argentina: Net revenues in 2000 under LDC trade liberalization relative to
the reference scenario.
Commodity
Wheat
Rice
Coarse grains
Protein feed
Other food
Nonfood crops
Fruits
Other animal products
Bovine and ovine
Milk animals
Reference scenario, ROa
0.05
0.29
0.05
0.13
0.80
0.35
0.16
3.70
48.48
147.92
F-LDC: % change over RO
36.8
-10.5
24.3
67.6
59.1
-9.9
46.2
28.2
34.2
9.7
30103 X national currency per hectare for wheat, coarse grains, protein feed, other food, and
nonfood crops; national currency per 1970 USS for fruits; 103 x national currency per tonne of
protein equivalent for other animal products; national currency per head for bovine and ovine
and for milk animals.
(2) The developing countries as a group reduce their agricultural production
and increase their agricultural imports of grains and dairy products.
Though their agricultural export volumes also go up, their agricultural
trade balances at current relative prices go down, so that their imports of
nonagriculture go down.
(3) The pattern of production and trade in individual developing countries
changes a lot, and in a number of commodities many countries change their
direction of trade.
What, however, is the impact on welfare at the global level as well as in the
developing countries? This question is taken up in the next section.
7.6. Impact on Welfare of Agricultural Trade Liberalization
by the Developing Countries
As in the previous chapter, the impact on welfare is examined at the global level
in terms of GDP measured at world prices and number of persons in hunger.
If total global GDP increases, one may argue that, in principle, the gains
due to agricultural trade liberalization are adequate to compensate those who
lose under it. In this sense, with lump-sum transfers, one would expect that a
movement toward trade liberalization would be welfare-improving. Keyzer
(1985) has shown that, even under a variety of other distortions, this should be
so. Of course, from theoretical considerations alone, one would not be able to
say how much or how little the gain would be.
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7.6.1. Global GDP increases marginally; hunger decreases
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Table 7.11 shows that the global GDP increases, but by a very small amount. A
0.05% increase in the year 2000 amounts to US$5.4 billion (1970), which is
almost one-fifth of the gain that resulted from agricultural trade liberalization by
the OECD countries. This is understandable as the developing countries, as a
rule, distort agriculture less than the developed countries (see Figure 1.1). Thus,
gains from removal of distortions can be expected to be smaller.
Table 7.11. Percentage changes in global GDP and hunger under LDC trade liberaliza-
tion relative to the reference scenario.
Persons in hunger
Region
World
DMEsa
CMEA
Developing without Chinab
Mid incomec
Low-mid incomed
Low incomee
GDP at 1970 world prices
1990 2000
0.05 0.05
0.08 0.18
0.01 -0.11
0.25 -0.01
0.17 -0.45
0.47 0.68
0.26 0.31
1990
-4.7
-7.2
9.8
-5.0
-8.5
2000
-4.6
-8.8
14.5
-7.9
-10.0
aAustralia, Austria, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, USA, and the EC.
bCountries with a separate national model, except China: i.e., those listed in footnotes c to e.
cArgentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
dEgypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Thailand, and Turkey.
eIndia and Pakistan.
The global-level changes in GDP are somewhat misleading in the system,
because of the way the models of the CMEA, China, and country groups
behave. As already pointed out, China does not participate in trade liberaliza-
tion. Production in the model of the CMEA responds to prices only marginally
since much of its behavior is determined by plan targets that are not revised as
the world market conditions change. Similarly, the responses of the country
group models to changing prices also do not fully exploit the possibilities of a
more efficient reallocation of resources under trade liberalization. As a conse-
quence, GDP at 1970 world prices goes down for most of the country groups in
this scenario. Thus, in Table 7.11, the figures for changes in GDP for the vari-
ous categories are given only for the countries explicitly modeled in the system.
The explicitly modeled developed market economies (DMEs), even though
they do not liberalize agricultural trade in this scenario, increase their GDP by
0.18% in 2000, Le., by about US$lO billion (1970). This is the outcome of the
fact that terms of trade improve significantly for Austria, Canada, the EC, and
the USA and decline only marginally for Australia and New Zealand, and
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changes in factor allocation for production consequent on the changes in the
world market prices are favorable.
In 1990, the GDP for all categories of developing countries in Table 7.11
shows improvement; this improvement reverses in 2000 for the mid-income coun-
tries Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, but continues for the others. The dynamics
of growth and factor allocations in the middle-income countries leads to a rela-
tively more inefficient allocation of factors under the F-LDC scenario.
Hunger in the world is reduced somewhat when the developing countries
liberalize agricultural trade. The low-income countries, India and Pakistan,
show a reduction of 8-10% in number of people in hunger. The reduction in the
number of hungry in most of the developing countries may suggest that the com-
bined effects of changes in income, due to changes in producer prices and pro-
duction, and of changes in food prices are beneficial to the poor in these coun-
tries.
The impact on welfare may be better explained at the level of individual
countries.
7.6.2. Many developing countries gain
The indicators of producer, consumer, and social welfare that are used in this
study are summarized in Table 7.12 for the different countries.
Egypt, Kenya, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey gain on all available indica-
tors; and one could conclude that these countries benefit from agricultural trade
liberalization.
Though the indicators for the other developing countries do not show uni-
form gains or losses, one could still pass a judgment on some of them. Thus,
Argentina, which gains in production value as well as in all consumer gain indi-
cators but loses on hunger and life expectancy, may still be considered a gainer,
as Argentina has a very small proportion of its population (less than 2%) in
hunger and a high life expectancy in the reference scenario.
Similarly, India may be considered a gainer as it shows improved consumer
welfare indicators as well as social indicators of hunger and life expectancy. The
small decline in value of GDP and parity can be considered as unimportant com-
pared to the 8-9% reduction in hunger. The 1% reduction in rural/urban
income parity does not affect the equivalent income of the rural population
adversely, and agricultural trade liberalization seems to benefit all rural and
urban classes in the country (see Table 7.19).
7.6.3. But some developing countries lose, too
Among those countries that may be considered losers under agricultural trade
liberalization, Brazil is a clear case, as it shows losses on all available indicators.
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Table 7.1£. Gains and losses on some macroeconomic and welfare indicators In 2000
under LDC trade liberalization relative to the reference scenario.a
Equiv. Consump- People Lile
Countries GDP70 Parity income tion cost hungry expect.
USA G L G NS
Canada NS NS NS ID NS
Australia NS L L L NS
New Zealand NS L L NS
Austria G L G G NS
EC NS G G G NS
Japan NS L G G NS
CMEA L G
China ID
Argentina G G G G L L
Brazil L G L L L L
Mexico L L L L G L
Egypt G G G G G
Kenya G G G G G
Nigeria L L L ID G G
India L L G G G G
Indonesia G G G G NS
Pakistan G L G G G G
Thailand NS G L L NS
Turkey G L G G G G
aC, country gains; L, country loses; ID, indeterminate; NS, not significant; -, not calculated.
For a description of the indicators, see Section 3.3.5.
Table 7.19. Class-wise impact in India in 2000 of LDC agricultural trade liberalization:
Percentage change in F-LDC relative to the reference scenario.
Expenditurea class
Calorie intake per capita
Rural
Urban
<$29
3
4
<$45
2
2
<$69 <$120 <$120
aExpenditure in 1970 USS per capita per year.
b+0 means a small increase.
c_Omeans a small decrease.
Thailand should also be considered a loser as it shows a loss for consump-
tion cost comparison as well as for people in hunger. The gains in production
value and income parity of the farmers seem to be more than offset by the
increase in the food price index and the loss of terms of trade.
Mexico and Nigeria show losses in production value and in the consumer
welfare indicators, equivalent income, and consumption cost comparisons. How-
ever, both of them show a reduction in hunger. The fall in food prices increases
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calorie intake even though the modified consumption bundles may not be con-
sidered as desirable as the reference scenario bundles by consumers on the aver-
age. The desirability of the outcome of trade liberalization for these two coun-
tries thus remains ambiguous.
7.6.4. Small impact on developed countries
Among the developed countries, the agricultural importers, Austria, the EC, and
Japan, gain in production value, equivalent income, and consumption cost com-
parisons.
The USA, an agricultural exporter, gains on both production value and
consumption cost comparisons.
The impact on Canada is insignificant on all the available indicators.
However, Australia and New Zealand both lose in terms of production
value and available consumer welfare indicators. Income parity also declines
significantly in these countries.
The different impacts on the agricultural exporters of North America and
Oceania arise from the commodity composition of their trade and the way in
which world market prices of different commodities change. Thus, whereas both
the USA and Canada improve their terms of trade, both Australia and New Zea-
land suffer from a decline in their terms of trade and consequently in the domes-
tic relative price of agriculture as well.
7.6.5. Why do some gain and some lose?
Among the developing countries, there is no easily discernible pattern as to who
gains and who loses. This can be seen in Table 7.14, where the countries are
classified as to whether they had an agricultural trade surplus or deficit and
whether they protected (a positive degree of protection) or penalized (a negative
degree of protection) agriculture in the reference scenario.
The explanations lie in the dynamics of the way countries react and adjust.
Even among the losing countries the dynamics are not uniform. In Brazil and
Thailand investment increases, whereas in Mexico and Nigeria it goes down.
These processes vary from country to country and have to be looked at on a case
by case basis.
The gainers do not need much of an explanation, as this is what one would
expect from economic theory. Trade liberalization would remove distortions,
improve allocational efficiency, increase gains from trade, and increase consumer
well-being.
What needs explanation is why some countries lose.
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Table 7.LI- Classification of gainers and losers in 2000 among developing countries
under LDC trade liberalization.
Current agricultural policy and status
Protecting agricultural exporters
Penalizing agricultural exporters
Protecting agricultural importers
Penalizing agricultural importers
Gainers
India
Turkey
Argentina
Kenya
Egypt
Pakistan
Indonesia
Losers
Mexicoa
Thailand
Nigeriaa
Brazil
aConsidered as losers, though the outcome on hunger is beneficial for these countries.
Before offering such explanations, one may note that the essential struc-
tures of the models are similar for most national models, and the specific charac-
teristics of a country are embodied in the estimated parameters. The explana-
tions given below are thus based on the differences in parameter values and
starting positions of different countries and not on differences in the structures of
the models. The explanations may appear to be ad hoc, but the same arguments
and analysis systematically applied to other countries do not lead to similar out-
comes because of differences in parameter values.
7.6.6. Brazil loses because of other domestic distortions
Under agricultural trade liberalization in Brazil, the relative price of agriculture
increases by almost 20%; more capital (24%), labor (2%), and land (8%) are
brought into agriculture; and income parity goes up by 24% compared to the
reference scenario in the year 2000.
However, the ratio of agricultural GDP per unit of labor to nonagricultural
GDP per unit of labor has been historically very low - at times less than 0.15.
In the reference scenario outcome, the parity ratio remains at more or less this
level.
This low parity ratio signifies a distortion in the labor market. Why does
agricultural labor not move out and into the nonagriculture sector and bring
down the inequality in income? Costs of movement, differences in skills, pro-
tected labor markets, social and cultural costs of movement, etc., may be behind
this low income parity.
When agricultural trade is liberalized, the income parity ratio improves and
marginally slows down the movement of labor out of agriculture into nonagri-
culture (see Table 7.15). This lowers the nonagricultural output and also the
total GDP (see Table 7.1J!). The reduction in total GDP, along with 12.5%
higher food prices, results in loss on all indicators other than income parity.
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Table 7.15. Brazil: Ratios of sectoral factor allocation, shadow prices, GDPs, and in-
comes.
Reference scenario F-LDC
GDP70A/GDP70NA
Income parity ratio
TLA/TLNA
>..LA/>..LNA
KA/KNA
>..KA/>..KNA
1980
0.06
0.14
0.61
0.16
0.11
0.70
1990
0.05
0.14
0.47
0.17
0.08
0.60
fOOO
0.04
0.13
0.37
0.16
0.06
0.56
1990 fOOO
0.05 0.04
0.17 0.16
0.47 0.38
0.21 0.20
0.09 0.10
0.63 0.57
aorLA/TLNA, ratio of labor in agriculture to that in nonagriculturej >.LAI>.LNA, ratio of shadow
price of labor in agriculture to that in nonagriculturej KAIKNA, ratio of capital in agriculture tc?
that in nonagriculturej >.KAI>.KNA, ratio of shadow price of capital in agriculture to that in
nonagriculture.
7.6.7. Thailand loses because of terms-of-trade decline
A rice-exporting country that taxes rice exports and had in general negative pro-
tection on agriculture, Thailand, under F-LDC, shows higher agricultural prices,
increased investment, higher production, higher food prices, a loss in terms of
trade, and a consequent loss in calorie intake, increase in the number of hungry,
and a loss in consumption cost comparison.
For Thailand, a major rice exporter in a relatively thin world rice market, a
tax on rice exports may be an optimal policy. In the reference scenario in 2000,
the value of its agricultural trade surplus constituted 5% of its GDP. A drop of
5% in terms of trade would mean a loss in income of 0.25% of GDP. The gain in
GDP at 1970 prices that Thailand shows under F-LDC in 2000 is 0.1%. Of
course the gain in GDP takes place in spite of the loss in terms of trade, but part
of the cost of loss in terms of trade is borne by consumers who lower their con-
sumption. Also a food price increase of 6% with a GDP increase of only 0.1%
would leave consumers who spend a large part of their income on food, as con-
sumers do in Thailand, worse off.
Thailand's loss under agricultural trade liberalization can thus be explained
mainly by a loss in terms of trade due to removal of what may be an optimal
tariff, by a country whose agricultural exports are a sizable part of its GDP.
7.6.8. Mexico and Nigeria lose because of lower real investments
Mexico and Nigeria both protect their agriculture. When the protection is
removed, the relative price of agriculture goes down in these countries.
In most of the country models, including those of Mexico and Nigeria, sav-
ings depend on GDP at current prices. The real value of investment made from
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these savings depends on the price of nonagriculture. A fall in agricultural
prices, relative to the nonagriculture price, reduces the real value of investment.
In the case of Mexico and Nigeria, the reduced investments lower GDP growth
rates, which do not recover following the more efficient allocation of resources
that can be expected as a result of trade liberalization, as they do for a number
of other countries such as Pakistan and Turkey, which also share a fall in the
relative price of agriculture and an initial drop in investment, but recover to
show in time higher investments and higher production.
Thus, one could say that Mexico and Nigeria lose because of the rigidities
in their domestic capital markets, which do not reallocate capital sufficiently
rapidly to more efficient uses.
The lower food prices in both Mexico and Nigeria, as already mentioned
above, do lead to higher calorie intake and reduction in hunger, though com-
parison of consumption costs and equivalent incomes indicate an adverse impact
of agricultural trade liberalization.
1.6.9. A comment on developing countries that lose
To what extent can the losses of Brazil, Mexico, and Nigeria be considered as
realistic and to what extent merely an outcome of the way the models are con-
structed? The rigidities in the labor movement or resource allocation efficiencies
that lead to these results are not farfetched. It is conceivable that they exist in
real life. To the extent that the model equations pertaining to these movements
and allocation are consistent with past observations, one cannot rule out that
they reflect empirical reality. On the other hand, as in all econometric estima-
tions, here also one can never establish that, in fact, they do so.
7.7. Summary and Policy Implications
Agricultural trade liberalization by the developing countries results in a gen-
erally favorable outcome for many developing countries.
Not only does agricultural production go up in many of them, but also con-
sumers are better off and the level of hunger in the world goes down. However,
the reduction in the number of hungry is only 5% (or 9% if one considers the
impact on only the explicitly modeled developing countries in the system); and
agricultural trade liberalization does not touch the heart of the hunger problem
and cannot be looked upon as a solution to it.
Though the percentage improvements in production values and consumer
gains are small, for many developing countries, agricultural trade liberalization
does seem a desirable policy.
This conclusion, however, needs to be qualified and cannot be generalized
to all developing countries as the impacts on Thailand, Brazil, Mexico, and
Nigeria show.
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The adverse impact on Thailand resulting from terms-of-trade loss can also
be important for other developing countries. Such adverse effects on terms of
trade in the present study are somewhat understated, as many commodities
exported by developing countries are a part of the aggregated commodities sec-
tors "other food" and "nonfood agriculture". Thus, countries that depend
significantly on exports of commodities that are part of these aggregated sectors
should seriously examine the possibilities of terms-of-trade loss before adopting
agricultural trade liberalization.
Similarly, the rigidities and distortions in domestic labor and capital mar-
kets that cause losses for Brazil, Mexico, and Nigeria in this scenario are also not
uncommon in developing countries. Thus, countries that are not able to remove
some of these rigidities and distortions before embracing agricultural trade
liberalization should also carefully examine the possibilities of losing under it.
Finally, the impact on the developed countries is marginal except for the
reduction in income parity in Australia and New Zealand. This is, of course, also
influenced by the assumption that the EC and the USA do not reduce their pro-
tectionist measures in this scenario. Since the OECD countries gained under
trade liberalization by themselves, it is worth exploring the impact of trade
liberalization by all - OECD countries as well as developing countries.
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CHAPTER 8
Agricultural Trade Liberalization
by All Market Economies
8.1. The Scenario F-ALLME
As we have seen in the preceding chapter, the countries liberalizing agricultural
trade, in general, seem to gain from it. However, the coun.tries that do not
liberalize are often affected adversely. In particular, a number of developing
countries lose when the OECD countries liberalize agricultural trade, though
some of them gain when they themselves liberalize. It is thus interesting to see
what happens when both OECD countries and the developing countries liberalize
agricultural trade together.
When more countries remove distortions, the scope for exploiting compara-
tive advantage increases, and global gains in efficiency should also increase.
However, in the absence of lump-sum transfers, an individual country may be
worse off if the changes in world market prices substantially worsen its terms of
trade. To estimate the magnitude of global gains and assess the extent to which
losses to some countries are offset by gains to others under agricultural trade
liberalization by all market economies, developed as well as developing, this
scenario is generated.
The scenario is designated F-ALLME as the centrally planned economies of
the CMEA and China do not liberalize. As in other scenarios, only border dis-
tortions are removed over a five-year period, 1982-1986, so that agricultural
trade is fully liberalized in 1986, when domestic relative prices in a country equal
its trade prices.
As in earlier chapters, the results of this scenario are discussed in the fol-
lowing sequence. First, changes in world market prices are described and com-
pared with the corresponding changes under F-OECD and F-LDC. How these
changes in world market prices affect domestic prices, the growth process, and
factor allocation is described next. Following this, how factor availability and
domestic relative prices affect production and trade patterns is highlighted. This
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is then used to explain why world market prices change the way they do.
Finally, the impact on welfare is examined. Here the global efficiency gains as
reflected in world GDP at constant prices and changes in the number of hungry
people in t.he world are examined first. The country-wise impacts on production,
consumer welfare, and social welfare, as reflected in extent of hunger and life
expectancy at birth and income parity, are discussed to assess which countries
gain and which ones lose.
8.2. Changes under Agricultural Trade Liberalization by All
Market Economies
8.2.1. Changes in world market prices under F-ALLME
The changes in the world market prices under this scenario are shown in Table
8..1. In Figures 8..1-8.9 the index of relative world prices of the various commod-
ities with 1980 prices as base is plotted for the various trade liberalization runs.
The price changes for many commodities are similar to what can be predicted
from the changes in prices under the F-OECD and F-LDC scenarios. The aggre-
gate agricultural price in the year 2000 relative to the nonagricultural price
increases by 5% over the reference scenario. Most of the commodity prices rise,
but those of nonfood agriculture and other food decline. Other animal products
show a very small decline of 1%. Dairy products show the highest price rise of
34%, as compared to the increases under F-OECD of 31% and under F-LDC of
12%. The price increases in 1990 are generally larger than in 2000, as by 2000
adjustments in production structures are more fully realized.
Table 8.1. Percentage changes in world market prices and global net exports under vari-
ous trade liberalization scenarios relative to the reference scenario.
Relative prices Net exports
Commodity
Wheat
Rice
CoarRe grains
Bovine and ovine meat
Dairy products
Other animal products
Protein feed
Other food
Nonfood agriculture
Total agriculture
Nonagriculture
1990 !WOO 1990 !WOO
ALLME ALLME OECD LDC ALLME ALLME OECD LDC
16 23 18 5 1 3 -2 3
22 16 21 1 35 36 37 -12
17 13 11 4 -4 -3 -5 0
26 11 17 -3 52 69 35 27
38 34 31 12 30 24 13 24
3 -1 -0 1 3 14 17 -4
11 13 13 1 5 4 5 -1
-1 -3 5 -6 4 10 10 -2
-11 -17 -2 -14 5 6 5 0
9 5 9 -2
o 0 0 0 13 13 17 -3
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The relative price indices for all agricultural commodities, plotted in Fig-
ures 8.1-8.Y show that the major price increases are in dairy products and in
bovine and ovine meats; the other prices change relatively very little.
Global trade expands. The most significant expansion of trade takes place
for bovine and ovine meat, which grows more than in other trade liberalization
scenarios.
The global trade/production share indices plotted in Figures 8.10-8.18 for
the four trade liberalization scenarios show clearly that, except for bovine and
ovine meat and dairy products, the trade shares in F-ALLME remain similar to
those in the F-OECD scenarios.
8.2.2. Changes in growth patterns under F-ALLME
The changes in world prices get transmitted to domestic prices under agricul-
tural trade liberalization. Once again, the driving forces behind the development
patterns of the various national economies can be understood in terms of
processes initiated by these price changes.
Table 8.2 shows changes in the world relative price of agriculture weighted
by the 1970 production volumes of each country, changes in domestic producer
price, investment, capital stock, and GDP at 1970 prices for the year 2000. The
country-production-weighted changes in world relative prices vary from country
to country, and for Nigeria there is even a decline of 2%. This shows the impor-
tance of the pattern of price changes across commodities in analyzing reactions
to trade liberalization.
Increases in the domestic relative price of agriculture make investment
goods cheaper and lead to higher real investment. This results in a larger total
capital stock, whereas a lower price results in a lower capital stock. Moreover, a
higher price for agriculture also draws in more resources to agriculture. This
reallocation results in more efficient use of resources for a number of countries
that show larger GDPs at 1970 prices in the year 2000.
Thus, the developp.d economies - those that protect as well as those that
tax agriculture - increase their GDPs. The one exception is Canada. However,
this apparent loss in GDP at 1970 prices for Canada results from an index
number problem and in fact, as can be seen in Table 8.9, the value of output
increases for Canada, too, when pair-wise comparisons are made of production
values in two situations.
Among the developing market economies with a national model in the sys-
tem, six countries show higher GDPs and the others show lower GDPs. The
largest reduction in GDP is for Mexico. Mexico follows a factor allocation pat-
tern similar to that in the F-LDC scenario, and its GDP falls as a result of rigidi-
ties in domestic factor movements between sectors. Such rigidities result in
suboptimal allocation of factors between sectors and, as was indicated in
Chapter 7, agricultural trade liberalization slows down the movement toward
more efficient factor allocations.
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Figure 8.1. Index of relative prices of wheat on the world market under various trade
liberalization scenarios.
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Figure 8.f!. Index of relative prices of rice on the world market under various trade
liberalization scenarios.
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Figure 8.9. Index of relative prices of coarse grains on the world market under various
trade liberalization scenarios.
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Figure 8..4, Index of relative prices of bovine and ovine meat on the world market under
various trade liberalization scenarios.
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Figure 8.5. Index of relative prices of dairy products on the world market under various
trade liberalization scenarios.
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Figure 8.6. Index of relative prices of other animal products on the world market under
various trade liberalization scenarios.
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Figure 8.1. Index of relative prices of protein feed on the world market under varIOUS
trade liberalization scenarios.
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Figure 8.8. Index of relative prices of other food on the world market under varIOUS
trade liberalization scenarios.
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Figure 8.9. Index of relative prices of nonfood agriculture on the world market under
various trade liberalization scenarios.
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Figure 8.10. Index of (global net export)/(global production) (1980 = 1) for wheat
under various liberalization scenarios.
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Figure 8.11. Index of (global net export)/(global production) (1980 = 1) for rice under
various liberalization scenarios.
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Figure 8.1£. Index of (global net export)/(global production) (1980 = 1) for coarse
grains under various liberalization scenarios.
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Figure 8.19. Index of (global net export)/(global production) (1980 = 1) for bovine and
ovine under various liberalization scenarios.
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Figure 8.14. Index of (global net export)/(global production) (1980 = 1) for dairy under
various liberalization scenarios.
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Figure 8.15. Index of (global net export)/(global production) (1980 = 1) for other
animal products under various liberalization scenarios.
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Figure 8.16. Index of (global net export)/(global production) (1980 = 1) for protein feed
under various liberalization scenarios.
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Figurc 8.17. Index of (global net export)/(global production) (1980 = 1) for other food
under various liberalization scenarios.
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Figurc 8.18. Index of (global net export)/(global production) (1980 =: 1) for nonfood
agriculture under various liberalization scenarios.
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T/lble 8.f!. Percentage changes in economic growth In 2000 under agricultural trade
liberalization relative to the reference scenario.
F-ALLME
Real Total
Types of protection/ CWPA a DRPA b invest· capital F-LDC F-OECD
market economy (pf / Plr) (PA/PN) ment stock CDpc CDpc CDpc
Positive/developed:
_OdJapan 2 -39 -1 +Oe +Oe +Oe
EC 9 -12 _Od _Od +Oe +Oe +Oe
USA 9 -5 NAf NAf +Oe +Oe +Oe
Negative/developed:
--odNew Zealand 11 8 4 4 1 2
Canada 11 13 +Oe +Oe _Od --od _Od
Australia 8 9 1 1 +Oe --od +Oe
Austria 11 6 +Oe +Oe +Oe +Oe _Od
Positive/developing:
--odTurkey 2 -10 +Oe -1 1 2
Pakistan 9 -1 3 1 3 3 _Od
Nigeria -2 -9 -2 -1 -1 -2 1
Egypt 3 8 -2 _Od -3 2 -1
Mexico 4 -5 -4 -2 -4 -2 -2
India 7 3 +oe NAf +oe _Od +oe
Negative/developing:
--od +OeArgentina 7 48 10 6 0
Brazil 1 25 1 1 -1 -1 _Od
Indonesia 3 17 6 4 1 1 +Oe
Thailand 3 20 3 3 +Oe +Oe +Oe
Kenya 4 15 9 6 3 1 2
aCWp A, country's world price of agriculture, weighted by 1970 production volumes of the
country.
bDRPA, domestic relative price of agriculture (divisia index of domestic producer prices, with
1970 as base year).
cGDP at 1970 prices.
d--{) means a decrease of between 0.005% and 0.5%.
e+0 means an increase of between 0.005% and 0.5%.
fNA, not available in the model.
Egypt also shows a large fall in GDP. Egypt's loss of 3% in its GDP is
surprising as, when only the developing countries liberalized in the F-LDC
scenario, it showed an increase of 2% in the year 2000. This is because the
changes in the prices of commodities in the F-ALLME scenario are different from
those in F-LDC and, as a result, domestic prices in Egypt are different. Whereas
the relative price of agriculture hardly changes for Egypt in F-LDC, in this
scenario it goes up by 8%, drawing in more resources for agriculture, and
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Table 8.9. Production value comparisons between F-ALLME and the reference
scenario.a
1985 1990 1995 flOOO
Countries A B A B A B A B
USA 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Canada 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Australia 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1
New Zealand 1.0 0.7 1.9 1.4 2.1 1.7 1.9 1.6
Austria 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1
EC 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Japan 0.1 +0 0.3 -0 0.4 +0 0.4 +0
CMEA -0 -0 -0 -0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3
China 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Argentina 1.1 1.0 3.2 2.1 4.7 2.9 5.8 3.8
Brazil 0.5 0.5 0.2 +0 -0.2 -Q.3 -0.4 -0.5
Mexico 0.2 0.1 -1.5 -1.6 -2.8 -2.9 -3.9 -4.0
Egypt 0.3 -Q -Q.1 -1.2 -1.4 -2.4 -2.3 -3.3
Kenya 0.6 -0 2.2 1.2 3.5 2.4 4.1 3.3
Nigeria 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.6 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.9
India 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 +0 +0 -Q -0.1
Indonesia -0 -0.1 -Q.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.3 0.4 0.1
Pakistan 0.9 0.7 1.9 1.5 2.0 1.5 2.1 1.6
Thailand -Q -0.2 0.4 -0 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.2
Turkey 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.8 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.3
aA=100[(~PlYl')/(~PlYn-l] and B=100[(~PtYl'l/(~PtY[)-11where Pt and P,~ are prices
of commodity i in the reference and policy scenarios, respectively, and yt and y! are produc-
tion of commodity i in the reference and policy scenarios, respectively.
agriculture has lower marginal productivities for both labor and capital than
nonagriculture in Egypt.
Argentina, even with a 6% larger capital stock in the year 2000, shows a
marginal decline in its GDP measured at 1970 prices. The reduction in the GDP
of Argentina, as in the case of Canada, is due to the index number problem.
Production value comparisons in Table 8.3 show a gain of 4-6% in the value of
production compared to the reference scenario. The changes in GDP at 1970
prices, therefore, do not provide a reliable indication of whether the GDP of a
country increases or decreases under agricultural trade liberalization.
In summary, the changes in aggregate GDP in this scenario, where all
market economies liberalize, are in general the sum total of changes in GDP
under trade liberalization by only developed countries (F-0ECD) and under
liberalization by only developing countries (F-LDC).
The changes in factor allocations and sectoral GDPs are shown in Table
8.4. The broad pattern is that, when agricultural prices increase, countries put
more factors into agricultural production. The allocation patterns of countries
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Tilble 8.4. Percentage changes in sectoral factor allocations and GDP (at 1970 prices)
under trade liberalization by all the market economies: Percentage changes relative to
the reference scenario.a
A gricultural sector Nonagricultural sector
Countries GDP Capital Labor Acreage GDP Capital Labor
Japan -6 -24 -5 -6 +0 +1 +0
EC -8 -6 -12 -2 +0 +0 +1
USA 1 NA NA 3 +0 NA NA
New Zealand 11 24 2 NA --0 +0 --0
Canada 17 20 19 2 -1 -1 -1
Australia 1 10 4 +0 +0 -0 -0
Austria +0 2 1 -0 +0 +0 -0
Turkey -9 -14 -8 -1 3 1 4
Pakistan -1 -3 -3 -1 4 3 3
Nigeria -1 -4 -1 -6 -1 -0 1
Egypt 5 11 5 3 -4 -5 -4
Mexico 1 -1 12 -2 -4 -2 -6
India -0 NA NA +0 +0 NA NA
Argentina 47 77 49 1 -5 -3 -6
Brazil 7 33 2 12 -1 -1 -1
Indonesia 6 20 1 -0 -0 -0 -1
Thailand 6 18 0 NA -1 -1 NA
Kenya 10 19 NA NA 1 4 NA
aNA, not available.
are similar to those already described in for F-OECD (Chapter 5) and F-LDC
(Chapter 7).
Percentage changes in these macroeconomic and other variables for 1990
and 2000 relative to the reference scenarios are summarized for the various coun-
tries in Table 8.5.
8.3. Changes in Patterns of Production and Trade
8.3.1. No significant changes in global production
The changes in global production levels are, as in other agricultural trade liberal-
ization scenarios, modest (see Table 8.6). The largest change is a 5% increase in
the year 2000 in the production of bovine and ovine meat. As pointed out ear-
lier, the global production levels have to be consistent with global demand, and
the changes in demands for agricultural products due to trade liberalization are
rather small. The low price elasticities in the richer countries and the small
changes in income for the poorer countries result in small changes in demand.
Although global production levels do not change much, the pattern of pro-
duction across countries and groups of countries does change. The changes in
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Table 8.6. Percentage changes in global production levels in trade liberalization
scenarios relative to the reference scenario.a
F-ALLME F-ALLME F-OECD F-LDC
Commodity 1990 2000 !!a00 2000
Wheat 1.4 1.1 0.5 1.5
Rice 1.3 1.6 1.2 0.7
Coarse grains 0.7 1.7 1.7 -oa
Bovine and ovine meat 2.2 5.3 3.3 1.6
Dairy products 1.2 2.4 1.9 0.4
Other animal products 0.7 1.0 .8 _Oa
Protein feed 2.7 2b3 2.0 0.3Other food 0.2 +0 0.2 -0.3
Nonfood agriculture -0.1 -1.1 -1.5 -0.3
Total agriculture O~ 1.1 0.8 0.2
Nonagriculture +0 _Oa -oa _Oa
a_a means a small negative number. b+O means a small positive number.
the pattern of production for different groups of countries, shown in Table 8.7,
indicate that the changes are, in general, in directions that could be predicted
from the changes in F-OECD and F-LDC scenarios, though, as might be
expected, the magnitude of changes is often not additive. Thus, the developed
market economies increase their wheat production by only 1.2% when all market
economies liberalize, whereas under F-OECD and F-LDC the production
changes were -2.6% and +6.3%, respectively.
The developing countries increase their production of all agricultural com-
modities except coarse grains. The most significant increases are in rice, bovine
and ovine meat, protein feed, other food, and nonfood agriculture. Though the
increases in the last two commodities seem small in percentage terms, these com-
modities constitute nearly 60% of the value of agricultural output in developing
countries.
The developed market economies reduce their production of rice, protein
feed, other food, and nonfood agriculture.
The CMEA countries, which do not participate in agricultural trade
liberalization in any of the scenarios, nonetheless are affected by the changes in
world prices. The production pattern in the model of the CMEA countries
changes in response to world price changes as constrained by prescribed
minimum self-sufficiency levels. They increase their production of bovine and
ovine meat, dairy products, and coarse grains.
The changes in production patterns at national levels are driven by the
changes in relative producer prices of various commodities and total factor
availabilities. The production allocation behavior of countries follows the pat-
tern described in Chapters 5 and 7. The country-wise changes in producer prices
and production are further discussed in Appendix A3, so a repetition is avoided
here.
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8.3.2. Global trade volume increases substantially
213
These changes in production patterns, which are even more significant when
looked upon at the level of individual countries, translate into substantial
increases in volumes of trade, as was seen in Table 8.1. The changes in trade
patterns over groups of countries are shown in Table 8.8.
The developed market economies significantly increase their imports of
bovine and ovine meat and other food. For rice, the group changes from being a
net exporter to a net importer.
The CMEA countries increase their imports of grains and other food. The
several-fold increase in protein feed imports does not amount to much as the
reference run level of imports was very low.
The developing countries increase their exports of protein feed and other
foods. They, as a group, turn from being net importers of rice and bovine and
ovine meat into net exporters. Their agricultural balance of trade increases by
more than 200% (i.e., more than triples) and, as a consequence, their imports of
nonagriculture increase by 18%. In 1970 prices, the additional earnings from
agricultural exports amount to around US$7 billion.
The changes in trade patterns at the country levels are even more
dramatic. As seen in Tables 8.g and 8.10, many countries change the direction
of trade for some commodity or other. For all commodities, the percentage
changes are large. The absolute changes shown in Table 8.10 indicate the contri-
bution of various countries to changes in global net exports.
8.4. Main Factors behind the Changes of the World Market
Prices
8.4.1. Price of dairy products
The fact that the EC and the USA, with shares of global milk production in the
reference scenario of 18% and 12%, respectively, strongly protect their dairy sec-
tors is one reason for the dairy price climb on the world market in the F-ALLME
scenario. However, the tariff equivalent for dairy products alone does not fully
explain the situation. The price rise is also influenced by changes in the size of
the labor force (dairy production is the most labor-intensive enterprise), invest-
ment in agriculture, and, of course, by the development of feed costs. Labor and
investment in agriculture depend largely on the overall profitability of agricul-
ture, and their response to changes varies from country to country. For exam-
ple, the agricultural labor force in Japan shrinks by about 4% in 1990 and about
5% in 2000, which leads, together with the relative improvement of net revenue,
to an increase in milk production. Also, Canada would not expand dairy produc-
tion so strongly were it not for the increase in the total labor force in agriculture.
A similar argument can be put forward for the EC.
214 Toward Free Trade in Agriculture
Table 8.8. Changes in trade patterns (net exports in 2(00): Volumes for reference run
and percentage changes relative to the reference run for other scenarios.
%change over RO
Country group Volumes
and commodity in ROa F-ALLME F-OECD F-LDC
Industrial market economies:
Wheat 109.4 2 -6 12
Rice 3.3 -291 -280 7
Coarse grains 82.3 19 2 12
Bovine and ovine meat -0.5 605 372 74
Dairy products 25.2 -7 -25 28
Other animal products 0.9 -2 1 -2
Protein feed 2.3 -80 -21 -59
Other food -4.5 118 11 47
Nonfood agriculture -2.8 16 6 8
Nonagriculture 15.0 32 35 -6
Agricultural balance of trade 10.3 -57 -46 -4
CMEA:
Wheat -19.2 20 20 2
Rice -0.4 1 1 +0
Coarse grains -12.0 8 7 1
Bovine and ovine meat 0 0 0 0
Dairy products 0.8 7 6 2
Other animal products 0 0 0 0
Protein feed -0 b b b
Other food
-1.5 80 84 14
Nonfood agriculture -2.1 -6 -5 -2
Nonagriculture 4.2 25 34 -3
Agricultural balance of trade -3.7 26 27 4
Developing countries:
Wheat 76.6 -3 15 15
Rice -4.5 -210 -199 6
Coarse grains -63.8 19 2 16
Bovine and ovine meat -0.1 -1856 --1109 -224
Dairy products -23.5 -4 -22 30
Other animal products -0.2 -2 10 -10
Protein feed 4.6 44 15 30
Other food 15.9 39 25 14
Nonfood agriculture 2.8 12 3 6
Nonagriculture -33.1 18 21 -4
Agricultural balance of trade 3.2 213 174 18
aUnits = 106 t for aU commodities except other food, nonfood agriculture, nonagricultural, and
agricultural balance of trade, which are 109 USS 1970.
bNo percentage change is given when the traded volume in the reference scenario does not
exceed 2% of domestic disappearance. In these cases a plus sign is used to indicate an increase
in net exports (increased export or decreased import), and a minus sign is used to indicate a de-
crease in net exports.
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The changes of the dairy price at the retail level are smaller than those for
producers, which is one reason why human consumption does not react strongly
to world market price changes.
8.4.2. Price of bovine and ovine meat
As for the dairy products, two major producing countries, the USA and the EC,
protect their producers of bovine and ovine meat. Farmers in these countries
face a price decline. The EC cuts back its production, but even then US farmers
increase their output marginally. At the same time, demand increases signifi-
cantly in the USA and Japan, where consumer prices fall. Argentina, which has
a strong comparative advantage in bovine and ovine meat production, responds
to the rise in world market prices with a substantial production increase.
8.4.3. Price of wheat
Many countries indicate a positive tariff equivalent for wheat (see Table 4.12).
Among them are countries with a sizable production share such as Australia,
Canada, India, and the EC, all of which are exporters too in the reference
scenario. Hence, quite a price incentive from the world market is needed to
offset the domestic price decline and to recover the production loss (the EC and
India) or even increase production (Canada and Australia). Largely the USA
and, to some extent, Australia and Pakistan step up their wheat exports.
Total demand for wheat does not respond to the price changes: neither
human consumption nor feed use show much of a change.
8.4.4. Price of coarse grains
What was said for wheat demand holds also for coarse grains demand. To re-
cover the loss in output occurring in some countries with a sizable share in
coarse grains production (Australia and Canada), the world market price must
go up because of a rather low price response in the USA. The shift of the EC
into coarse grains production certainly has a dampening effect on the price
increase.
8.4.5. Price of rice
It is mainly Japan that causes the rice price to rise. After removing its protec-
tion, it buys a substantial amount of rice on the international market. The two
main rice-producing countries (China and India) respond to the price rise either
not at all (China, by assumption) or only marginally. A substantial price incen-
tive is needed for the producers with a relatively small share in production to
meet the additional import requirements of Japan. It may be added that the
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treatment of quality differences in the BLS implies that there would be no prob-
lem for the world market to supply the variety of rice preferred by Japanese con-
sumers though it may involve some quality premium. In fact, this applies to
quality differences in all commodities for all countries.
8.4.6. Price of protein feed
Two major producers of protein feed, the USA and Brazil, both together having
an export share of more than 50% in 2000 in the reference scenario, do not pro-
tect this commodity. Since the grains (especially coarse grains for the USA) are
the major competing crops, the protein feed price must increase, otherwise the
acreage would be allocated to grains and production would decline. The price
incentive is too small for the USA to expand protein feed production. Only Bra-
zil meets the additional import needs, which come mainly from Japan. The
latter uses it as feed in the production of pork, poultry, and eggs.
8.4.7. Price of other animal products
Other animal products have a rather high price elasticity of supply so that only a
little price incentive is needed to compensate lost production in one country by
others. But these products are also relatively little protected.
8.4.8. Price of other food
Many developing countries tax the export of these products in order to raise
government revenue. The developing countries together have a production share
of more than 70% in the year 2000 in the reference scenario. Removal of export
taxes gives farmers enough incentive to step up output to make up for the reduc-
tions occurring in output in the developed market economies. The latter impose
a small positive protection in the reference run that is as large in nominal terms
as in real terms, since the price of other food declines and therefore reduces the
domestic price of this aggregate relative to the other agricultural products in
many of these countries.
8.4.9. Price of nonfood agriculture
An argument similar to that used for other food can be put forward for nonfood
agriculture. Again, most developing countries tax the export of this commodity.
Under liberalization, these taxes are removed and the countries expand produc-
tion. The developed market economies reduce their production. As was men-
tioned earlier, the treatment of tobacco and fibers in the US model does not lead
to full liberalization of these commodities by the USA, so the USA reduces its
demand as well and, thus, the world price falls.
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8.5. Nominal versus Real Tariff Equivalents
The discussion on changes in domestic producer prices showed that they adjust
to a level that sometimes could not be expected from looking at the nominal
tariff equivalents of Table 4.12. The reason, of course, is that, when a large
country or a number of small countries liberalize their agricultural trade, the
world market prices also change and thereby dampen or reinforce the effect of
the removal of the tariff equivalent. The countries with positive protection have
to adjust less, and those with negative protection more, when the corresponding
wor ld market price increases.
The tariff equivalents that one obtains by comparing domestic prices with
the world market prices that would prevail under global trade liberalization may
be called real protection rates, as a part of the protection provided by nominal
tariff equivalent is neutralized by the protection introduced by other countries.
They indicate how strong the price adjustment would be if all countries move to
liberalized trade in agriculture. As an example, the nominal and real tariff
equivalents for the EC in the year 2000 are given in Table 8.11.
Table 8.11. Nominal,a real,b and realizedc tariff equivalents of the EC in 2000.
Commodity
Wheat
Rice
Coarse grains
Bovine and ovine meat
Dairy products
Other animal products
Protein feed
Other food
Nonfood agriculture
Nominal, RO
112
61
37
12
34
24
36
12
28
Real, F-ALLME
32
41
26
3
-3
16
22
18
54
EC policy
adjusted
51
59
35
7
7
11
35
12
26
aComputed using reference run domestic prices and reference run border prices (see Table 4..13).
bComputed using reference run domestic prices and border prices under F-ALLME.
cComputed using reference run domestic prices and border prices under F-EC.
On the other hand, one may argue that each country may take the protec-
tion level of other countries as given; then the protection realized by a country
through its own tariff is the difference between the domestic price in the refer-
ence run and the border price when that country alone liberalizes. Thus, one
may define realized protection as the own-policy-adjusted protection rates.
These are also shown for the EC in Table 8.11.
From Table 8.11 one can observe that, given all the assumptions made with
regard to protection in the reference run, by 2000 the EC has a less than zero
real tariff rate for ruminants. For all other crops, the real tariff rate is around
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20-30% with the exception of rice (41%) and nonfood agriculture (54%). It is
the high nominal protection for dairy products that many other countries exer-
cise which pushes the real protection rate of this commodity in the EC to just
below zero.
It is also worth noting that, for a large entity such as the EC, the real pro-
tection levels are much smaller compared to the nominal protection rates for
commodities in which the EC is a significant trader - namely, wheat, bovine and
ovine meat, dairy, and other animal products.
8.6. Welfare Gains and their Distribution from Agricultural
Trade Liberalization by All Market Economies
8.6.1. Global GDP increases, but still by a small amount
At the global level, as more countries remove distortions, more gains in produc-
tion efficiency should result. This does indeed seem to happen, and the increase
in global GDP at 1970 world prices, though still small at 0.28% in the year 2000,
is larger for this liberalization scenario than for the others (see Table 8.12). At
the global level, the gain in GDP due to trade liberalization by the OECD coun-
tries is more than four times that due to liberalization by developing countries,
and the gains seem to add up. The much larger gains due to liberalization by
the OECD countries are understandable since these countries protect their agri-
culture more than the developing countries do, and in many commodities (all
except rice, other food, and nonfood agriculture) the OECD countries' produc-
tion is more than that of the developing countries.
Table 8.12. Impact on GDP (at 1970 world prices) of various agricultural trade liberal-
ization scenarios: Percentage change in 2000 relative to the reference scenario.
Scenario World DECD CMEA Developing
F-ALLME 0.28 0.63 -0.30 -0.22
F-OECD 0.22 0.48 -0.40 -0.02
F-LDC 0.05 0.15 -0.11 -0.10
The distribution of global gains, however, across groups of countries is
uneven. Whereas OECD countries increase their GDP in all scenarios, both
CMEA countries and developing countries lose in all the scenarios. The CMEA
countries lose most under F-OECD as they suffer the worst terms-of-trade loss in
that scenario. On the other hand, the developing countries' GDP falls most
under F-ALLME.
The prices of wheat and coarse grains, which are imported by many
developing countries, rise most under this scenario. Moreover, the removal of
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what may be an optimal tax on the exports of nonfood agriculture by the
developing countries results in their exporting 10% more of it, but, owing to a
17% fall in price, earning less from it. This does not happen in F-LDC, as the
DECD countries continue to protect in that scenario; this restricts exports by
the developing countries, which therefore do not expand exports to the same
extent.
8.6.2. Hunger increases marginally
The number of persons who are hungry increases marginally in this scenario (see
Table 8.13). Food becomes more expensive for consumers in developing countries
in this scenario compared to the F-LDC scenario. The adverse impact of higher
food prices does get offset by gains in income for some developing countries.
Still, in the aggregate, the impact on hunger is marginally adverse.
Table 8.19. Impact on hunger of various agricultural trade liberalization scenarios: Per-
centage change in persons hungry relative to the reference scenario.
Scenario
F-ALLME
F-OECD
F-LDC
1990
+0.8
+3.3
-4.7
2000
+1.4
+3.6
-4.6
The fact that the distorting agricultural trade policies of the developing
countries that are removed in this scenario do not make much of an impact on
hunger implies that such distortions cannot be considered to be important causes
of hunger, and removal of such distortions is not a solution to the problem of
chronic hunger in the world.
8.6.3. Welfare effects on individual countries
The impact on different countries is once again summarized in terms of the set of
indicators used to reflect producer, consumer, and social welfare.
Table 8.14 shows that all the developed market economies of the DECD
gain from agricultural trade liberalization in terms of GDP at 1970 world prices
and consumption cost comparisons, except for Canada, which loses in GDP at
1970 prices but does show a gain in production value comparison (see Table 8.9)
and an insignificant loss (less than 0.05%) in consumption costs.
Whereas Austria, the EC, and Japan show gains in equivalent income as
well, Canada and Australia show small (less than 0.1%j see Table 8.5) losses. As
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Table 8.14. Gains and losses on some macroeconomic and welfare indicators under agri-
cultural trade liberalization by all market economies relative to the reference scenario.a
Equiv. Consump- People Life
Country GDP70 Parity tncome tion cost hungry expect.
USA G L G NS
Canada L G NS ID L
Australia NS G L G G
New Zealand G G G G
Austria NS G G G G
EC G L G G G
Japan G L G G G
CMEA L G
China ID
Argentina G G G G L L
Brazil L G L L L L
Mexico L L L L G L
Egypt L G L L L
Kenya G G G G G
Nigeria L L G G G G
India NS G G G L NS
Indonesia G G L ID G
Pakistan G L G G G G
Thailand G G G L NS
Turkey G L G G G G
aG, country gains; L, country loses; ID, indeterminate; NS, not significant; -, not calculated.
For a description of the indicators, see Section 3.3.5.
explained earlier, equivalent income and consumption cost comparisons should
be consistent. However, small discrepancies are possible in the BLS models,
where the consumer expenditure systems are approximated by a linear expendi-
ture system every year around an expected consumption point. Thus, a small
loss of equivalent income for Australia, while it shows somewhat larger gains in
terms of consumption cost comparison, can be interpreted to show a gain for
Australian consumers.
Thus, except for the very small loss for consumers in Canada, all OECD
countries gain from agricultural trade liberalization by all market economies.
8.6.4. CMEA consumers gain too
The CMEA countries do not liberalize their agricultural trade in this scenario.
However, they do respond to a limited extent to changes in world market prices.
This results in gains for consumers in terms of consumption cost comparisons
even though the production value comparison shows a loss.
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8.6.5. A mixed picture for the developing countries
The developing countries show a mixed picture. Some clearly lose, some are
clear gainers, and others show losses on some indicator or other.
Brazil and Egypt lose on all indicators and thus are clear losers. Mexico
loses on all indicators except number of hungry people. In spite of a 4% loss in
production value, lower food prices in Mexico reduce hunger. In general, how-
ever, Mexico should be considered a loser.
Production value and consumption costs both show improvement for Thai-
land, but higher food prices increase hunger in that country.
India shows an increase in hunger and a loss in production value but gains
in average equivalent income and consumption costs. Thus, both Thailand and
India gain on the average, but the poor in these countries lose. Conversely,
Indonesia shows a gain for the poor but a loss on the average for consumers.
Kenya, Pakistan, and Turkey show clear gains on all indicators.
Argentina shows substantial gains in production value, equivalent income,
and consumption cost, but an increase in hunger because of a large increase in
the food price index. Yet, the number of hungry in Argentina is very low, and
the average level of calorie intake is more than 3500 kcal per day. In principle,
from the large gains in production value in Argentina, the few poor losers can be
easily compensated. Since lump-sum transfers are not considered in this
scenario, Argentina may be considered a country with mixed outcome.
Nigeria, which shows improvement on all indicators other than production
value, which is not really a welfare indicator, should be considered a gainer.
In summary, among the explicitly modeled developing countries are three
losers and four gainers, and the picture is mixed for the remaining four.
8.6.6. "Getting prices right" can play only a limited role in further
promoting economic growth in developing countries
In a sense, the prices in the F-ALLME scenario are the least distorted of the
prices in all the free trade scenarios reported here. To that extent, the agricul-
tural prices in this scenario may be considered as the "right prices". The
impacts on production value comparisons and on the incidence of hunger are
mixed. Moreover, even for those countries where production values increase, the
gain after 15 years of trade liberalization is small. Though one should not scoff
at such gains, this does indicate the limited role that further improvement in
agricultural prices can play.
This is, of course, not to say that a country may have such a bad pricing
policy that correcting it could not produce dramatic improvements. However,
the prices of the explicitly modeled developing countries, when made "right", do
not always help; and, when they do help, they do little. One should, however,
qualify this conclusion by noting that the present analysis does not account for
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aU gains from trade liberalization, such as those from elimination of rent-seeking
activities. Some of these gains are difficult to quantify. But, if such gains are
large, the conclusion here should be modified.
8.6.7. For the developing countries, it matters who else liberalizes
Comparison of whether countries gain or lose under alternative scenarios of agri-
cultural trade liberalization shows the importance of the interaction of policies of
different countries.
Table 8.15. Gainers and losers under alternative scenarios of trade liberalization.a
Country F-ALLME F-OECD F-LDC
USA G G G
Canada ? ? ?
Australia G G L
New Zealand G G L
Austria G G G
EC G G G
Japan G G G
Argentina G G G
Brazil L L L
Mexico L L L
Egypt L L G
Kenya G G G
Nigeria G G ?
India ? L G
Indonesia ? L G
Pakistan G ? G
Thailand G ? L
Turkey ? L G
aG, country gains; L, country loses; ?, outcome unclear.
Table 8.15 shows that, for the developing countries, their status as gainers,
losers, or mixed-outcome countries changes for quite a few countries between F-
LDC, when only they themselves liberalize, and F-ALLME, when all market
economies liberalize. Only for Brazil, Mexico, Kenya, and Pakistan does the
status remain the same. Other developing countries change their status.
Though between the scenarios the changes are in both directions, more develop-
ing countries are adversely affected when the developed market economies also
liberalize. Thus, whereas one could have said, as in Chapter 7, that agricultural
trade liberalization is in general beneficial to developing countries, it can no
longer be said when the developed market economies also liberalize their agricul-
tural trade.
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Table 8.16. Percentage changes in agricultural labor and income parity for selected
countriesa in 2000 under alternative trade liberalization scenarios relative to the refer-
ence scenano.
Labor in agriculture Income parity
Country F-ALLME F-OECD F-LDC F-ALLME F-OECD F-LDC
USAb NA NA NA -3 -0 +0
EC -12 -12 -2 -7 -4 1
Japan -5 -5 -1 -39 -35 -1
Mexico 12 6 5 -15 -3 -13
Nigeria -1 5 -5 -8 -1 -7
Pakistan
-3 2 -11 -I 1 -7
Turkey -8 3 -11 -10 4 -15
aCountries where income parity is adversely affected.
bIn the US model, agricultural labor is not explicitly accounted for and parity figures are calcu-
lated assuming no change in sectoral labor share.
On the other hand, developed market economies that gain when they them-
selves liberalize (in F-OECD) continue to remain gainers when the developing
countries also liberalize in F-ALLME. In fact, their gains are larger. However,
in terms of income parity (see Table 8.16), the farmers in the USA, the EC, and
Japan are marginally worse off in F-ALLME than in F-OECD, suggesting some-
what larger adjustment problems. However, larger economic gains in F-ALLME
should make it easier to deal with them. Thus, the developed market economies
find it in their interest that not only they themselves but also the developing
countries liberalize agricultural trade.
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CHAPTER 9
Findings and Policy Conclusions
After the analyses of the impact of agricultural trade liberalization presented in
the preceding chapters of this book, the questions naturally arise: What are the
major findings and what do they mean for policy? To what extent do the results
reflect reality and to what extent can they be ascribed to the characteristics of
the analytical tool used? What are the methodological or analytical lessons to be
learned from the study? These questions are addressed in this chapter. Before
addressing them, however, it would be useful to reiterate the scope of the study.
The study was concerned with assessing the impact of agricultural trade
liberalization by various groups of countries. Agricultural trade liberalization
was partial in the sense that trade distortions reflected in the differences between
domestic relative price and border relative price (FOB for exports or CIF for
imports) were removed from agricultural commodities. Thus, distortions intro-
duced as a result of border measures such as tariffs and quotas were removed.
The distorting effects of other measures, such as in ut s . ay~
ave a so een removed to the extent t at the are reflected in the relative rice ~­
differences, w IC epen on the measures used to restrict trade.
It should also be emphasized that distortions on the nonagricultural econ-
omy, which was represented by one aggregated sector, were not removed. Thus,
agricultural trade liberalization, as defined here, removed relative distortions, as
defined above, from all agricultural commodities in the country, but not all of
the distortion between the agriculture sector and the nonagriculture sector.
Finally, in none of the scenarios is agricultural trade liberalization accom-
panied by any compensating nondistorting income transfers between countries.
The scenario results presented in this book consist of agricultural trade
liberalization by OECD countries, by the EC, by the USA, by the developing
countries excluding China, and by all market economies. The CMEA countries
and China do not liberalize their agricultural trade in any of the scenarios, but
they do adjust their trade volumes in response to changing world prices.
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9.1. Small Global Impact of Agricultural Trade Liberalization
Agricultural trade liberalization leads to a global efficiency gain, as reflected in
global GDP measured at constant world prices. The gain, however, is small.
The largest gains occur when all market economies liberalize. Even then, the
annual gain is only 0.28% in the year 2000 over the GDP in the reference
scenario.
It is true that in the present study only partial liberalization of agriculture
is carried out and the distortion between agriculture and nonagriculture is not
fully removed. One may think that, were these distortions to be fully removed,
the global efficiency gains would be larger. Scenarios were generated to analyze
the impact of removing, in addition to agricultural protection measures, those in
nonagriculture. For the latter, some very crudely estimated and some assumed
protection factors were used. The results did not show a significant increase in
global efficiency gains. Of course, with only one aggregate nonagriculture sector
the BLS cannot capture fully the efficiency gains that could be realized by
removing distortions among various subsectors of nonagriculture.
Other studies of trade liberalization that follow the general equilibrium
approach also report such gains to be small and of similar magnitude. Thus,
Whalley (1985) reports an annual gain of around 0.65% (measured as equivalent
variation) of global GDP from a simultaneous abolition of tariffs from all the
seven regions of the world. Similarly, Deardorff and Stern (1986) also report
welfare gains comparable to that reported by Whalley. These studies involve
liberalization of all trade, whereas the present study has involved only agricul-
tural trade liberalization.
The small size of the gain in percentage terms is understandable, as agri-
culture is a small part of the global economy and only agricultural trade is being
liberalized. The annual gain expressed as a percentage of agricultural GDP of
the countries liberalizing amounts to 4% when all market economies liberalize.
In the case of agricultural trade liberalization by the OECD countries, the global
gain in GDP evaluated at 1970 world prices is 0.22%, which amounts to 20% of
t a ricultural GDP of OECD countries.
Viewe t is way, e presen s y shows somewhat larger gains from
trade liberalization than other studies do.
These trade liberalization studies, including the present one, which show
gains at the global level to be small, assume that production in an economy takes
place on the production possibility frontier before and after liberalization. The
gains are to be obtained by a change in the production structure along this
efficiency frontier due to changes in relative prices. These studies also assume
that producers do not enjoy any monopoly powers. The monopoly power that
producers in a sheltered economy enjoy may be severely curtailed and disappear
when the country liberalizes. The efficiency gains from such a situation could be
substantial. Thus, Harris (1984), in his study of trade liberalization for Canada,
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shows annual gains of nearly 5% of GDP for Canada for a 50% reduction in
tariff, using a model that accounts for the monopoly power of producers.
Similarly, it has been argued that rent-seeking activities that arise as a
result of distortions waste real resources and that production in such an economy
takes place inside the production possibility frontier. The gains from liberaliza-
tion to be realized by a movement from inside the efficiency frontier to the fron-
tier can be much larger than gains from movement along the frontier. Thus,
Grais et ai. (1984) show with a general equilibrium model of Turkey, and assum-
ing a production function for rent-seeking activities, large gains in GDP from the
removal of quotas on intermediate and consumer imports.
Since agriculture is characterized by many "small" producers, they do not
enjoy monopoly power. Thus, agricultural trade liberalization is not likely to
produce gains from curtailment of such power.
To what extent rent-seeking activities induced by distortions in agriculture
absorb productive resources has not been empirically estimated. It is therefore
not possible to say how important gains from abolition of such directly unpro-
ductive activities can be. Until such quantification is made, the extent of such
gains cannot be estimated.
Moreover, it is worth noting that Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1982) have
shown that, in a second-best world, such rent-seeking activities can be welfare
improving. This implies that, in an economy with other distortions, the gains
from elimination of such rent-seeking activities may not be as great as may
appear from the resources used up in such activities.
Summarizing, one may note that gains from agricultural trade liberaliza-
tion could be larger than what has been estimated in this study. Though the
estimated gains are small, they are not negligible, and the gains accruing to the
DECD countries are comparable to the level of aid that the give at present to
evelopmg countries.
-
9.2. Should OECD Countries Liberalize Agricultural Trade?
Among the DECD countries, separate models of Austria, Australia, Canada, the
EC, Japan, New Zealand, and the USA are available in the BLS. Thus, policy
implications for these countries are drawn.
Austria, the EC, Japan, New Zealand, and the USA gain from agricultural
trade liberalization whenever these countries liberalize. The measures of con-
sumer welfare - equivalent income and consumption cost comparisons - show
annual gains exceeding 1% for Japan and the USA, 0.1-0.3% for Austria, 0.4%
for the EC, and more than 3% for New Zealand. Considering that agriculture is
a small part of these economies (less than 4% of GDP originated in agriculture in
1980 in the DECD countries), the gains are substantial. These countries would
thus find it in their interest to liberalize agricultural trade.
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For Canada and Australia, the outcome is somewhat mixed, and an unam-
biguous policy recommendation cannot be made.
Even when consumer welfare increases, agricultural incomes go down in the
EC, Japan, and, marginally, the USA. Nonetheless, the overall consumer welfare
gains show that agricultural producers can, in principle, be compensated from
the gains of agricultural trade liberalization.
Unilateral agricultural trade liberalization by the EC and the USA shows
that most of the consumer welfare gains are realized by the country that liberal-
izes even when the other OECD countries do not do so. This would indicate
that the EC and the USA could unilaterally liberalize agricultural trade. Of
course, when other OECD countries also liberalize their agricultural trade, the
losses in agricultural incomes are smaller, so that adjustment problems would be
smaller.
Since the gains from agricultural trade liberalization are so small as a per-
centage of GDP, the following question arises: Why change the status quo and
liberalize? For one thing, the policies that provide protection to agriculture are
themselves not easy to continue because of the growing costs of such support.
Secondly, even when one accepts the goal of farm income support, it could be
provided at a smaller cost than at present through nondistorting alternatives.
In lact, for a large economy such as that of the EC, measures of agricul-
tural protection have become self-defeatin to a considerable extent. The price
Increases rea ize or EC farmers for their products throug the protective poli-
cies of the EC over its border prices are much smaller than the nominal protec-
tion provided. Protection by the EC depresses world prices in most agricultural
commodities below what they would be in the absence of such protection. Thus,
when the nominal tariff level in excess of 100% percent for wheat is removed, the
world market price increases and the domestic producer price of wheat is only
34% lower. Similar effects are observed for most other agricultural commodities.
What this suggests is that the outlays on nondistorting alternatives to preserve
farm income would be much smaller than the costs of current policy. This is
also reflected in the fact that the fall in a ricultural . C is onl
7% w en e ECD countries lib ural trade whereas the
agricultural protection removed has an aggregate rate of nearly 40% in the EC.
9.3. Do the Current Protective Agricultural Policies of the
Rich Countries Help or Hinder the Poor?
The present protective agricultural policies of the OECD countries can affect the
developing countries in a number of ways. They reduce opportunities for
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developing countries to export agricultural products to developed country mar-
kets. By stimulating agricultural production in the DECD countries, they
depress world prices of agricultural products, which in turn may depress the
domestic prices and production incentives for agricultural producers in the
developing countries.
The lower food prices in the developing countries in the short run may
reduce the level of hunger in them, but the reduction in hunger may be reversed
in the long run if the loss of agricultural production incentive adversely affects
the incomes of the poor.
When the DECD countries liberalize agricultural trade in the F -DECD
scenario, the number of hungry persons in the world increases marginaIly. Even
when countries gain in average equivalent income, the number of hungry in them
increases. These results imply that the present protective agricultural policies of
the DECD countries result in world market food prices that are lower than those
that would have been obtained in the absence of such policies. The food-
importing developing countries are able to import more food.
The beneficial effect of lower food prices on the number of hungry persons
in the world is not fuIly offset by the adverse effect on agricultural production
and the reduced opportunities for other countries to export agricultural products
to DECD countries. Though beneficial, the net effect on the number of hungry
is, however, very small.
A particular case of protective agricultural policies is the CAP of the EC.
When the EC's agricultural trade is liberalized (in the F-EC scenario), the
results obtained are similar to those when all DECD countries so liberalize.
Thus the EC's CAP, on balance, helps to reduce, howsoever marginally, hunger
in the world.
This does not mean, however, that the policies of the EC and other DECD
countries to protect domestic agriculture should be continued. If the intention is
to protect farm incomes and also incidentaIly to help the poor in some develop-
ing countries, then one should examine whether the CAP and similar policies are
the best ways of realizing these objectives.
As was seen earlier, protecting farmers' incomes by nondistorting ways
ought to be much cheaper. Similarly, provision of direct aid to poor countries
may be much more cost-effective. Moreover, such aid can be targeted to specific
countries, unlike the effect of protective policies that benefit all food-importing
countries, rich and poor.
It should be emphasized that this result - that the protective policies of the
DECD countries, on balance, help the poor - relates to only agricultural protec-
tion. The protection policies in the nonagricultural sector, through which DECD
countries restrict industrial imports from developing countries, may have a
significant adverse impact on the developing countries. This issue has not been
examined in the present study.
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9.4. Should the Developing Countries Liberalize their Agricul-
tural Trade?
Many, though not all, developing countries find agricultural trade liberalization
beneficial. When only the developing countries liberalize in F-LDC, the number
of persons in hunger is reduced and consumer welfare also goes up.
Increases in consumer welfare, either equivalent income or consumption
cost comparisons, in the year 2000 amount annually to 2-3% for Pakistan and
Turkey; 1-2% for Egypt, Kenya, and India; and around 0.5% for Argentina and
Indonesia.
For some of these developing countries these gains are reduced, and some
of them even suffer a loss in consumer welfare, when the OECD economies also
liberalize their agricultural trade. However, most of these developing countries
are worse off when they do not liberalize their agricultural trade along with the
OECD countries than when they do. Thus, once again for Argentina, Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, and Turkey, agricultural trade liberalization
is a preferred policy irrespective of whether OECD countries liberalize their agri-
cultural trade or not.
Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, and Thailand suffer a loss in consumer welfare
when, as considered here, they liberalize their agricultural trade in all commodi-
ties. It is thus not a policy that can be recommended for these countries.
The impact of agricultural trade liberalization on economic development is
somewhat muted in these models. In the models, domestic and imported savings
and capital goods are perfect substitutes. To the extent that, for many develop-
ing countries, restricted availability of imported capital goods that cannot be
substituted by domestically produced capital goods constrains economic growth,
the larger imports that become possible when agricultural trade is liberalized
should stimulate economic growth. Such effects are not accounted for in these
models, and gains in production value result from increases in allocative
efficiency and increased investments resulting from removal of price dist.ortions.
Even then, the gains in production value or constant-price GDP become il."l high
as 3-5% for some developing countries. For most countries, however, these gains
or losses are much smaller. Removal of agricultural price distortions or getting
agricultural prices right is thus shown to be useful for some countries, but in
general the scope of these reforms in stimulating economic development is lim-
ited for many developing countries.
This conclusion, however, relates only to agricultural prices. The potential
gains from removal of distortions from the various subsectors of nonagriculture,
the elimination of wasteful rent-seeking activities, and the stimulating effect of
larger availability of nonsubstitutable imported capital goods may translate into
a much larger effect on growth. This, however, has not been explored in this
study.
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9.5. Development of the Global Agricultural System
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The reference scenario with more or less continuing present policies provides a
perspective on global agricultural development. It shows that the global system
continues to provide growing quantities of food to a larger and richer population
with very modest increase - less than 0.5% per year - in overall agricultural
prices, but with a decline in basic staples prices.
Production of crops in particular shows that technical progress and supply
possibilities are significant, so that crop prices decline modestly over the years in
the reference scenario.
The main increases in prices occur for ruminant products, namely, bovine
and ovine meat and dairy products. These commodities also show much larger
price changes in the various agricultural trade liberalization scenarios. The rela-
tively limited possibilities of technical progress and higher income elasticities of
demand for these products result in much larger price changes for them than for
other commodities.
Agricultural output in these scenarios shows significant price responses at
the aggregate level over the long run in most countries. A higher relative price
of agriculture increases investment, capital, labor, and input use in agriculture.
Over the years, these factor allocations to agriculture build up and result in
greater production in agriculture. The long-term supply elasticity of agricultural
GDP exceeds 1 in some cases (Argentina, Canada, and New Zealand), is between
0.5 and 1.0 for quite a few countries (Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the
EC), and is less than 0.5 for other countries. Thus, agricultural output can be
stimulated by increasing agricultural prices. However, this is not to say that it is
always good to stimulate agricultural output. As is seen in this study, changes
in agricultural GDP may be large in a country, but changes in the total GDP
may be small. Larger agricultural output is achieved at the cost of drawing
away productive resources from the nonagricultural sector. This shows the need
to consider agriculture as a part of the economy and not as an isolated sector.
9.6. Need for the Analytical Approach
At the end of such a study, from an analytical point of view, one may raise the
questions: Could one have arrived at the results and policy conclusions with the
same degree of confidence through a much simpler approach? How useful has
the BLS been as an analytical tool?
The results presented in this study have demonstrated the importance of
accounting for the following in the analysis of the impact of agricultural trade
liberalization:
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(1)
(2)
(3)
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The substitution possibilities in production and consumption of commod-
ities.
The interactions of simultaneous changes in policies of different countries.
The behavioral responses of economic agents as producers and consumers.
Though the broad patterns of reactions at the global level to agricultural
trade liberalization have been fairly predictable, the specific details are not so.
The changes in prices of different commodities, and often even the direction of
these changes, are not easily predictable by single means. This is highlighted by
the fact that some other studies indicate price changes with signs different from
those shown here.
Similarly, the national-level changes are often large, and the quantitative
impacts at the level of individual commodities show many surprising changes
that are nonetheless understandable on ex post analysis of the results of the
scenario. As has been pointed out at a number of places in the text, some impor-
tant changes with respect to a number of commodities are such that they would
not have been observed if the model did not distinguish a number of commodi-
ties.
The changes in commodity prices at the international level and the produc-
tion and trade patterns at national levels provide information necessary for the
formulation of national policies.
In summary, the multicommodity, multinational general equilibrium
approach of the BLS has been shown to be necessary for analyzing the impact of
agricultural trade liberalization. The BLS has proved to be a useful analytical
tool.
The question now is what further uses of the BLS can be made to help for-
mulate better agricultural trade policies in different countries.
9.1. Global Interdependence, Trade Policy Negotiations, and
the Usefulness of the BLS
It is almost a cliche that the countries of the world are becoming more inter-
dependent as time marches on. Yet, for some, this growing interdependence is
simply a reflection of a growing dependence of some on others and, indeed, of the
weak and powerless on the strong and powerful. One important contribution a
study such as this can make is to evaluate interdependence in, it is hoped, a
scientific way.
At one extreme is autarkic development of the countries of the world with
interactions between countries kept to an unavoidable minimum; and at the
other is free and unfettered exchange of goods, services, people, and ideas. The
real world lies in between the two extremes, with severe restrictions (if not
outright prohibitions) on some forms of interactions (e.g., movement of people,
particularly workers, across national boundaries) and almost no restrictions on
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others (e.g., most countries have no restrictions on imports of lifesaving drugs).
It is difficult to quantify the joint impact on a country of its own myriad policy
interventions (which may have accumulated over some period of time) in its
foreign trade, and virtually impossible to assess the impact on it of the policy
interventions of all other trading nations. A system such as the BLS can provide
each country with such impact assessments.
An equally, if not in fact a more, important use of the assessment of the
distribution of gains and losses from policy interventions through a system such
as the BLS is that it can help negotiations toward removal of trade barriers.
This it does in several ways. First, it is almost certain that multilateral liberali-
zation scenarios will produce positive global net gains for the group, showing that
the game of trade negotiations is likely to have a positive sum. Second, it can
help each country to formulate better its proposals for liberalization. As Whal-
ley (1985) showed in the Tokyo Round, the formulae for tariff cutting that the
USA, Japan, Canada, etc., each proposed did not often lead to the maximum
gains for the country that proposed them. Third, it may bring home to a coun-
try negotiator, as has been shown to be the case for the EC, that the removal of
his country's nominal protection as part of a multilateral or global bargain need
not cost his country as much as the pre-removal tariff levels would suggest.
Fourth, by assessing the distribution of the impacts of unilateral and multila-
teral, as well as global, liberalization, a more informed judgment of the costs and
benefits of interdependence is made available to policy-makers. Fifth, agricul-
tural trade policy negotiations are likely to involve suggestions on partial or
selective trade liberalization. A common understanding of the consequences of
such liberalization proposals can contribute to the success of negotiations. The
BLS constitutes a powerful tool for such analysis and could be of much value in
this context.
Apart from this, many national policies in the real world involve moving
from one second-best situation to another. Quantitative exploration of the
consequences of policy changes with the help of empirically relevant analytical
tools becomes valuable in formulating economic policy in such situations. The
national models of the BLS provide analysts of national agricultural policies with
such a tool.
Many improvements are possible in the models. Some of them can even be
made with marginal effort. Yet, even without them, the analysis reported in this
book shows the power and usefulness of the BLS.
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APPENDIX Al
Economic Theory of Trade Liberalization:
Some Selected Results
In most of the literature, free trade is urged for the efficiency in the allocation of
resources that it leads to, resulting in greater possibilities for improvement in the
welfare of the citizens of a country. Moreover, it is also argued that free trade
would improve the efficiency of global resources allocation and the welfare of
mankind. In this appendix, we examine aspects of efficiency, welfare, and distri-
bution under free trade.
Some of the propositions of trade theory are elaborated in this appendix
using the geometrical arguments traditional in trade theory. It can be shown
that, under suitable assumptions, equilibrium with income transfers can be
represented through the use of (Samuelson) social utility functions and the asso-
ciated indifference map as if there were only one consumer in the economy who
receives all the income and spends it so as to maximize social utility. In what
follows we use this construct.
AI.!. Some Trade is Better than No Trade - and Free Trade
is Optimal for a Small Economy
The first thing to note is that, for any country, trading with others provides an
opportunity to transform one set of goods into another that is in addition to that
available through domestic production and exchange. For this reason some
trade is better, or at least no worse than, no trade since it is possible to exploit
trade opportunities in such a way that the country can have no less of any good
than it had without trade. With the improved availability of goods, trade thus
provides an opportunity to improve the welfare of the country's citizens.
While some trade is better than no trade in the above sense, there is the
further question of whether or not unrestricted trade is the best in some sense.
Thi~ question has attracted the attention of economists since Adam Smith. The
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basic proposition of this literature is that, for a small open competitive economy,
free trade is the "optimal" policy. By a "small economy" is meant an economy
that has negligible market power - i.e., it cannot influence the equilibrium prices
in world markets by its trade policy. Such an economy could be large in other
dimensions: geographical area, population, etc. This is seen as follows:
producer's profits will be maximum under free trade only if the marginal
transformation ratio in production between any two domestic products (i.e., how
much production of one commodity can be increased by reducing the output of
the other by one unit - which equals the domestic price ratio between the two
under competition) is equal to the foreign rate of transformation (Le., how much
of one commodity may be obtained by exchanging one unit of the other on the
world market - which is the price relation between the two on the world
market). If this condition is not satisfied for all pairs of commodities, someone
can make profits by arbitraging between domestic and world markets. This con-
dition also means that the value of national income measured in international
prices is maximized, thus ensuring efficiency of resource allocation in production.
This in turn means that the value, at international prices of output under no
trade or autarky equilibrium is less than the national income in the free trade
equilibrium. However, by definition, autarky output is the sum of the consump-
tion of all individuals in the economy in that equilibrium. Hence, with free trade
national product, one can certainly maintain the autarky level of welfare of each
person by providing enough income to that individual to enable that person to
consume the bundle of commodities (s)he consumed under autarky and still have
some product leftover. With the leftover income, the welfare of one or more
individuals can be raised above autarky levels. Thus, the free trade equilibrium
can be made Pareto-superior to autarky in that, under free trade, no individual is
worse off and some are better off compared to autarky. This in general will
involve income transfers between individuals since the income an individual
earns from participating in the market in the free trade equilibrium may not
equal the value of his consumption bundle in the Pareto-superior free trade
equilibrium. Indeed, this argument can be seen, on reflection, to show that a
Pareto-superior free trade equilibrium can be found relative to any restricted
trade equilibrium. Thus free trade is optimal for a small open economy.
This can be seen in Figure Al.l(a). AB is the domestic production possi-
bility curve. The country can have any combination of outputs on AB. Suppose
that, under autarky; production takes place at S with the price ratio pA. If the
world price ratio p is different from pA, then continuing to produce at S but
trading at prices p * in the direction ST will improve welfare over the level
achieved at S.
That trade also improves social utility can be seen in Figure Al.l(b).
Under autarky, production and consumption will be at S, giving a utility of V'.
With trade, on the other hand, production can be at F and trade along CD can
provide consumption at Q with a utility level V" higher than V'.
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Figure AI.I. (a) Some trade is better than no trade. (b) Liberalization is welfare im-
proving for a small country.
When trade is permitted but distortions are introduced through tariffs,
etc., the domestic production will take place at a point other than at F, and
trade at international prices will result in a utility level lower than U".
Note that the allocation of resources in autarky is such that production at
S is on the production possibility frontier AB. The gain in efficiency in free
trade over autarky here arises from the reallocation of resources to produce at F
rather than at S, and from exploitation of the opportunity to trade.
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When a country intervenes in agricultural trade, through tariffs, subsidies,
or trade quotas, or other barriers, the domestic prices are no longer the same as
the world market prices. Thus, domestic production decisions will be such that
the domestic rate of transformation will not be equal to the foreign rate of
transformation. The economy will not maximize the value of domestic product
at world market prices and, hence, social utility will not be maximized.
It has been argued by Anam (1982), Bhagwati (1982a), Bhagwati and
Srinivasan (1982), Findlay and Wellisz (1982), Krueger (1974), Tullock (1967),
and Young and Magee (1983) that, in the absence of free trade, production in a
country may take place at an inefficient point and not on the production possibil-
ity efficiency frontier, and that, under free trade, production will shift to the
frontier. A number of reasons are given why production in a distorted economy
may not be on the production possibility frontier. Protection may create shel-
tered markets and monopolies with little incentive for producers to be efficient.
Entrepreneurs may find that rent-seeking activities that are not directly produc-
tive give them much more personal income compared to productive activities.
Thus, scarce entrepreneurial resources get squandered. The bureaucracy admin-
istering the distortions may obstruct entrepreneurs in order to earn part of the
rent from them. All these wastes disappear in free trade, and even domestic
monopolies have incentives to become efficient under the threat of foreign com-
petition. In such a case the gains from free trade could be substantial.
A1.2. Global Free Trade Could be Pareto-Superior
Turning now to the world economy, under fairly general conditions Grandmont
and McFadden (1972) have established the possibility of Pareto-superior equilib-
rium under free trade compared to autarky in a world of many nations, each
with many consumers and with competitive domestic markets, as follows:
Proposition A: Given a world competitive trade equilibrium allocation, any
alternative allocation that is feasible under autarky and makes
some consumers in a nation better off must make some other
consumers in that nation worse off.
Under somewhat restrictive assumptions, the following is also established:
Proposition B: Given an allocation achieved under autarky, one can find a sys-
tem of world trade prices and domestic lump-sum transfers for
which there will exist a competitive equilibrium allocation that
will be at least as satisfactory as autarky for every consumer.
Proposition B, though it is established under a set of restrictive conditions
(such as convexity of consumer preferences and technology of production), does
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show that gains from free trade are sufficiently large to finance the needed
lump-sum transfers to fully compensate everyone who may lose under free trade.
A1.3. Without Compensating Transfers, Free Trade May not
Be Socially Preferable
What can one say about a free trade competitive equilibrium if we rule out
transfers? Being a competitive equilibrium, it is still Pareto optimal. In other
words, under free trade for each country the domestic rate of transformation
equals the domestic rate of substitution, and these are also equalized (adjusted
approximately to account for transport costs) globally. Thus, the first-order con-
dition for Pareto optimality is satisfied. Yet this does not imply that everyone
is better off under free trade, but only that free trade leads to a Pareto-optimal
outcome for global welfare. Corresponding to each different distribution of
resource endowments among countries, a different Pareto-optimal solution will
be attained under free trade. Thus, an infinity of such alternative solutions is
possible. Under a given distribution of resource endowments, some countries
may lose under free trade relative to autarky; and, even in the countries that
gain, some people may lose. In a country that gains, if the rich gain and the
poor lose and compensating transfers are not possible, free trade may not be con-
sidered socially desirable for that country if the society places larger weight on
the welfare of the poor.
AlA. Terms-of-Trade Loss Can Make a Country Worse Off
under Free Trade
In Figure AL2 the utility possibility curves are shown for two individuals in an
economy under protection and under free trade. If individual 1 is poor and indi-
vidual 2 is rich and compensating transfers are not possible, protected equilib-
rium at S may be considered socially preferable to free trade equilibrium at F.
Of course, with lump-sum transfers, any point on S'S" will give under free trade
a Pareto-superior equilibrium to the equilibrium under protection of S.
Though free trade is an optimal policy for a small competitive economy, it
is not so for an economy that is large in the sense of having significant market
power. A large country affects world prices by its own trade. Thus, it may find
that, by restricting trade, it can improve its terms of trade so that it gains. If
the world demand for its exports is inelastic, a major exporting country can raise
its export earnings relative to free trade by restricting imports. If individual
private exporters do not perceive this market power of the country, then a tax on
its exports may ensure that only an optimal volume of exports, and no more,
occurs. Similarly, if the world market supply is inelastic, a major importer may
restrict imports to an optimal level, and no more, through a tariff on imports.
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Abolition of such an optimal tariff in a shift to free trade could make such a
country worse off.
Figure Al.9 illustrates how, when a country moves to free trade, terms-of-
trade loss can make it worse off under free trade. The country initially produces
at T under tariff and a domestic price ratio pd, given by the slope of the produc-
tion possibility frontier AB at T, and trades along TQ at the world price given
by the slope of line TQ. Under free trade, the export tax on goods is removed
and production takes place at F and the country trades along FR, the new world
market price line, which provides the country with consumption at R with a util-
ity level less than that of Q.
At.5. A Change in World Prices Can Be Welfare Worsening
even when the Country Trades Freely and Uses Domes-
tic Lump-Sum Transfers
Just as a large country can suffer a terms-of-trade loss by its own action (for
example, by abolition of its optimal tariff) and be worse off under free trade, a
small country can also be worse off when world prices change and it suffers a
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Figure Al.S. Terms-of-trade loss can hurt under free trade.
terms-of-trade loss even though it is following free trade policies and using
lump-sum transfers.
How this can happen is shown in Figure A1.4. A small country following
free trade is producing at Fo and consumption after trade is at Qo. When world
prices change, still pursuing free trade the country produces at F 1 and consump-
tion at Q 1 is welfare worsening compared to that at Qo. Of course, if this small
country does not follow free trade policies, its welfare would be still less than
that at Q1. The important point is that policies of other countries can lead to
price changes that make it worse off. However, given that the country has no
influence over world prices and that the world price change would occur anyway
and has occurred, protection does not help to reduce the welfare loss. Indeed,
U' - U" is an unavoidable welfare loss due to change in world prices, and protec-
tion simply adds avoidable welfare losses over and above this. Such a terms-of-
trade loss can occur for a small country - for example, when other countries
changes their policies and world prices change. This underlines the importance
of accounting for the interdependence of policies.
A corollary to this is that protection may improve the welfare of a country
or a group of countries, though it lowers global welfare.
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The outcome of simultaneous abolition of tariffs by two trading partners is
not predictable using quantitative theoretical considerations alone; empirical
analysis is required to solve ambiguities.
Al.6. Simultaneous Abolition of Tariffs by Two Trading
Partners Can Raise, Lower, or Leave Unchanged the
W orId Market Prices
The traditional geometric tool of international trade theory - namely, the offer
curve representing each country's export supply in exchange for its import
demand - is used in the analysis. A point on the offer curve shows the amounts
of goods the country would like to trade when the world market price ratio of
these goods is given by the slope of the line connecting this point to the origin.
In each subfigure (see Figure A1.5), the solid curve represents free trade offers
and the broken curve represents offers when each country is levying an import
tariff (or, equivalently, an export tax). Alternative world market prices or terms
of trade can be read as slopes of rays from the origin. The curves are drawn
under the assumption that, at each terms-of-trade position, the point on the
tariff-ridden offer curve represents a lower offer of exports (and demand for
imports under balanced trade).
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Figure At.5. Possible changes in terms of trade under simultaneous liberalization by
two countries.
In Figure Al.5(a), trade liberalization by both countries leads to no change
in terms of trade, but only to an increase in trade volumes. In Figure Al.5(b),
the home country's terms of trade deteriorate (i.e., the equilibrium world relative
price of its imports in terms of its exports rises and it has to export more food
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now to get same amount of nonfood) after trade liberalization. In Figure
Al.5(c), the equilibrium world relative price of the home country's imports in
terms of its exports falls (i.e., the home country's terms of trade improve).
AI.7. Dynamic Effects: Gains from Free Trade May Be Lost
over Time
The discussion on gains from free trade so far has been mainly in the context of
a static situation with and without free trade. It is conceivable that a large
country that gains immediately by moving to free trade can, over years, become
poorer. This can happen, for example, when it puts more resources into an
exportable commodity of which it becomes a major exporter and does not impose
an optimal tariff. Thus, the price of the exportable commodity becomes lower,
adversely affecting the country's terms of trade.
AI.8. Removal of One Distortion while Others Remain May
Be Welfare Worsening for an Economy
A possibility that should be recognized in analyzing the impact of a trade liberal-
ization is that removing some trade distortions while leaving others in place
might exacerbate the distorting effects of the latter.
The literature on distortions shows that the removal of one distortion while
others remain may be welfare worsening. In the free trade scenarios presented
here, only trade distortions are eliminated, leaving in place other distortions that
are not related to trade. It is not inconsistent with neoclassical theory that in
such a context a move to free trade can be welfare worsening even for a small
country. Loosely speaking, the gain from trade is more than offset by accentua-
tion of the effects of other distortions. One nontrade distortion is of particular
significance in the dynamic context. If the intertemporal resource allocation
mechanisms (loosely speaking, the savings-investment-allocation nexus and
labor movement between sectors) are not optimal, then a move to free trade may
lead to a dynamic path that is welfare inferior relative to the path associated
with protection. Again crudely speaking, the effect of the nonoptimal allocation
of resources over time gets accentuated enough under free trade to offset the
intertemporal gains from trade that would have otherwise accrued. It is to be
noted, however, that the crucial feature in either case is that a move to free trade
accentuates the welfare loss due to the other distortions. This can be shown as
outlined below.
Consider the following simple model. The economy produces two goods
using capital and two fixed factors of production, one being specific to each good.
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Let one of the goods be investment goods. Let the world price of investment
goods in terms of consumption goods be unity. Let there be an ad valorem tariff
at the rate t on the investment good. Let the economy operate just for two
periods. Let the world prices and tariffs remain unchanged between periods. Let
the initial capital stock be K and let there be no depreciation. It is fairly easy to
see that the value of the profit-maximizing output of the two goods evaluated at
world prices can be written as a function ~ (t, K) of the tariff rate and the capi-
tal stock. ~ attains its maximum for any K at t = 0: Le., free trade maximizes
the value of output at world prices. Let the economy invest f in the first period
so that the capital stock available in the second period is K + f. The value of a
second-period output at world prices is ~ (t, K + f). Suppose the welfare of the
consumers of the economy can be represented by W = U( C]) + p U( C2) where
Ci is consumption in period i (i = 1, 2) and p is the discount factor. We can set
investment in period 2 at zero, since the economy operates only for two periods.
How liberalizing trade may lead to loss in welfare is illustrated in Figure
Al.6. In the top part of the diagram the availability line in period 1 at world
prices is shown. Under free trade, the available capital K enables the economy
to achieve any combination on F]F'] between consumption and investment in
the period. In other words, OF] equals ~(O, K) and F]F' I has slope 1 since the
world price of investment is 1. If the economy imposes a tariff on investment
goods, the availability shifts inward to T]Ti parallel to F]Fi. Clearly, OT]
equals ~(t, K).
Starting from OF] (OT]) by giving up current consumption and investing,
consumption can be increased. By spending the entire value of output at world
prices on consumption and not investing anything, the second-period consump-
tion will equal the first-period consumption. This choice is shown in the bottom
part of the diagram as G2(H2) whose distance from the horizontal axis is
OF] (OT]): Le., OF2 = OF] and OT2 = OT]. By making positive investment
f, and using the production possibilities, the consumption that can be obtained
in period 2 is ~(O, K + f) under free trade and ~(t, K + f) under a tariff. By
plotting this against the corresponding first-period consumption, i.e.,
~(O, K) - f under free trade and ~(t,K) - f under the tariff, we obtain -the
curves G2G2 and H 2H2. Given that F]Fi lies to the right of T]Ti, the curve
G2G2will lie below and to the right of the curve H2H2.
If investment is optimally set both under free trade and tariff, the
corresponding intertemporal choices can be shown as p* and Q*. Clearly, free
trade dominates. If nonoptimal choice of investment leads to an intertemporal
choice of P under free trade and of Q under a tariff, the tariff equilibrium can
lead to higher welfare than the free trade equilibrium. As the diagram shows,
loosely speaking, the loss in welfare due to nonoptimal investment is "small"
(i.e., Q is close to Q * in welfare terms under a tariff) but it becomes accentuated
under free trade (i.e., P is further from p* in welfare terms).
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From this brief look at the gains from free trade, it should be clear that,
although a free trade equilibrium is Pareto optimal, it is not immediately clear to
whom the gains from trade will accrue. Their distribution between countries, as
well as within countries, depends on several factors. Within the countries the
distribution of the gain will depend on the adjustment path. For a country that
gains in free trade if production factors move easily or the transition period to
free trade is well adapted to the speed at which factors can move between sec-
tors, gains will accrue to both producers and consumers. Not only the policies of
the country itself matter; the policies of other countries also affect the outcome
of who gains under a move to free trade.
Thus, a small economy for which free trade is the optimal policy may lose
under free trade (compared to its position before the movement to free trade)
when the movement to free trade is part of a global movement toward free trade.
However, if the small economy does not move to free trade when others do, it
will be worse off than if it were also to move to free trade.
Similarly, as we have seen, it may be optimal for a large country to impose
a tax on its exports or a tariff on imports to affect world market prices to its
advantage. In free trade, where such taxes and tariffs are removed, the country
would lose its advantage. However, the lowering (raising) of world prices of its
exports (imports) may benefit (hurt) the consumers in countries importing those
commodities, whereas producers of those commodities in other countries may
lose (gain). Also, in the presence of other distortions in the economy, such as
nonoptimal investment decisions, nonoptimal allocations of capital, rigidities in
movement of labor, etc., free trade could be welfare worsening for a country.
In summary, one can conclude that, provided nondistortionary redistribu-
tion arrangements are available, there are gains from a move to free trade. In
the absence of such arrangements, the issue is one of second best, and no general
statements can be made. In such a situation, the distribution of gains and losses
between countries and within countries needs to be evaluated and assessed
before one can reach a conclusion on the desirability or otherwise of free trade.
Moreover, such an assessment cannot be made from purely qualitative considera-
tions: an empirical analysis is essential.
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APPENDIX A2
Modes, Means, and Estimates
of Protection
A 2.1. Modes of Distortion - A Multiplicity of Measures
Protection can take many forms. In fact, the ways in which governments inter-
vene in markets are so numerous that there is no easy way to measure fully the
combined effect of all of them. They vary from sheltering domestic from world
markets through tariffs and quotas to purchaser taxes or subsidies that influence
domestic demand, producer taxes or subsidies that affect production, market
regulations, government purchases, sales and stock accumulation, and so on.
Though many of the measures are obviously distorting, others are less easy to
describe as such. For example, an import quota is an obvious protection mea-
sure. However, if the same restriction of imports is realized through imposing
hygienic quality standards, it is discriminating only if the same hygienic stan-
dards are not applied and enforced on domestic production. Even then, "imposi-
tion" of such standards in itself could be distorting unless one argues that the
level of hygiene that would prevail in the absence of the imposition is below the
socially desirable level. And it would fall below such a level only if there is some
market failure. Nondiscrimination is not necessarily nondistortion.
Similarly, subsidies given or taxes imposed on inputs such as fertilizer,
chemicals, electricity, and fuel are rarely nondistorting and easy to quantify.
However, the value to farmers of subsidized agricultural research, or subsidies
given to develop infrastructure such as transport and power, may not be distort-
ing if these subsidies address a market failure arising from an externality; and,
even if they are distorting, their value is often difficult to quantify.
Even when trade is unrestricted, a government-operated domestic buffer
stock can be distorting if it is large enough to affect world market prices and if
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the level of stocks is beyond what would be "optimal" from a global perspective
- i.e., if its stocking or destocking ability is large enough. If world prices are not
affected, it could still be distorting unless government stocking ensures social
optimality of stocks compared to private stock activity.
Usually, at least in developed countries, border protection measures (i.e.,
measures that drive wedges between domestic and world market prices for agri-
cultural products through tariff and nontariff barriers) dominate. In some coun-
tries these are supplemented, and in some replaced, by production subsidies,
which increase the profits of producers over and above the margin they would
otherwise obtain from the price paid by consumers.
We can classify (after OECD, 1983), without claiming to be exhaustive, the
various intervention measures according to the group of individuals they pri-
marily affect, though obviously many measures affect more than one group of
individuals. These are given in Sections A2.1.1-A2.1.3.
A 2.1.1. Measures primarily affecting producers
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Price-support payments or output subsidies. These are specific payments
per unit of output, paid regardless of the level of market price.
Diversion payments. These are payments made to farmers for the purpose
of limiting output.
Input subsidies. Both "fixed" inputs (e.g., land, building, and machinery)
and variable inputs (e.g., fertilizer) may be subsidized. Subsidies reduce
the farmer's cost of production and increase his profits. They also lead to
misallocation of these inputs and hence to a loss in efficiency of the econ-
omy.
Production/marketing quotas. Usually such quotas, which set quantitative
floors or ceilings on how much can be produced or marketed, are linked to
a specific pricing arrangement and they affect prices and incomes of pro-
ducers.
Storage subsidies. Subsidies for on-farm storage of domestic products
reduce a farmer's costs and hence increase profits.
Deficiency payments. These are payments made to cover part or all of the
difference between market prices and a specified target or guaranteed price;
they are intended to help to stabilize farmers' incomes and assure them a
minimum income from production.
Price/income stabilization funds. These may be direct transfers of funds or
interest rate subsidies.
Producer levies or taxes. These apply when producers are required to sell a
specified part of their output to the government at prices below the ruling
open market prices.
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A2.1.2. Measures primarily affecting consumers
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(1) Consumer subsidies/taxes.
(2) Domestic donations. Programs directed at specific segments of the popula-
tion (e.g., children, the elderly, or the poor) may involve the free distribu-
tion of foodstuffs or various degrees of price reduction for selected groups.
A 2.1.3. Measures affecting both producers and consumers
(1) Tariffs. A tariff raises the price that domestic producers can command for
their production and the price that consumers have to pay.
(2) Two-price schemes. Such schemes involve differential pricing by com-
modity or type of market: e.g., the markets for fluid versus processed milk,
or subsidized prices in urban ration shops selling limited amounts to con-
sumers versus the free market price when any amount can be purchased.
(3) Variable levies. A variable levy is a tariff that is adjusted in response to
changes in cost, insurance, freight (GIF) import prices, so as to maintain
the domestic price of imported goods at a predetermined level.
(4) Import or export quotas. These affect domestic availability and prices.
(5) Transportation subsidies. These are often provided to equalize prices to all
consumers in a large country. Normally such subsidies benefit producers
located far away from main markets and also consumers far away from the
producing areas. However, they may impose additional costs on nearby
consumers, while producers nearer the market lose their locational advan-
tage.
(6) Export credits/subsidies. Export subsidies and preferential credits increase
the returns to domestic producers and, by making export markets more
attractive, increase the price of the product to domestic consumers.
A 2.2. Measuring Protection - Nominal, Relative, Real, and
Effective Protection
A number of alternative concepts and methods for measuring protection have
been suggested in the economic literature: see Balassa (1971) and Strak (1982).
The different concepts are useful for different purposes of analysis.
Nominal rate of protection is defined by Balassa (1971) as "the percentage
excess of the domestic price over the world market price, resulting from the
application of protective measures." Thus, the nominal rate of protection for the
ith commodity, tr, can be expressed as
tf = (pt-pf')/pr
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where r1 is the domestic price of the ith commodity and Pi" is the world market
price of the ith commodity at the country's border.
In this definition the domestic price may be defined, for either the producer
or the consumer, to measure the nominal protection rates for the producer and
the consumer, respectively.
Since the difference between pf and Pi" has often been interpreted as tariff,
the nominal rate of protection can be looked upon as measuring the tariff
equivalent of various protection measures; however, equivalence, in the sense
that if the various other protection measures were eliminated and a tariff at this
rate imposed the same equilibrium would result, will not hold in general. There
is an extensive literature on the equivalence and nonequivalence of tariffs, quotas
and other protective measures (see, for example, Bhagwati, 1983; Dasgupta and
Stiglitz, 1977; Rodriguez, 1974; Takacs, 1978). Be that as it may, tariff
equivalents are arrived at by computing the percentage by which the actual pro-
ducer price lies above the price the producers would receive, if the world market
price also operated on the domestic market (in the absence of border measures
and subsidies). In practice, the would-be producer price is calculated as the
world market price in exporting at the harbor minus the distribution and pro-
cessing margin necessary to bring the commodity from the farm gate to the
wholesale market. For lack of data, or if the margin is insignificant, comparison
is made between the export and domestic wholesale prices.
The tariff equivalent includes the net effect of all measures affecting the
producer prices, be they tariffs, import levies, quotas, or subsidies. However,
subsidies to inputs (fertilizers, below-market interest rates for investment loans,
etc.) affect the difference between domestic and world prices differently depend-
ing on the protection measure used. The domestic price at which a given quota
is absorbed in equilibrium is different, depending on whether or not there is an
input subsidy. A negative tariff equivalent can appear for export products that
are being taxed. The tariff equivalent for consumers might be lower than that
for producers with price subsidies, or higher if the producers have to incur a loss
when the export price is lower than the domestic one.
The size of the tariff equivalent is, of course, dependent on the level of
world market prices. If a country stabilizes its domestic price through, say,
stock operations and quotas while the world price fluctuates, tariff equivalents
will fluctuate from year to year and will seem to indicate a changing government
policy, whereas the policy to stabilize domestic prices may have continued
unchanged. A measurement problem arises in the case of a large country, which
may depress the world market price by its protection. For such a country two
measures are conceivable, one based on current world market prices and the
other on what the world market price would have been in the absence of protec-
tion by this country (see below). For a large country, the tariff equivalent could
be negative when calculated using the latter method, if the Metzler paradox
applies - Le., the country lowers its domestic price or domestic production by
protecting the commodity. In this case the domestic price falls after the tariff
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has been introduced, but the world price also falls. The post-tariff equilibrium
tariff is positive measured in the first way, but negative measured in the second.
Incidentally, if one defines protection as a measure to raise domestic output from
what it would have otherwise been, what the Metzler paradox suggests is that a
tariff need not protect.
The implied tariff corresponding to a given trade quota can be calculated ex
post, but it is not always easy to determine in advance what level of tariff will be
equivalent to a particular quota value. One difference between quotas and tariffs
is that tariff revenue accrues to the government, whereas the premium on quotas
accrues to the quota holder unless the government allots quotas through auction.
But a tariff equivalent could be the same either way if income effects are absent
in a competitive set-up. This would be the case, for example, when the con-
sumption pattern of those who receive premiums on quotas or income from tariff
receipts, including the government, are the same. This, in general, is not likely
to be the case. And, of course, in the general equilibrium framework, how the
government disposes of its tariff revenue also affects the outcome regarding
which quota level would be equivalent to a particular tariff level.
In spite of such difficulties, tariff equivalence provides a simple way to cap-
ture the effects of a large range of border distortion measures, particularly for
estimating distortion over historical periods.
If one is interested in evaluating the distortions introduced in the domestic
structure of production or consumption, relative rates of protection between
different commodities are more relevant. If two commodities have the same
nominal rate of protection and neither one is used as an input for the other, their
relative price is not affected by this protection. This means that one commodity
is not economically favored in terms of nominal protection in comparison with
the other. Thus, if we select the nominal protection rate on the nonagricultural
sector, t:, as the numeraire, then the relative protection rate for commodity i, tl,
can be defined as
- 1
Once again, the relative protection rate may be defined for consumers and pro-
ducers.
In estimating the nominal protection rate as defined above one needs the
world market price at the country's border. However, the question arises as to
which world market price to use - the present one, which may itself be affected
by the distortion the country has imposed when it is a large country, or the
world market price that would have prevailed had the country not introduced
the distortion? In addition, the distortion introduced by a country may be in
retaliation for the distortion introduced by other countries. In this case, should
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one not take the world market price that would have prevailed had all countries
removed their distortions? In a sense the nominal protection rates calculated
using such global free trade world prices are the real protection rates, and that is
how we define them. As mentioned already, protection imposed by a single large
country depresses world market prices. The corollary is that the introduction of
free trade by that country alone would lead to higher world market prices. How-
ever, the effect of simultaneous removal of protection by all countries is not
predictable (see Chapter 3).
Similar to real protection rates (Le., protection rates calculated with world
prices that would prevail under global free trade), one can define adjusted protec-
tion rates as those calculated with world market prices that would prevail under
free trade by a limited number of countries. Of particular interest are EC-
adjusted, USA-adjusted and GECD-adjusted protection rates, which are defined
as rates calculated with world prices that would prevail, respectively, under
trade liberalization by the EC alone, the USA alone, and all the OECD countries
together.
As pointed out above, there are a number of protection measures, such as
input subsidy, taxes, stock operations, etc., which affect the difference between
domestic and trade prices only under some measures of protection, but which
nonetheless affect the effective price received by the farmers or paid by the con-
sumers. Such protection measures may distort the nominal, real, adjusted, or
relative rates of protection.
To account for the effect of input subsidies, the notion of effective protec-
tion rate is introduced. This can be described as the protection of the value
added of a commodity, as opposed to the nominal protection, which applies to
the gross output value of the commodity. It is arrived at by subtracting the pro-
tection of the intermediate inputs from the nominal protection of the end prod-
uct. If the former protection is lower than the latter, the effective protection is
higher than the nominal one. This can apply to agriculture, for example, if the
protection of feed is lower than that for the animal product produced by the
feed. Thus, the effective rate of protection, ti, is defined as
,
tt! =,
where v,d and vi are value added in production of the commodity, valued at
domestic and world prices, respectively.
The difference between effective and nominal protection rates is important
in understanding the adjustments of production structure when a country moves
toward freer trade.
An alternative approach - due to Josling and followed in the F AO (1975)
study - used to measure protection calculates producer subsidy equivalents
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(PSEs) and consumer subsidy equivalents (CSEs) of all measures of intervention.
In essence, this is similar to the measurement of effective protection rates but
includes the impact of all other measures of intervention, which may not be
reflected in changes in the domestic prices of inputs and outputs compared to
their international prices. The advantages of this method are that it looks at the
various specific measures of intervention and tries to quantify their impact on
producers and consumers. Thus it helps in focusing negotiations between coun-
tries and groups on specific measures of protection. The disadvantage of the
method is that it follows a partial equilibrium approach, and thus the impacts of
substantial changes in policies or of simultaneous changes in protection in a
number of commodities or by a number of countries cannot be assessed using
this approach.
In marginal analysis based on a partial equilibrium approach, effective pro-
tection rates may be preferable. However, such partial analysis can be mislead-
ing. In fact, it has been shown (Ramaswami and Srinivasan, 1971; Jones, 1971;
Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1973) that, except under restrictive assumptions, the
relative values of effective rates of protection indices of two sectors cannot be
relied upon to indicate even the directions in which factor reallocation, and hence
supply changes, will take place when rates of protection are changed.
For our analysis we use the nominal rates of protection, as the major agri-
cultural inputs constitute separate sectors in our system. Removal of nominal
tariffs from both output and input sectors thus amounts to removing effective
tariffs. The supply behavior in our models thus integrates the nominal protec-
tion rates into effective protection and responds as such.
A2.3. Estimation of Protection Rates - Nominal Tariff
Equivalents
A2.3.1. Broad outline of the approach
For estimating the nominal tariff equivalent of all border measures (tariffs, quo-
tas, other barriers), the difference between domestic price and world market
price may be used. However, the difference between a country's trade price and
its domestic price may be due to a number of factors. These are:
(1) Tariffs (positive or negative) and trade quotas.
(2) Composition differences.
(3) Quality differences.
(4) International trade margins - which depend on whether the country is an
exporter or an importer.
For estimating nominal tariff equivalents, factors (2), (3), and (4) are
estimated first, and tariff is obtained as a residual.
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A 2.3.2. Definition of domestic prices under free trade
In this section the treatment of the three major causes of possible deviations of
the domestic prices in free trade from world market prices as annually generated
in the BLS is described. Two of these aspects deal with individual commodity
mixes and quality differences; the third adjustment then takes into account a
country's trading position.
World Price Aggregation Factors (WPAF) for a Country
The general idea of calculating this first correction factor, WP AF, is to account
for country-specific compositions of the commodities that are aggregated to the
nine agricultural commodities used in the BLS.
The F AO Supply Utilization Accounts (SUA), the primary data source on
agricultural commodities used in the BLS, are originally composed of over 1000
commodities related to agriculture, 600 of which are used as input for the aggre-
gation down to nine commodities (see Fischer and Sichra, 1983). The following
list gives an overview of the aggregation steps:
Name
Original SUA
Main commodities
Large F AP commodity list
Small FAP commodity list
Number of commodities
600 (260 main + 340 derived)
260
19 (including nonagriculture)
10 (including nonagriculture)
Over the historical period 1961-1981, world market prices of each com-
modity in the original SUA list have been calculated reflecting the lowest export
unit values among producers exceeding a minimal prespecified export share in
the world trade of that particular commodity (see Sichra, 1984). In the aggrega-
tion process these prices are weighted with the corresponding world export levels
to arrive at world market prices in terms of the F AP 19- and 10-commodity lists.
Hence, aggregate world prices reflect the commodity mix as traded on the world
market. The aggregation weights most appropriate in the case of a particular
country's "free trade" price for consumers, however, are the corresponding
demand levels (instead of world trade) and for producers, the corresponding pro-
duction levels. We therefore proceed as follows: Given a set of world market
prices pWi' total world export weights wio and country-specific commodity
weights Wij' where the commodity index i refers to the original SUA list, and j
refers to individual countries. Let K be the set of SUA commodities i that are
aggregated to F AP commodity k; then the country-specific commodity aggrega-
tion world price factors, WPAFkj - aggregation correction factors for brevity -
can be calculated from
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In other words, in the numerator we weight the world market prices computed at
the most detailed commodity level available to us by country-specific commodity
weights, whereas world trade data are used in the denominator.
A2.3.3. Country-specific quality world price factors (WPQF)
So far, only structural differences of commodities in different countries have been
taken into account. A further criterion to be considered, however, is quality
differences. Unfortunately, there is no simple and straightforward way to tell
quality differences from the information contained in the FAD SUA data base.
Accordingly, the quality adjustment multipliers used in the BLS price functions
were supplied using one of the following three methods:
(1) Data were processed in terms of the original SUA commodity list. When-
ever a country exported a minimal prespecified fraction of domestic produc-
tion, the deviation of the implied export unit value from the corresponding
world market price series has been interpreted as an indication of possible
quality differences (see Section 3.2).
(2) Whenever commodity-specific tariff levels were known from other sources,
this information was used to estimate quality differences, since the total
difference between world market price and domestic price can be attributed
to tariff quality differences and aggregation differences and the latter are
known.
(3) Whenever (1) and (2) could not be applied, the quality factor reflects "best
guesses" from agricultural experts.
Aggregation correction factors (WPAF) and quality multipliers (WPQF)
together yield a country-specific world price factor CSWPFk{
We use I.his 1.0 define a country-specific world market price CSWPkj taking into
accounl. I.he quality and mix of commodities relevant to a particular country j:
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where PW" represents the aggregate world price of commodity k in the F AP
commodity list.
The country-specific world price factors for the nonagricultural commodity,
CSWPnj' were taken to be 1.0.
A 2.3.4. Country-specific trade position world price factor (WPTF)
In determining raw material producer prices under liberal trade scenarios we
consider yet another aspect that relates to a country's net export situation for a
particular commodity. In practice, countries importing agricultural goods are
faced with costs higher than those implied by the world market price (export
unit value) owing to transport costs. Similarly, exporters are required to provide
special processing and transport up to the border to make a product exportable.
Hence, we assume a price band around the appropriate country-specific world
price as indicated in Figure A2.1.
The graph in Figure A2.1 shows that, for countries at 100% self-sufficiency
(no export or import of that particular commodity), WPTF"j is set to 1.0, imply-
ing a raw material price under free trade equal to the country-specific world
market price CSWP"j' The transition from minimum to maximum price has
been stretched out between self-sufficiency levels labeled b and a in Figure A2.1.
One of the justifications that may be offered for this particular function
specification accounts for the fact that most BLS commodities represent aggre-
gates, so that the net export concept hides the possible (and likely) coexistence of
subcommodity exports and imports. The interval (a, 1) may therefore be inter-
preted as the range of aggregate self-sufficiency levels where imports dominate
but some exports still take place, and vice versa for the interval (1, b). A second
argument is the increased numerical stability achieved by stretching the interval
(a, b) as far as justifiable, since zigzagging of target prices cannot occur easily
from one year to another. When self-sufficiency falls, prices will deviate upward
up to a commodity-specific maximum, which is reached at a self-sufficiency level
indicated by a in Figure A2.1. Conversely, WPTF"j decreases until it reaches a
minimal level at a self-sufficiency ratio b and stays constant thereafter. In the
BLS, the values of a and b are commodity-specific but not country-specific. The
value of b is set to 1.10 except for meats (FAP commodity 4 and 6) and "Non-
food agriculture" (FAP commodity 9) where b is set to 1.05. Similarly, a is set
to 0.90 for "Dairy products" (FAP commodity 5) and "Other food" (FAP com-
modity 8), and to 0.95 otherwise (see Table 9.2). Country-specific data on trans-
port costs by commodity were not available to us. Therefore, average interna-
tional transport costs have been estimated as the difference between average
world import and world export unit values. Estimates on domestic transport
(for export) and export processing requirements have been provided by experts.
Percentages defining maximum upward and downward deviations of WPTF
from 1.0 are shown in Table A2.1.
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Minimum price-
World market price-
Maximum price-+--------------t ~
:\ I International transport
I \.. ~rgins for imports
I"' .. Domestic transport,....---~marginsfor exports
a 1.0 b Self-sufficiency ratio
I'-~-----N-et-i-m-p-o-rt-er-----~I~Net exporter ~
a = 0.90 for 5 and 8
0.95 for all other commodities
b = 1.05 for 4. 6. and 9
1.10 for all other commodities
Figure A£.1. Domestic raw material price under trade liberalization.
The relatively high margin for dairy products as set for developing coun-
tries reflects the belief that infrastructure and dairy processing industries are
generally inadequate to allow for substantial trade in milk powder, which needs
reconstitution to give whole milk.
A 2.3.5. Price of nonagriculture in the BLS
The quantification of prices and physical supply and demand volumes for the
highly aggregated nonagriculture commodity poses serious practical problems
that require simplifying assumptions that are important for understanding the
notion of protection rates used in this study.
In the BLS, the nonagricultural sector output is measured in millions of
1970 US dollars. Accordingly, the world price of the nonagriculture commodity
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Table A2.1. Average international transport cost, and domestic transport plus export
processing requirements, as percentage of world market price for various commodities
and countries.
Other
Coarse Bovine animal Protein Other Nonfood
Country Wheat Rice grams k ovine Dairy products feed food agric.
International 12 11 12 9 6 8 10 11 2
Argentina 15 20 15 5 50 5 20 15 3
Australia 15 20 15 5 10 5 20 15 5
Austria 10 20 10 5 10 5 20 15 3
Brazil 20 20 20 5 50 5 20 15 3
Canada 15 20 15 5 10 5 5 15 3
Egypt 10 20 10 5 10 5 20 20 3
Indonesia 10 20 10 5 50 5 20 20 3
Japan 10 20 10 5 10 5 20 15 3
Mexico 10 20 10 5 50 5 20 15 3
Nigeria 10 20 10 5 50 5 20 15 3
Pakistan 10 20 10 5 50 5 20 15 3
Turkey 10 20 10 5 50 5 20 10 3
EC 20 20 20 5 10 5 20 15 3
in 1970 has been set to 1.0. Time series data for GDP of the nonagricultural sec-
tor used in this study [from United Nations (UN) National Accounts Statistics]
were available in terms of current and constant 1970 national prices.
Given time series estimates for country j on tariff equivalent of protection
on nonagriculture t n i t, exchange rates EXCH j t, value added of nonagriculture
VJ" t at current dome~tic prices and V~ t at constant domestic prices of 1970, and
, "country-specific aggregation and quality multipliers CSWPFnit (following the
concepts outlined in the previous sections), consistent series o~' "true" nonagri-
culture prices PRAW~rj1 and production volumes Q~rj1 can be constructed as
follows: ' , , ,
PRAW~:j,1 = (1 + tn,j,t) X CSWPFn,j,t X PWn,t
and
It should be emphasized that estimates of tariff equivalents t n j t and
aggregation/quality multipliers CSWPFn j t were not available. An att~~pt to
estimate the required coefficients t n j t' ~ould involve estimating the tariff
equivalent of the border protection or't~adeable goods as well as its impact on
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the value added of the nontradable output of the nonagriculture sector. Given
the unavailability of data and the highly aggregated treatment of nonagriculture
in the study, the effort needed to collect the necessary data was considered not
justifiable within the resource constraints of the study. Instead, time series
PRA Wn JO t and Qn JO t were constructed in the following way:, , , ,
PRA Wn,j,t = (Vj,tlEXCHj,t)/( Vj,tlEXCHj,70)
Qn,j,t = (Vj,tlEXCHj,t)/PRA Wn,j,t = VJ,tl EXCHj,70
which implies
PRA Wn,j,t = PRAW~~j,1/[CSWPFn,j,70 X (1 + t n,j,7o)]
and
Qn,j,t = Q~~j,1 x [CSWPFn,j,70 X (1 + t n,j,7o)]
We have to emphasize the fact that only PRAWn j t, and not the "true"
price PRAw~rj1, is used in this study; this has also an i~portant bearing on the
estimations of ~griculture protection factors. In the rest of this Appendix it is
PRAWn j t that is meant whenever the price of nonagriculture is referred to, and
not PRAwtn~e.
n,J,t
A 2.3.6. Country-specific raw material prices under free trade
Given all the adjustment factors as outlined above, we define country-specific
raw material prices PRAWFkj under free trade conditions in the following way:
PRAWFkj _ CSWPkj = WPTF ° X CSWPFkj X PWk
PRA WFn,j - WPTFkj x CSWPn,j kJ CSWPFn,j X PWn
k = 1, ...,9
where k refers to agricultural commodities, n stands for the nonagriculture sec-
tor, and j refers to BLS countries shown in Table A2.1. For BLS scenarios
where agricultural prices PRAWkj are set according to endogenized policy func-
tions, the above definition of country-specific raw material prices under free
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trade implies the calculation of agricultural protection levels PRTCkj ,
_[PRAWlj] [PRAWFlj]
PRTC kj - PRAW . / PRAWF .
n,J n,J
k = 1, ...,9
It should be noted that these implied protection levels are not to be confused
with tariff levels, but rather indicate average deviations of country raw material
prices from what might prevail under liberalization of agricultural policies and
trade. Thus they represent nominal tariff equivalents.
A 2.3.7. Use of protection factors to define prices under free trade
So far we have only covered the set of countries in the BLS that use policy
transmission functions annually to set domestic prices. The rest of the countries
(except the CMEA and China) use a somewhat simpler approach in that domes-
tic prices are calculated by applying a fixed margin PRCFCTkj on top of the
world market price. This margin is assumed to capture all of the above individ-
ual aspects - commodity mix, quality aspects, and protection - pertaining to a
deviation of domestic prices from world market prices as generated in the BLS:
In addition, we have specified relative protection factors, PRTCkj, for each of
these countries and country groups; these factors are used to modify the price-
setting mechanism under free trade assumptions. Free trade prices are therefore
specified by adjusting the above price-setting mechanism accordingly:
1 PRCFCTlj
PRAWFkj = x PRAWkj = x PW kPRCTlj PRCTlj
It should be noted that, in these price functions, self-sufficiency considerations
are not explicitly included.
A2.4. Data Analysis in the Quantification of Protection
Levels
In the previous section we have presented the general definition used to arrive at
country-specific prices under free trade as well as implied protection levels for
the BLS reference scenario. Even though the general concept may sound trivial,
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the appropriate classification of the observable differences between domestic agri-
cultural prices and the respective set of world market prices used in the BLS
poses many practical problems, so that "expert judgment" had to be applied
generously. In the following, we describe the relevant data analysis carried out
to quantify the required adjustment multipliers or to assist experts in their judg-
ment.
A 2.4.1. Country-specific commodity aggregation world price factors
This adjustment multiplier, which corrects for differences in domestic versus
world trade commodity mixes, is the least problematic in terms of quantification.
All the required data to carry out the calculations indicated in Section A2.3.3 are
available in the F AO SUA data base, so that even time series indicating a possi-
ble change in commodity mixes could be generated. The results obtained for
1961-1976 turned out to be fairly stable over time, justifying a constant value of
the WPAF multipliers to be used in the BLS simulation runs. Tables A2.2 and
A2.9 show average values (usually for 1961-1976) obtained for each of the nine
agricultural commodities using country-specific production and demand weights,
respectively. In the case of the BLS wheat and rice commodities, the correspond-
ing factors have to be strictly unity, since the F AO SUA does not distinguish
different qualities of these two commodities. However, the value differences are
accounted for.
It should be noted that the WP AF multipliers are especially relevant to the
highly aggregated BLS commodities 6-9, Le., "Other animal products", "Protein
feed", "Other food" , and "Nonfood agriculture" .
A 2.4.2. Separating quality aspects from protection effects on prices
A first serious problem in data analysis arises from the fact that F AO time series
on average annual producer prices are given in national currencies whereas trade
is reported in US dollars. To make price series comparable, one therefore has to
apply exchange rates, which, however, may be distorted because of lag effects,
balance of payments considerations, or other deliberate national policy targets.
To avoid exchange rate problems, we looked at relative prices, Le., agricultural
prices divided by the price of the nonagricultural commodity. It should be noted
that this procedure is fully compatible with the BLS methodology requiring
model results to be independent of absolute price levels [homogeneity of degree
zero in world market prices: see Keyzer (1981)1. Hence, all results reported in
the following will refer to this notion of relative agricultural prices. To extract as
much relevant information as possible from the SUA data base, time series for
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Table A2.2. Country-specific commodity world price aggregation factors weighted by
domestic production.
Other
Coarse Bovine animal Protein Other Nonfood
Country Wheat Rice grains & ovine Dairy products feed food agric.
Argentina 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.04 1.00 1.26 1.16 0.86 0.96
Australia 1.00 1.00 0.94 1.01 1.00 1.28 0.51 0.93 1.26
Austria 1.00 1.01 1.10 1.00 1.61 0.65 0.92 0.75
Brazil 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.05 1.00 1.35 1.06 0.54 0.94
Canada 1.00 1.02 1.07 1.00 1.24 0.77 0.93 0.58
China 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.95 1.12 1.66 0.88 0.69 0.87
Egypt 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.82 1.48 1.07 0.77 1.39
India 1.00 1.00 0.92 1.26 0.85 1.34 1.36 0.89 0.91
Indonesia 1.00 1.04 1.01 1.00 1.16 1.33 0.46 0.55
Japan 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.70 0.87 0.71 0.45
Kenya 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.13 1.05 1.63 1.31 0.56 1.24
Mexico 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.03 1.28 0.97 0.91 1.21
New Zeal. 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.57 0.46 0.78 1.21
Nigeria 1.00 1.00 0.89 1.39 1.00 1.44 2.09 0.60 0.80
Pakistan 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.82 1.18 0.89 1.04 1.05
Sweden 1.00 0.99 1.08 1.00 1.10 0.62 1.07 0.78
Thailand 1.00 1.03 0.70 0.81 1.05 1.15 0.49 0.78
Turkey 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.18 1.40 0.90 1.12 0.78 0.90
USA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.08 1.00 1.45 0.85 0.89 0.92
Bulgaria 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.99 1.32 1.39 1.49 0.77 0.63
Czech. 1.00 0.97 1.03 1.08 1.59 0.64 0.83 0.78
GDRa 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.01 1.38 0.59 0.89 0.81
Hungary 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.02 1.05 1.58 1.21 0.83 0.70
Poland 1.00 0.98 1.05 1.00 1.47 0.68 0.84 0.59
Rumania 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.01 1.15 1.50 1.38 0.84 0.74
USSR 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.05 1.00 1.22 1.21 0.92 1.08
EC 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.02 1.34 0.70 0.90 0.78
Bel-Luxb 1.00 0.97 1.05 1.00 1.47 0.66 0.94 0.71
Denmark 1.00 1.00 1.06 1.00 1.42 0.84 1.07 0.75
France 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.99 1.04 1.31 0.62 0.88 0.82
FRG a 1.00 1.03 1.07 1.00 1.46 0.61 0.99 0.85
Ireland 1.00 0.90 1.03 1.00 1.26 0.59 0.93 1.03
Italy 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.01 1.08 1.25 0.69 0.89 0.63
Netherlands 1.00 0.95 1.05 1.00 1.38 0.74 0.90 0.72
UK 1.00 0.97 1.05 1.00 1.22 1.21 0.92 1.08
aGDR, German Democratic Republic (East Germany); FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
(West Germany).
bBelgium and Luxemburg combined.
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Table A£.9. Country-specific commodity world price aggregation factors weighted by
domestic consumption.
Other
Coarse Bovine animal Protein Other Nonfood
Countrya Wheat Rice grains & ovine Dairy products feed food agric.
Argentina 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.04 1.00 1.29 0.98 0.79 1.01
Australia 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.01 1.00 1.22 0.58 0.89 1.07
Austria 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.08 1.00 1.48 0.88 0.92 0.96
Brazil 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.05 1.00 1.32 1.12 0.49 0.89
Canada 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.07 1.00 1.43 0.77 0.85 0.83
China 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.95 1.12 1.67 0.88 0.69 0.92
Egypt 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.68 0.83 1.41 1.03 0.76 1.14
India 1.00 1.00 0.91 1.26 0.90 1.35 1.14 0.89 0.97
Indonesia 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.01 1.00 1.17 1.15 0.42 0.62
Japan 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.88 1.00 0.72 0.84 0.78 0.94
Kenya 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.13 1.06 1.64 1.39 0.57 1.19
Mexico 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.03 1.29 0.94 0.93 1.08
New Zeal. 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.03 1.00 1.60 0.52 0.88 0.95
Nigeria 1.00 1.00 0.89 1.39 1.00 1.34 1.61 0.51 0.74
Pakistan 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.83 1.29 0.96 1.03 0.99
Sweden 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.07 1.00 1.19 0.91 0.96 0.83
Thailand 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.70 0.98 1.05 1.11 0.65 0.75
Turkey 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.18 1.40 0.90 1.09 0.78 0.94
USA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.08 1.00 1.42 0.87 0.84 0.90
Bulgaria 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.99 1.28 1.38 1.31 0.83 0.99
Czech. 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.03 1.08 1.51 1.08 0.81 0.98
GDR 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.32 0.89 0.85 0.89
Hungary 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.02 1.05 1.60 1.14 0.83 0.91
Poland 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.05 1.00 1.47 0.93 0.83 0.86
Rumania 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.00 1.17 1.48 1.27 0.85 0.87
USSR 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.05 1.00 1.23 1.21 0.90 1.00
EC 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.32 0.94 0.89 0.96
Bel-Lux 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.04 1.00 1.37 0.91 0.84 1.00
Denmark 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.00 1.09 0.94 0.99 0.79
France 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.99 1.05 1.30 1.00 0.83 1.00
FRG 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.07 1.00 1.41 0.92 0.91 0.94
Ireland 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.40 0.93 0.87 0.97
Italy 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.02 1.07 1.18 0.86 0.93 0.91
Netherlands 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.04 1.00 1.39 0.91 0.87 0.88
UK 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.00 1.30 1.02 0.89 1.00
aSee footnotes to Table A2.2.
268 Toward Fru Trad~ in Agriadtur~
Table A£.{ Producer price of wheat relative to world market price, 1966-1980.
Country 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 197£
Argentina 0.58 0.60 0.69 0.71 0.68 0.66 0.58
Australia 1.18 1.12 0.97 0.94 1.05 1.12 1.05
Austria 1.82 1.62 1.63 1.54 1.71 1.75 1.62
Brazil 2.19 1.87 1.85 1.83 1.94 2.03 1.86
Canada 1.18 0.98 0.81 0.73 0.91 0.90 1.17
Egypt 1.35 1.38 1.22 1.21 1.63 1.59 1.52
India 2.05 2.44 1.81 1.89 2.11 2.06 2.01
Japan 2.82 2.60 2.74 2.70 3.06 3.41 3.36
Kenya 1.35 1.29 1.31 1.24 1.15 1.35 1.25
Mexico 1.33 1.15 1.19 1.13 1.23 1.31 1.22
New Zealand 1.07 0.91 0.92 0.94 1.05 1.08 1.11
Nigeria 2.46 1.92 1.92 2.38 2.66 3.74 3.34
Pakistan 1.70 1.88 1.74 1.55 1.82 1.95 1.93
Sweden 2.05 1.82 1.76 1.65 1.78 1.81 1.67
Turkey 1.68 1.46 1.50 1.50 1.60 1.54 1.37
USA 1.18 0.90 0.80 0.77 0.89 0.93 1.16
EC:
Belgium/Luxemburg 1.82 1.65 1.66 1.57 1.83 1.85 1.76
Denmark 1.48 1.26 1.17 1.20 1.33 1.37 1.42
France 1.51 1.42 1.42 1.32 1.54 1.66 1.57
FRG 2.22 1.82 1.89 1.84 1.93 1.93 1.84
Italy 2.22 1.94 1.91 1.84 2.06 2.13 1.97
Netherlands 1.96 1.72 1.71 1.64 1.89 1.84 1.74
UK 1.22 1.12 1.18 1.18 1.36 1.40 1.42
the years 1966-1980 of five different indicators have been calculated in terms of
the original SUA commodity list. It may be noted that, since these calculations
are done at the levels of the detailed commodity list, there is no composition
difference between countries. The five indicators calculated are:
(1) Domestic producer price over world market price, which is defined as the
minimum unit value of exports above a certain threshold value in share of
world exports. This indicates the total difference in the prices that needs
to be separated into that due to quality differences and that due to protec-
tion.
(2) Domestic producer price over average world export unit value. This ratio
shows the value of the domestic producer price relative to the unit value of
the average traded quality.
(3) Domestic producer price over each country's export/import unit value.
This shows the combined effect of protection and any quality difference
between the average quality of production and the average quality of
product traded by the country.
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Table A2.4. (Cant.)
1979 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1966-1980
0.81 0.57 0.43 0.47 1.04 1.12 0.60
1.84 1.06 0.83 0.64 1.02 1.19 1.11 0.90 1.07
1.49 1.01 0.94 1.00 1.45 1.41 1.25 1.07 1.42
1.96 1.59 2.14 1.49 2.40 2.17 1.55 1.92
2.64 1.48 0.90 0.86 1.19 1.53 1.50 1.20
1.60 1.25 1.25 1.02 1.41 1.40 1.37
1.97 1.78 1.49 1.27 1.89 1.67 1.44 1.73
3.40 2.50 2.61 2.95 5.88 5.87 5.03 4.60 3.57
1.33 1.13 1.24 1.36 1.94 1.89 1.47 1.38
1.14 0.94 1.01 0.88 1.25 1.32 1.09 0.88 1.14
1.43 0.81 0.85 0.75 1.07 1.06 0.81 0.68 0.97
3.01 1.65 1.58 1.30 1.91 1.86
1.64 1.05 1.30 1.43 2.03 2.13 1.70
1.50 1.11 1.08 1.09 1.57 1.51 1.29 1.11 1.52
1.37 1.29 1.24 1.11 1.48 1.21 0.91 1.37
2.49 1.60 1.30 0.97 1.18 1.42 1.42 1.19 1.21
1.76 1.09 1.09 1.15 1.64 1.60 1.30 1.12 1.53
1.61 1.06 0.97 0.97 1.55 1.45 1.27 1.11 1.28
1.55 1.06 0.99 1.08 1.57 1.54 1.24 1.04 1.37
1.83 1.22 1.16 1.31 1.82 1.76 1.46 1.26 1.69
2.33 1.78 1.53 1.57 2.35 2.30 1.84 1.98
1.71 1.07 0.98 1.04 1.45 1.40 1.16 1.00 1.49
2.24 1.30 0.96 1.14 1.76 1.65 1.37 1.05 1.36
(4) Export/import unit value of each country relative to world market price.
This shows the difference between the quality of a country's traded goods
and that of the cheapest major exporter.
(5) Domestic producer price relative to producer price of a selected country.
Usually a country is selected that is an important producer of the commod-
ity and known not to protect that commodity. This ratio gives information
on the relative protection provided by different countries for that commod-
ity.
This information is used to arrive at judgments on the quality factors for
each commodity and each country. Naturally, more emphasis was put on major
countries and important commodities.
To illustrate the kind of results obtained from these calculations and the
process of analysis, Tables A2.4-A2.7 present time series of the five indicators in
the case of wheat.
In Table A2.6 two series are given per country. The first line shows the
ratio of domestic producer price to relevant trade price (i.e., export unit value or
import unit value), which may be interpreted as an indication of commodity
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Table At.5. Producer price of wheat relative to average world export unit value,
1966-1980.
Country 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 197£
Argentina 0.51 0.54 0.63 0.66 0.62 0.53 0.50
Australia 1.04 1.00 0.89 0.87 0.95 0.89 0.90
Austria 1.60 1.45 1.48 1.43 1.55 1.40 1.39
Brazil 1.93 1.67 1.68 1.69 1.77 1.62 1.59
Canada 1.04 0.87 0.74 0.68 0.83 0.72 1.01
Egypt 1.19 1.23 1.11 1.12 1.48 1.27 1.30
India 1.80 2.18 1.65 1.74 1.92 1.65 1.72
Japan 2.48 2.32 2.49 2.50 2.78 2.72 2.88
Kenya 1.19 1.16 1.19 1.15 1.05 1.08 1.07
Mexico 1.17 1.03 1.09 1.04 1.12 1.04 1.04
New Zealand 0.94 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.95 0.87 0.95
Nigeria 2.16 1.72 1.75 2.20 2.42 2.99 2.86
Pakistan 1.50 1.68 1.58 1.43 1.65 1.55 1.66
Sweden 1.80 1.62 1.61 1.52 1.62 1.45 1.43
Turkey 1.48 1.30 1.36 1.38 1.46 1.23 1.17
USA 1.03 0.80 0.73 0.71 0.81 0.74 1.00
EC:
Belgium-Luxemburg 1.60 1.48 1.52 1.45 1.67 1.48 1.51
Denmark 1.30 1.13 1.06 1.11 1.20 1.09 1.22
France 1.33 1.27 1.29 1.22 1.40 1.32 1.35
FRG 1.95 1.62 1.72 1.70 1.76 1.54 1.58
Italy 1.95 1.73 1.74 1.70 1.87 1.70 1.69
Netherlands 1.72 1.53 1.56 1.51 1.72 1.47 1.49
UK 1.07 1.00 1.08 1.09 1.23 1.12 1.22
protection; the second time series refers to the relationship of trade price to
world market price. The latter will often indicate quality differences, but should
be interpreted with care, as in the case of wheat for EC countries shown in Table
A2.6. The values presented there indicate that border prices in EC countries
have been 40-60% above world market prices (as defined in the BLS). This high
margin clearly cannot be explained by quality differences, but is rather an out-
come of border protection in the Community and trade between EC member
countries at this protected price, which is reflected in their trade statistics.
To give an example of the kind of considerations involved in the sometimes
difficult task of separating out price differences due to quality aspects on the one
hand and price-policy-induced deviations on the other hand, let us look at the
figures for the USA in Tables A2.4-A2. 7:
(1) From Table A2.4, we learn that US producer prices of wheat have been (on
the average for 1966-1980) around 20% above the respective world market
price as defined in the BLS approach.
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Table A.I:?5. (Cant.)
1979 197~ 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1966-1980
0.51 0.40 0.37 0.42 0.81 0.90 0.49
1.15 0.75 0.72 0.58 0.80 0.96 0.92 0.82 0.88
0.94 0.72 0.82 0.90 1.13 1.14 1.03 0.97 1.20
1.23 1.13 1.85 1.34 1.87 1.75 1.27 1.60
1.65 1.04 0.78 0.77 0.93 1.23 1.23 0.97
1.00 0.88 1.08 0.92 1.10 1.13 1.14
1.23 1.26 1.29 1.15 1.48 1.35 1.19 1.44
2.13 1.77 2.26 2.66 4.60 4.74 4.14 4.17 2.98
0.83 0.80 1.07 1.22 1.52 1.53 1.21 1.15
0.71 0.66 0.87 0.79 0.97 1.07 0.90 0.80 0.95
0.90 0.57 0.74 0.68 0.84 0.85 0.67 0.61 0.80
1.88 1.17 1.37 1.17 1.49 1.55
1.03 0.74 1.12 1.28 1.59 1.71 1.42
0.94 0.79 0.93 0.98 1.23 1.22 1.06 1.00 1.28
0.86 0.91 1.07 1.00 1.16 0.97 0.75 1.15
1.56 1.13 1.13 0.87 0.92 1.14 1.17 1.08 0.99
1.10 0.77 0.94 1.04 1.29 1.29 1.07 1.02 1.28
1.01 0.75 0.84 0.88 1.21 1.17 1.04 1.01 1.07
0.97 0.75 0.85 0.97 1.22 1.24 1.02 0.94 1.14
1.15 0.86 1.00 1.18 1.42 1.42 1.20 1.14 1.42
1.46 1.26 1.32 1.42 1.84 1.85 1.51 1.65
1.07 0.75 0.84 0.94 1.13 1.13 0.95 0.90 1.25
1.40 0.92 0.83 1.03 1.38 1.33 1.13 0.95 1.12
(2) Table Ae.5, however, shows that the US wheat producers received about as
much per metric ton of wheat as the average export unit value on the world
market.
(3) Finally, Table Ae.6 indicates that US export prices, on the average,
matched US producer prices of wheat fairly well.
(4) We therefore conclude that there has not been any substantial protection of
US producer prices for wheat over the period 1966-1980. (Note that set-
aside policies, loan rate mechanisms, and other US agricultural policies
aimed at protecting farmers are separately treated in free trade scenarios.)
The above analysis further suggests that the quality of US wheat is about
20% above the quality of wheat exports of the cheapest major exporter in
the historical period (see Sichra, 1984).
All this information has been compiled to come up with country-specific
world price factors CSWPFkj (k referring to commodities, j indicating the coun-
try). Table Ae.8 shows the final choice of factors as used in the BLS simulation
runs.
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Table A2.6. Producer pricea of wheat relative to export or import price and ratio of ex-
port or import priceb to world market price, 1966-1980.
Country 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
Argentina 0.58 0.60 0.69 0.71 0.68 0.59 0.51
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.12 1.15
Australia 1.14 1.07 0.95 0.94 1.04 1.12 1.05
1.04 1.05 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Austria (export) 1.53 1.38
1.06 1.23
Austria (import) 1.37 1.03 1.09 1.02 1.14 1.18 1.06
1.33 1.58 1.49 1.51 1.50 1.48 1.53
Brazil 1.71 1.50 1.52 1.57 1.63 1.49 1.37
1.28 1.25 1.21 1.16 1.19 1.36 1.35
Canada 0.97 0.80 0.68 0.61 0.82 0.75 1.02
1.22 1.22 1.20 1.20 1.12 1.20 1.15
Egypt 1.09 1.15 1.11 1.17 1.60 1.21 1.27
1.25 1.20 1.10 1.04 1.02 1.31 1.19
India 1.45 1.98 1.34 1.28 1.56 1.34 1.46
1.41 1.23 1.35 1.48 1.36 1.54 1.37
Japan 2.20 2.07 2.21 2.32 2.46 2.56 2.78
1.29 1.26 1.24 1.16 1.24 1.33 1.21
Kenya 0.88 0.86 0.90 0.79 0.73 0.84 0.86
1.53 1.50 1.46 1.57 1.59 1.60 1.46
Nigeria 1.50 1.08 1.19 1.50 1.75 2.43 1.72
1.64 1.78 1.61 1.59 1.52 1.54 1.94
Pakistan 1.37 1.54 1.24 2.15 2.25 1.54
1.24 1.22 1.40 0.84 0.87 1.26
Sweden 2.03 1.85 1.89 1.74 1.70 1.58 1.72
1.01 0.98 0.93 0.95 1.05 1.14 0.97
USA 1.05 0.83 0.75 0.76 0.84 0.70 1.05
1.12 1.08 1.07 1.02 1.06 1.32 1.11
EC:
Bel-Lux (export) 1.54 1.19 1.07 1.04 1.08 0.95 0.90
1.19 1.39 1.55 1.50 1.70 1.94 1.95
Bel-Lux (import) 1.18 1.14 1.10 1.07 1.08 1.04 0.99
1.55 1.45 1.51 1.47 1.70 1.79 1.79
Denmark 1.30 1.15 1.06 1.25 1.44
1.14 1.04 1.25 1.09 0.98
France 1.26 1.12 1.25 1.07 1.11 0.97 1.02
1.20 1.27 1.13 1.24 1.39 1.71 1.54
FRG (export) 1.90 1.66 1.57 2.09 1.56 1.18 1.22
1.17 1.09 1.21 0.88 1.24 1.63 1.51
FRG (import) 1.54 1.32 1.30 1.20 1.31 1.14 1.15
1.44 1.37 1.46 1.53 1.47 1.69 1.61
Italy 1.48 1.31 1.34 1.37 1.46 1.39 1.28
1.49 1.48 1.42 1.34 1.41 1.53 1.54
Netherlands 1.55 1.32 1.20 1.12 1.19 1.19 1.09
1.26 1.30 1.43 1.46 1.59 1.55 1.60
UK 0.91 0.88 0.99 1.04 1.07 1.02 1.12
1.34 1.27 1.20 1.14 1.27 1.37 1.27
aFirst line for each country. bSecond line for each country.
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Table A£.6. (Cont.)
1979 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1966-198(f
0.58 0.40 0.37 0.47 1.04 1.07 E 0.64
1.40 1.43 1.17 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.07 1.00 E 1.09
1.84 0.89 0.68 0.57 0.78 1.19 1.11 0.90 E 1.02
1.00 1.20 1.23 1.12 1.30 1.00 1.00 1.00 E 1.07
0.94 1.03 1.09 0.83 E 1.13
1.06 1.37 1.15 1.29 E 1.19
0.81 0.65 M 1.04
1.84 1.55 M 1.53
1.01 0.91 1.84 1.27 2.05 1.63 1.19 M 1.48
1.94 1.76 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.33 1.30 1.42 M 1.34
1.75 0.89 0.74 0.72 0.96 1.37 1.25 E 0.95
1.50 1.66 1.22 1.20 1.24 1.12 1.20 1.11 E 1.24
1.13 0.74 0.92 0.88 0.74 0.80 M 1.06
1.41 1.70 1.36 1.16 1.91 1.75 0.76 1.08 M 1.28
0.98 1.38 1.11 0.93 0.94 M 1.31
2.01 1.29 1.34 1.37 2.00 M 1.48
1.83 1.38 1.93 2.23 4.29 4.06 3.62 3.46 M 2.63
1.86 1.81 1.35 1.32 1.37 1.44 1.39 1.33 M 1.37
1.08 0.66 1.06 E 0.87
1.23 1.71 1.28 E 1.49
1.38 0.81 1.05 0.84 1.51 M 1.40
2.18 2.03 1.50 1.56 1.26 1.32 1.26 1.10 M 1.59
1.39 1.03 1.02 1.28 1.45 1.72 M 1.50
1.18 1.03 1.27 1.11 1.39 1.23 1.20 1.07 M 1.16
1.22 0.79 1.03 1.08 1.55 1.36 1.19 1.01 E 1.45
1.23 1.41 1.04 1.01 1.02 1.12 1.08 1.10 E 1.07
1.52 1.12 1.14 0.91 1.00 1.16 1.19 1.09 E 1.01
1.64 1.42 1.14 1.07 1.18 1.22 1.19 1.09 E 1.18
1.01 0.79 0.89 0.99 0.84 0.96 1.07 1.15 E 1.03
1.75 1.39 1.23 1.17 1.96 1.67 i,21 0.98 E 1.51
0.86 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.80 0.77 0.72 0.79 MO.94
2.04 1.27 1.28 1.32 2.05 2.09 1.80 1.43 M 1.64
0.82 0.89 0.88 0.78 0.93 0.78 0.88 0.94 E 1.01
1.96 1.20 1.11 1.24 1.67 1.86 1.44 1.18 E 1.32
0.80 0.88 0.97 0.96 0.85 0.79 0.80 0.80 E 0.98
1.94 1.21 1.02 1.13 1.85 1.95 1.54 1.31 E 1.43
0.97 0.85 0.96 1.03 1.02 0.83 0.83 0.86 E 1.23
1.89 1.44 1.21 1.28 1.78 2.12 1.77 1.46 E 1.44
0.94 0.86 0.86 0.95 0.97 0.90 0.81 0.81 M 1.07
1.96 1.41 1.35 1.37 1.88 1.95 1.81 1.56 M 1.59
1.10 1.05 1.01 1.28 1.36 1.28 1.16 M 1.28
2.12 1.69 1.51 1.23 1.73 1.80 1.59 1.51 M 1.56
0.92 0.78 0.76 0.84 0.83 0.77 0.71 0.68 M1.00
1.87 1.37 1.28 1.24 1.74 1.82 1.63 1.46 M 1.51
1.34 0.80 0.77 1.00 1.11 0.95 0.87 0.84 MO.98
1.67 1.63 1.25 1.14 1.59 1.73 1.58 1.26 M 1.38
eE, export; M, import.
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Table A2. 7. Producer price of wheat relative to US producer price, 1966-1980.
Country 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
Argentina 0.49 0.67 0.86 0.93 0.76 0.71 0.50
Australia 1.00 1.25 1.21 1.23 1.17 1.20 0.90
Austria 1.55 1.81 2.02 2.01 1.91 1.89 1.40
Brazil 1.86 2.08 2.30 2.38 2.18 2.18 1.60
Canada 1.01 1.08 1.01 0.96 1.02 0.97 1.01
Egypt 1.15 1.53 1.52 1.58 1.82 1.71 1.31
India 1.74 2.72 2.25 2.46 2.37 2.22 1.73
Japan 2.40 2.89 3.41 3.52 3.42 3.67 2.89
Kenya 1.15 1.44 1.63 1.62 1.29 1.45 1.08
Mexico 1.13 1.28 1.49 1.47 1.38 1.41 1.05
New Zealand 0.91 1.01 1.14 1.22 1.18 1.17 0.95
Nigeria 2.09 2.13 2.39 3.10 2.98 4.03 2.87
Pakistan 1.45 2.09 2.16 2.01 2.03 2.10 1.66
Sweden 1.74 2.02 2.19 2.15 1.99 1.95 1.44
Turkey 1.43 1.62 1.86 1.95 1.79 1.66 1.18
USA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
EC:
Belgium-Luxemburg 1.55 1.84 2.07 2.04 2.05 1.99 1.52
Denmark 1.26 1.40 1.45 1.57 1.48 1.47 1.22
France 1.29 1.58 1.77 1.72 1.73 1.78 1.35
FRG 1.88 2.02 2.35 2.39 2.16 2.08 1.59
Italy 1.88 2.15 2.38 2.40 2.30 2.30 1.69
Netherlands 1.66 1.91 2.13 2.13 2.12 1.98 1.50
UK 1.04 1.24 1.47 1.54 1.52 1.50 1.22
Note that not all of the BLS countries are listed in this table because only
this group of BLS countries is modeled in this particular way. It should also be
noted that in some cases the CSWPF multiplier has been used as a calibration
device for the policy price transmission function. One prominent example for this
ex post modification is the low value of the corresponding multiplier for protein
feed in Brazil, where the boost in soybean production in the 1970s led to a
significant composition change in the aggregate commodity.
The high multiplier values shown for dairy products in Egypt, India, and
Pakistan are explained by their high shares of buffalo milk - with a much higher
fat content than cow milk - in the composition of the aggregate commodity.
A2.5. Agricultural Protection Levels in the BLS
It has been indicated in Section A2.1 that each country can be assigned a
country-specific world market price that takes into account quality and com-
modity mix considerations.
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Table At. 7. (Cont.)
1979 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1966-1980
0.32 0.36 0.33 0.48 0.88 0.79 0.62
0.74 0.67 0.64 0.66 0.86 0.84 0.78 0.75 0.93
0.60 0.63 0.72 1.04 1.23 0.99 0.88 0.90 1.30
0.79 1.00 1.65 1.53 2.03 1.53 1.09 1.73
1.06 0.92 0.69 0.89 1.01 1.08 1.05 0.98
0.64 0.78 0.96 1.05 1.19 0.99 1.25
0.79 1.11 1.15 1.32 1.60 1.18 1.01 1.69
1.36 1.56 2.00 3.05 4.99 4.15 3.53 3.86 3.11
0.53 0.70 0.95 1.40 1.64 1.34 1.03 1.23
0.46 0.59 0.77 0.91 1.06 0.93 0.77 0.74 1.03
0.57 0.50 0.66 0.77 0.91 0.75 0.57 0.57 0.86
1.21 1.03 1.22 1.34 1.62 2.17
0.66 0.66 0.99 1.47 1.72 1.50 1.58
0.60 0.70 0.83 1.13 1.34 1.07 0.90 0.93 1.40
0.55 0.81 0.95 1.14 1.26 0.85 0.64 1.26
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.71 0.68 0.83 1.19 1.39 1.13 0.91 0.94 1.39
0.65 0.67 0.74 1.00 1.31 1.02 0.89 0.93 1.14
0.62 0.66 0.76 1.11 1.33 1.09 0.87 0.87 1.24
0.74 0.76 0.89 1.35 1.54 1.25 1.03 1.06 1.54
0.93 1.11 1.17 1.62 1.99 1.62 1.29 1.78
0.69 0.67 0.75 1.07 1.23 0.99 0.81 0.83 1.37
0.90 0.81 0.74 1.18 1.50 1.16 0.97 0.88 1.18
Since consistent data for domestic prices were not available for many coun-
tries in the BLS for 1978-1980, these were generated from simulation runs of the
national models, with observed world market prices for these years. We assume
a continuation of past political trends in setting agricultural price levels. There-
fore, domestic prices will generally deviate from the corresponding world prices
appropriately adjusted for quality and product mix.
As far as the transmission of changes in world prices to domestic price lev-
els is concerned, we can distinguish two types of model in the BLS. One group
of countries uses price transmission functions, parameters of which were
estimated econometrically. Here the domestic price level, apart from world
market prices, usually also depends on past domestic price levels as well as each
country's self-sufficiency situation. Hence, the ratio of domestic to world prices
may well change over time, and also for different simulation runs. These coun-
tries will be treated in the next subsection. The second type of model uses fixed
protection factors to keep a constant relationship between domestic and world
price levels. Country models following this approach are discussed in the next-
but-one subsection. No protection rates were estimated for CMEA and China,
as these do not liberalize agricultural trade in any of the scenarios.
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Table A.t!.8. Country-specific world price factors, CSWPF.
Other
Coarse Bovine animal Protein Other Nonfood
Country Wheat Rice grains &- ovine Dairy products feed food agric.
Argentina 1.00 1.00 1.08 1.40 1.00 1.60 1.24 1.08 1.03
Australia 1.05 0.80 1.00 1.10 1.00 1.40 1.24 0.88 1.40
Austria 1.00 1.70 1.05 1.20 1.00 1.70 1.12 1.05 1.00
Brazil 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.45 0.26 0.70 0.96
Canada 1.07 1.90 0.95 1.45 1.00 1.75 1.09 1.70 1.12
Egypt 1.05 1.15 1.30 1.25 1.50 1.80 1.75 0.83 3.10
India 1.10 1.00 1.20 1.00 1.60 2.10 0.88 1.00 2.10
Indonesia 1.00 0.75 1.09 1.00 1.00 1.32 8.24 0.69 1.15
Japan 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.00 1.00 1.15 0.45 0.88 1.25
Mexico 1.05 1.25 1.50 1.40 1.00 1.90 1.60 1.03 2.60
Nigeria 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.20 1.00 0.86 4.50 1.35 1.35
Pakistan 1.05 1.40 1.60 1.45 1.75 1.00 2.85 1.53 1.75
Turkey 1.05 1.00 1.10 1.75 1.10 1.00 2.60 0.90 1.50
EC 1.05 1.00 1.10 1.50 1.02 1.52 0.94 1.25 1.30
A 2.5.1. Protection levels in country models using price transmission
functions
Table A2.9 shows a comparison of agricultural prices relative to country-specific
world prices for 1978-1980 as generated by the national models. Note that the
last two columns in Table A2.9 show average aggregate deviations of domestic
raw material prices from world market prices weighted by domestic production
and demand items, respectively.
When we talk about protection levels in agriculture, we include one addi-
tional multiplier that reflects a country's trading position as explained in Section
A2.3.4. According to our definition, the implied agricultural protection levels
would amount to values as shown in Table A2.9 if the corresponding commodity
self-sufficiency ratios were exactly 100%. Lower self-sufficiency - i.e., net imports
- will increase the price level deemed appropriate under free trade conditions
and hence decrease implied protection levels; higher self-sufficiency will act in the
opposite direction. It should therefore be understood that in our definition the
agricultural protection level implied by given sets of domestic and world market
prices may change with different production and consumption levels.
In Table A2.10, commodity-wise as well as average agricultural protection
rates are listed for BLS countries where the concept described so far is applica-
ble. Data refer to the national model scenarios for the years 1978-1980. Note
that the protection rates in Table A2.10 depend also on the trade position of the
country in that commodity. A large positive protection rate for an exported
commodity can change to a small positive protection rate when the commodity is
imported without there being any substantial change in the domestic price. This
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can be seen in Table A2.ll, which shows the possible range of protection levels
implied by the extreme values of the country-specific trade position world price
factor (WPTF). Rows labeled "max" give protection levels in relation to
minimum prices (as would be applicable for exporters), while rows labeled "min"
refer to maximum prices, Le., world market price plus international transport
margin.
As with the data presented in Table A2.9, values in the last two columns
represent average agricultural protection rates weighted by production and con-
sumption items, respectively.
A 2.5.2. Protection levels in country models that do not use price
transmission functions
It was mentioned that the BLS consists of different types of models, some of
which use a less sophisticated approach in determining domestic price targets.
In these cases, commodity-wise relative protection rates have been collected to
describe the relationship between domestic and world market prices. When the
model is run under free trade assumptions, the individual relative prices are
reduced by the corresponding rates regardless of the country's trading position.
It should be mentioned, however, that the tariff rates used in the BLS simulation
runs were calculated on the basis of the SUA data analysis, though "expert judg-
ment" had to be used to fill gaps in the data base and to resolve quality versus
protection conflicts.
A summary of protection rates for these countries and country groups
where applicable in the BLS is given in Table A2.l2.
No protection rates could be provided for the "Far East Medium-High
Calorie Importer" (FEA MH CALIM) group of countries, which includes Kam-
puchea, Korea DPR, Laos, and Vietnam owing to lack of appropriate data.
A 2.5.3. The price of nonagriculture, measurement of protection fac-
tors, and relative prices under trade liberalization
It was explained that the price of nonagriculture PRAWn,j as used in this study
is a construct subject to various kinds of distortions. Therefore, protection fac-
tors as measured above need to be carefully interpreted.
The procedure in this study measures agricultural protection factors for
commodity k in country i,
P . = [PRAWkj ] / [CSWPkj ]
RTCk] PRAW· PW·
n,] n,]
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instead of "true" protection factors,
t
[
PRAW k:.) [CSWPkJ.]PRTC rue - J
kj - PRAwtr~e / CSWP .
n,J n,J
which implies a distortion
PRTCkj------,---~=l+t .
PRTcljue n,J,70
Toward Free Trade in Agriculture
where tn j 70 is the tariff equivalent of the base-year 1970 protection on nonagri-
culture i~ ~ountry j.
In trade liberalization scenarios, domestic prices for the agricultural com-
modities are adjusted by the measured protection factors PRTCkj instead of the
unobserved PRTc:;ue, resulting in partial liberalization in which relative distor-
tions among agricultural commodities are removed but distortions between agri-
culture and nonagriculture may not be fully eliminated. Comparing "true" pro-
tection rates across countries j and I, this implies
PRTC:jue
PRTctruekl
In other words, "true" relative prices in trade liberalization scenarios will
only be equal across countries with comparable levels of protection for the
nonagriculture sector. The implications of this for the analysis of agricultural
trade liberalizations are discussed in Section 3.3.3.
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APPENDIXA3
The Impact of Trade Liberalization
from the Country Perspective
The main text in the book is structured around global trade policy issues and
options. The discussion focuses on a particular scenario, describes regional
trends, and looks at individual country results from the sole viewpoint of obtain-
ing an understanding of what determines the major outcome of that scenario. A
deeper analysis of the specific features and characteristics of the individual coun-
tries, which obviously playa role in determining their reactions to alternative
policy options, would take too much space. The present chapter is an attempt
to balance the presentation by taking a country view and discussing the
responses to all five trade liberalization scenarios presented in this volume.
Emphasis is placed on those effects that show the largest responses. In most
cases these are effects of scenarios in which the country itself participates in the
liberalization. In this chapter we only discuss results for those countries that are
included in the BLS with a detailed model. There are 18 such "countries"
including the EC.
Each country model generates information for a large number of variables.
Together for all trade liberalization scenarios and the reference scenario this
adds up to a rather voluminous amount of data. Not all of this can be presented
in the tables in this chapter. Only those data that are indicative of the main
effects of alternative trade policies are tabulated for the years 1990 and 2000. To
facilitate comparison, the corresponding values of the reference scenario are
given in the tables as well.
For better readability of the text, Tables A9.1-A9.18 have been put at the
end of this Appendix.
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A 3.1. Argentina
Toward Free Trade in Agric:uIture
With a per capita income of about US$l400 (at 1970 prices) in 1980, Argentina
belongs to the upper part of the middle-income group of developing countries.
Agricultural commodities account for about 20% of the country's exports, and
these constitute about 8% of the total agricultural exports of all developing coun-
tries together. Still, the agricultural sector accounts for only 10% of the total
value added, with about 13% of the labor force and 12% of the capital stock
employed therein (Table AS.!.)
Natural conditions are favorable for agricultural production, and the ratio
of cultivated land to population is quite high (0.75 ha per person in 1980). Crop
yields are relatively high given the low use of yield-increasing inputs (6 kg nitro-
gen per hal. This gives Argentina's agriculture a comparative advantage and
favors exports of both livestock and crops even when the government has
effectively taxed agricultural exports.
It can therefore be expected that, in all trade liberalization scenarios, agri-
culture will expand whenever world market prices move favorably for Argentina.
The increa.c;e varies from 6% when the EC removes protection to 47% in the case
of liberalization by all market economies (Table AS.!). The changes in domestic
prices across the scenarios are similar in magnitude to the changes in agricul-
tural GDP. This implies an elasticity of agricultural GDP with regard to domes-
tic prices of around unity.
Based on equivalent income, Argentina gains under trade liberalization.
This holds irrespective of whether Argentina joins the countries liberalizing trade
or not. A small deterioration occurs only in the initial period when the LDCs
liberalize. The gains are in general quite sizable, especially when all developed
countries liberalize too.
Several factors contribute to these gains in welfare. There are substantial
terms-of-trade improvements for Argentina, reaching almost 20% when all
market economies or all OECD countries liberalize. The improvements in the
country's terms of trade when other countries liberalize and the transmission of
those changes from the world market prices to the domestic market are sufficient
for Argentina to enjoy welfare gains. But an alignment of the domestic prices
with the much higher world market prices leads to additional welfare gains. The
increase in equivalent income is smaller when all developed countries liberalize
than when all market economies do so, because Argentina enjoys a far smaller
increase in the terms of trade in this scenario.
In all the liberalization scenarios, agricultural exports increase substan-
tially, especially exports of livestock products. As a consequence, imports of
nonagriculture can be increased, responding to higher demand and replacing
some domestic production. The trade surplus is slightly reduced, but the volume
traded is much larger as compared to GDP.
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This rather positive picture in overall terms includes some drastic shifts in
domestic distribution of income in favor of the agricultural population and a
decline in calorie consumption. A look at the food price index reveals why the
latter happens. This index goes up in all runs, but more in those in which
Argentina also liberalizes its agricultural trade. As a consequence of these higher
food prices, most food products are consumed in smaller quantities. Persons at
the low end of the urban income strata may be seriously affected by the increase
in the food price index. Argentina's government must pay attention to this
development when agricultural trade is liberalized.
Substantial changes occur also on the production side. The most noticeable
difference from the reference scenario is Argentina's sharp reduction in the pro-
duction of whe~and coarse grains and the expansion of all other agricultural
commodities. As ~sequence, much more land is used for roughage produc-
tion. When all market economies liberalize simultaneously, the number of dairy
cattle goes up by 50% in 2000 and the number of beef cattle and sheep by 70%.
The total roughage area needed in addition to that used in the reference run is
therefore considerable. In the national models only that roughage area is
accounted for which is required in addition to that used already in 1970. This
adjustment works also when the herd sizes of ruminants shrink. Then it is
assumed that the land not used any more for roughage production can be
planted with other crops. If one considers only the changes in the roughage
acreage in addition to that of 1970, then one finds an increase of almost 170% in
the scenario where all market economies liberalize, its share rising from 15% in
RO to almost 40% in F-ALLME.
The reduction in wheat and coarse grains production is caused by the high
opportunity cost of land, which becomes a scarce resource under all scenarios,
but especially when Argentina also liberalizes. These high opportunity costs
reduce the relative profitability of wheat and coarse grains. In addition to lower
production, more of the two grains is fed to animals, and exports therefore
decrease substantially. Coarse grains are even imported in small amounts when
all market economies liberalize by 2000. On the other hand, exports of all other
agricultural commodities strongly increase, except those of protein feed.
A3.2. Australia
Australia is one of the countries with the lowest agricultural protection. Com-
pared directly with world market prices, producer prices hardly reveal any
difference. However, when the domestic costs related to the trading activities are
taken into account, even the grains show a protection of approximately 25%.
Dairy products and bovine and ovine meat are taxed when they are shipped
abroad. The average protection rate (weighted with value of production)
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amounts to less than 10%. Australia accounts for about 5% of agricultural
exports from developed market economies but, at the same time, these exports
account for some 45% of its merchandise exports.
The welfare indicators show some ambiguous results of the trade scenarios
(see Table AS.e). Equivalent income points toward welfare losses except in the
EC trade liberalization scenario.
When Australia participates in trade liberalization by OECD countries or
by all market economies, both sectors of the economy expand. Since relative
agricultural prices increase, the agricultural sector expands much more than the
nonagricultural sector. Investment is shifted into the agricultural sector, but
also more labor is employed as a result of the parity ratio increase. The
improvements in the terms-of-trade are quite sizable. As in the case of Argen-
tina, this allows Australia to import more nonagricultural products because the
value of agricultural exports increases (by 16% when all market economies
liberalize) .
The changes in world market conditions with trade liberalization are as
favorable for Australia as they are for Argentina, if one compares the improve-
ments in the terms of trade for both countries. However, the welfare implica-
tions are different for the two countries. This may be explained by several fac-
tors. First, agricultural GDP appears to be much more price-responsive in
Argentina than in Australia. Also, compared to Argentina, the price distortions
in the reference scenario are not as severe in Australia, leading to smaller gains
after the domestic prices are aligned with those of the world market. Investment
increases by only 1-2% in Australia while it goes up 6-10% in Argentina. The
stronger increase in value added in Australia does not mean more savings and
investment compared to Argentina. Finally, differences in the preference sys-
tems of the two countries, together with the changes in food prices, also contrib-
ute to the opposite behavior of the welfare indicators. Whereas in Argentina
total consumer expenditure increases significantly, it does so only marginally in
Australia. As a result, in spite of higher food prices, in Argentina human con-
sumption of nonagriculture increases, whereas it declines marginally in Australia.
This explains why equivalent income increases in Argentina but declines in Aus-
tralia.
When OECD countries or all market economies liberalize, production of
wheat is expanded in Australia and production of coarse grains is reduced
because of a widening gap between their prices. Herd sizes of ruminants are
expanded while less of pork, poultry, and eggs are produced. Again, this is
mainly a result of international price changes, which are fully transmitted to the
domestic market.
The adjustments of both production and demand lead to a sizable increase
in exports of dairy products, but also to a switch in trade of other animal prod-
ucts from net exports to net imports, although the quantities are small.
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Australia's income distribution changes favorably for farmers and landown-
ers when agricultural trade is liberalized. Not only does the parity ratio go up,
but also the shadow price of land rises by more than 10%.
A3.3. Austria
Agriculture is generally Jess protected in Austria than it is in the neighboring EC
countries. Some commodities are substantially protected, particularly nonfood
agriculture, wheat, coarse grains, and bovine and ovine meat. Exports of dairy
products are taxed and imports of rice subsidized.
The country's agriculture is characterized by widely different natural condi-
tions between plain and mountain areas. Particularly in the less suitable
regions, a relatively large share of the labor force remains engaged in agriculture.
This results in relatively low agricultural income. Among the developed market
economies, Austria has one of the lowest parity ratios in the reference scenario
(only Japan has a lower one). Eleven percent of the labor force generated 5% of
GDP in 1980 (see Table 4.16). More than 60% of the farms are run on a part-
time basis, with the low farm income being compensated by off-agricultural
employment.
Austria benefits from trade liberalization in agriculture, although an align-
ment of domestic with world market prices does not substantially increase total
value added (see Table AS.S). Austria benefits from the very strong improve-
ments in the terms of trade when either the OECD countries or all market
economies liberalize. No other country in the system shows similar improve-
ment.
The adjustments in production are rather substantial under trade liberal-
ization. Most noticeable are the declines in output of coarse grains and other
animals and the increase in dairy production. Export of the latter commodity is
stepped up by 250%. It is the dairy export that largely contributes to the
improvements in the terms of trade. It dominates the calculation of the unit
value of exports in trade liberalization.
Austria's self-sufficiency in agriculture increases slightly when trade is
liberalized. Also, the dependence of agriculture on the international market
increases when one considers its foreign trade ratio - i.e., the value of exports
plus imports relative to the agricultural GDP. However, this goes up by a
slightly lower percentage than does the foreign trade ratio of the whole economy.
Owing to the price increases, agricuiture employs more capital and labor
when all market economies and all OECD countries liberalize (see Table AS.S).
However, less fertilizer is applied since the crop price index falls relative to the
fertilizer price. (The fertilizer price is assumed to change proportionally with the
nonagricultural price). Farmers gain in income relative to those employed in
nonagriculture.
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Brazil is one of the largest agricultural producers among the developing coun-
tries, its agricultural value added being exceeded only by China and India. Agri-
culture in Brazil is also characterized by a large diversity of natural conditions,
covering areas from the tropical up to the temperate zone. Agriculture plays a
major role in employment, absorbing about 40% of the total labor force. Since
this 40% accounts for only about 6% of GDP, there is a wide income disparity
between agriculture and nonagriculture.
Exports of agricultural products earn about half of the country's foreign
exchange from trade. In the more recent past, however, processed and semipro-
cessed commodities have become increasingly important in exports. At the same
time, Brazil is one of the largest importer of cereals among the developing coun-
tries: in particular, the wheat self-sufficiency rate is low.
As Table A9.4 shows, Brazil's total value added is always lower when agri-
cultural trade is liberalized than in the reference scenario, regardless of whether
the country itself participates in trade liberalization or not. Why this happens
has been explained in Chapter 7 for the scenario in which developing countries
liberalize. The same reasoning can be applied in all other scenarios.
The decline in total GDP and the increase in food prices work in the same
direction in Brazil - toward a lowering of equivalent income. The percentage
loss in equivalent income always exceeds that of total GDP.
Table A9.4 reveals that human consumption is lower under free trade than
in the reference run for all commodities but wheat and protein feed. Wheat is
consumed more because its retail price falls when Brazil liberalizes. Wheat is the
only agricultural commodity that has a positive tariff equivalent. The rather
steep increase in food prices makes it necessary for Brazilians to allocate more
money for food. However, the increase in food expenditure does not match the
food price rise, resulting in reduced consumption of food.
Brazil does not benefit much from terms-of-trade improvement. The world
market prices of its major export commodities, protein feed and other food, do
not increase relative to the prices of those commodities that it mainly imports.
While most countries show an increasing ratio of the value of trade to GDP
when they liberalize trade, Brazil indicates the opposite. This ratio falls by 20%
when all market economies or all developing countries liberalize. Demand for
agricultural products goes down while production increases for most products.
This happens for almost all agricultural products, leading to less imports in
value terms. Since the trade deficit for the whole economy changes only margin-
ally, nonagricultural exports are also cut back.
Given the rigidities in the mobility of labor, as found in the model, one
might argue that agricultural prices lower than the world market prices are
preferable for Brazil because they could prevent welfare losses. As an alterna-
tive, policies to improve factor mobility in conjunction with trade liberalization
could lead to positive results.
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Canada's agriculture is very export oriented. This is indicated by the high share
of agricultural exports in total exports (25%) and by one of the highest self-
sufficiency ratios among all nations (Table 4.11), even though this number is not
an indication of the high level of bilateral agricultural trade with the USA. Agri-
cultural exports are equivalent to about 40% of farm cash receipts. Protection
from world market conditions is low, or even negative, for almost all agricultural
products with the exception of dairy products and bovine and ovine meat. For
the former commodity, production quotas are issued aimed at balancing supply
and demand. Given the low protective policies, Canada's farmers depend to a
large extent on the level of world market prices for their income.
As with most countries, Canada's adjustments occur mainly in those
scenarios in which it also liberalizes trade. Accordingly, the welfare implications
of those scenarios in which Canada does not liberalize are very small or negligi-
ble (see Table AS.5). However, the two scenarios in which it participates in
trade liberalization show only small changes that indicate losses.
These welfare losses occur in spite of sizable improvements in the terms of
trade, which are the second largest among all countries. In 2000 these increases
reach almost 30%. As Canada is a net exporter of agricultural products, this
helps to improve the agricultural trade balance (at current prices), which goes up
by 65% in the case when all market economies liberalize. Out of this, 27% is a
volume effect leading to higher imports of nonagricultural goods.
The domestic terms of trade change in favor of agriculture, leading to more
resource use in this sector. Approximately 20% more of both investment and
labor are used in agricultur;-when Canada participates in trade liber . tion.
n addition, ferti izer app lcation goes up y a similar amount and more acreage
is cultivated. This pushes agricultural GDP up by 17%, implying a GDP elastic-
ity with regard to price changes of about unity. The additional labor use in agri-
culture comes entirely from the nonagricultural sector, and almost all of the agri-
cultural capital stock is built up by shifting investment away from nonagricul-
ture. The GDP elasticity of labor is six times higher in nonagriculture than in
agriculture (see Table AS.l). In spite of a 50% higher GDP elasticity in agricul-
ture than in nonagriculture with respect to capital, the increase in agricultural
GDP cannot completely compensate the loss in nonagricultural GDP and, as a
consequence, total GDP falls marginally in Canada under trade liberalization.
This decline in value added is not offset by terms-of-trade improvements. Under
free trade, Canadians buy fewer agricultural goods but slightly more of the
nonagricultural aggregate, leading, in conjunction with an increase in food prices,
to a decline of equivalent income.
Aillustments in agricultural production are very substantial in Canada.
They ire dominated by a shift into milk production when Canada participates III
trade liberalization. Milk output is doubled by the year 2000 compared to the
reference scenario, mainly as a result of the removal of the production quota.
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The imputed shadow price of this quota is about 50% of the milk price in the
reference run. (This proportion is almost constant over the period 1980-2000; it
might somewhat overestimate the real value of the quota). A removal of the
quota is equal in its impact to a milk price increase of the same proportion. This
explains why dairy output increases so much, although its price change does not
suggest such a response.
The other changes in production are, of course, also affected by the expan-
sion of dairy output. The doubling of the dairy herd size implies that more
roughage is produced on land that was used for other crops in the reference run.
The decline in wheat and coarse grains acreage (2 and 10%, respectively) equals
this increase in roughage land. The acreage expansion of the other crops is
matched by more land brought under cultivation.
The additional animal production - bovine and ovine meat and other
animal products are also produced in larger quantities ~ leads to strong increases
in feed use, especially of coarse grains because its price goes up less than that of
wheat. The trade effects are strong: wheat exports are increased by 6% when
market economies liberalize, while coarse grains are shipped abroad only in very
small quantities in 2000. Canada becomes the largest exporter of dairy products
by 2000, when all market economies or DECD countries liberalize, reaching a
quarter of the global net exports of these products. Total demand for this com-
modity hardly increases, with more than 90% of the additional production sold
on the world market.
A3.6. Egypt
At the end of the last decade, Egypt's agriculture contributed approximately
20% to total GDP with a labor share of 50%. Rapid growth of population, scar-
city of agricultural land, and changes in the water regime due to the Aswan High
Dam together resulted in a sharply increased dependence of the country on the
world market for staple food imports. Exports of high-value crops like citrus
fruits and cotton have been maintained, through direct government control, to
overcome the negative nominal protection of these products. Wheat imports,
covering more than 50% of domestic disappearance, as well as imports of bovine
and ovine meat and of other animal products are heavily taxed. This mix of
domestic price policies leads to relatively low agricultural incomes as compared
to nonagricultural earnings.
Egypt has all-year-round agricultural production, which is made possible
by the warm climate and fully irrigated land. Rain-fed production is
insignificant. The cropping intensity is one of the highest in the world and
reached 190 at the end of the last decade. Expansion of cultivated land is mainly
possible only through a further increase in the cropping intensity.
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Egypt benefits from trade liberalization only when this policy is confined to
LDCs, as indicated by the equivalent income measure in Table AS.6. This can-
not be explained by changes in terms of trade because they fall in all scenarios,
but especially strongly when Egypt also liberalizes together with all other market
economies or all other developing countries. The reason can be found in the sec-
toral allocation of resources. Investment and labor are shifted into nonagricul-
ture only in the scenario with liberalization by developing countries. This,
together with a relatively strong increase in total investment, leads to a higher
nonagricultural capital stock so that GDP of nonagriculture goes up by almost
3%, offsetting the loss in agricultural value added. It should also be noted that
the elasticity of capital is twice as high in nonagriculture as it is in agriculture,
while the reverse holds for labor but at a much lower level (see Table AS.l).
Also of interest in this scenario is the substitution between acreage and fertilizer:
more fertilizer is used on less land.
From the change in value added, it becomes clear why Egypt gains in
terms of equivalent income when developing countries liberalize but loses when
all market economies do so. The loss of income in the latter scenario leads to a
strong decline in consumption of nonagriculture, while in the former both agri-
cultural and nonagricultural commodities are consumed at higher levels (see
Table AS.6). Changes in relative prices at the retail level and in terms of trade
do not have very much influence on this result.
Egypt's rice production is strongly affected by trade liberalization, espe-
cially when all market economies liberalize. The rice price increases in this
scenario by 25% and production by 50%. Land allocation is shifted from coarse
grains (mainly maize in Egypt) into rice. It is implicitly assumed in the model
that these shifts can be accommodated within the available irrigation capacity.
The land not needed any more for production of coarse grains is not fully used
up by rice. The acreage share of rice does not increase so drastically because
total acreage also goes up in this scenario; the acreage share of rice reaches 17%
of the total. Rice consumption goes down in this scenario with the result that
Egypt becomes an exporter of rice and reaches a market share in global trade of
6% by 2000.
The 25% price increase of rice is to be compared with the change in all
crop prices. The crop price index goes up by 19%, which is also the result of the
rise in the price of nonfood agriculture, which is negatively protected in the refer-
ence scenario. Production of the latter commodity also increases substantially
with trade liberalization.
The agricultural balance of trade turns from a deficit into a surplus when
all market economies liberalize, mainly because of the large exports of rice.
Egypt remains in deficit in agricultural trade when only the developing countries
liberalize and obtains a balanced foreign account for agriculture when the OECD
countries liberalize since mainly imports of agricultural commodities are reduced.
In general, Egypt becomes more open under trade liberalization, as is indicated
by the ratio of trade to total GDP.
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TollllJNl Free Trade in Agricultun
Over the past 15 years, India has moved from being a net importer of agricul-
tural products to being a net exporter. Extension of water control and irriga-
tion, combined with the introduction of new technologies for major food crops,
has resulted in a better balance of domestic effective demand and food supplies,
with comfortable stock margins in most years. Still, in terms of food adequacy
for all people, further improvements are still required as, around 1980, close to
one-third of the population could be considered to be chronically hungry.
Protection levels in agriculture are low for most products, except for
exported products in the other food and nonfood categories, which have negative
nominal rates, and for wheat and dairy products, which are increasingly pro-
tected to move toward self-sufficiency. Given these developments over past years
and the changes that came about in the level and composition of agricultural
trade, India is found in a position where its terms of trade improve with every
liberalization scenario (see Table AS.7). The improvement is particularly
marked when the OECD countries liberalize, or when all market economies do
so, whereas the scenario with liberalization by only developing countries leads to
an initial deterioration but subsequent improvement of a smaller magnitude than
in the other two scenarios.
The improvement of the terms of trade when only the developing countries
liberalize is different in nature from the improvements in the F-0ECD or F-
ALLME scenarios. In the first case, the effect of improving terms of trade on
domestic prices of agricultural products is a relative decline except for other
food. As a consequence, agricultural prices lag behind those for the nonagricul-
tural product, and parity for agricultural incomes shows a slight deterioration.
In the two other liberalization scenarios, import prices rise also by less than
export prices, but domestic prices do rise for almost all agricultural products
when the OECD countries liberalize and, at the aggregate, are at similar magni-
tude when all market economies liberalize. Parity improvement comes about
mainly because agricultural product prices increase more than nonagricultural
prices, aided to some extent by higher agricultural production volumes.
Obviously, the income distribution effects are equally contrasting. Agricul-
tural producers - notably those producing a marketable surplus - are worse off
when developing countries liberalize but the larger number of market-dependent
consumers benefits. In terms of equivalent income, there is a gain, and the same
is noted for calorie consumption per capita. The number of hungry is reduced.
With liberalization by OECD countries or by all market economies together, all
of these indicators are reversed, as the benefits appear to belong to a smaller
group of farmers who market part of their output and are more than offset by
the negative effects on consumers.
When developing countries liberalize, India's trade balance (at constant
1970 prices) initially contracts and then widens, but these changes are rather
marginal. Lower production of, and more domestic demand for, most products
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reduces exports of wheat, rice, and nonfood agricultural products; imports of
coarse grains increase substantially. However, these changes in trade are largely
offset by export increases for protein feed, other animal products, and other food.
In the two other scenarios, when the OECD countries also liberalize, the trade
deficit in agricultural products widens considerably.
AS.8. Indonesia
In spite of a rapid population growth, Indonesia was able to move gradually
toward self-sufficiency in its main staple food, rice, over the last two decades.
Policies to promote agricultural growth have generally been nonprotective and
have concentrated on reliably providing input supplies for rice-growing farmers
and on enabling farmers to buy new technologies at relatively low costs. The
achievement of the strong output growth of rice has led to increased attention on
diversifying food production, both in traditional farming regions and in parts of
the country that are gradually being opened up for agricultural production.
Agriculture is still the dominant sector of Indonesia's economy. In 1980,
agriculture employed 60% of the labor force and 35% of the total capital stock to
generate roughly one-third of the country's value added (Table 4.15). This indi-
cates li. rather low (average) labor productivity in agriculture as compared to
nonagriculture. Eighty percent of the land is cultivated by small-scale farming,
with the rest being held by large estates. Given the unequal distribution of rain-
fall over the year and its variability, it is often necessary to provide supplemen-
tary irrigation in some years and to have a well-functioning drainage system in
other years.
Indonesia does not reach self-sufficiency for any of the agricultural aggre-
gates in the reference run by 2000 (see Table AS.B). Staple food imports are sub-
sidized by the government at decreasing cost as both international prices and
volumes imported decline.
Under trade liberalization the government no longer subsidizes imports and
hence reduces the tax level. Consumption expenditures go up in spite of the fact
that the increase in value added in the liberalization scenarios is completely used
for additional capital formation. But, of course, food prices also increase. The
fact that consumption of agricultural commodities is higher when all market
economies liberalize than for the scenario in which only the developing countries
do so, although food prices are lower in the latter case, can be explained by the
difference in consumption expenditure. Consumers have less to spend in the
latter scenario, and the income effect dominates the price effect.
Equivalent income goes down when all market economies liberalize, signify-
ing a welfare loss in this scenario. It increases slightly when only developing
countries liberalize, but the other scenarios also indicate welfare losses, especially
when liberalization takes place only in OECD countries. As holds for the other
countries, changes in equivalent income are dominated by changes in the
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consumption of nonagriculture in Indonesia, although the share of expenditure
spent on food is one of the highest among all countries in the BLS.
When Indonesia participates in liberalizing agricultural trade, agricultural
prices increase and attract more resources, especially capital, into the agricul-
tural sector. When all market economies liberalize, 20% more capital is
employed in this sector by 2000; when only developing countries do so 13% more
capital is employed. The increase is so large that the capital stock goes down in
the nonagricultural sector in spite of greater total investment. However, this
decline is only marginal, and the nonagricultural GDP shrinks by a marginal
amount. GDP of agriculture increases, but proportionally less than its decrease
in the nonagricultural sector because capital, especially, has a much smaller elas-
ticity in agriculture than in nonagriculture (see Table A3.1).
In agricultural production, Indonesia switches into rice and away from
coarse grains when it liberalizes trade. The expansion of rice production is
strong enough to make Indonesia a small exporter when all market economies
liberalize. In all other scenarios rice is imported. The strongest price and pro-
duction increases concern nonfood agriculture. This is mainly due to an expan-
sion of acreage, while yield of this commodity increases by about 3%. So much
more acreage is allocated to this commodity because it has the largest improve-
ment in net revenue per hectare among all crops.
Net revenue from animals increases only modestly when developing coun-
tries liberalize, but somewhat more when all market economies liberalize,
although relatively less than the average for all crops. This is partly a result of
increasing feed costs. Therefore, animal production does not vary strongly, with
the exception of milk production. This responds with output increases exceeding
10%.
The value of agricultural production increases more than that of consump-
tion. Under trade liberalization, Indonesia improves its agricultural balance of
trade: i.e., it reduces its deficit. This shows up as lower net export of the
nonagricultural aggregate.
A3.9. Japan
Japan is a net importer of all agricultural products except other animal products.
The country still employs about 13% of its labor force in agriculture, with a con-
siderable number of part-time farmers. Even then, labor in agriculture is rela-
tively high for a country with this level of development. Agriculture contributes
only 4% to total value added. Japan's farm structure is characterized by small
farms, and average income in agriculture is one-third of that in nonagriculture.
This situation prevails in spite of the fact that Japan has the highest average
protection of agriculture among all countries included in the BLS. It is therefore
not surprising that this sector declines drastically when Japan participates in
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trade liberalization. Relatively small changes are observed in the three scenarios
for which Japan is assumed not to liberalize (see Table AS.9).
Trade liberalization leads to welfare gains in Japan as evidenced by the
increase in equivalent income. The distribution of these welfare gains is likely to
be biased in favor of those employed in nonagriculture since the parity ratio falls
exceptionally strongly. Terms of trade also worsen under trade liberalization.
Their negative impact on the whole economy is offset by a reallocation of
resources to more efficient uses: investment, especially, is shifted to the nonagri-
cultural sector. The capital stock in agriculture is reduced by more than 20% in
2000 in the scenariQs with Japan participating in liberalization. It is obvious
that Japan's agricultural self-sufficiency declines under trade liberalization.
However, the decline is less than 10%.
Production of all agricultural commodities except dairy products and other
animal products declines under trade liberalization (see Table AS.9). The latter
~ases by more than 10%. Considering only pork, poultry, and eggs (Le.,
excluding fish), this increase is about 40%. (The aggregate other animal prod-
ucts contains approximately 65% fish in the year 2000 in the reference run, the
rest being pork, poultry, and eggs; in the scenario where almost all countries
liberalize the latter reach a share of approximately 45%.) The reason for this -I::
strong increase in the output of pork, poultry, and eggs is the decline in feed
costs, which leads to an Increase In net revenue per animal and gives this aggre-
gate a strong comparative advantage. The situation is somewhat similar, but
less pronounced, for dairy products. In 1990, when labor migration out of agri-
culture is not as pronounced as in subsequent years, production of milk
increases. The reason for this is the relativp. improvement in net revenue per
dairy cow. By 2000, more labor has left agriculture, and this affects milk pro-
duction especially strongly since it coincides with a fall in the milk price. There-
fore, milk output does not change significantly by the end of the period.
Japan increasingly exports other animal products when its trade in agricul-
ture is liberalized. It ls3ble toeapiure a world marketsnareor-if>Olit-3"5%by
2000, an increase of 7 percentage points from the reference scenario. In contrast,
more dairy products have to be Imported because of higher demand.
The most drastic change in trade position concerns rice. A sizable cut in
production coincides with an equally large increase in the quantity demanded.
The fall in the rice rice is the strongest among all agricultural rices.
Imports of protein feed are a so increase su stantially under free trade.
Feed use of this commodity goes up by 50%. Since protein feed becomes sub-
stantially cheaper compared to grains, it substitutes for the latter in the feed
rations of pork, poultry, and eggs. (Feed intake of protein feed per animal unit
increases in the range between 15 and 20% for the three animal types in the
scenario where almost all market economies liberalize compared to the reference
run, while those of wheat and coarse grains decline in similar proportions). In
2000, 80% of the total feed use of protein feed is needed for the production of
pork, poultry, and eggs in the reference run. Their production increase of 40% in
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the F-ALLME scenario pushes this share up to 86%. This aggregate alone
increases the feed use of protein feed by 75%. In absolute value, this equals the
total increase in feed consumption, which has to be entirely imported because
production also goes down slightly. Protein feed consumption by ruminants does
not increase since their number of heads declines.
As can be seen from Table A9.9, Japan's trade balance changes only mod-
estly with trade liberalization (4.1% when DECD countries liberalize). To bal-
ance increasing imports of agricultural products, exports of the nonagricultural
aggregate drastically increase (by 30%).
Dne of the interesting observations with regard to Japan is that it matters
little whether all countries join in trade liberalization or only the DECD coun-
tries liberalize. The results are very similar because of the high protection that
is removed in both scenarios. Relatively speaking, the differences in world
market prices are small in both scenarios compared to the impact that the re-
moval of protection has on domestic prices.
A 3.10. Kenya
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s Kenya's economy showed one of the higher
growth rates among African nations, with agriculture having a slightly lower
growth rate than other sectors of the economy. With its high growth rate of
population, Kenya remains one of the countries with serious food problems. Its
production is very vulnerable to weather shocks, as recent years have shown.
With about 80% of the country's labor force employed in agriculture, generating
25% of GDP, and approximately one-half of the country's foreign exchange earn-
ings obtained from agricultural exports, this vulnerability extends to virtually
the entire population and economy.
Protection of agriculture has traditionally been modest, and is largely re-
stricted to wheat and dairy products. Exports such as bovine and ovine meat,
other food, and nonfood agriculture are taxed at the border. Given these trade
policies it is to be expected that the welfare indicators show positive impacts
from all trade liberalization scenarios for Kenya. The cost of consumption com-
parison is positive, the number of people hungry declines, and life expectancy
improves. Agricultural prices increase in all scenarios and agricultural GDP is
pushed up quite substantially owing to a higher capital stock (see Table A9.10).
Labor does not adjust in these scenarios. Since total investment also increases,
the nonagricultural sector expands as well, so that total value added increases
considerably in Kenya. This can even be observed for the scenario when DEeD
countries liberalize.
Higher income leads to more consumption of all commodities in all
scenarios, except when the EC liberalizes. Consumption of wheat declines mar-
ginally by 2000 in this scenario. The increase in the consumption of animal
products is particularly noticeable.
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On the production side, Kenya expands ruminant production (both meat
and dairy) and cuts back output of other animal products. This adjustment is
caused by relative price changes and, of course, the expansion of capital. Both
favor ruminant production. Dairy output increases substantially so that Kenya
becomes an exporter of this commodity. Bovine and ovine meat are also
exported at higher levels by the year 2000. Of the commodities from which
Kenya earns most of its surplus in agricultural trade in the reference run - other
food and nonfood agriculture - only other food is exported in larger quantities
when Kenya liberalizes trade. The surplus in agricultural trade (at current
prices) increases in all scenarios by 2000 and higher imports of nonagriculture
are possible. The foreign trade ratios both of the total economy and of the agri-
cultural sector increase and make Kenya a more open economy.
A3.11. Mexico
As for Brazil, which has about the same level of economic development as Mex-
ico, t.he overall growth performance of Mexico over the 1960s and 1970s has still
left more than one-third of the labor force occupied in agriculture, producing
only 8% of total GDP (see Table +.15). The rapid growth of the nonagricultural
sector has been achieved by large investments, including a substantial com-
ponent for the oil industry. This capital-intensive growth of the nonagricultural
sector restricted the absorption of labor employed in low-income agriculture. To
offset the negative equity effects of this nonagricultural-growth-oriented policy,
Mexico followed an "asset-redistribution" policy, the land reform. In spite of the
massive distribution of expropriated cultivated land and virgin land (approxi-
mately 84 million hectares over the time span from 1916 to 1976), a large-scale
farming system also developed that is very export oriented (see, for example,
Fischer et al., 1982).
Mexico's trade policies with regard to agriculture are a mix of modest pro-
tection for rice, coarse grains, bovine and ovine meat, other animals, and other
food, and mostly negative tariffs for most other agricultural products. The labor
market situation, aggravated by rapid population growth, can to some extent
explain why Mexico does not gain from trade liberalization in agriculture, either
when it participates or when only other countries liberalize. This shows up not
only in indicators like equivalent income and life expectancy but also in total
value added (see Table AS.11). With regard to hunger, the situation improves in
those scenarios in which Mexico participates in trade liberalization and
deteriorates in all others. The reason for this is that, in addition to income, the
food price index moves unfavorably when Mexico does not liberalize; income dis-
tribution between the two sectors is also heavily affected in these scenarios.
Although agricultural GDP (at constant prices) shrinks only when all developing
countries liberalize, taking migration and price changes into account farmers face
parity losses in all but the EC liberalization. These income losses are very heavy
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when Mexico itself also liberalizes because the agricultural labor force strongly
increases in these scenarios.
That more people work in agriculture in the scenarios when Mexico partici-
pates in liberalization is mainly a result of the increase in the ratio of marginal
value product of labor in agriculture to that of nonagriculture. This increase is
spurred by two factors. First, there is a price increase in animal products rela-
tive to crops, shifting resources away from crops into animal production. As a
result of this change the shadow price of acreage declines strongly. This, in turn,
increases the relative scarcity of the two other constrained inputs, labor and cap-
ital. The shadow price of labor rises proportionally much more than that of cap-
ital, which explains why more labor is attracted by agriculture in these scenarios.
The proportionally higher increase of the labor shadow price is a result of the
changes in relative prices within agriculture. The most labor-intensive com-
modity, dairy products, enjoys one of the highest price increases and, at the
same time, a relative decline of feed cost, resulting in a large increase in net reve-
nue per animal. Similar arguments can be advanced to explain the increase in
labor in the other scenarios as well.
Total investment goes down in all scenarios (see Table AS.11). This leads
to a smaller capital stock in nonagriculture in all scenarios, even in those in
which agricultural capital declines. Together with a reduced labor force in
nonagriculture, CDP declines. Agricultural CDP does not go up enough in any
of the scenarios to offset the decrease of nonagricultural CDP, resulting in a con-
traction of the whole economy.
There is a second reason why Mexico's economy shrinks. The strongest
contribution to the increase in agricultural CDP comes from the increased labor
input. However, since average labor productivity is considerably higher in
nonagriculture, total CDP declines as labor is shifted to agriculture.
The tax imposed on exports of dairy products in the reference scenario by
2000 and the relatively large increase in world dairy prices in all the scenarios
discussed here lead to a strong increase in export of this commodity. Although
this increase is from a relatively small base value, dairy products are almost the
only agricultural commodity group for which Mexico becomes increasingly an
exporter. The exceptions to this general pattern are nonfood agriculture, of
which higher quantities are also sold on the world market in all scenarios except
when the US liberalizes, and other food, when OECD countries liberalize. Mex-
ico is self-sufficient in agricultural production in the reference scenario. It
increases this self-sufficiency in all but the LDC liberalization scenario.
A 3.12. New Zealand
New Zealand is a net exporter of all agricultural products except rice. Agricul-
ture contributes 15% to total CDP, the highest percentage among the developed
market economies included in the BLS with a detailed model. Approximately
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9% of the labor force is still employed in agriculture, and 15% of the capital
stock is also in agriculture.
Farm incomes are considerably higher on average than nonfarm incomes.
These circumstances explain why New Zealand does not protect its agriculture,
except for other animal products. Seventy-four percent of all exports originate in
agriculture.
New Zealand derives quite sizable welfare gains when it liberalizes agricul-
tural trade together with other countries. Trade liberalization by the developing
countries alone brings a small welfare loss when one considers the cost of con-
sumption. In the remaining scenarios, the cost of consumption comparison
shows a small welfare gain. Value added in nonagriculture indicates only mar-
ginal changes in this sector, while the agricultural GDP shows that agriculture
must adjust substantially (see Table A9.12). These adjustments are in general
positive: Le., more capital and a larger labor force are employed. However, fer-
tilizer application is reduced. In nonagriculture, capital is substituted for labor
with no volume effects. The parity ratio increases, giving the farming commun-
ity an even more substantial income advantage over workers in nonagriculture.
When only developing countries liberalize agricultural trade, the entire
economy is negatively affected and almost all adjustments are of opposite sign,
though at lower levels, compared to the scenarios when New Zealand participates
in liberalization. Agricultural prices fall, GDP of agriculture goes down, total
value added declines, and with it investments are reduced. Labor does not
migrate at all, and both sectors of the economy operate with a smaller capital
stock.
Table A9.12 also reveals which agricultural commodities cause this rather
different outcome in F-LDC compared to the other scenarios. Ruminant prices
go up much less than in the other scenarios. The ruminant products taken
together reach a value share of nearly 70% of the total value of agricultural pro-
duction in the reference run by 2000. This indicates how much the outcome of
the agricultural sector is tied to the performance of the ruminant sector in New
Zealand. The aggregate "other animal products" is the only commodity that
obtains a relatively strong price advantage compared to the scenario in which all
market economies liberalize. However, production does not respond very much
to this increase because feed becomes more expensive.
In all other scenarios, ruminant products more or less receive the strongest
price boosts. Since grains are not used as feed supplements in New Zealand,
ruminants do not obtain an advantage from the relative decline in the prices of
feed grains. Nevertheless, ruminants show the largest production increase in
almost all other scenarios. Since demand for these products expands only
marginally, a strong increase in exports can be observed. However, New Zealand
loses some of its world market share of bovine and ovine meat in most scenarios
because of the large increase in international trade in this product. Only when
the EC liberalizes is New Zealand able to capture a higher share. In dairy prod-
ucts, the situation is just the opposite. Because global trade in most cases does
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not expand as strongly as that of bovine and ovine meat, New Zealand increases
its share in world net exports in 2000.
A3.13. Nigeria
Nigeria placed emphasis on developing its oil industry during the 19608 and
19708, neglecting somewhat its agricultural sector output, which appears to have
declined over this period. Although there is some uncertainty about the reliabil-
ity of the data, corroborating evidence can be obtained from trade statistics.
The importance of oil for Nigeria's economy affected incomes, prices, and
the exchange rate in ways detrimental to agriculture and in favor of food imports
at low prices. Nominal protection for most grains and animal products appears
high but is to a large extent compensated by equally high protection of the
nonagricultural sector and by an overvalued exchange rate. Export taxes on pro-
tein feed, other food, and nonfood agriculture seem to be small but are, for the
same reason, prohibitive.
The most favorable scenario for Nigeria is when the OECD countries
liberalize their agricultural trade, since this scenario gives the highest gain in
equivalent income (see Table AS.1S). This is obtained because of a large increase
in total value added and in spite of a worsening of the terms of trade and
increases in food prices. It is very important for Nigeria which other countries
join in the trade liberalization. When all market economies liberalize, the coun-
try gains in welfare; when the developing countries liberalize, it loses. Negative
changes occur in both these scenarios with regard to the terms of trade, food
price index, and value added. The latter only increases when Nigeria itself does
not liberalize but other countries do. This is easily explained because these
scenarios are the only ones in which Nigeria increases resource use in agriculture,
especially the use of capital as the country invests more. Cultivated area and
fertilizer use increase as well. The agricultural sector expands considerably in
these scenarios, although prices improve only moderately. According to the
results shown in Table AS.1S, however, agricultural GDP responds differentially.
A positive price change leads to a strong response whereas even a strong price
decline is followed by only a slight decline in agricultural GDP. This reflects the
lack of opportunities in the nonagricultural sector in Nigeria. Resources respond
strongly to a price increase by moving into agriculture, and very sluggishly to a
price decline by not moving out proportionally.
Production of all agricultural goods is negatively affected under trade
liberalization, with the exception of other food (which has a high share of coffee
in Nigeria) and protein feed - the two commodities with a domestic price below
the world market price in the reference run. Feed concentrates are used only as
supplements in Nigeria. The price decline of grains, therefore, does not improve
net revenue from animals. Herd sizes are not cut back as much as the crop land
1M Impact 01 TrotU LA6eralimtlon from the Country Per,pedill£ 301
for wheat and coarse grains. Among crops, wheat, which is of small importance
in Nigeria, shows the largest response.
The demand changes resemble somewhat those in Indonesia. All agricul-
tural commodities are consumed at higher levels except other food, which is con-
sumed slightly less. It is worth noting that milk and rice are bought at consider-
ably higher levels in the scenarios where Nigeria participates in liberalization.
Nonagricultural consumption goes down in both these scenarios, but much more
so in F-LDC.
A 3.14. Pakistan
Compared to India, Pakistan has enjoyed the advantage of a much larger share
of cultivated land being irrigated. Significant improvements have been made in
water control systems, and their capacity has been increased over the years, pro-
viding an excellent opportunity to introduce new crop varieties and technologies
and increasing production. Thus, agricultural production in Pakistan grew at an
average rate of 5% per year during the 1960s and at 2.5% per year during the
1970s. The excellent performance in the early period resulted from the introduc-
tion of high-yielding varieties of wheat along with increased use of fertilizer,
expansion of irrigation, and extension of acreage. In the second period, a wors-
ening of the domestic terms of trade for agriculture, combined with the fact that
scope for expansion of acreage and irrigation was reduced, led to a slowdown in
agricultural growth. The high growth of agriculture during the 1960s has not
yielded a favorable food situation for all. The country is still poor (it ranks in
the lower third with regard to income per capita - see Table 4.16), and approxi-
mately 10% of the population is counted as being hungry.
The agricultural sector employs 50% of the country's labor force but
contributes only 28% to total GDP. Pakistan's protection is similar to that of
Egypt. Grains and animal products receive protection, but exports of other food
and nonfood agriculture are taxed.
Equivalent income increases in all scenarios in Pakistan, but welfare
improves most when the country itself also liberalizes agricultural trade (see
Table A3.14). In terms of equivalent income, no other country shows percentage
gains from trade liberalization as large as those for Pakistan. What makes it
gain so much? The gains are due mainly to increases in total value added and,
to a much lesser extent, in trade deficit. Comparison of the results of the
different scenarios shows that changes in the terms of trade do not seem to have
a strong impact on these welfare gains.
When the country participates in trade liberalization, the agricultural price
index falls compared to nonagriculture. Labor and capital are reallocated to the
nonagriculture sector. Total GDP increases owing to an increase in nonagricul-
tural GDP, which more than offsets the decline in agricultural GDP. Increase in
302 Toward Free Trade in Agriculture
total investment is not the only explanation for the rise in GDP because it
increases much less when developing countries liberalize than when all market
economies do so. The increase in total GDP is even slightly higher in F-LDC
than in F-ALLME because more labor and investment are shifted to nonagricul-
ture. Both inputs have a somewhat higher GDP elasticity in nonagriculture than
in agriculture (see Table A9.1).
Compared to its per capita income, Pakistan is engaged in a large trade
with other countries. When only developing countries liberalize, this ratio of
trade to GDP decreases, whereas it increases under liberalization by all market
economies. This follows the changes in the terms of trade, which improve in the
latter scenario and worsen in the former. The foreign trade ratio of agriculture
increases in both scenarios, but the increase is not always due to the same com-
modities. When all market economies liberalize, more wheat and less bovine and
ovine meat are exported and fewer dairy products are imported than in the more
restrictive scenario when only LDCs liberalize. In general, the agricultural trade
pattern changes significantly between these two scenarios. But nonagriculture
also shows such changes. Again, a higher import of nonagriculture is made pos-
sible - in spite of a lower overall trade deficit - when all market economies
liberalize than when only developing countries do so, because the agricultural
trade deficit (at current prices) increases much less.
Behind these changes in trade are, of course, alterations in production
and/or demand. On the production side, the difference in wheat output is espe-
cially noticeable. Owing to the strong price and net revenue increase when all
market economies liberalize, more wheat is produced in this scenario. It is mainly
the price responsiveness of its yield that changes Pakistan's comparative advan-
tage in wheat so drastically. A higher price leads to a relatively large increase in
yield and also in net revenue. Therefore, more acreage is allocated to this com-
modity.
All animal production is reduced in both scenarios, and dairy production
especially so when the developing countries liberalize. Since, at the same time,
demand for dairy products increases strongly in this scenario, Pakistan's imports
increase by 70%. Rather substantially increased human consumption is also
found for rice, for other animal products, and for nonagriculture.
A 3.15. Thailand
Thailand's performance in agricultural production over the last 20 years has
been remarkable. Agricultural output has increased annually by about 5% over
this period. In the early years of the period, additional land was brought under
cultivation. Later, the country had to shift to more intensive land use. A labor
share of nearly 80% was absorbed by agriculture in the early 1980s, but only
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20% of total value added came from this sector. More than half of export earn-
ings originate from agriculture. The country has been able to respond well to
changes in international market conditions by adjusting its exports and the
structure of production.
Agricultural incomes are unequally distributed between the richer Central
Plains and the hilly regions, particularly the densely populated Northeast.
About 15% of the population is still counted as hungry. Agricultural commodi-
ties are taxed at the border when they are exported. The two exceptions to this
rule are wheat and dairy products, of which Thailand is a net importer and of
which the latter is taxed.
The aggregate "other food" plays an important role in Thailand for future
earnings of foreign exchange. In the year 2000 in the reference scenario, 76% of
total export earnings is obtained from exporting this commodity. About 40% of
production is exported in that year (see Table A9.15). It is therefore important
for Thailand how the relative world market price of this commodity changes. In
the scenarios in which Thailand participates in liberalization, this price drops by
3%-6%. The impact on the terms of trade amounts to a modest gain when all
market economies liberalize and a nearly 5% fall when only developing countries
follow a policy of trade liberalization.
These scenarios also indicate different impacts on domestic prices and, with
that, on resource allocation, total investment, and fertilizer use. These
differential changes show up in the form of varying responses of sectoral value
added, although total value added is almost of the same magnitude in both
scenarios. However, based on welfare considerations, Thailand is better off when
all market economies liberalize rather than when only the developing countries
do so. The cost-of-consumption comparison shows a rather positive impact for
F-ALLME but a small loss for F-LDC. The number of people hungry also
reveals that liberalization by all market economies yields results that are prefer-
able for Thailand compared to a liberalization by only developing countries. This
occurs in spite of the relatively larger increase in the food price index when all
market economies liberalize.
Table A9.15 offers some additional insight into why such differences in wel-
fare changes show up. The demand for the nonagricultural commodity declines
substantially in F-LDC compared to F-ALLME. Movements of the food price
index, which goes up less with LDC-liberalization, would suggest the opposite
result, but the worsening of the terms of trade actually reduces the income when
international prices are used for this comparison.
In all other scenarios - Le., in those in which Thailand is not pursuing
trade liberalization - it gains in small amounts. The income distribution is also
affected in some of the scenarios, especially when Thailand liberalizes. In these
cases, the farming community obtains much higher incomes, which exceed the
rise of agricultural prices.
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A 3.16. Turkey
Toward Free Trade in Agriculture
Turkey belongs to the lower part of the middle-income country group (see Table
4.16). Agriculture makes up 20% of the total economy in terms of GDP but
employs more than 50% of the labor force. The income parity ratio is rather
low, indicating that an agricultural employee earns less than one-third of what a
nonagricultural worker earns. Turkey trades relatively less with the outside
world, but agricultural exports are important for foreign exchange earnings.
This rather autarkic economy has been designed by policy and is not a result of
lack of opportunities since large markets are within reach, both in Europe and
the Middle East.
This characteristic is also to be found when one considers the protective
system, which consists of a relatively high import barrier for grains, high protec-
tion for the dairy industry, and almost no barriers for other food and nonfood
agriculture.
The country gains when it liberalizes agricultural trade but, as can be
expected from the low trade levels, does not benefit from freer trade pursued
only by other countries. The gains occur in spite of a worsening of the terms of
trade in those scenarios in which the country participates in liberalization. How-
ever, total value added increases in both these scenarios because of a reallocation
of labor and capital in favor of the nonagricultural sector (see Table A9.16).
Both capital and labor have a higher GDP elasticity in the nonagricultural sector
than in agriculture (see Table 9.1). Although the total capital stock goes down
slightly, given the higher elasticities in nonagriculture, the resource shift is
sufficient to increase total GDP. The decline in agricultural prices that causes
this reallocation also leads to lower fertilizer application and to less land being
cultivated.
In addition, the decline of agricultural prices causes the food price index to
go down. This stimulates consumption of agricultural commodities. Almost all
of these commodities are consumed at higher levels in both scenarios in which
Turkey participates in liberalization, with the exception of wheat and coarse
grains, when only developing countries liberalize. Demand for nonagriculture
also goes up as a result of the increase in income.
The changes in Turkey's agricultural production are similar in both these
scenarios. Wheat and coarse grains production remain almost unchanged, while
outputs of the other crops are reduced. This cannot be explained by a change in
relative prices (see Table A9.16). However, the opportunity costs of land fall
drastically (more than 50% by 2000 when all market economies liberalize), rais-
ing the comparative advantages of wheat and coarse grains. The reduction in
the agricultural labor force also gives advantage to these products since they
have the lowest labor intensity.
Animal production is reduced by approximately 14-23%. The decline in
grain prices does not help much to improve their profitability because only small
amounts of feed concentrates are used in Turkey. The relative increase in the
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scarcity of labor and capital affects animal production in general more than it
does grain production, especially production of bovine and ovine meat, which
declines in spite of a relatively small price decline. However, this reduction is
also affected by the smaller herd size of dairy cattle under trade liberalization
since a rather high share of beef production in Turkey comes from culling dairy
cows. This affects beef output as well.
The agricultural trade balance worsens in both the scenarios in which Tur-
key participates in liberalization. The surplus Turkey has in the reference run is
lost to the extent of 57% when all market economies liberalize and 81% when all
developing countries pursue this policy. Therefore, Turkey's Imports of nonagri-
cultural commodities have to be cut. The increase in the total trade deficit
offsets only a small part of the worseiiThg of the agricultural trade surplus.
A3.17. USA
The USA is a major supplier of agricultural products to the world market. This
strong export performance is possible because of vast natural resources available
for agricultural production. Incomes in agriculture are comparable with those in
other sectors of the economy since only a small part of the total labor force is
occupied in agriculture. The share of agricultural labor in total labor is less than
the share of agriculture in total GDP.
For most agricultural products no protection is given. Meat, dairy prod-
ucts, and some commodities of the aggregates other food and nonfood agriculture
(e.g., sugar) are protected, but not at high rates with the exception of dairy
products.
The USA benefits from trade liberalization as a comparison of consumption
costs reveals. These gains occur not only when the USA liberalizes agricultural
trade but also when other countries pursue these policies. Under EC trade
liberalization, however, the picture is not as clear because only negligibly small
improvements are indicated.
In general, the trade liberalization scenarios discussed here lead to lower
average agricultural prices, EC liberalization being the only exception (see Table
A9.17). This, in turn, lowers food prices in all scenarios except those when only
other countries liberalize. Human consumption of both agricultural and nonagri-
cultural goods increases simultaneously in most scenarios. Only in the F-EC or
F-USA scenarios are the changes in human consumption of opposite sign. Com-
paring the changes in aggregate human consumption with aggregate supply, one
finds that human consumption is more affected by trade liberalization than is
supply.
In spite of the lower prices in agriculture, value added in this sector
increases in all scenarios except when the USA itself liberalizes. There is a shift
in production when either all market economies or all OECD countries liberalize.
Production increases occur for wheat and coarse grains and for bovine and ovine
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meat. The most noticeable change occurs in milk production because of a rela-
tively strong price decline leading to a cut in production of more than 10%. The
USA becomes an importer of this commodity. On the other hand, exports of
wheat and coarse grains increase. The USA dominates the coarse grain trade in
this scenario even more than in the reference scenario. Its world market share
increases from 75% in the reference scenario to above 90% in the year 2000 when
all market economies liberalize.
When the USA is the only country to liberalize trade, there is no strong
increase in grain production. All other commodities are also produced in about
the same quantities as in the reference scenario with the exception of dairy prod-
ucts and nonfood agricultural products, which are produced less by 12% and 8%,
respectively. Under trade liberalization by the developing countries and the EC,
dairy production goes up.
Changes in human consumption of agricultural commodities are also quite
pronounced when the USA liberalizes. The lower prices of bovine and ovine
meat lead to 16% more consumption, while dairy products are consumed in 9%
larger quantities.
A3.18. The EC
The CAP of the EC replaced in 1964 the market regulations of its then six
member countries by a joint price and intervention system. At that time the EC
was a net importer of agricultural products, with dairy products the main excep-
tion. The CAP's objectives of stable prices and regular supplies for consumers
and fair incomes for farmers compared to those prevailing in the nonagricultural
sector are pursued through price settings, intervention purchases, and border
levies. With this system the internal markets of the major agricultural products
are regulated in a community that now includes twelve member nations.
The relatively high agricultural prices in the EC together with the intro-
duction of new technologies have stimulated rapid growth of its agriculture and
increasing self-sufficiency. The more recent past is characterized by large expen-
ditures for intervention buying, storage, and subsidized sales both to internal
and outside markets. New policy designs are being discussed to curb production
growth and to achieve a better internal balance in physical as well as financial
terms.
The EC shows gains from trade liberalization in all scenarios. Equivalent
income increases by less than 0.5%, and all the other welfare indicators show
positive signs (see Table A3.18). Yet, not everyone is likely to benefit from these
welfare gains. Those who make their living from agriculture may lose in all
scenarios, including the EC liberalization, because their income goes down. A
redistributive income policy could offset or at least dampen this effect.
Under trade liberalization, the EC uses less land and its capital stock is
lower. Total labor remains constant across all scenarios. However, total GDP
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increases in all scenarios, except when the USA alone liberalizes. This indicates
that average productivity goes up. The improvement is caused by a shift of
labor from agriculture into nonagriculture where it has a substantially higher
GDP elasticity (see Table 9.1).
Total investment declines in the EC when trade is liberalized because sav-
ings do not increase enough to compensate for the relative increase in the
nonagricultural price. The reduction of factor inputs in agriculture is caused by
the shift of the domestic terms of trade in favor of nonagriculture.
Table A9.18 summarizes the major adjustments that take place in the agri-
cultural sector. Production of milk is reduced by only about 11% when the EC
liberalizes trade because its real protection rate is relatively low. Since wheat
prices fall in most scenarios more than the prices of coarse grains, output of
wheat is reduced and coarse grains output increased. As a result, the EC virtu-
ally ceases to export wheat and buys increasingly less coarse grain on the world
market. Coarse grains is the only product for which the EC expands production
under trade liberalization.
The value of agricultural imports increases by 45% when all market
economies liberalize in the year 2000. This is the result of fewer exports of
temperate-zone food products and more imports of commodities from LDCs,
both other food and nonfood agriculture.
Note
The abbreviations used in Tables A9.1-A9.18 refer to the following:
GOP70, GOP at 1970 prices (106 US$); GOPA70, GDP of agriculture sector at
1970 prices (106 US$); GOPNA70, GOP of nonagriculture sector at 1970 prices (106
US$); AG vol. index WP70, volume index of agricultural production weighted with 1970
world market prices (1970 = 1); Trade deficit 70, trade deficit at 1970 ~rices (106 US$);
AG trade deficit 70, deficit in agricultural trade at 1970 prices (10 US$); Invest-
ment, investment at 1970 prices (106 US$); Total capital, capital stock at 1970 prices
(106 US$); Agricultural capital, capital stock in agriculture (106 US$); Agricultural
labor, labor force in agriculture (thousand people); PA/PN, agricultural price index rela-
tive to nonagriculture price index; Food price index, index of food retail prices (1970 =
1); Terms of trade, index of unit value of exports over index of unit value of imports
(1970 = 1); Parity, agricultural GOP per person engaged in agriculture divided by
nonagricultural GDP per person engaged in nonagriculture; Equivalent income, income
required to buy a consumption bundle at domestic prices of 1970 that would provide the
same utility as provided by current consumption (1970 US$ per capita); Calories/capita,
energy intake from average diet (kcal per capita per day).
Commodity units of measurement are 106 t for wheat, rice, coarse grains, bovine
and ovine meat, and dairy products, 106 t protein equivalent for other animal products
and protein feed, and 109 US$ 1970 for all other commodities.
Commodity prices are in 109 US$ per unit of commodity.
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APPENDIX A4
Countries and Groupings
(1) Countries represented by a model with common structure:
(a) Developed market economies: Australia, Austria, Canada, Japan,
New Zealand, the EC (as the countries of the EC have integrated
economies, they are modeled as one country).
(b) Developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya,
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey.
(2) Countries represented by a model with specific structure: China, the
CMEA, India, the USA (as the countries of the CMEA have integrated
economies, they are modeled as one country).
(3) Simplified country grouping models:
(a) Africa:
Oil exporters: Algeria, Angola, Congo, Gabon.
Medium income/calorie exporters: Ghana, Ivory Coast, Senegal,
Cameroon, Mauritius, Zimbabwe.
Medium income/calorie importers: Morocco, Tunisia, Liberia,
Mauritania, Zambia.
Low income/calorie exporters: Benin, Gambia, Togo, Ethiopia,
Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda, Sudan.
Low income/calorie importers: Guinea, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone,
Upper Volta, Central African Republic, Chad, Zaire, Burundi,
Madagascar, Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania.
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(b) Latin America:
High income/calorie exporters: Costa Rica, Panama, Cuba, Dom-
inican Republic, Ecuador, Surinam, Uruguay.
High income/calorie importers: Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago,
Chile, Peru, Venezuela.
Medium-low income: EI Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nica-
ragua, Colombia, Guyana, Paraguay, Haiti, Bolivia.
(c) Far East Asia:
High-medium income/calorie exporters: Malaysia, Philippines.
High-medium income/calorie importers: Republic of Korea, Laos,
Vietnam, Korea DPR, Kampuchea.
Low income: Nepal, Burma, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh.
(d) Near East Asia:
Oil exporters/high income: Libya, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus,
Lebanon, Syria.
Medium-low income: Jordan, Yemen Arab Republic, People's Demo-
cratic Republic of Yemen, Afghanistan.
(e) Rest of the world:
Developed countries:
Albania, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, South Africa, Greenland, Hong
Kong, Israel, Singapore, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, San Mar-
ino.
Developing countries:
Africa: Botswana, British Indian Territory, Cape Verde, Comoros,
Equatorial Guinea, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Namibia,
Reunion, St Helena, Sao Tome, Seychelles, Spanish North Africa,
Swaziland, Western Sahara.
Central America: Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda,
Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Martinique,
Montserrat, Netherland Antilles, Panama Canal Zone, Puerto
Rico, St Kitts-Nevis, St Lucia, St Pierre and Miquelon, St Vin-
cent, Turks and Caicos, Virgin Islands (UK), Virgin Islands
(USA).
South America: Falkland Islands, French Guinea.
Asia: Bahrain, Bhutan, Brunei, East Timor, Gaza Strip, Kuwait,
Macau, Maldives, Mongolia, Oman, Qatar, Sikkim, United Arab
Emirates.
Europe: Andorra, Faeroe Islands, Gibraltar, Vatican City.
Countriu and Grouping3 347
Oceania: American Samoa, Canton and Enderbury Islands, Christ-
mas Island, Cocos Islands, Cook Island, Fiji, French Polynesia,
Gilbert Islands, Guam, Johnston Island, Midway Islands, Nauru,
New Caledonia, New Hebrides, Niue Islands, Norfolk Islands, Pa-
cific Islands, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn, Samoa, Solomon
Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Wake Island, Wallis and Futuna
Islands.
The results are often aggregated in different ways for presentation. These
aggregations are defined below. The numbers and the names given in the first
column refer to country codes used in the computer program. Aggregation
designated with a * include only those countries of the group for which an ex-
plicit national model exists in the BLS.
Group 1: OEeD
10 Australia
11 Austria
33 Canada
110 Japan
156 New Zealand
231 USA
888 EC
916 Rest World
australia
austria
canada
japan
new zealand
united states
ec
remaining countries
Group 2: D.M. Econ. - Developed Market Economies
10 Australia australia
11 Austria austria
33 Canada canada
110 Japan japan
156 New Zealand new zealand
231 USA united states
888 EC ec
916 Rest World remaining countries
Group 9: D.M. Econ. '"
10 Australia
11 Austria
33 Canada
110 Japan
156 New Zealand
231 USA
888 EC
australia
austria
canada
japan
new zealand
united states
ec
348
Group -4: CMEA
777 CMEA
Group 5: Mid Income
9 Argentina
21 Brazil
138 Mexico
901 AFR Oil Exp
906 LAM H CAL Ex
907 LAM H CAL 1m
912 NEA Oil Exp
Group 6: Low-Mid Inc
59 Egypt
101 Indonesia
114 Kenya
159 Nigeria
216 Thailand
223 Turkey
902 AFR M CAL Ex
903 AFR M CAL 1m
908 LAM LM
909 FEA MH CAL Ex
910 FEA MH CAL 1m
Group 7: Low Income
41 China
100 India
165 Pakistan
904 AFR L CAL Ex
905 AFR L CAL 1m
911 FEA LOW
913 NEA LM
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cmea
argentina
brazil
mexico
africa, oil exporters
latin america, high income/calorie exporters
latin america, high income/calorie importers
near east asia, oil exporters, high income
egypt
indonesia
kenya
nigeria
thailand
turkey
africa, medium income/calorie exporters
africa, medium income/calorie importers
latin america, low-medium income
far east asia, medium-high income calorie exporters
far east asia, medium-high income calorie importers
china (exc. taiwan)
india
pakistan
africa, low income/calorie exporters
africa, low income/calorie importers
far east asia, low income
near east asia, low-medium income
Group 8: Low Income w/o China
100 India india
165 Pakistan pakistan
904 AFR L CAL Ex africa, low income/calorie exporters
905 AFR L CAL 1m africa, low income/calorie importers
911 FEA LOW far east asia, low income
913 NEA LM near east asia, low-medium income
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Group Y: Developing
9
21
41
59
100
101
114
138
159
165
216
223
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
Argentina
Brazil
China
Egypt
India
Indonesia
Kenya
Mexico
Nigeria
Pakistan
Thailand
Turkey
AFR Oil Exp
AFR M CAL Ex
AFR M CAL 1m
AFR L CAL Ex
AFR L CAL 1m
LAM H CAL Ex
LAM H CAL 1m
LAMLM
FEA MH CAL Ex
FEA MH CAL 1m
FEA LOW
NEA Oil Exp
NEALM
argentina
brazil
china (exc. taiwan)
egypt
india
indonesia
kenya
mexico
nigeria
pakistan
thailand
turkey
africa, oil exporters
africa, medium income/calorie exporters
africa, medium income/calorie importers
africa, low income/calorie exporters
africa, low income/calorie importers
latin america, high income/calorie exporters
latin america, high income/calorie importers
latin america, low-medium income
far east asia, medium-high income calorie exporters
far east asia, medium-high income calorie importers
far east asia, low income
near east asia, oil exporters, high income
near east asia, low-medium income
Group 10: Developing w/o China
9 Argentina
21 Brazil
59 Egypt
100 India
101 Indonesia
114 Kenya
138 Mexico
159 Nigeria
165 Pakistan
216 Thailand
223 Turkey
901 AFR Oil Exp
902 AFR M CAL Ex
903 AFR M CAL 1m
904 AFR L CAL Ex
905 AFR L CAL 1m
argentina
brazil
egypt
india
indonesia
kenya
mexico
nigeria
pakistan
thailand
turkey
africa, oil exporters
africa, medium income/calorie exporters
africa, medium income/calorie importers
africa, low income/calorie exporters
africa, low income/calorie importers
350
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
LAM H CAL Ex
LAM H CAL 1m
LAMLM
FEA MH CAL Ex
FEA MH CAL 1m
FEA LOW
NEA Oil Exp
NEA LM
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latin america, high income/calorie exporters
latin america, high income/calorie importers
latin america, low-medium income
far east asia, medium-high income calorie exporters
far east asia, medium-high income calorie importers
far east asia, low income
near east asia, oil exporters, high income
near east asia, low-medium income
Group 11: Mid Income *
9 Argentina argentina
21 Brazil brazil
138 Mexico mexico
Group 12: Low-Mid Inc *
59 Egypt egypt
101 Indonesia indonesia
114 Kenya kenya
159 Nigeria nigeria
216 Thailand thailand
223 Turkey turkey
Group 19: Low Income *
41 China china (exc. taiwan)
100 India india
165 Pakistan pakistan
Group 1,-1: Developing*
9 Argentina argentina
21 Brazil brazil
41 China china (exc. taiwan)
59 Egypt egypt
100 India india
101 Indonesia indonesia
114 Kenya kenya
138 Mexico mexico
159 Nigeria nigeria
165 Pakistan pakistan
216 Thailand thailand
223 Turkey turkey
Countrie. and Groupil1fl
Group 15: Developing w/o China *
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9 Argentina
21 Brazil
59 Egypt
100 India
101 Indonesia
114 Kenya
138 Mexico
159 Nigeria
165 Pakistan
216 Thailand
223 Turkey
Group 16: China
41 China
argentina
brazil
egypt
india
indonesia
kenya
mexico
nigeria
pakistan
thailand
turkey
china (exc. taiwan)
Group 17: Lprot OECD - Low protected OECD
10 Australia australia
33 Canada canada
156 New Zealand new zealand
231 USA united states
Group 18: Hprot OECD - High protected OECD
11 Austria austria
110 Japan japan
888 EC ec
916 Rest World remaining countries
Group 19: Hprot OECD*
11 Austria
110 Japan
888 EC
Group 20: 901 - 919
901 AFR Oil Exp
902 AFR M CAL Ex
903 AFR M CAL 1m
904 AFR L CAL Ex
905 AFR L CAL 1m
906 LAM H CAL Ex
907 LAM H CAL 1m
908 LAM LM
909 FEA MH CAL Ex
910 FEA MH CAL 1m
austria
japan
ec
africa, oil exporters
africa, medium income/calorie exporters
africa, medium income/calorie importers
africa, low income/calorie exporters
africa, low income/calorie importers
latin america, high income/calorie exporters
latin america, high income/calorie importers
latin america, low-medium income
far east asia, medium-high income calorie exporters
far east asia, medium-high income calorie importers
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911 FEA LOW
912 NEA Oil Exp
913 NEA LM
Group /!1: 916
916 Rest World
Group /!/!: World Total
9 Argentina
10 Australia
11 Austria
21 Brazil
33 Canada
41 China
59 Egypt
100 India
101 Indonesia
110 Japan
114 Kenya
138 Mexico
156 New Zealand
159 Nigeria
165 Pakistan
216 Thailand
223 Turkey
231 USA
777 CMEA
888 EC
901 AFR Oil Exp
902 AFR M CAL Ex
903 AFR M CAL 1m
904 AFR L CAL Ex
905 AFR L CAL 1m
906 LAM H CAL Ex
907 LAM H CAL 1m
908 LAM LM
909 FEA MH CAL Ex
910 FEA MH CAL 1m
911 FEA LOW
912 NEA Oil Exp
913 NEA LM
916 Rest World
999 Discrepancy
far east asia, low income
near east asia, oil exporters, high income
near east asia, low-medium income
remaining countries
argentina
australia
austria
brazil
canada
china (exc. taiwan)
egypt
india
indonesia
japan
kenya
mexico
new zealand
nigeria
pakistan
thailand
turkey
united states
cmea
ec
africa, oil exporters
africa, medium income/calorie exporters
africa, medium income/calorie importers
africa, low income/calorie exporters
africa, low income/calorie importers
latin america, high income/calorie exporters
latin america, high income/calorie importers
latin america, low-medium income
far east asia, medium-high income calorie exporters
far east asia, medium-high income calorie importers
far east asia, low income
near east asia, oil exporters, high income
near east asia, low-medium income
remaining countries
statistical discrepancy
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While malnutrition and hunger are endemic in many countries, the world's granar-
ies are bursting with nearly 400 million tons of surplus grain. For rational domestic
reasons, national governments support their beleaguered agricultural sectors.
Collectively they spend upward of $120 billion a year perpetuating excess pro-
duction and compounding the problem of what to do with the surplus. The sum of
national policies has been global mayhem. Protecting domestic markets while
off-loading surpluses onto world markets at subsidized prices has wrought havoc
with the world food trade.
In all this, the only consensus is that something now has to be done to bring san-
ity to the World food situation - the only question is what? The debate centers on
liberalizing World agricultural trade but there are major uncertainties which com-
pound the problems of securing politically acceptable solutions: who will gain,
who might lose and how might the losers be compensated?
This book reports the findings of a major IIASA study on the likely outcomes for
different countries of a range of trade liberalization scenarios. The emphasis on
distributional as well as on overall effects represents a relevant and timely con-
tribution to the resolution of the current crisis.
ISBN 90-247-3632-3
